As international norms have proliferated, theorists have debated whether sovereign states respect them as binding legal mandates or as moral standards that are subordinated to political interests. Since World War II, the United Nations and regional human rights organizations have adopted treaties limiting the use of capital punishment. The Council of Europe's 47 members have abolished the death penalty and seek to establish a universal norm against capital punishment.
Challenging the realist paradigm, Sangmin Bae theorizes that international norms have persuaded state leaders to abolish capital punishment despite considerable public support for the death penalty. She tests her thesis by examining four states—two abolitionist countries, Ukraine and post-apartheid South Africa; a retentionist great power, the United States; and her own country, South Korea, which has had a moratorium in effect since 1998. In addition to international regimes, Bae also considers the importance of public opinion and grassroots movements, elite leadership, crime rates, social inequality, radical political transformation, and the degree of centralized government.
Bae's work seeks to answer several important questions. When do states decide to abolish the death penalty? Have international human rights norms promoted abolition in states that derive no security or material gain from the reform? How have states that abolished capital punishment made that decision?
Following its separation from the Soviet Union, newly independent Ukraine experienced a significant increase in violent crime and became a global leader in executions. A year after joining the Council of Europe, Ukraine carried out 167 executions, ranking second in the world after China. In reaction, the Parliamentary Assembly and Council of Ministers both demanded ratification of Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights banning capital punishment.
Faced with a combination of threats and exhortation, Ukrainian elites defied public opinion and banned capital punishment. The government conducted the last European execution in 1997, the Constitutional Court found capital punishment unconstitutional in 1999, and within three months the Parliament removed the death penalty from the criminal code. Bae concludes: “Ukraine's case was less voluntary, less norm-based, in that the decision to abolish the death penalty came as a response to the coercive persuasion of the Council of Europe, and not as a normative change” (p. 38).
In seeking to explain why states “comply” with the international “norm” against capital punishment, why does Bae rule out coercive enforcement by a regional human rights regime? The book's introductory chapter identifies international “standards” found in human rights treaties that become legally binding on states that ratify. Her conclusion about Ukraine only makes sense if by “norm” she means a moral standard with persuasive authority that is less binding than a legal mandate, and by “comply” she means to acquiesce without any pressure or coercion.
The case study of South Africa illustrates a voluntary adoption of the moral norm against capital punishment in a second country with considerable public support for the death penalty. During the apartheid regime, white minority rulers regularly executed black dissidents. Freedom fighters in the African National Congress led by Nelson Mandela opposed all executions. Shortly after the country's first democratic elections, South Africa's new constitutional court ruled the death penalty unconstitutional. South Africa's centralized political structure, like Ukraine's unitary system, enabled the court to change national policy with a single unanimous decision.
As a result, South Africa became an outlier on a continent where states overwhelmingly approved the death penalty. In the absence of pressure from an international regime, Bae identifies radical domestic political transformation as the decisive variable. As in Ukraine, abolition imposed by elite leaders triggered a public backlash. Despite calls for resumption of the death penalty as violent crime increased dramatically, the leadership maintained the ban.
Liberal democracies confront the Madisonian dilemma of balancing majority rule with minority rights. Public opinion polls show fluctuating support for capital punishment, but a majority consistently favors the death penalty. Bae offers compelling social science evidence to demonstrate that, contrary to public opinion, executions do not deter crime. She concludes that public support for execution is shallow and notes that only four states reinstituted the death penalty. Ultimately, Bae praises elites socialized by international norms for courageous leadership in defending human rights against the shortsighted majority. Countermajoritarian policies are essential in a liberal democracy that respects minority rights and civil liberties.
Bae treats South Korea as a case of weak compliance based on a moratorium that continues despite unsuccessful efforts at legislative reform. Following years of authoritarian rule, South Koreans elected as president Kim Dae-jung, who as a political prisoner had served time on death row. As in South Africa, internal leadership disregarded public opinion in a country with weak abolitionist organizations. Political change was more incremental than South Africa's radical transformation and, unlike Ukraine, South Korea's neighbors lead the world in executions.
Bae explains U.S. exceptionalist support for capital punishment as the result of its decentralized political system and political leaders' subservience to public opinion. She fails to note the U.S. dualist approach to international law, which treats human rights treaties as nonself-executing. European monists incorporate international norms into national law without implementing legislation.
The book's effort to explain norm compliance falls short by failing to clarify the distinction between moral and legal norms. Executions of mentally competent adults in the United States do not violate an international legal norm since the government has never ratified a treaty provision that bans capital punishment. Europeans have pressed the United States to abolish capital punishment by challenging its departure from a prerequisite norm for observer status at the Council of Europe and by refusing to extradite without assurances that no death sentence will be imposed. Norm compliance as Bae applies that concept would also constitute legal norm development if the United States added its authority by abolishing capital punishment.
Bae's four case studies are instructive, and her valuable analysis of abolition in Europe extends far beyond the confines of Ukraine. Her effort to offer broad generalizations is nevertheless based on too small a sample to be reliable. All four cases are so unique that the countries selected may or may not be representative of the class of abolitionist, moratorium, and retentionist states they may be presumed to represent. Although her evidence does not fully support the conclusion that enlightened leaders act on principle rather than political calculus, Bae's work makes a worthy contribution to the ongoing debate.
