This themed section focuses on the political and social policy discourses of resurgent welfare chauvinism and identity politics in contemporary Europe. The populist radical right, in particular, has utilised these discourses to great effect, reframing social policy and social citizenship through a heady mix of arguments evoking the nation state and ethnicity, often contemporaneously. Although the explanations for the outcome of the referendum on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, or Brexit, cannot be distilled to any single issue or cause, it is also impossible to deny the relevance of social policy to the outcome. For example, vote choice in the referendum was influenced by factors such as education levels and levels of labour market vulnerability (Reference HoboltHobolt, 2016), ultimately dovetailing with the well-known thesis about globalisation's ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Reference Kitschelt and McGannKitschelt & McGann, 1995; Reference MuddeMudde, 2007; Reference RydgrenRydgren, 2007; Kriesi et al., Reference Kriesi, Grande, Dolezal, Helbling, Hoglinger, Hutter and Wuest2012) and the structural failures of post-industrial economies to stop growing inequality.
Whilst it might be easier to see Brexit through the lens of British exceptionalism (Reference AshAsh, 2001) and as the result of unique circumstances of little concern to the EU more broadly, this would be short sighted. As the contributions to this themed section show, the way in which the Leave campaign fed off concerns with migration, social liberalism and globalisation is being repeated by the radical populist right across the EU member states. The critical questions about the EU – freedom of movement, migrant access to social rights, self-serving and aloof EU bureaucracy, eroding legitimacy of nation states and their political leaders – that remain at the centre of the Brexit debate, are also central to the broader debates propelled forward by the European populist radical right.
The welfare context of both Brexit and the success of European radical right populism can be found in a shared crisis narrative. In the case of the UK, the ‘double crisis’ of the welfare state has been brought about by the most extensive welfare austerity programme seen in any comparable welfare state in a context where the long-term costs of key services are rising in the areas of health, education and pensions (Reference Taylor-GoobyTaylor-Gooby, 2012). The inequalities stemming from these developments, Taylor-Gooby argues, ‘are an important factor in the Brexit referendum outcome’ (Reference Taylor-Gooby2017, p. 815). In the broader European context, Hemerijck (Reference Hemericjk2013) describes trends of rising in welfare costs and plummeting government earnings as a ‘double bind’, asking whether European welfare states may become casualties of the global financial crises. These observations speak to the ‘crisis of solidarity’ that associate Europe and the EU with increased (social) insecurity and instability (Reference DelantyDelanty, 2008, pp. 676–677). Schierup, Hansen, and Castles (Reference Schierup, Hansen and Castles2006) perceived of the problem in terms of ‘dual crisis’: not only has welfare retrenchment led to social exclusion across Europe, but supranational integration has at the same time also challenged the nation and national identities. Crucially, the shape of the ‘dual crisis’ meant that the subsequent debate ‘focused on social rights of citizenship […] exploited by nostalgic and reactionary populism that proposes ‘cultural difference’ as the rationale for excluding all those who do not belong to ‘the nation’ (2006, p. 3).
The first contribution by Ketola and Nordensvard frames the section by reviewing the recent literature on welfare chauvinism from a social citizenship perspective. The subsequent article by Fenger shows that despite the appearance of welfare chauvinism being the common denominator across the six case studies (the US, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and France), the policies proposed under this welfare chauvinist umbrella vary rather a lot. Lugosi, in her article on the somewhat less studied case of Hungary, highlights the relevance of the communist legacy in the welfare chauvinist framing of the populist radical right parties of Fidesz and Jobbik, while also highlighting the central role of women in the nationalist narrative crafted by the Hungarian populist radical right. Salo and Rydgren in turn look at how the radical right's reframing of socioeconomic issues in Finland has lead to adoption of nationalist rhetoric among mainstream parties, but that the reasons for this are not limited to the threat posed by populist True Finns. Taken together the articles highlight the multiple trajectories the populist radical right strategies take, paying close attention to the relevant historical, cultural and political variables.
The overall aim of this themed issue is to contribute to the public and political debate across Europe on issues surrounding the persistent and indeed growing popularity of populist radical right parties, and how these parties have reoriented themselves from the fringes to the political mainstream. It investigates an important but so far under-researched aspect of this process: how radical right populist parties utilise social policy in gaining legitimacy and normalising their political ideology to the public.
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