Public goods, as economists use the term, are “nonrival” (one person's consumption does not make it unavailable for others) and, typically, “nonexcludable” (if the good is provided to one person, others cannot be prevented from enjoying it as well). The classic example is the lighthouse, whose warning light goes out to and benefits all ships. Economists devote special attention to public goods because markets do not deliver them efficiently. Rational, self-interested actors realize that if anyone else provides this good, they can have it without paying for it. The incentives favor “free riding.” Others, however, see the same opportunity and so public goods go underprovided. There is thus a strong case for collective action to furnish public goods. Where collective benefits outweigh the costs of provision, government action can make society as a whole better-off.
Scott Barrett applies a related analysis to a wide range of “global public goods,” including climate change mitigation, nuclear nonproliferation, the eradication of smallpox, humanitarian intervention, and the creation of a universal standard for time. In most cases, no one country has the incentive to take on the costs of providing these goods. At a “global” level, moreover, there is often no effective or legitimate authority to discourage free riders through the force of law. If we accept, with Barrett, that national sovereignty is a given (p. 17), then the only alternative is to promote more-or-less voluntary cooperation among states. Using “simple game theory” (p. xiii), he reveals the incentives that impede such cooperation and describes ways of rearranging incentives so that more global public goods are delivered.
Happily for the nonspecialist, Barrett rarely inserts function symbols into his crisp prose. Vivid narratives—about how nations might react to an impending asteroid impact or how the last smallpox case was tracked down—illustrate the potential of collective action. This book is an exciting, accessible read.
Barrett's main analytical achievement is to differentiate global public goods in a way that reveals the diversity of incentives at work in them. A global public good, such as protection from an asteroid collision, involves benefits so great that a single nation, or a small coalition, has all the incentives needed to provide the good for everyone (p. 28). These are “single best effort” global public goods. “Weakest link” goods, on the other hand, are undermined by anything less than universal cooperation. Had smallpox persisted in a single country, for example, no country could have dared suspend its vaccination program without posing huge risks to all. Success at realizing such goods depends as much on reinforcing the efficacy of national governments everywhere as it does on coordinating international action. Other goods, such as nuclear nonproliferation, require “mutual restraint.” Here, treaties can be effective instruments, especially if restraint is made conditional on other signatories' compliance (p. 143). In other cases, where financial resources are a major factor and free riding threatens to undermine cooperation, the best strategy may be to foster widely respected norms. Using the financing arrangements that support the United Nations as a key example, Barrett shows how creating a universal expectation that others will pay their assessment helps develop a sense of obligation among member states (p. 122). Finally, there are global public goods whose realization requires the “aggregate efforts” of many nations. Efforts to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases are an extremely challenging example. Temptations to free ride abound. But as the Montreal Protocol (to phase out ozone-depleting chemicals) shows (pp. 75–83), carefully crafted treaties—ones combining carrots and sticks and credible enforcement mechanisms—can help overcome them.
Barrett's nuanced typology of global public goods runs counter to any generalized pessimism about the efficacy of international cooperation. This book argues eloquently for “a deliberative but spirited multilateralism” (p. xi). Yet it also chastens any generalized optimism about humanity's progressive march toward a world of burden-sharing solidarity. Sovereignty and self-interest complicate most efforts at international cooperation and defeat many of them.
Never polemical, Barrett reveals his leanings as a critic only in the book's final pages. The Bush administration's “minilateral” approach to foreign policy “sacrificed the benefits of broader international support” and “endangered the mission” (p. 193). Bully! I just wish that this controversial edge appeared more often. His book does not set up a debate. Nonetheless, for the normative political theorist that I am, its manner of framing issues surrounding cooperation stirs controversy.
I worry that Barrett pushes an economics-derived paradigm too far. The economists' concept of a “public good” presupposes that rational, self-interested actors expend as few of their resources as possible to acquire the goods that interest them. In this perspective, a decision to cooperate with another actor is a self-interested calculation, not one motivated by any special concern for the other's well-being. Before cooperating with Actor B, Actor A asks: Will this venture bring me a net gain in desired goods, relative to what I could have by acting alone? Economic arguments favoring government provision of public goods are only a variant of the self-interest perspective. Government provision simply aims to assure that more actors enjoy benefits that they want as individuals anyway. (The lighthouse gets built; lives are saved; commerce flourishes.) But quite often, Barrett steps outside the confines of this paradigm. If “naming and shaming” can help enforce some international agreements (p. 94), if there is an effective “taboo” on the use of nuclear weapons (p. 135), it must be because nations sometimes respond to appeals to their sense of right and wrong. Preventing genocide (p. 118) and banning reproductive cloning of human beings (p. 145) appear as examples of global public goods. They are so only in a moral perspective. Genocide in Darfur barely affects my comfortable American life. But it troubles my sensibility as an ethical being who believes in human equality and dignity. This sensibility requires that I think reciprocally, not self-interestedly. To be clear: I do not at all want to suggest that using an economic paradigm means that one lacks moral, humanitarian motivation. In fact, such motivation is evident on every page of Barrett's book. The point is that moral motivation is logically distinct from rational self-interest.
This matters to Barrett's project because he is trying to explain the conditions under which nations work together to achieve global benefits. Such explanations fall short unless they take into account that nations, like individuals, see themselves as moral actors as well as self-interested ones. Will the international community be able to address the challenges of climate change mitigation? He is acutely aware that any future treaties in this area face daunting free-rider and enforcement problems (p. 100). True enough. But getting nations to agree to drastic reductions in greenhouse gas emissions will also require answers to questions about equity and justice raised by developing countries, who bear little responsibility for the historic accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and for whom economic sacrifices will be more painful.
Barrett's question “Why cooperate?” is enormously important. The world suffers from too little cooperation. And Barrett is convincing: Eliciting cooperation is a delicate affair. We should never underestimate the potential for self-interested action to make almost everyone worse-off. But self-interest is not the whole story. Understanding cooperation also requires attention to the logic of moral discourse and to the development of forums in which norms can evolve. Why cooperate? Surely part of the answer is because people have a sense of right and justice, because acceptable agreements acknowledge all parties' claims for recognition as beings of equal worth.
