These two books answer meaningful and relevant questions in comparative politics. In Curbing Clientelism in Argentina, Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro explains why some politicians opt out of using clientelistic strategies to mobilize voters; and in Politicized Enforcement in Argentina, Matthew Amengual explains variation in states’ enforcement of regulations across regions, industries, and policy areas, focusing on four Argentine provinces.
To explain variation in politicians’ decisions to use political clientelism in Argentina, Weitz-Shapiro examines the tradeoff of political support between poor and nonpoor voters. The author argues that whereas poor voters support clientelistic candidates, the nonpoor reject them; thus, while using clientelistic strategies is likely to increase support from poor voters, it also, simultaneously—and therein lies the trade-off—decreases support from nonpoor voters. As a result, “it is only the combination of competition and a large nonpoor population that provides an incumbent with both the incentives and political will to eschew clientelism” (p. 151). The interaction between poverty and political competition is at the center of Weitz-Shapiro’s explanation. Neither political competition nor a large middle class alone provide enough incentives for politicians to opt out of clientelism. It is only when politicians face both high levels of political competition and the presence of a large middle class that they will refrain from using clientelism to mobilize poor voters.
Weitz-Shapiro tests her argument by combining evidence from fieldwork, an elite survey in more than 125 municipalities in three provinces, statistical analysis of cross-municipal data, a large citizen survey, and an original survey experiment focused on the middle class. Most of the original data for the book was collected over five months in 2006 by the author and her research assistants. In addition to presenting this impressive array of qualitative and quantitative evidence, the author compares the effects of the program, the National Food Security Program (PNSA)— studied in the book, which by the time the hardcover was published had changed significantly—with those implemented in Mexico (Progresa/Oportunidades) and Brazil (Bolsa Familia). The author also makes reference to the country’s new social-welfare universal program, Asignación Universal por Hijo.
Matthew Amengual’s book examines how the state succeeds in enforcing regulations in some provinces and industries, but fails in others. To explain this variation in state enforcement, Amengual develops the idea of a porous state that enables some societal organizations to influence the state bureaucracy. He tests his theory by focusing on regulation in labor and the environment across different industries in several Argentine provinces.
Amengual’s explanation (see Table 2.3, p. 36) is that the combination of certain quantities of resources (low and high) with different types of linkages (weak and strong) leads to different types of enforcement: no enforcement, state-driven enforcement, society-dependent enforcement, and coproduced enforcement. In order to understand variation in state enforcement, the author focuses on identifying ways in which the state was porous to different groups. He finds that even states that have limited resources, organizational flaws, and problematic state bureaucracies are still able to enforce regulations.
To test his theory, Amengual examines two separate policy areas, combining a wide array of data, including 260 in-depth interviews with bureaucrats and politicians, as well as with political, social, and business leaders in different industries; a survey of 166 labor inspectors in six provinces (collected during 16 months of fieldwork in the country in 2008 and 2009); and archival research. The description and analysis of each case shows the author’s vast knowledge of each policy. It is worth noting the important role of partisanship in generating strong linkages between unions and inspectors: “Both cross-sectional comparisons of provinces and changes within provinces over time reveal that there is a robust relationship between the party in power and the way inspectors work with unions” (p.144). The author also does an excellent job in showing that the “allocation of enforcement was politically determined, not programmatic” (p.220).
The weakest point in Weitz-Shapiro’s argument is its absence of a clear prediction for the effects of low competition. The theory offers predictions (see Figure 3.1, p. 64) for the combinations of high political competition and different levels of poverty, but provides no conjectures for cases in which political competition is low. If instead of using a figure to show the interaction between poverty and political competition the author had used a 2 x 2 table, we would have observed that one column was empty. Indeed, the author recognizes that “where political competition is low, the model has no clear expectations about whether politicians will reject clientelism” (p. 63), and addresses the shortcoming in a brief section (pp. 68–70) speculating about the diverse possibilities. Yet this section does not examine the different possibilities fully, and the reader is left with more questions than answers. For instance, if we assume that the use of clientelism leads to low levels of political competition, we could have a potential problem of endogeneity. Whereas I thoroughly praise the author’s honesty and openness about the model’s limitations, the book would be stronger with a longer discussion.
Addressing nonpoor voters’ reasons for rejecting the use of clientelism, Weitz-Shapiro suggests that “middle-class voters might reject clientelism on moral grounds and decline to support a politician who uses it, regardless of whether clientelism has any direct effect on their material well-being” (p.13). She understands the problem with assuming that middle-class voters have a sense of morality that poor voters lack, and so she goes on to argue, instead, that poor voters are pressured to support clientelistic candidates who can secure access to goods. Middle-class voters, in contrast, do not face this kind of pressure; clientelism nonetheless sends a “negative signal of the quality of government performance more generally and therefore [the nonpoor] object to clientelism due to self-interest” (pp. 12–13). Such a theory of self-interest seems much more plausible and less judgmental than the assumption about a relationship between voters’ morality and economic status.
Amengual’s work is based on detailed knowledge of policy areas, political actors, and special events that are difficult, if not outright impossible, to replicate. Adding this problem to the fact that “instances of enforcement were messy and highly imperfect” (p. 220) leaves the reader wondering if Amengual’s interpretation and understanding of the facts are accurate. To the author’s credit, the accounts provided are very detailed, making it easier for readers to identify flaws in the author’s reasoning. I use the case of the garment industry examined in the book to illustrate some potential problems with the author’s argument.
In his explanation of why the Sub-Secretariat of Labor Buenos Aires was successful in enforcing regulations in the garment industry, Amengual emphasizes the combination of La Alameda, a civil society organization, with the city’s high level of administrative resources. Yet the author fails to assign any weight to the mass media, whose coverage of illegal labor practices can be argued to have exerted the pressure that single-handedly resolved the issue. Certainly, once the pressure was exerted, the preexistence of a civil society organization made it easier for political actors to enforce existing regulations. However, and quite surprisingly, the role of the mass media as a critical actor in forcing authorities to take action is largely ignored in Amengual’s book.
Whereas it is correct to assume that the mass media’s influence alone is incapable of explaining variation in enforcement of regulation, it seems too significant a factor in many of the cases examined in the book to be ignored. In Amengual’s own account: “[I]n the eleven days that followed the fire [at a garment workshop in Buenos Aires that killed two adults and four children, all Bolivian migrants], a series of operations by inspectors from the Sub-Secretariat of Labor Buenos Aires closed 122 workshops” (p. 132).The timing of the closure—11 days after the media reported the incident—suggests that the initial enforcement of the regulation was media driven. Furthermore, the case is even more interesting when we learn that similar incidents involving migrant workers in Córdoba (in the brickmaking sector) were largely ignored, whereas those that occur in Buenos Aires immediately gained national attention. Comparing these cases and the role of the media would have enabled the author to provide further evidence of the causal mechanisms described in the book, and could have enlightened us about the role that mass media may—or may not—have in enforcing regulations in porous states.
Beyond their minor shortcomings, these two books are extraordinary and pioneering examples of research in comparative politics. The deployment of data and detailed knowledge in both books is simply impressive, and sets a high bar for students interested in solving puzzles in developing countries. They should be an example for those interested in exploiting variation within a country and using the subnational method, as well as for those interested in combining quantitative and qualitative research in the social sciences. Both Curbing Clientelism and Politicized Enforcement are well written, and their data collection and results are transparently presented. The focus on Argentina makes them an immediate and obvious read for those interested in the country’s politics, but their questions and findings provide significant insights for understanding challenges faced by many other countries in the region and beyond.
