Why does the United States continue to prevent current and past convicts from voting, while international law, other democracies, and even nondemocracies have moved in the opposite direction? Implicitly and explicitly, this question shapes Alec Ewald and Brandon Rottinghaus's wide-ranging collection of essays. Any comparative examination of criminal disenfranchisement—the temporary or permanent denial of voting rights during and after a citizen's criminal conviction and punishment—finds the United States a monumental outlier in fact and law. Of its 50 states, 48 maintain some level of criminal disenfranchisement. In some, even one felony conviction can result in the lifelong loss of the right to vote, well after the prison door has opened, probation or parole has been completed, and every other criminal sanction has expired. By contrast, in nearly all other democracies, the political debate is over ballot access in prison. Postrelease enfranchisement is assumed, with continuing disenfranchisement the rare exception.
In the excellent introduction to their volume, Ewald and Rottinghaus cast US exceptionalism in terms of state differences, partisanship, and racial exclusion. Unfortunately, the explicitly comparative chapters of their collection do not take these insights into consideration. None, for instance, realizes the significance of their reminder that in the United States, suffrage (and the death penalty, where the United States is also an outlier) is governed at the state level. Except for constitutional amendments requiring the extension of suffrage—to former slaves, to women, to citizens over the age of 18, and to citizens without the means to pay poll taxes—states determine voter qualifications, govern the process of voter registration, and dictate the procedures for voter identification, voting, and vote counting.
Acknowledging this crucial fact would have deepened the analysis in many of these chapters. Christopher Uggen, Mischelle Van Brakle, and Heather MacLaughlin, who compare the characteristics of countries that do and do not deny convicts the vote, could have provided a more fine-grained analysis if 50 sets of state characteristics were substituted for the national measures they used for the United States. In particular, the lack of results for “ethnic fractionalization” might change, especially if more sensitive dependent variables (reflecting degrees of disenfranchisement) were also used. Similarly, Richard Wilson's discussion of the norms of international law misses the central legal problem: How can the US federal government fulfill its treaty obligation to follow international human rights conventions when its power to dictate suffrage law to the states is constitutionally limited? Even Laleh Ispahani's description of the different kinds of criminal disenfranchisement in democracies is locked into a paradigm of the ultimate persuasiveness of international law—not on the reasons why voters and elites, especially at the subnational level, might place a positive value on criminal disenfranchisement.
Surprisingly, the two US-themed chapters also fail to acknowledge the significance of federalism, or its tie to Ewald and Rottinghaus's other causes of American exceptionalism: partisanship and racial exclusion. This is not to say that the authors ignore race: All of the authors who either focus on or deal with the United States in comparative context mention the disproportionate impact of these laws on the vote of African American men. But they see this as a consequence of racial discrimination, not as a cause: not, in other words, as a continuing vestige of Jim Crow practices intended to limit the votes of black men. Thus, Elizabeth Hull's chapter on the cultural and political factors explaining criminal disenfranchisement focuses on the recent rise of fundamentalist Christianity and the political popularity of harsh sanctions. Both of these explanations would be less ad hoc if she had connected the political strength of evangelicals and the expansion of imprisonment with race-based partisan realignment. They would also have been more convincing if she had actually traced them in state-level politics.
Similarly, Nora Demleitner argues that while US criminal disenfranchisement was rooted in race, criminal justice frames now dominate. She thus ends her chapter by condemning the irrationality of disenfranchisement as criminal sanction and bemoaning the hold that punitive philosophies have on the American justice system. But her comparison between criminal justice in Germany and the United States breaks down with the observation that German criminals “looked and behaved like all Germans” (p. 91), while American criminals do not. Her failure to recognize the importance of this racial distinction is a failure to understand both countries. In the United States, disenfranchisement operates not as criminal sanction but as racial exclusion because the Fifteenth Amendment prevents explicit racial restrictions on suffrage. In Germany, and many other European countries, such explicit racial restrictions (against Arabs, Turks, Africans, Roma) can operate more openly, via citizenship laws.
The most effective chapters in this collection are the five case studies at the end. Ronnit Redman, David Brown, and Bryan Mercurio's chapter on Australia and Christopher Manfredi's chapter on Canada describe recent legislative efforts to expand criminal disenfranchisement against judicial opposition. Two others, Claire Hamilton and Rick Lines' chapter on Ireland and Lukas Muntingh and Julia Sloth-Nielsen's chapter on South Africa, recount judicial efforts to overturn existing criminal disenfranchisement law. The wealth of legal and institutional detail in these chapters can prove somewhat bewildering. But read together, they do show how the politics of enfranchisement is now taking place in an explicitly international context, where countries look to one another and international law as models, even as they assert their own sovereign rights. Another chapter on Denmark, by Anette Storgaard, explains how prisoners can be provided the vote with relative ease. While it is not set in a comparative context, it provides an interesting counterpoint to the case of South Africa, where implementation of prisoner enfranchisement falls far short of the legal ideal. Together, these chapters make a stronger argument for seeing criminal disenfranchisement in international perspective than do the explicitly comparative studies.
There is good comparative work to be done on criminal disenfranchisement. Australia and Canada, in which states/provinces share power over suffrage with their federal governments, would be fascinating comparisons with the United States. The hypothesis that grants of suffrage to disfavored minorities, through citizenship or government action, are later followed by restrictions upon its exercise could be investigated in multiple countries, eras, and contexts, including, but not limited to, criminal disenfranchisement. It is to be hoped that Ewald and Rottinghaus, and the contributors to their collection, will follow their good beginning with further work.
