Among the ghastliest biblical tales, Concubine in Gibeah has pride of place. A mob from the tribe of Benjamin demands to rape a man from the tribe of Levi. The Levite offers them instead his concubine, whom they abuse throughout the night. In the morning, the Levite finds her lifeless, then carves up her body into twelve pieces, sending her limbs to the twelve Israelite tribes. Enraged, the other tribes demand justice of the Benjamites, who refuse, and a vicious war ensues, nearly extinguishing the tribe of Benjamin. Concluding the Book of Judges, before the advent of the unified kingdom, the story ends, “In those days there was no king in Israel: every man did that which was right in his own eyes.”
The Israelites’ first fraternal war captures the horrific heart of Kissane's excellent book, attesting to civil wars’ cataclysmic and transformative qualities, to how they emanate from volatile circumstances yet reveal an abiding human nature—by dismembering the people's body politic. Presaging Hobbes, the Israelites opted to splice the limbs of this collective human body to forge a monarchically headed state—a Leviathan. Kissane, in turn, takes cues from Hobbes's state of nature and Thucydides's account of stasis, or civil strife, to dissect the patterns, causes, and consequences of, and possible remedies for, civil war. He equally explores how civil war has figured in both art and scholarship. The latter, he suggests, has belatedly addressed civil war, which has increasingly eclipsed interstate war since 1945, occurring, often endemically, mainly in new states. Tracing these and other, less evident, patterns, political scientists have systematized the study of civil war, but all too often have oversimplified its intricacies. Kissane critically reviews this literature, drawing on the cases of Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, often going further in historical depth and cultural breadth.
Nations Torn Asunder is a humbling antidote to the scholarly demand for a clear bottom-line account of civil war. Kissane's interdisciplinary account synthesizes insights from both the “naturalists,” who consider violence the innate dark side of humanity, and the “situationalists,” who explain war by changing circumstances. Kissane seems to suggest that while situationalists ascribe the patterns of the waves of civil war to changing “wind regimes”—shifting structural causes—it is equally important to delve deep into the sea that makes for these recurrent waves in the first place. Indeed, Kissane stresses that “at some point every society will go through the experience” of civil war, which features in every era and “in every regime form known to humankind” (104, 238).
Kissane seeks answers to three core questions: What is civil war? Does the state make, or unmake, civil war? What does civil war reveal of human divisiveness? Each line of inquiry leads to some astute answers, and invites even more intriguing questions.
Civil war defies simple definition. What sets it apart from revolution, for example, is often a post hoc evaluation of whether the violence was deemed progressive or not. Moreover, the boundaries between internal/civil war and interstate war are blurred when state weakness and external intervention are entwined, as in the case of Mozambique. Ascribed causes also find their way into classifications, which do not handle changes very well, “as anti-colonial wars were transformed into post-colonial wars during the Cold War, these became resource wars, and so on” (105). Finally, the defining of civil war is also prone to “semantic bleaching,” extending it beyond discrete meaning.
To provide such precise meaning, Kissane submits that civil war is not merely about a split polity, territorially and militarily: “what makes a civil war situation a civil war” is the addition of a “structure of feeling,” whereby people “lose that sense of shared fate which underpins any community. … This then leads to the escalation of conflict to civil war proportions” (233–35).
This valuable insight, however, remains undeveloped. Arguably, giving up on “the possibility of living together in the future” can also be cause or consequence of civil war. Adding this intersubjective criterion to the very definition of civil war may thus hinder our capacity to explain it and its implications. This criterion may also overqualify civil war. How often do intrastate belligerents truly renounce all hope of living together? To return to the case with which we began this review, after nearly eliminating the tribe of Benjamin, the Israelites nonetheless pleaded, “O Lord God of Israel, why has this come to pass in Israel, that today there should be one tribe missing in Israel?” The remnant Benjamites would later beget Saul, the first king. Kissane insists we should not confuse civil war with “simply armed conflicts within a state, such as most insurgencies,” but if insurgencies comprise the great majority of conflicts currently classified as civil war (26), Kissane's criterion so delimits civil war as to render it far less ubiquitous, and perhaps negligible.
But civil war is important, and so is the role of the state therein. Kissane rightly notes that “the struggle for state power is an enduring characteristic of civil war” (63). After all, “the troubles of the post-colonial states make up the largest part of the contemporary challenge posed by civil war,” and in a sense, “decolonization has simply created more units for people to fight over” (18, 106). Political scientists have further revealed that “only some regimes are really vulnerable to civil war” (65). And, when chaos reigns, as in the wake of the Arab Spring, “the state is the one structure that still matters,” while belligerents fight over “who can speak with the authority of the state” (137, 171). State failure thus becomes a prime cause for civil war, a strong state its remedy.
To all these helpful Hobbesian observations, Kissane adds crucial qualifications. First, state strength spans a continuum from state weakness to failure to collapse, which might lead to actual anarchy only in the latter case. Second, “if state strength was that important, and weak states the main source of violence, the world would have experienced much more violence and conflict than it has” (166–67). Third, strong states are lethal, too. Finally, Kissane accurately suggests that “it is not weak states but divided nations that matter,” for civil wars are “often cases of a failure of nation-building, as much as a failure of state-building” (164, 173).
The last point, however, may also subvert the suggestion that civil war is about “nations torn asunder.” Underscoring the nation-state mismatch, we readily see that it was not the “Yugoslav nation” that was torn asunder during the Balkan civil war but the society created in the image of its unitary state, and the discrete ethnic nations are precisely what tore it apart. “Perhaps the creation of so many states provided only an opportunity for something in human nature never far below the surface,” argues Kissane (238). Perhaps that something was nationalism.
Kissane goes after something deeper yet: human divisiveness, which he identifies in the fragmentation that civil war breeds. Stasis, ingrained in the socialized human nature, always lurks beneath the surface, and heinous violence, which civil war often features, brings it forth. The state fails to sustain “the divided self” that it perforce inhabits, and becomes torn between factions claiming authenticity against the enemies within. Why is it so? Kissane notes that “religious, tribal, and regional divisions can be easily exploited to break up a state; they are not, however, so malleable that they can be manipulated from above to reconstruct a more cohesive state” (226).
The politics of identity are crucial, but partial, in this context, and while Hobbes's Leviathan is instructive, its sequel Behemoth (which Kissane does not address) may be equally enlightening. If Leviathan is Hobbes's prescription against the state of nature imagery, Behemoth is his explanation of the actual strife—the English Civil War—where the source of evil is not the lack of absolutist government, but the existence and clash of absolute moral opinions in matters of “divinity and politics.” Every man did that which was right in his own eyes. Dangerous ideas, spurred by the spirit of Reformation, not deficient coercion, bred internal enmity. Civil war, in this regard, is also the history of dangerous ideas, and Kissane erects a fine gate by which to enter their realm.
