These two books are very different. They do, however, share a departure. Both reject the Rawlsian approach to political philosophy and democracy: Construct principles and then seek the institutions and civic character (either under ideal or nonideal conditions) that best further or embody those principles. The authors of both books begin with the real world we happen to inhabit. For Jack Knight and James Johnson, that world is made up of a plurality of complex institutions that are not the result of the application of principles but, rather, the actions of empirically situated individuals pursuing self-interested ends. Why should we think that democracy among all the possible institutions at our disposal should have priority in coordinating our collective life together? Steven Bilakovics takes a sociological and indeed almost psychological perspective and begins with empirically observable pathologies of contemporary American public rhetoric and opinion: More and more citizens appear disgusted and fed up with democratic politics. Rather than finding the source of these pathologies in corrupting forces external to democracy, Bilakovics traces the source of our growing cynicism to a core feature of the democratic ethos itself. His question then is this: Can democracy defuse its own self-destruct mechanism?
Unlike much democratic theory today (especially deliberative democratic theory), neither book takes for granted that democracy is an unquestionable good that simply needs to be perfected. Knight and Johnson ask “What is it good for?” By the end, they have constructed a rigorous, sustained, and powerful defense of the priority of democracy, but they begin with an open question. Bilakovics' final message is more ambiguous, but I read it as “We should be careful what we wish for.” Democracy comes with a lot of psychic baggage for which we might not have bargained. The democratic ethos needs a little couch time to sort itself out but that is not likely to happen under present conditions of denial.
The Priority of Democracy is the result of a long and productive partnership between two serious and seriously smart scholars. Much in the book will be familiar to readers who have been following the article trail of these two over the last 20 years. But nothing to my knowledge puts it all together into a full theory of democracy like this book. Unlike so many books these days, it is not a collection of their greatest hits marketed as a coherent whole. It is a real book that benefits from being read from beginning to end.
The book begins with what appears to be a modest claim on behalf of democracy: Democracy has no first-order priority. Between complexity and pluralism, our societies face tremendous coordination problems at all levels. When is taking a vote, flipping a coin, assessing merit, or leaving it to the market the best way to coordinate action or resolve disputes? Sometimes the answer will be democracy, but often it will not. So what is democracy good for? It is good for the second-order evaluation of the first-order coordination mechanisms. Democracy is particularly good at figuring out when a coin toss will do or at monitoring the effectiveness of markets.
Why is democracy good at assessing how other institutions are doing? Here is where Knight and Johnson's pragmatism and what they call “constrained consequentialism” enter the picture. When assessing what makes one institution better or more attractive than another, there is no single matrix. Instead, there are multiple metrics that include things like efficiency, equality, fairness of distribution, long-term stability, and the benefits of fluidity. Democratic institutions are best suited to make these calls because of three features of democratic political argument: It creates domain restriction, it effectively uses collective knowledge, and it exercises reflexivity. Democratic institutions include more than just political argument but political argument is the feature of democracy that gives it its special effectiveness.
Domain restriction is the mechanism that mitigates problems in aggregation identified by social-choice theory. Knight and Johnson's arguments here are familiar from earlier work and have launched a fruitful dialogue between deliberative democracy and social-choice theory. The appeal to distributive knowledge introduces an epistemic defense of democracy along pragmatist grounds. Diversity of opinion expressing itself in contestation and dissent promotes experimentation and testing, the two pragmatist avenues to fallible truth. Finally, reflexivity, understood simply as talking, is particularly important for finding solutions to coordination problems among citizen who deeply disagree.
Talking and arguing do not, according to the authors, transform preferences or lead to agreement, or at least not very often. But they can restructure disagreement in such a way as to avoid instability and ambiguity. The authors are at pains to stress that this modest role for talking in their theory sets them apart from much of deliberative democratic theory. And although their realist starting point, pragmatist methodology, and deep suspicion of normative arguments do indeed set them apart from the mainstream, I would still place them in the deliberative democracy camp for the simple reason that, like Dewey, they believe that talking is where all the important stuff goes on in democracy. Voting is essential, but voting without talking has little merit.
In the first 190 pages of the book, Knight and Johnson are relentlessly hardheaded, never wavering from the standard of “effectiveness” in assessing democracy. Absent is the value talk of freedom, autonomy, equality, self-determination, dignity, and respect. Absent, too, is talk about legitimacy and popular sovereignty. The hardheadedness gives way to a relatively radical normative agenda in the final section, still couched, however, in the language of effectiveness. Their pragmatism holds them to the principle that “the conditions of causal efficacy are the same as the conditions of normative legitimacy” (p. 195). It turns out that these conditions are very demanding and involve nothing less than the “equal opportunity of political influence” (p. 197). What becomes apparent by the end of the book is that our existing democracies, and especially the United States, fall very short of meeting this condition. Democracy cannot effectively perform its second-order function of assessment and correction without a whole lot more equality out there in the public as well as social sphere.
Like any good book, there is much detail here with which one could take issue. But this is overshadowed by the impressive nature of the enterprise. The authors offer us a full theory and justification of democracy on pragmatist grounds. It is a beautifully constructed argument that should bring pragmatism to center stage of democratic theory.
Democracy without Politics begins with a portrait of democratic political culture that is deeply schizophrenic: Americans love democratic ideals but hate democratic politics. Drawing on survey data, public rhetoric, and cultural observation, Bilakovics paints a disturbing picture. We turn our back on democratic politics in disgust and contempt: Democratic politics is “experienced as nonsense,” “a theatre of the absurd,” “vacuous,” full of “trite slogans and repetitive gibberish,” “scripted and staged.” We see though the manipulative advertising, cavalier disregard for truth, and the shameless pandering of elites. We do not rise up in indignation at the sorry state of our public sphere but shrug it off as politics as usual and sink into resigned cynicism. And so Americans come to despise politics and withdraw. Not apathy so much as disgust leads to the depoliticization of America. But alongside this disgust is a robust belief in all of the high ideals of democracy: Equality, opportunity, freedom, and dignity are values we claim to cherish and promise to protect.
Where did this paradoxical and contradictory ethos come from? Bilakovics proposes to seek its source in Tocqueville's analysis of democracy in America. Indeed, most of the book is taken up with a deep analysis of Tocqueville, followed by studies of two recent readers of Tocqueville, Claude Lefort and Sheldon Wolin. Lefort and Wolin are found not to have really understood Tocqueville or the true nature of our predicament. Tocqueville almost puts his finger on it when he identifies the many hazards involved in rejecting hierarchy in favor of equality. But Bilakovics needs to make it clearer. The cynical rejection of politics is contained in the very aspirations of democracy. What Americans love about democracy is the giddy feeling of possibility produced by the rejection of hierarchy and tradition. Bilakovics calls this openness. Democracy opens up vertiginous vistas of possibility before our eyes: We can do anything, be anybody, achieve everything. There are no barriers to our aspirations. But this message of radical transcendence inevitably leads to comparisons with what is going on in the real world of day-to-day politics. The real world falls drastically short of the ideal. Contemporary cynicism, however, is not anchored in a realist awakening that politics is down and dirty after all (although this version of our cynicism sometimes creeps into the argument). Our schizophrenia is not centered on power versus justice. Not power but triviality and absurdity stand as “the other” to the lofty aspirations of democracy. Jerry Springer, not Machiavelli, is the nemesis here. And so the book ends with an attack on the superficiality of poplar culture, infotainment, the faux politics of the Internet, and the cynicism it breeds.
The conclusion, entitled “Despotism and Democratic Silence,” is not a happy one. Democracy is “self-subverting.” At the beginning of the book we feel some sympathy for the patient, who has been set up for a fall, so to speak. What real-world politics could live up to the ideals of radical openness? And Bilakovics hints throughout the text that there might be a cure to the affliction, or at least some way to manage it. But by the end, the patient is less and less a sympathetic character: “There is no place for the politics of arguing in the prevailing culture and consciousness” (p. 225), he tells us. Calling on Neil Postman and Richard Sennet, Bilakovics offers a full-on culture critique that targets our willingness to go along with the trivialization of politics while alienating our democratic ideals into fantasy utopianism. In the end (literally, as this is the last line of the book), “we imagine ourselves equally free and powerless” (p. 236).
There are many wonderful insights in this book. The reading of Tocqueville is deep and imaginative, as are the critical analyses of Lefort and Wolin. The contrast between the aspiration to openness and the realities of a fallen world are wonderfully productive. But at almost every turn, Bilakovics overstates the claim and makes extravagantly sweeping and often empirically questionable claims in the first-person-plural voice. Almost everything he says has a certain truth to it. But a certain truth is not the whole truth, and the rhetoric of the book lacks moderation. It is nevertheless a very good read and the core insight is compelling.
The final message of both books is that the future of democracy rests on the shoulders of citizens, but that future does not look bright. For Knight and Johnson, democratic institutions cannot do their job if citizens cannot do their job (arguing, deliberating, then voting); citizens cannot do that job without the institutionalization of effective freedom and equality; effective freedom and equality appear under strain in contemporary America. For Bilakovics, authentic democratic citizenship is also about arguing and deliberation, and citizens are also seen as having a hard time getting on with these activities. This is not, as Knight and Johnson tell us, because barriers have been placed in their way (mostly by groups and individuals who want unequal influence) but because of an incoherent ethos: We reject arguing and deliberation because we see that it is useless in the face of, say, negative advertising, but also because we have become the sort of people who are swayed by negative advertising rather than argument and deliberation.
Knight and Johnson articulate the problem in terms of institutions, and Bilakovics in terms of psychic/cultural pathologies. Both analyses are fully and exclusively focused on the United States and are closely tied to the pathological influence of unequal power and money in politics. So the natural question to ask is: What about Sweden? That this is perhaps not the most obvious question to ask is because so much of contemporary democratic theory is dominated by American exceptionalism. Knight and Johnson are updating and extending American pragmatism, and Bilakovics is updating and extending Tocqueville's analysis of democracy in America. So the focus on the United States is natural and understandable. But both arguments make claims to generality (the inside jacket of Democracy without Politics begins “In western democracies today …”). Neither follows through on those claims. Within a wider frame that actually included Western democracies today as well as potential democracies of the future, the critical conclusions of these books might be read as cautionary tales rather than foregone conclusions.
The high bar set by Knight and Johnson seems quite hopeless in an institutional context dominated by Citizens United, but not so hopeless in other contexts (which might be the unstated message anyway). The cynicism identified by Bilakovics may not be found in other democratic contexts or not to the same degree, which raises the question of what sort of an exemplar we wish to make of America. Democracy is on the upswing across the globe. It is important that our theories speak to this broader context or acknowledge and perhaps justify the domain restriction of our arguments.
