Science, Steve Fuller's contribution to Acumen's Art of Living series, is not primarily a guide to life. Sensibly, Fuller opted for a loose reading of his remit; the result is a series of essays on the history of science, scientific values, science and religion, and science's relationship with ‘the public’. We are told that the work has an ‘overarching argument: that our continuing faith in science in the face of its actual history is best understood as the secular residue of a religiously inspired belief in Divine Providence’ (p. 1). Strictly speaking that is a thesis rather than an argument, but an argument of sorts soon emerges. Science, Fuller tells us, has wrought massive destruction and exposed us to extreme risks (bombs, gas chambers and ‘environmental despoliation’), yet public support for scientific research remains strong (p. 5). We ‘have acted’, and continue to act, ‘as if the benefits of science outweigh the costs’ (p. 35). Since the historical evidence suggests that the costs outweigh the benefits, ‘it is easy to conclude that faith in science is the modern superstition’ (p. 6, original italics). If you buy that, then you will probably find Fuller's genealogical explanation attractive.
Unfortunately the argument does not withstand scrutiny. ‘We have acted’: who are ‘we’? Fuller marvels at ‘the ability of our species to bounce back from quite obviously science-led catastrophes … only to embrace science with more gusto’ (p. 7, my emphasis). But the human species never made a collective decision to ‘embrace science’. Rather, particular countries, corporations and individuals decided to support particular research programmes at particular times. No doubt it was frequently in their own narrow interests to do so. That observation is (i) uncontroversial and (ii) compatible with the (controversial) suggestion that scientific progress is a net bane at the species level. At a stretch, Fuller could perhaps have presented the history of science as a prisoner's dilemma-style tragedy. But to make the superstition charge stick, he needs to present it as a story of widespread prudential rationality failure. There is not the slightest reason to believe such a story. Fuller makes rhetorical headway only by suppressing the distinction between agents' interests and humanity's collective welfare.
Argumentatively, Science is a washout. But, token efforts aside, Fuller is not really in the argument business. His stock-in-trade is the provocative assertion. Some of these are interesting (see above), some are silly (‘there is no denying that science has served to demystify the idea of divine creation’, p. 48), a fair few are barely intelligible (‘Darwin … underestimated our ability to penetrate the nature of life by virtue of his scepticism of life's progressive and mathematical character’, p. 17). Science might nonetheless have been an engaging work. It isn't. To a quite extraordinary degree, Fuller allows stream of consciousness to stand in for chain of thought – and then garbles the prose to boot. Any three-page excerpt could serve as an illustration, but sometimes the free associations come thick and fast:
[Physicist Freeman Dyson's] career has been that of an avuncular Dr Strangelove, had he appeared in a Hollywood sequel, now in atonement for having worked on the project that did the most to underscore our transience as an earthbound species. It is also easy to imagine Dyson's evil twin in a counterfactual world where the Nazis triumphed, or at least survived the Second World War. He would be an Albert Speer-like figure, who out of a vague sense of guilt for the slaughtered Jews decided to devote his life to the support of indigenous peoples to remain, just as they themselves would wish, in ‘separate but equal’ environments (pp. 10–11).
The context does not help. Fuller provides a few lines of biographical information about Dyson, but these offer negligible motivation for his Strangelove and Nazi fantasies. The fantasies are, in turn, the only discernible grounds for Fuller's judgement that Dyson takes science ‘as the basis for a very unconventional morality’ (p. 11). After that, Dyson is never alluded to again, and the ‘unconventional morality’ business is brushed aside in the very next sentence: it ‘obscures science's ultimate problem with the public, which has less to do with what science is trying to sell than the hardness of its sales pitch’. Then we are back to the Nazis (‘What the Nazis failed to see …’). Readers will quickly cease to be shocked by this sort of thing. Its cumulative effect is, simply, to exhaust.
