I. INTRODUCTION: MONETARY MANAGEMENT AND STATE INTERVENTION AS POSSIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL EUROPE
Recent research has stressed the fallacy of the “free market” paradigm. Even the perfect markets of today’s capitalist economies are tightly regulated (Harcourt Reference Harcourt2011; Stanziani Reference Stanziani2012; Rössner Reference Rössner2015c). What historians of economic thought have often tended to forget is that this idea, almost a truism, has had a long intellectual history as well as tradition as applied policy. Historical evidence shows that since the last half-millennium or earlier (see Reinert Reference Reinert1999), Europe’s rise towards capitalism and modern economic growth took place under the fetters of order, regulation, and state interventionism. Without a sense of order and state intervention, the mere concept of economic freedom would sound counterintuitive (Sombart 1921; Braudel 1982–84, vol. 3; Vries Reference Vries2002 and Reference Vries2015; Reinert Reference Reinert1999 and Reference Reinert2007; Epstein Reference Epstein2000). Neither did the world become more liberal, or the state withdraw from the economy in any way after c. 1800 (Stanziani Reference Stanziani2012; Magnusson Reference Magnusson2009).
But whilst means and theories of state interventionism post-1800 are increasingly well understood by historians and economists (summaries in Reinert Reference Reinert1999 and Reference Reinert2007; Vries 2006), the pre-1800 period, which in many ways laid the preconditions for later economic growth (van Zanden 2009), still remains understudied. In an age when neither modern states nor modern economies existed, state intervention in the economy came across in shapes and forms profoundly different from what we have learnt to view as “economic policy” nowadays. And, as late as the nineteenth century, state interventionism looked very different from twentieth-century economic governance (Hall Reference Hall1986). Even the more powerful fiscal military states of the Ancien Régime (Bonney Reference Bonney1999; Yun-Casallila and O’Brien 2012) had a fairly limited strategic menu of economic policy choices available at their disposal (Magnusson Reference Magnusson2009, chs. 1 and 2). These usually extended to basic means of regulatory policy, especially market regulation, including price caps (usually at times of harvest crises), prohibitions of usury and forestalling, quality controls, or regulation of access and market hours. Footnote 1 England was an exception, with a somewhat deeper history of economic interventionism. Industrial and economic development had been state-promoted since the Middle Ages, in particular by the stimulus that the woolen manufactures received by the policy of bounties and export prohibitions on raw wool since the later fifteenth century (Reinert Reference Reinert2007, ch. 3). But similar prohibitions are known from the German Imperial Diets of the 1530s (e.g., Blaich Reference Blaich1970) and many other European regions; there is still scope for large-scale comparative surveys. New research has found proactive interventionist states at work in the eighteenth-century Habsburg Netherlands (Flanders) as well as Scotland, which worked according to the modern Infant Industry promotion scheme (ISI) (Coenen Reference Coenen and Rössner2016; Rössner Reference Rössner2015a). Footnote 2 To what extent such measures were effective still remains a matter of mystery; comparative long-term studies on European economic policy and economic growth are still wanting. Footnote 3
One major branch of economic policy and state intervention that has evaded the radar of historians so far was monetary policy and monetary management. Indeed, it is in the realm of monetary policy as a “policy of order”—which the German language still has as Ordnungspolitik (Eucken Reference Eucken1950; Woll Reference Woll1999, pp. 8–17)—where we find a rich economic discourse, mainly in continental Europe but in particular in the German lands since the fourteenth century. We find competing paradigms on how the well-being of the common wealth—the emerging “states,” nations, and national economies in early modern Europe, which did not yet quite exist in their commonly recognized post-1800 shapes, but were in the making—could be raised by a well-designed monetary paradigm, policy, and management. This discourse has remained underexplored, both in regards to its possibilities of actively interfering with the economy and thus the promotion of the common weal, as well as in terms of its general contributions to modern economic reasoning. Footnote 4 It is these underexplored lines of the continental economic discourses, sometimes called “Cameralism” (on the virtues and pitfalls of this nomenclature, see Rössner Reference Rössner2015b, 2016), that provide a new vision not only of the rise of the modern state but ultimately also the rise of modern capitalism. These lines of thought will be explored in the present paper, with specific regards to Cameralist monetary theory; Cameralist economic practices have been dealt with elsewhere (e.g., Rössner Reference Rössner2012).
Similar to its stepbrother “mercantilism,” “Cameralism” represents in many ways a misnomer. It implies a degree of epistemic stringency it may have never had. Apart from the fact that not even the modern economic sciences have ever been fully paradigmatic or “closed” theories (such as “Keynesianism/Post-Keynesian economics,” “Neoclassical Economics,” “Monetarism,” etc.), eighteenth-century Cameralism was at least sufficiently codified and “canonized” to a degree to classify as a visible and peculiar economic theory. Since the 1720s Cameralism was a fully accredited course of study at German, Swedish, Italian, and Portuguese universities, with a fairly specified range of textbooks used in class, implying a degree of epistemological coherence that other streams of thought, such as mercantilism, lacked (Rössner 2015; Magnusson Reference Magnusson and Rössner2016; Reinert and Carpenter 2016; Reinert and Rössner Reference Reinert, Rössner, Reinert, Ghosh and Kattel2016; Backhaus 2009; Priddat Reference Priddat2008; Bowler Reference Bowler2002; Wakefield 2009).
Cameralist political economy—the mainstream economic reasoning in continental Europe between the later sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries (Reinert Reference Reinert2007; Reinert and Carpenter 2016; Rössner Reference Rössner2016a)—emphasized how through the ordering and structuring of the market by monetary policy and monetary management the common weal and domestic competitiveness could be raised. Prima facie, this seemed to involve little more than some basic market regulation, using ordinances that dealt with the types of coin to be accepted in the market, and the fixing or setting of spot exchange rates for the hundreds of different types of currencies and currency denominations that circulated in the German and other market economies on the continent (gold florin, silver thaler, cruzado, gulden, down to shillings, stuivers, groats/groschen, batzen, then pennies, kreutzers, hellers, farthings, and mites, and so on). It was about getting the parameters right, mainly through setting the “right” price of currency, usually denoted as the gold–silver ratio, or spot exchange rates for all circulating coins in the realm—domestic (old vs. new) as well as foreign ones—as well as specifying the amount of coin received in return for deliveries of bullion to the mint. This entailed keeping a healthy supply of money in circulation, preventing actors from exporting or demonetizing a particular type of money or coin, on the grounds that gold or silver were under- or overvalued. It included the prevention of individuals’ engaging in financial market arbitrage and speculation, which would have led to an outflow of coin for speculative gains to foreign financial markets and thus jeopardized the “common good.” Currency speculation and coin arbitrage were frequently identified (and sometimes persecuted) malpractices in early modern Europe. They were seen as negatively affecting the well-being of the common weal (Rössner Reference Rössner2012, ch. IV). This was, in practice, a fairly laissez-faire approach to the market economy, as medieval and early modern economists entertained no illusion of being in control over the actual amount of money in circulation: government could never control, let alone determine, the amount of money put in circulation. It could only offer the “right” monetary parameters to the public (see also Sargent and Velde Reference Sargent and Velde2003). But the story did not end there. Clever and well-designed monetary management could significantly raise the well-being of the common weal and achieve positive impacts upon this common weal’s economic expansion, often effecting economic growth. The following sections will work out the central aspects of this in more detail.
Cameralist theory was contingent upon idiosyncratic conditions of time and space, especially the peculiar political and economic geography of the early modern Holy Roman Empire or “Germany” (Backhaus 1993, p. 329; Backhaus Reference Backhaus and Robinson Rössner2016). A near persistent undersupply of domestic silver—the main monetary material (Rössner Reference Rössner2012, ch. III; Rössner Reference Rössner2014a)—generated, in continental European political economy discourse before 1800, a quite peculiar line and approach towards promoting domestic welfare through monetary policies addressed at “ordering” the market through measures directed at coping with and overcoming such silver (monetary) scarcity. This entailed strategies to close the liquidity gap triggered by persistently negative trade balances and the absence of native silver supplies in the case of most German and other continental economies of the age (Rössner Reference Rössner2016c).
But how did this translate into positive economic development? The following sections will offer a sketch of suggestions. A focus will be on the history of economic thought accompanying this process during the early modern/pre-industrial period, where we find important pre-texts and pre-conditions that were laid for later (post-1800) processes of modern economic growth and transformation (van Zanden 2009; Malanima Reference Malanima2009; Sombart [1921] 1928). The discussion commences with general issues of development in relation to silver scarcity or balance-of-payment constraints (II), followed by the question of whether currency ought to remain stable in terms of its intrinsic or silver value (III), or whether it may be debased in some cases. Both strategies were considered, by varying authors and during various times, as permissible strategies in terms of promoting economic stability and development. But the mainstream inclined towards the former: currency debasement was frowned upon by most writers. It was against God’s chosen order. It violated distributional justice. The well-governed Christian community would be tainted by debased coins that did not contain the “just” amount of silver and gold. Since the Renaissance and through to the modern age, currency debasement as a means of effecting currency devaluation remained a profoundly heterodox stance. Strikingly enough, it was repeatedly applied in practice by European states, leading to a sort of intellectual schizophrenia or cognitive distortion: voices such as the Saxon “Ernestine” (1530) at least were being honest by arguing in favor of something that had been, and would be, practiced for centuries, yet was, and had always been, condemned in the political economy writings as frivolous and utterly sacrosanct (IV). Strategies directed at increasing money’s velocity of circulation represented an alternative strategy of improving the effective monetary mass (M.V) as an expedient for currency manipulations, enhancing monetary supply without resorting to currency debasement. They represent an interesting development in continental monetary theory, which exhibits wider implications with regard to economic growth and development. These will be discussed as well (V), before a conclusion offers some further thoughts (VI). In this way the paper opens up new perspectives for research in the history of pre-classical economic thought and Europe’s rise towards capitalism.
II. “LAISSEZ-FAIRE WITH THE NONSENSE TAKEN OUT”: SILVER, DEFLATION, AND THE CAMERALIST VISION OF A FREE MARKET ECONOMY AS SEEN THROUGH THE MONETARY LENS
Since the days of Adam Smith (Wealth of Nations 1776, bk. IV, ch. 1), the mercantilists and Cameralists had been ridiculed for their silver and gold fetishism (“Midas Fallacy”). Some modern historians (e.g., Mokyr Reference Mokyr2009, ch. IV) and economists have endorsed this claim (e.g., Ekelund and Hébert Reference Ekelund and Hébert2014, pp. 48–50, 72ff.), albeit it can be easily proven unfounded: no self-respecting early modern mercantilist would have been so naive as to conflate gold or silver with real wealth (Stern and Wennerlind Reference Stern and Wennerlind2014, introd.). Gold and silver were seen as merely representative of such real wealth, which lay in production, agricultural as well as manufacturing (ibid.). But the mercantilists and Cameralists had a point. Given the prevailing geographic and economic circumstances of early modern continental European states, silver shortages created problems of economic and social disequilibrium (Rössner Reference Rössner2012 and Reference Rössner and Isenmann2014b; Keynes Reference Keynes1936, ch. 23). This was a result of the peculiar nature of monetary policy, monetary management, and early modern theories of money (Redish Reference Redish2006; Sargent and Velde Reference Sargent and Velde2003; Schremmer and Streb Reference Schremmer and Streb1999; Rössner Reference Rössner and Isenmann2014b).
When sixteenth-century English writers used the terms “common wealth” or “common weale”—German sources used the linguistic equivalent der gemeine Nutzen or das gemeine Wohl—they had in mind a functional, thriving, and harmonious society at large. Economics and the market economy were only one subfield within a larger field, representing a more holistic conception that combined individual with societal welfare maximization (Roberts Reference Roberts2014, pp. 135–138). In this model of economy (or oeconomy), social, economic, and political features were inseparably tied together, covering even religious well-being. The very same ruler who had to look after a well-governed spiritual Christian community had, with the same degree of emphasis and enthusiasm, to keep an eye on domestic manufacturing competitiveness, productivity increases, economic growth, and development in the same way as church services on Sunday and the upkeep of a good Christian spirit and faith amongst the community. It is only our modern macroeconomic models and conceptions that have given up on the “spiritual” elements of societal well-being, focusing almost exclusively on the “economy,” and measures for its well-being are often limited to GDP per capita, total factor productivity, and the like, indicators developed when national income accounting schedules were derived to cope with crisis in manufacturing during the age of Keynesian ascendancy in the 1920s and 1930s (Schmelzer Reference Schmelzer2016; Philipsen Reference Philipsen2015). Footnote 5
From Martin Luther’s Von Kauffshandlung vnd Wucher (On commerce and usury; see interpretation and translation in Rössner Reference Rössner2015c) (1524) to John Hales’s A Discourse of the Common Weal of this Realm of England (1549), not to speak of later macroeconomic visions by Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff (Teutscher Fürsten-staat, [1656] 1720) or Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk’s Oesterreich über alles wann es nur will / Austria Supreme (if only it wills so) (1684) (Rössner Reference Rössner and Rössner2018 forthcoming), economists began to address questions of productivity and economic growth that were, in generic terms as well as purpose, not radically different from modern conceptions (see essays in Rössner Reference Rössner2016a). Footnote 6
Perhaps the best way to elucidate this point is to return to the mid-fourteenth-century polymath Nicolaus Oresme (Latin: Oresmius), who has been hailed, in a recent contribution, as an origin figure for modern political economy and modern conceptions of the state (Nederman Reference Nederman2009, pp. 235–247). Footnote 7 And, indeed, literally all later monetary visions under the mercantilist and Cameralist paradigm would draw, between 1500 and 1900, upon “Scholastic” views of money and the economy, views that had been presented in condensed form in Oresmius’s Tractatus de origine, natura, jure et mutationibus monetarum, written sometime between 1350 and 1358. Although a direct link between Oresmius and post-1600 “German” economic texts is difficult to prove (neither medieval nor early modern authors before 1700 bothered much to use footnotes and other references to indicate their sources), we know that Oresmius’s treatise was widely read across Europe until the end of the Middle Ages.
Gabriel Biel (c. 1415–1495), one of Germany’s most important “scholastic” theologians, was heavily influenced by Oresmius in his remarks on monetary theory and policy. He was principal of the newly founded University of Tübingen, acted as advisor to the Duke Eberhard of Württemberg, and became actively involved in southwest German monetary policy. His fame and reputation extended as far as the Spanish “School of Salamanca”; at Salamanca and Coimbra, university chairs were instituted explicitly for the exegesis of Biel’s works. Biel was probably the first voice in the German lands to promulgate Oresmius’s message that the currency—and thus monetary management—was not in the property of the king (prince), but belonged to the entire political nation or common weal (Mäkeler Reference Mäkeler2003, pp. 58–60, 81f.; Iserloh Reference Iserloh1955, pp. 225f.; Detloff Reference Detloff and Balz1980, pp. 489–491; Kötz 2016 for a most recent summary). Oresmius’s claim was made against the background of the absurdly high rates of coin debasement used by the French king to raise money for war in the 1350s (Spufford Reference Spufford1998; Sussman Reference Sussman1993). It nevertheless made for an important intellectual refinement in medieval and early modern conceptions of “the state” and “economy,” their boundaries as well as fields of interaction (see also Nederman Reference Nederman2009). Biel in turn proved highly influential to other sixteenth-century German writers, including Martin Luther. Germany’s most eminent nineteenth-century economist, Wilhelm Roscher, was convinced that Oresmius stood the test of modern monetary theory (Roscher Reference Roscher1863, p. 306, quoted in Schefold Reference Schefold2004, p. 79).
Cary Nederman has called Oresmius’s treatise “a work recognizably in the vein of political economy,” stressing that in this treatise Oresmius accidentally laid the scientific foundations of modern aggregate economic analysis: “By acknowledging and exploring the necessity of a symbiotic relationship between good government and the common wealth, Oresme maps out the rudiments of a route that would be travelled time and again in European political and social thought” (Nederman Reference Nederman2009, pp. 245, 247). By negating the prince’s (or king’s) prerogative to alter a currency’s precious metal value at will, stressing that this prerogative belonged in the hands of the communitas regni (community of the realm) instead, and that to promote the common weal should have the highest priority for any ruler (Schefold Reference Schefold2004, p. 98), Oresmius captured the pillars of Renaissance and early modern social and economic theory, as visible in the medieval Fürstenspiegeln (Princes’ Mirrors) literature and Giovanni Botero’s Ragion di Stato (1589), upon which the mercantilist–Cameralist conception of manufacturing promotion and division of labor as the main sources of a nation’s wealth seems to have rested (see contributions in Rössner Reference Rössner2016a; especially Reinert and Carpenter 2016, pp. 29–39). Since the fifteenth century, excerpts of Oresmius’s treatise began to appear in print—1484 in Cologne; 1511 in Paris (Schefold Reference Schefold2004, p. 84). We can be confident that early modern writers on monetary matters knew and drew on Oresmius’s treatise (Schefold Reference Schefold2004, p. 98; Dittrich Reference Dittrich1974). In the case of the German-speaking authors of the post-1500 period, Biel’s treatise would have been known, too, with Biel acting as an important transmitter between Oresmius and Cameralism, with early Cameralist texts going back to the sixteenth century (Dittrich Reference Dittrich1974; Schefold Reference Schefold2009, introd.; Zielenziger Reference Zielenziger1914). Thus, Oresmius’s Tractatus, although not usually or specifically acknowledged as a source of inspiration by contemporary mercantilist and Cameralist authors, provided the benchmark of continental monetary theory until the mid-nineteenth century. Statements to be found in Eli Heckscher (1932, 2, pp. 197–216) or, more recently, Wilga Föste (2015, pp. 14f.) that the mercantilists and Cameralists never made a meaningful contribution to European monetary theory thus need reconsideration. They reflect a somewhat skewed view on the emergence of modern theory. Whilst the Cameralists and most English and French mercantilists did borrow heavily from medieval conceptions, they nevertheless devised important new departures in monetary theory and monetary management (and in macroeconomics as well as growth and development theory; see Reinert Reference Reinert1999) that deserve closer examination.
Well into the days and age of Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717–1771) or James Steuart (1712–1790), most contemporaries seem to have shared essentially similar convictions as to what money should look like. These conceptions extended mainly to the axiom that its purchasing power should rest upon intrinsic content. The amount of gold or silver each coin contained should equal the market value of these metals, with only a small allowance for deduction, usually in the area of 2%, for brassage (cost of minting) and seigniorage (at that time the regal monopoly charge). There is little here that distinguished earlier voices during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries from the post-1650 Cameralist and mercantilist “mainstream” voices, from Francis Bacon, Gerard de Malynes, William Potter, and John Locke down to their continental counterparts of the likes of Wilhelm von Schröder, Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk, or Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi towards the later eighteenth century, even into the nineteenth century (an age into which the metallic or commodity standard and theory of money survived (see Redish 2003, and Sargent and Velde Reference Sargent and Velde2003).
This “medieval” framework of analysis carried an important set of implications. Bullionist reasoning—“bullionism” denoting a sort of crude or primitive medieval mercantilism with a generally rather undifferentiated emphasis on a positive balance of payment without considering wider implications, such as particular trade balances that may be negative as long as the aggregate trade balance remained positive—ran across the epistemological boundaries of what could be called Scholastic or neo-Aristotelian vs. mercantilist economics and later pre-classical schools (Pribram Reference Pribram1992; on the medieval period, see Wood Reference Wood2002). Footnote 8 It can be found in European economic thought since the mid-fourteenth century at the latest; it has even continued to reappear until very recently. Scholars have studied this hunger for bullion or “fear of goods” (according to Heckscher) from various angles, often with a critical stance. John Maynard Keynes, in his General Theory, was among the few influential non-Germanic modern economists who was outspokenly positive, arguing that a net inflow of money would have kept interest rates, and thus the costs of borrowing money, low, which should have helped stimulate incomes, consumption, and employment. In this way, he saw the medieval Usury Laws as an early form of economic management, stimulating the common weal by keeping the marginal profitability of capital high so as to sustain a good level of investment or gross domestic capital formation (Keynes Reference Keynes1936; Böhle Reference Böhle1940; Röpke Reference Röpke1971). In the present context it is important to see how those theoretical considerations (discourses) and practical requirements (policy) went beyond providing good property rights and the frame of a healthy and well-governed early modern Christian market economy. They touched upon the age-old question of economic growth.
On the continent monetary policy always was a policy of order in the market. And the market theory, which the Cameralist authors entertained, from the days of Johann Joachim Becher (1635–1682) and Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff (1626–1692) up to Justi, was quite close to our modern notion of the free market (Harcourt 2001; Eichengreen Reference Eichengreen2007 on post-1945 coordinated capitalism). In this model free markets were defined as markets that were free of rent seeking, monopoly, ruinous competition (“Polipoly,” in the words of Becher), speculation, arbitrage, and other forms of usurious exchange, or what Martin Luther in the 1520s and Cyriakus Spangenberg in the 1590s called vngleiche hendel: asymmetrical transactions involving money as a means of payment, in which one person lost out because of imperfect market knowledge, lack of good money (i.e., reliable, full-bodied coin with which to settle obligations), or lack of stamina and standing to withstand the other person’s usurious desires of getting an unfair advantage by asking for more than the official coin or spot rate of exchange, fixed by the government, would command. This was, in contemporary early modern sources, often called agio or “premium” on the exchange (contemporary German: Aufwexl or Aufwechsel). Footnote 9 In this way the German Cameralists had a strong notion of economic order as a means to raise overall welfare. But the idea did not stop there, as many accounts fixated on the Cameralist notion of economic order would imply (e.g., Tribe Reference Tribe1995). Cameralist theory drew its empirical insights from the realities of the feudal economies of the early modern age, where exploitation of peasants and serfs and rent-seeking possibilities were endemic (Backhaus Reference Backhaus and Robinson Rössner2016; Magnusson Reference Magnusson and Rössner2016). In the German context of “cooperation with nobody in charge” (Seabright Reference Seabright2004, pp. 19–26), the archetypically neoliberal vision of the modern market economy (Harvey Reference Harvey2007) as a means to maximize societal welfare would have been out of order. Free markets had to be created by design; they had to be organized: homo was, as yet, not oeconomicus but still profoundly imperfectabilis (Priddat Reference Priddat2008; Bowler Reference Bowler2002). There were too many competing freedoms in the market, such as feudal and other privileges, as well as possibilities for rent seeking, including monopolies enjoyed by craft guilds (Epstein Reference Epstein2000; Epstein and Prak Reference Epstein and Prak2008).
Political economists facing these sociological and distributive distortions called for an enlightened despot, an abstract discursive figure or model, a stance that has far too often been taken literally. This more abstract ruler could be impersonated by a monarch or parliament or any other body politic that was effectively in charge and that would destroy or crush existing market asymmetries, monopolies, and rent seeking, thus creating the free market from scratch and by design. Subsequent research has accordingly mistranslated the basic idea of “the Statesman” and “policing” the economy—something to be found especially powerfully in James Steuart’s Principles of Political Œconomy (1767, chs. 1, 2), where the economy “began” with the ruler or prince. By taking the German word of Policey-Staat literally and in its modern meaning (a modern translation wrongly suggests “police state”), from which the Cameralist model of free market was essentially derived, many historians of economic thought have taken the Cameralist vision to advocate a form of dictatorial or “police” state. But this could not be further from what the Cameralists really desired. Policey in the eighteenth century meant “policy,” not “police”; Policey thus simply translates as “good economic policy.” The Cameralists had thus put Physiocracy on its feet long before it emerged (Harcourt Reference Harcourt2011), or, in Joseph Schumpeter’s timeless words, advocated our modern notion of “laissez-faire with the nonsense taken out” (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1954, pp. 170–173). Good economic policy in the Cameralist vision meant a free market marked by transparency, equal access, little regulation, and the absence of rent seeking, monopoly, and usury—the market that corresponds to (most) modern models of modern capitalism. But it could not be achieved without rules, laws, and strong governance (see also Harcourt Reference Harcourt2011). Footnote 10
Many contributors to the early modern economic discourse (Cameralism, mercantilism), especially the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Cameralists, also expressed a fear of deflation. Footnote 11 Low prices reflected shortfalls of aggregate demand over supply, often caused by a lack of silver money in the economy that could, if worse came to worst, lead the market economy into depression (Dreissig Reference Dreissig1939, pp. 31–40). Given the times and age, there was usually a lot of common sense to it. Around 1500 Germany exported about sixteen tons of pure silver per year via Lisbon, Venice, and Antwerp into the Baltic, Levant, Africa, India, and China (Rössner Reference Rössner2012, ch. II). Very often this equalled the entire yearly output of the German mines (ibid.; drawing on tables and discussions in Munro Reference Munro, Flynn, Giráldez and von Glahn2003). Throughout most of the early modern period most German principalities remained net exporters of silver, which is borne out not least by the numerous legislations, both on the territorial as well as imperial levels, directed against “mercantilist” measures, such as promoting domestic manufacture and industry, which we find in the imperial policy ordinances of the 1530s and again in the “Imperial Mercantilist” (Reichsmerkantilismus) legislations of the post-1660 period (Bog Reference Bog1959). Prior to the influx of American silver after the mid-sixteenth century, Germany was the world’s largest exporter of silver, not least because of the German native silver mines. Global price differentials in the gold–silver ratio offered the merchants arbitrage opportunities, as silver fetched an increasing price the further east it went. Silver was extensively used in financing the spice trades (Flynn and Giráldez Reference Flynn and Giráldez1995a; Reference Flynn and Giráldez1995b; Reference Flynn, Giráldez and Denzel2004, p. 83). This could have manifest impacts on economic performance, conjunctures, trade, and business cycles, even though the pre-modern market economy worked, in many ways, differently from our modern one (Boldizzoni Reference Boldizzoni2011). Between 1470 and 1530 population increased, whilst silver supplies per capita decreased, leading to deflation in the general price level, and arguably a depression in terms of wages, living standards, and economic activity in the German lands (Rössner Reference Rössner2012, pp. 166–250; Schremmer and Streb Reference Schremmer and Streb1999). Similar mechanisms were discussed in Cameralist textbooks as late as Justi’s Staatswirtschaft (2 vols., 1755; see section IV below); Germany’s economic fortunes obviously rose and fell with the per capita silver stocks in the economy. Accordingly, German political economy and economic theory evolved around these lines, c. 1500–1900.
Silver represented the general means of payment. The Rhenish florin, Rhinegulden, or Goldgulden—i.e., a gold coin containing, around 1500 A.D., 2.5 grams of pure gold—had by 1500 all but vanished from monetary circulation; it remained a money-of-account. It had been substituted since the 1480s by a large silver coin minted to the exact equivalent of one florin or Rhinegulden, weighing in at 27.3 grams of silver in Saxony during the early 1500s. This was the Groschen so einen Gulden gilt (literally: “groat equalling one florin”), later on nicknamed “thaler” (dollar) after the Bohemian mining town of Joachimsthal, abbreviated “das Thal” in the 1500s (today, Jáchymov in the Czech Republic), where large quantities of silver were discovered and minted into coin after 1516. From now on the anchor money would be expressed in terms of silver, rather than gold. Silver was finally adopted as the “imperial” standard (Sprenger Reference Sprenger2002, ch. 7; North 1994, pp. 71–86; North 2009). This means that after 1500 most coins, from the small-change penny (Lat. denarius, d.) and heller (half-penny), to groats (Groschen) and batzen (middle monetary layer or segment), up to the large full-bodied silver coins equivalent to the Rhenish florin, contained at least some silver. But the price of currency on the financial market (exchange rate against other coins) and goods markets (in terms of the basket of consumables one particular coin would buy) was determined by each coin’s intrinsic value or silver content. Footnote 12 Any shortage in the net balance of silver in any of the German states was bound, therefore, to turn into a general monetary shortage, which carried an inherent risk of deflation and depression. And the economic discourse of the day repeatedly picked up on this problem.
Martin Luther, in his great economic treatise of 1524, Von Kauffshandlung vnd Wucher (On commerce and usury; see interpretation and translation in Rössner Reference Rössner2015c), found the emerging global trades of his day disturbing. He called them auslendische kauffs handel (literally “foreign trades”), which brought in, as he said, “from Calicut, India, and such places, wares such as costly silks, gold-work and spices, which minister only to luxury and serve no useful purpose, draining away the wealth of land and people” (Rössner Reference Rössner2015c, p. 176). This concept of superfluous luxury was something Luther shared with the early mercantilists, before later contributions developed a more relaxed stance, admitting that bilateral trade balances may be negative as long as the nation’s aggregate balance of trade and payments remained positive, sustaining a net influx of bullion (Pribram Reference Pribram1992). In a famous and oft-quoted passage, Luther went on:
We have to throw our gold and silver into foreign lands and make the whole world rich while we ourselves remain beggars. England would have less gold if Germany let it keep its cloth, and the king of Portugal, too, would have less if we let him keep his spices. Calculate yourself how much gold is taken out of Germany, without need or reason, from a single Frankfurt fair, and you will wonder how it happens that there is a heller [i.e., the smallest denomination coin: a half-penny] left in German lands. Frankfurt is the gold and silver sink through which everything that springs and grows, is minted or coined here, flows out of Germany. If that hole were stopped up we should not now have to listen to the complaint that there are debts everywhere and no money; that all lands and cities are burdened with charges and ruined with interest payments. (quoted in Rössner Reference Rössner2015c, p. 176)
Luther seems to hint here at a situation of monetary contraction and economic depression, which would explain, given his observations were correct, why interest rates were high in the first two decades of the sixteenth century (see full discussion in Rössner 2015, introd., chs. 2–4). He made equivalent remarks in his Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation (An den Christlichen Adel Deutscher Nation, 1520). Many other works, such as his Table Talk, bear out the classically mercantilist “fear of goods.” In the same year as his Kauffshandlung appeared, a small book was published by the popular preacher Eberlin von Günzburg, entitled I Wonder Why There Is So Little Money in Germany (Günzburg 1524). Ulrich von Hutten and the Imperial Knights, highly educated but impoverished robber barons who played an important role in the early Reformation public discourse, struck the same chord. In his Vadiscus dialogue (1519–20) of the “Romans” (meaning the Curia/Papal Court), von Hutten reported how Rome devised new means of “taking away” money from the Germans day after day. It was three things in particular, von Hutten wrote, that anyone returning from Rome would bring: “bad conscience, an upset stomach, an empty purse.” There were three things everyone at Rome desired: “short Mass, good coins, having a good time” (Bentzinger Reference Bentzinger1983, pp. 46, 52, 72–74). Here, von Hutten hinted at what has become colloquially known amongst monetary historians and numismatists as “Gresham’s Law” or “spontaneous debasement” (Sargent and Velde Reference Sargent and Velde2003). If coins of differing precious metal contents circulated alongside each other at the same denomination level and face value, rational actors would cull out the good money, substituting it with bad money in domestic circulation.
The debates on the Imperial Diet in Nuremberg 1522 picked up on the export of good money and silver, as did the complaints of the Imperial Knights (Reichsritterschaft) in 1523 (Schmoller Reference Schmoller1860, pp. 635–638). The German Reichspolizeyordnung of 1548 (Imperial Policy Ordinance) contained a general export ban on raw wool, as well as the admonition to “wear only domestically manufactured cloth.” The Imperial Resolution of 1555 sounded similar (Schmoller Reference Schmoller1860, pp. 650f.; Blaich 1967, pp. 17–37; Blaich Reference Blaich1970, pp. 135–153). We find early traces here of the strategy later on labeled “import substitution” and “infant industry protectionism.” Later Cameralists, especially Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk (Oesterreich über alles wann es nur will, 1684; cf. Rössner Reference Rössner and Rössner2018 forthcoming) or Justi, up to the economists of the nineteenth century from Friedrich List (1789–1846) to Gustav von Schmoller (1838–1917) and Wilhelm Roscher (1817–1894), developed a full theory about catch-up development by infant industry protection following the lines laid in the economic discourse of the sixteenth century (Reinert Reference Reinert2007, ch. 3; Chang Reference Chang2003). They need no reiteration here. But we should remember three interesting policy stances derived from these late medieval and early modern discourses in the monetary field, which have been understudied. They amount to partly conflicting scenarios, whilst principally serving the same goal—promoting economic stability as well as growth: first, keeping money stable; second, playing around with its external exchange value by coin debasement; and third, increasing money’s velocity.
III. ADVOCATES OF STABLE MONEY—THE CASE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY
As seen above, Oresmius had argued that coins as the chief means of exchange must not be tampered with. Footnote 13 They may only be manipulated by altering, most commonly reducing, their intrinsic value—i.e., silver content—if the market price of silver and gold changed, so as to prevent demonetization. Otherwise, coins would be taken out of circulation and smelted, as their precious metal value would be higher than their purchasing power or nominal value. The only other permissible scenario for “legal” or justified debasement was when society and the common good were in acute danger: for instance, by an imminent foreign invasion. Then the prince would be entitled to collect what modern economics has as “inflation tax” by temporarily increasing seigniorage beyond the acceptable or usual measure (Spufford Reference Spufford1998; Sussman Reference Sussman1993; Rössner Reference Rössner2014a). Generally, coin debasement harmed society and economy, Oresme said, for the following reasons: (1) It increased economic instability, especially when negotiations over a coin’s exchange value made contracts harder to enforce. (2) Coin debasement was considered an unjust transfer of assets (effectively a tax) from the subjects to the king or whoever had the sovereign right to mint coins (Regalian right). (3) Progressive or sustained currency debasement would cause an outflow of good or full-bodied coin—only “bad” or underweight coin would remain within the country (Gresham’s Law). (4) An excess of bad over good money would depress imports, because no one would want to sell goods to a country where payments were made in bad coin. (5) Domestic circulation and exchange would be hampered by bad coin. (6) Rents and all other types of income that were fixed and specified in terms of a certain currency would devalue, too, once this particular currency became debased, as people would adjust their appreciation and thus value of the debased coins downwards once they had discovered the true nature of this debasement. Money would thus lose its function as a means of storing value. (7) People who used differential coin types, making a profit out of substituting bad money for good, or vice versa, depending upon nature and motif for the transaction, would gain an undue profit. Currency arbitrage was deemed usurious, and it did cause widespread economic and social problems as well as unrest in the Germanies around 1500. Footnote 14
Later Germanic texts on monetary theory completely built upon Oresmius. The Tübingen theologian Gabriel Biel (d. 1495), one of the most prolific German Scholastic authors, embedded his monetary theory within an overall treatise on theology (Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarium). Footnote 15 Coin debasement was bad for economy and society, especially when false or underweight foreign coins entered domestic circulation in a form and shape deceptively similar to the commonly accepted old money of good value (the usual case). The common people would not normally be able to distinguish new coins from old, or debased from full-bodied, and would, effectively, be betrayed (Elze and Steiger et al. 1977). Coins must contain precious metal roughly equaling their purchasing power, Biel maintained. Only a small deduction was allowed for covering the expenses of minting (seigniorage and brassage). This remained standard monetary theory, not necessarily practice, into the twentieth century. But if coins were manipulated so as to extract a profit—e.g., by reducing their silver content below the allowance for seigniorage and brassage—this would bring ruin to the country, Biel reiterated, echoing Oresmius. Only when the silver price changed on the financial market so as to price existing coins out of the market would such manipulations be permissible. The bottom line was: “Don’t touch the coins.”
Nikolaus Koppernigk or Copernicus (1473–1543), Prussian churchman, theologian, and astronomer, produced three memoranda on Prussian currency matters between 1517 and c. 1526 (Sommerfeld [1978] 2003; see also Volckart Reference Volckart1996 and Reference Volckart1997). In the first memorandum dating from 1517 (Copernicus, Denkschrift A, printed in Sommerfeld [1978] 2003), he maintained that the coinage was a measure of value fixed by the “community.” An unstable or devalued currency would harm the common good. Copernicus differentiated between two sources of a coin’s particular value: (1) intrinsic value (roughly equaling its market value), derived from the physical amount of precious metal embodied within each coin; and (2) the coin’s official exchange rate set by the government. The coins in a sense “belonged” to the polity or common weal, because they represented the basic way of numbering things and expressing value (qva precia emptibilium vendibiliumqve rerum numerantur, secundum cuiusuis reipublice institutum vel gvbernantis ipsam. Est igitur mensura qvedam estimationum). The polity or community needed a firm and stable measure of value and order in exchange so that the public may carry out their business and transactions without fraud and uncertainty (Oportet avtem mensuram firmum semper ac statum servare modum; alioqvi necesse est confundi ordinacionem reipublice). Such a reliable measure and standard of value could be achieved only through a stable—read: “unadulterated”—currency of good standard of weight, which everybody can determine and, accordingly, trust (Hanc ergo mensuram estimacionem pvto ipsius monete; qve etsi in bonitate materie fundetur oportet tamen valorem ab estimacione discernere; Copernicus, in Sommerfeld [1978] 2003, p. 24 Latin; p. 25 German translation).
Coins enjoyed a liquidity premium over uncoined silver bars or ingots. Individual probations of coins by the economic actors proved ineffective, as this required considerable knowledge of metallurgy and financial markets (ibid.). Money changers, mint masters, and merchants had this kind of knowledge; the general public did not. They would have to trust the circulating means of exchange bona fide (i.e., give and take coins by tale; see Sargent and Velde Reference Sargent and Velde2003), or else, if they mistrusted the coins, try to accept them at their real value or silver equivalent (by weight), i.e., at a discount (when coins were undervalued or debased). Clearly, the liquidity premium argument worked only if coins did contain sufficient precious metal, as over time people would devise ways and means to find out or else “spread the word” to those who could not find out themselves; then the public would rate down the coins in day-to-day or spot exchange, i.e., give and take such coins at a discount or disagio. Footnote 16 Copernicus admitted that coins may contain less precious metal than their face value; this difference must not exceed the cost of minting (brassage plus seigniorage); then the value of the coin was considered “just” (Copernicus 1517, in Sommerfeld [1978] 2003, pp. 24–25). As did every Scholastic author since Oresmius and many others still to come, Copernicus thought it a matter of course that devaluation of the currency by means of coin debasement was a no-go. He said in his more detailed 1526 memorandum that there were four plagues of mankind: war, plague, hunger, and coin debasement (monete vilitas; Copernicus 1526, in Sommerfeld [1978] 2003, pp. 48–49). Contrary to the first three evils, which are obvious, coin debasement made for a slow corrosion of the common weal (quia non vno impetus simul, sed paulatim et occulta quadam ratione respublicas euertit; ibid.). Modern rationales, especially the post-World War Two Deutschmark monetary paradigm, from which the EURO was begotten towards the end of 1999 during the Kohl supremacy, have made similar claims as to monetary stability and the well-being of the common weal. In Copernicus’s vision bad coins made purely or chiefly of copper would cause trade, especially exports, to decay. Foreign merchants would disappear; no foreign merchant would sell for debased coin. Debased coin would purchase nothing in foreign lands, either (Copernicus 1526, in Sommerfeld [1978] 2003, pp. 54–55). This would lead, Copernicus was convinced, to the utter ruin of the country (ingentem reipublice prussiane … in dies magis et magis supine negligencia miserabiliter labi ac perire sinunt; ibid.). Gold- and silversmiths and expert metal traders—the financial market speculators of those days—would profit from debased money by sorting out and buying up the old coins, resmelting them, and selling the silver back to the mints (Gresham’s Law) (ibid.). Here, we are reminded again that monetary policy those days was dependent upon free minting. Essentially, it was a free-market game: the amount of money, as well as its composition (small-change pennies; medium-sized groats; full-bodied thalers, etc.), was determined by the public who brought silver and gold to the mint to have it coined or, in the case of foreign money, recoined into domestic money (Sargent and Velde Reference Sargent and Velde2003). Governments had no control of the amount of money in circulation. The state simply set the “mint ratio,” the amount of coin in a specified denomination (florin, thaler, shillings, kreuzers, pennies, farthings, hellers, mites, etc.) that the public received for bullion delivered to the mint. Footnote 17 The state sometimes could, but to a very limited extent, control the composition of domestic new supplies of coins by balancing the amount of small change vis-à-vis full-bodied money. Spontaneous debasement (Gresham’s Law) resulted in an oversupply of bad underweight coin in the economy. It would cause price inflation.
Modern research on price-level trends during the so-called Price Revolution (1470–1620) has confirmed Copernicus’s hypothesis. Prices quoted in pennies—the money of the common man—increased more than twice as fast as prices expressed in “good” money such as florins and thalers over the 150 years or so of this inflationary cycle (Sprenger Reference Sprenger1977). This was a result of these coins’ higher velocity of circulation. They were heavily debased and of little use in the long run. People tried to get rid of them as fast as they could, as such coins were of no use for saving or storing value (Rössner Reference Rössner2014a, pp. 327–328). Copernicus was convinced that only those countries where good coins circulated would also do well economically and flourish. Countries with a weak currency would suffer from “inertia” (ignavia), idleness and stagnation (desidia), even “regression” (resupinatio) (Copernicus 1526, in Sommerfeld [1978] 2003, p. 56). Not everyone would share this view, as will be seen in section III.
The anonymous “Albertine” or “Catholic” (Old Church) voice in the Saxon currency debate (Münzstreit, 1530–31), which Roscher and Schmoller judged to be amongst the first pieces of modern economic analysis, Footnote 18 echoed Oresmius, Copernicus, and the other medieval metallists. Receivers of fixed income streams, such as interest, rent, and census payments, would suffer most from currency debasement (Aber die geringe Muentze berawbet von stundt den nehmer des zehinden pfennigs seins guths / vnd alles seins werths / vnd zuweylen mehr / das er zu auffgelde geben mus; Gemeyne stimmen von der Muntz [Dresden 1530]; facsimile in Schefold Reference Schefold2000a, p. 6). In a way, the anti-debasement voices of the day represented the interests of the capitalist “upper classes.” But it was not only the rich whose fortunes were harmed by bad money. The entire common weal suffered, as research on coin debasement and social unrest during the time of the medieval peasant wars and the early Reformation in Germany has shown (Rössner Reference Rössner2012, ch. IV). Bad coins would keep the level of economic activity below full potential. Business and commerce flourished only where a reliable and stable currency prevailed, the Albertine maintained (ibid., p. 7). Bad coin drove up prices for imports (ibid., p. 11), as well as domestic goods traded within the domestic economy, as the seller would adjust her supply price to the precious metal content of the coins offered in return (assuming that coins circulated by weight, and not by number or tale). Bad money would cause inflation and thus harm to the people (ibid., p. 7). The negative welfare effect of an underweight currency that kept the economy below full potential was also highlighted by the Saxon jurist Melchior von Osse (1506–1557) (Testament [1556] 1922; discussion in Dittrich Reference Dittrich1974, pp. 40–42): where good money circulated, business and economy flourished, as did fiscal income. Footnote 19
Georgius Agricola (1494–1555), a polymath who wrote a series of learned treatises on medicine, geology, mining, and metallurgy (e.g., De re metallica, 1556), said in his De precio metallorum et monetis libri III (Three books on money and the price of metals, 1550), that money use was more efficient than barter exchange (Agricola [1550] 1959, p. 352) for several reasons. First, coins make it easier for prices to form and adjust. This sounds familiar to anyone who has read William Stanley Jevons (Jevons Reference Jevons1875): it is the “coincidence of wants” argument (which goes back to Aristotle, though). Money reduces transaction costs because it reduces complexity in exchange. Second, the costs of transporting money were lower than payment in goods or barter. Third, coins were needed to settle debts with people who will not take our wares in return, Agricola said (Agricola [1550] 1959, p. 352). He picked up on one of the most prominent debates and pressing issues of the day: whether coins should circulate full-bodied or debased (i.e., overvalued), giving both pros and cons (ibid., p. 358). The arguments in favor of a full-bodied coinage were, first, that coins represent, as the document says, a “treasure” or “investment”—they are worth their value everywhere. Undervalued or debased coins have a higher value where they are struck, because in their native realm they contain a small fiat element, whilst in foreign nations they are likely to be given and taken below face value, at a discount reflecting their factual silver content or “real” value (ibid.). The second argument was that countries or regions where bad or debased money is struck will be less favored by merchants than countries where good (full-bodied) coins are struck (ibid.). Customs and toll revenues will decline; investors and entrepreneurs will migrate to those states offering better currency (ibid.).
The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Cameralists were in line with the “medieval” arguments sketched so far, extending from Oresmius to Osse. Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff argued, in his Teutscher Fürsten-staat (The German princely state, [1656] 1720), Footnote 20 that coins represented a standardized means of exchange. They should therefore always retain their “just” weight. As did all medieval and Scholastic authors before him and most of them after him, Seckendorff avoided a specification of how much debasement or underweight was “just” or “right.” He evoked the functionalist argument and origin myth of money—that money had been invented as societies became ever more complex and moved from barter to monetized exchange. Even Scripture confirmed, in Seckendorff’s view, that the use of money had been common in biblical times. Money made of precious metal fulfilled all qualities for this purpose: it was scarce; it was highly estimated by the people; and it could be made to represent value and thus facilitate the exchange of different products of different type, amount, quality, etc., which would otherwise have to be bartered against each other using costly and time-consuming schedules of enquiry without the necessary guarantee that there was always a coincidence of wants (Denn man zu dem tausch nicht allerley so weit bringen, noch an jedem ort so wohl, als an dem andern, verhandeln oder angenehm machen koennen; Seckendorff [1656] 1720, pp. 406–407).
Whilst Jevons and virtually all modern textbooks on monetary theory have copied this stance—most of them surely unwittingly—classical archaeologists, cultural anthropologists, and some monetary historians are in disagreement with this origin story of money, suggesting a state-driven process of money’s origin instead (e.g., Graeber Reference Graeber2011; Reden Reference Reden2011; Peacock Reference Peacock2013). Precious metal had been transformed by the princes (monetary authorities), Seckendorff said, into coins of varying design, shape, size, and purchasing power. And due to the fact that this regal privilege had been transmitted to the hundreds of political authorities within the Empire, a considerable level of confusion about currencies had ensued (Seckendorff [1656] 1720, pp. 410–411). Coins should not be tampered with or altered at will (daß eine jede müntze in gold, silber und kupffer, ihr verordnetes, richtiges gewichte habe; ibid., pp. 412f.), as this would reduce people’s trust in them. Transaction costs would rise. Seckendorff acknowledged, however, that princes and other monetary authorities should have the right of striking slightly underweight coins, but only for compensation of expenses incurred in the process of minting (brassage); perhaps this also included an allowance for seigniorage. He alluded to a famous principle in the business economics of running a mint (mints were usually leased to wealthy merchants): the cost of minting coins was inversely related with a coin’s nominal value. As labor and capital costs of minting were the same for each coin regardless of the weight or denomination (value) of a particular coin, the costs of minting small-denomination coins would be proportionally larger for small-change coins compared to high-value/full-bodied coins (Munro Reference Munro and North1993). Small-change coins must be slightly debased, the logical conclusion went, lest their production became, over all, unprofitable. Seen in the reverse, this explains the temptation of early modern mint masters and rulers to issue heavily debased small-change pennies and bad groats. It is important to note that the practice of introducing a fiat element into the small-change segment of the currency must not be confused with deliberate or outright debasement, i.e., coins whose precious metal content was reduced significantly below face value so as to increase the mint master’s profit or the gain of the fisc (inflation tax). Seckendorff considered debased coins “abominable,” “fraudulent,” and harmful to the people (schaendlich, gemischten, betrieglichen, unwuerdigen sorten by which viel leute in schaden und armuth erbaermlich gesetzet warden (Seckendorff [1656] 1720, p. 416).
The later Cameralist authors followed suit. Suffice it to quote Justi, who, with his classic treatises on principles of economics (Staatswirthschaft 1755; Grundsätze der Policey-Wissenschaft, 2 vols., 1756), arguably produced the finest models of Cameralist economics (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1954, pp. 170–173). Like most of his predecessors, Justi stressed that underweight coins would reduce people’s trust in them and depress future expectations in the performance of the well-run common weal or economy, thus doing harm to economy and society. Bad money, he argued, increased transaction costs (Justi [1756] 1782, I, p. 198). Footnote 21
Coin debasement had been one of the biggest socio-economic problems and causes of popular unrest in the age of the Reformation (Rössner Reference Rössner2012, ch. IV). It continued to be endemic in the continental economies between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries. But not every writer would have concurred that debasing coins was a bad thing per se. In fact, there were quite interesting variations upon the standard monetary theory of the Middle Ages, which were not so monolithic as they appear, after all.
IV. ADVOCATI DIABOLI—PLAYING AROUND WITH THE EXCHANGE RATE
Six years after Luther’s Von Kauffshandlung vnd Wucher appeared in 1524 (On commerce and usury; see Rössner Reference Rössner2015c), the anonymous “Ernestine” or heterodox (1530) voice in the Saxon currency dispute (see above), Footnote 22 a Protestant and clearly someone belonging to the Saxon merchant community, made an important departure from the prevailing mainstream. He said that
the same kingdoms, countries and islands [referring to the Low Countries/Holland, England, and France] have orientated their business, commerce, order of things, economic policy and practical economic activity thus that they export their and other countries’ goods predominantly to us Germans, as well as Hungarians and Bohemians, thereby bringing our money into their country, which enriches them and makes their wealth increase.
...
Our domestic industry is geared towards accumulating and exporting money and wealth [silver being Saxony’s main export commodity] and take manufactured imports in return. This enriches about a hundred people, whilst driving princes and the common man, numbering more than one hundred thousand, to ruins. (Die Muentz Belangende Antwort vnd bericht [1530] 2000, p. 41) Footnote 23
The Ernestine had a point. Saxon silver at his time may well have contributed up to 50% of European silver output (Munro Reference Munro, Flynn, Giráldez and von Glahn2003, tables). Theoretically, the Saxon rulers would have been able to produce what should have been by far the finest currency of their age (Rössner Reference Rössner2012, ch. III; Rössner Reference Rössner and Schattkowsky2013). Footnote 24 As silver was cheaper in Saxony than elsewhere, coins should have contained more silver, reflecting the inverse relationship between goods prices in the economy and the price of silver money in Saxony, compared with the lands that had no domestic silver resources and relied upon foreign trade and payments to replenish domestic silver stocks. But it followed that Saxon goods paid in full-bodied heavy money would have been less competitive on markets outside Saxony, where goods were paid with lighter money, coins that contained proportionally less silver than the “good” and “hard” Saxon currency did. The Ernestine specifically identified the overvalued currency as the prime cause for Saxony’s lack of competitiveness in the international economy (den wirdigen / vberigen wert der Muentz / Vnd was ferner dem anhengig erfolgt) because, as he maintained, an overvalued “strong” (wirdigen) currency drove up prices for consumables as well as servants’ wages (so doch die kauff wahr / das gesinde lon / vñ alle gemeine zerung vnd ausgaben / bey der wirdigen Muentz erhoehet vnd gestiegen). The recipe the Ernestine suggested in consequence, however, sounds somewhat surprising, as this is the least that one would expect from a late Scholastic or mercantilist author. He straightforwardly suggested that the Saxon currency be debased by raising the amount of coins struck out of a silver mark (around 250 grams) from 8¼ florins Rhenish to 10 florins Rhenish. This debasement in the order of 21% would have led to an effective devaluation of the Saxon currency, because the public would give and take coins by weight, not tale, according to the market value of the precious metal contained in them. As Europe’s monetary history shows, people quickly adjusted their appreciation of devalued coins downwards. Within weeks or months after each new mint run, or as soon as the common man received reliable information regarding the new coins’ factual intrinsic value, market or spot exchange rates for debased small-change coins would diverge from their “fixed” or official coin exchange rate stipulated in the government edicts (Sussman Reference Sussman1993; Sargent and Velde Reference Sargent and Velde2003; Rössner Reference Rössner2012, chs. III, IV; Rössner Reference Rössner2014a). They would usually adjust downwards, turning debasement into effective devaluation of the new currency. This would cause inflation—for prices of those goods that were paid in small-change coin (mainly consumables and everyday items)—and thus result in a downward adjustment of the domestic currency in terms of foreign coins. This quick fix should, as the Ernestine expected, have solved Saxony’s economic problem of the day. It would have boosted Saxony’s competitiveness by making Saxon domestic exports cheaper on the international market. It would also have reduced the demand for imports, which would become more expensive. And, more importantly: the money would remain in the country (damit das gelt souil mehr ynn landen blieben).
Modern policies of devaluation have sometimes worked according to the logic presented in the 1530 Ernestine voice in the 1530–31 Saxon currency dispute (Schefold Reference Schefold and Schefold2000b). This assessment, however, flew in the face of what medieval monetary theorists, drawing upon the Scholastic argument of “just” or good currency, cherished as the cornerstone of the prevailing monetary paradigm: currencies needed to be sound. Only a stable currency would reflect, and safeguard, an ordered, fair, and well-governed Christian common weal! To most contemporaries, suggestions such as the Ernestine’s must have sounded perverse (Rössner Reference Rössner2012, ch. IV). It is only one and a half centuries later that we hear such an unorthodox voice again. Johann Joachim Becher was one of seventeenth-century Germany’s most-celebrated economists, a polymath, alchemist, project maker, and close associate of the London-based Royal Society. He traveled widely in England and Scotland during the 1660s after a spell in the Netherlands, and attained proverbial fame as a “project maker,” propagating the creation of an East India Company for the rather insignificant Duchy of Hanau. He became acquainted with Prince Rupert of Palatine—cavalier, daredevil, and Lord High Admiral of the Royalist Navy during the English Civil Wars (Roscher Reference Roscher1864, p. 40). He was hailed by Schumpeter as the inventor of “Becher’s Law,” commonly known nowadays as “Say’s Law” (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1954, p. 283). Footnote 25 In his 1668 work on Politischer Discurs: Von den eigentlichen Ursachen deß Auf- und Ablebens der Städt, Länder und Republicken (Political discourse on the rise of cities, states and republics), Becher made remarks similar to Seckendorff’s (see above) on the general nature of money as a means of reducing transaction cost, in comparison with the counterfactual (and counterintuitive) system of pure barter exchange (on Becher, see Roscher Reference Roscher1864, pp. 38–59; Hassinger Reference Hassinger1951; Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1954; also Rössner Reference Rössner and Isenmann2014b). Money was the nervus rerum (Nerv uñ Seel) of things, Becher wrote. There ought to be a uniform currency in each country. A good-quality standard was to be kept for the coins in circulation (Becher [1668] 1688, pp. 269–270). But then Becher made a departure from mainstream dogma, suggesting upfront that domestic currency may be minted 5% below the intrinsic value of foreign moneys, so as to prevent spontaneous debasement (Gresham’s Law). None of the previous authors had dared to quantify such a digression from the “pure” standard, albeit it seems as though a 5% debasement was a humble suggestion. It certainly was low by comparison with the Ernestine devaluation of 21% (see above) and possibly in line with medieval Scholastic stability commands, which had propagated maximum interest rates of 5% per annum. By issuing underweight coins, Becher said, the desire to export money was reduced and a somewhat healthier amount of money would be retained for domestic circulation (Becher [1668] 1688, p. 272). Domestically, the money would circulate at face value with foreign coins. But everyone who took it abroad would incur a loss on the exchange rate in the order of 5%, as the foreign money markets would rate, following the common notion of giving and taking coins by weight, the domestic coins based on their precious metal content. Becher called this a “justified tax” on the export of money (billige und rechtmaessige impost und zoll, ibid.). Foreign exchange transactions should be monitored and cleared through an exchange bank (Wechsel=Banck) financed using the profits yielded by the (mildly) debased coins (Becher [1668] 1688, pp. 272–274). Blueprints for such an exchange bank can be found in Amsterdam (Wisselbank, est. 1609) or Nuremberg (Banco Publico, est. 1621; see Denzel Reference Denzel2012). They were modeled on earlier Italian public and city banks known since the Middle Ages (Spufford Reference Spufford2006).
Becher had realized one important thing. People need a certain amount of money to make society and the economy run smoothly, quite regardless of each coin’s intrinsic value: money is an important economic resource in the process of growth and development. This leads us to the final point: the promotion of velocity as a means of economic policy.
V. VELOCITY, OR THE MANAGEMENT OF MONETARY MASS
In his masterpiece A History of Economic Reasoning, Footnote 26 Karl Pribram once hypothesized that the discovery of velocity was made by mid-seventeenth-century English economists (Pribram Reference Pribram1992). William Potter’s The Key of Wealth, or A New Way for Improving Trade (1650) seems to have been the first work in English discussing it in a specific manner (Pribram Reference Pribram1992, 1, pp. 147–148). Schumpeter, in his likewise monumental yet unfinished History of Economic Analysis (1954), concurred, claiming that velocity “did not acquire substance until the last decades of the seventeenth century. This was a purely English achievement” (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1954, p. 316). These assessments are in need of revision. When placed into a wider context, we find one origin of “velocity” in sixteenth-century German economic texts.
As did most of the later Cameralists, but, strikingly, also earlier voices such as Martin Luther, the Humanists, and authors of the German Imperial Ordinances trying to ban the import of foreign cloth manufactures into the Germanies in the 1530s and 1540s (see above), Potter based his observations on a perceived situation of “decay of trade,” a slump or trade depression. It is difficult to come up with economic data suitable to prove or disprove this proposition, but that is not the matter. Important for the development in economic reasoning was that people believed they lived through an age of trade depression and that they, accordingly, devised increasingly refined models of dealing with such a depression. What Potter stated would be good, first and foremost, for business. Many of the mid-seventeenth-century English mercantilists were successful merchants and businessmen, after all. But successful strategies of overcoming a commercial depression could, with modifications, be turned into a theory useful for the entire common weal (Potter 1650, preface; not paginated). The German Cameralists had this as Umlauf, with Potter’s “revolution” and the Cameralists’ “Umlauf” coming close to what the modern monetary conception has as the left side of the Fisher Equation (M.V, or effective monetary mass; Boldizzoni Reference Boldizzoni2005). Such a “quick current” (Potter 1650, bk. I, sec. VII; bk. II, sec. III) would be a sign of ample supply of commodities and low prices—i.e., a glut in the market. (Contemporary German linguistic convention had this as wohlfeile Markt.) Footnote 27 This was because, as Potter went on, “seeing for that we cannot increase money at pleasure to any quantity needfull; we have no feasible means whereby to quicken Trade (as I said before), but by multiplying a firme and knowne credit amongst Tradesmen, fit to transmit from hand to hand” (Potter 1650, p. 41). Footnote 28
Modern economists may agree by saying that credit adds to velocity of money (V), not the amount of money as such (M), even though historians and economists have been in debate about this conceptual problem (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1954, pp. 318f). Footnote 29 John Locke (1632–1704) was amongst the first to study the frequency and rhythms of payment and the duration of time people would withhold money from the market, thus pre-empting Keynes’s concept of demand for money to hold (Pribram Reference Pribram1992, I, p. 147). Potter stressed the importance of “quicknesse of trade” and “to quicken the revolution of money and credit,” so that “money, resting no where [sic] must needs occasion a quick current thereof” (Potter 1650, p. 72). The metaphor of blood circulation, used, amongst others, in Thomas Hobbes’s 1651 treatise, was popular during the seventeenth century; according to Heckscher, it had earlier precedents (sixteenth century). Charles Davenant highlighted the necessity for “A quick Stock running amongst the People,” and William Petty (1661), another important mid-seventeenth-century English economist, stressed that the more hands a fixed sum of money passed through throughout the year, the higher would be national income and employment (Heckscher Reference Heckscher1932, II, p. 198). Petty wrote about “frequency of exchange” and “frequency of commutations.” Amongst others, he drew attention to the fact that different classes of people would know different rhythms and thus frequency or turnover of payment. Artisans often gave short-term credit, and accounts were settled weekly, whilst long-distance and wholesale trade was often running along long lines of credit extending several months, if not years. Irving Fisher (1867–1947) acknowledged this differentiation in payment habits as an important way of “measuring” velocity (Morgan Reference Morgan2006, pp. 14f.). According to Mary Morgan and Andrea Finkelstein, Locke’s introduction of velocity into the economic discourse can be seen as an “innovation” (Finkelstein Reference Finkelstein2000, p. 112; Morgan Reference Morgan2006, p. 3). But if we look to the continent, adopting a broader and long-term view, this conception once again turns out to be anything but new.
The above-sketched dimensions of velocity represented the epistemic base of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English mercantilists. Continental authors, however, worked under a slightly different conceptual-epistemic framework, yet often came to surprisingly similar conclusions (see also Simon Reference Simon and Isenmann2014 and Boldizzoni Reference Boldizzoni and Rössner2016). The Spanish Scholastics of the School of Salamanca had known the concept of velocity, but seem to have interpreted it as a constant (Grice-Hutchinson 1993). Later authors would take a very different opinion. In 1664 we find in France the voice of Jean de Lartigue, who stated:
The Prince’s affairs must be put in order, his debts paid, … his treasury filled … and employed immediately for outlays and the needs of state, in fear that it [money] will languish and fail; if we do not keep the existing [stock] of money in circulation it is put in reserve and produces nothing. Instead, by passing from hand to hand it gives vigor to commerce of which it is the soul. (quoted in Rothkrug Reference Rothkrug1965, p. 90)
Another Frenchman, Jean Eon, had maintained in 1646:
[A]s several persons form a family, several families a bourg, several bourgs a town and several towns a kingdom, so … the good of the kingdom depends upon the well-being of the towns, that of the towns upon the happy condition of the bourgs, and [that] of the bourgs on the ease and facility of the individual persons. Thus by relating the first to the last we find the happiness and complete felicity of the state depend upon the prosperity and good fortune of individual people. (quoted in Rothkrug Reference Rothkrug1965, pp. 92f.)
This sounds familiar to the analytical concept of Glückseligkeit (a holistic concept of a societal welfare-maximization schedule similar to modern-day Bhutan’s “Happiness Index”) to be found in German economic discourse since the age of von Seckendorff’s Fürstenstaat (1660) (Priddat Reference Priddat2008). But it also shows awareness of the possibility of a functionally and well-differentiated market economy.
The German Cameralists picked up on a discourse that was about 300 years old by the time Cameralism condensed into encyclopedic knowledge, laying the foundations for continental non-Anglo-Saxon economics, 1600 to 2000 A.D. (nowadays somewhat misleadingly classified as “heterodox” in the JEL keyword list). Georg Gottfried Strelin (Strelin 1788, entry “Geld,” p. 163) distinguished between Umlauf (perhaps the amount of money in circulation, perhaps monetary mass, perhaps the transactions volume—it is not always easy or straightforwardly sensible to transmit modernisms such as “M.V=P.T” to historical problems and times) and its Lebhaftigkeit (vivacity) as important variables for monetary circulation, alongside the coins’ intrinsic value as another manifest economic variable. A good Umlauf or revolution (in the sense of re-volution or circulation returning to its origin point and starting anew) of money was accompanied by low interest rates (niedrige Interessen), absence of “mistrust,” and adverse relations or terms of trade between the number of goods, on the one hand, and total amount of money in circulation, on the other hand (i.e., inflation or deflation; ibid.). The more money in circulation, and thus the higher the Umlauf, the lower the Interessen. Low interest rates were indicative of a high supply of money relative to demand (ibid., p. 162). But how could the effective monetary mass (M.V) be stimulated? It could be enlarged through the creation of paper money (papiere; ibid., p. 160)—the most obvious and increasingly popular answer during the later seventeenth century. This was an age of alchemists and project makers, amongst which land banks and other collateralized note-issuing financial institutions were most popular (just consider John Law’s various financial adventures, Wennerlind Reference Wennerlind2011; Carey and Findlay 2011; also Bensen 1798, p. 302). Another means was to attract wealthy foreigners and producers of high-quality manufactures, so as to increase foreign exports (Strelin 1788, p. 160). This was standard fare in contemporary economic theory, most clearly laid out in Austrian economist and state servant Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk’s major economic treatise, Oesterreich über alles wann es nur will (Austria Supreme [if only it wills so], 1684) (Rössner 2018 Reference Rössner and Rössnerforthcoming). Cultural transfer would lead to knowledge transfer and emulation and the generation of useful knowledge (Reinert Reference Reinert2011, ch. 1). This was especially important in domestic manufacturing, and a strategy known widely in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, from Austria and Prussia to Scotland and Sweden in the north (Rössner Reference Rössner2015a).
The Umlauf of money—and goods—should be “vivacious,” as the texts went on. What the blood circulation was to the animal and human body, a good monetary and goods circulation was to the economy (Strelin 1788, entry “Geld,” p. 163). Commodities and money would be “drawn to each other” like blood contracted to the human heart, only to be released back again into circulation thereafter, when the heart pulse expanded, to attract new purchases and goods over and over again, so that no “beggar” and no Kapitalist (as in the original German, i.e., someone hoarding money for speculative purposes) could possibly survive (und es würde kein Kapitalist und kein Bettler seyn; ibid.). Money hoarded in the vaults of the avaricious Kapitalist and lack of liquid funds in the hands of the producers would increase interest rates, leading to disequilibrium (allein das Gleichgewicht hört auf). The increased costs of borrowing (interest) would be reflected in higher prices charged by the producers of the goods. Only a good Umlauf and moderate interest rates would keep the organism at equilibrium.
Low interest rates in England, as Strelin went on, were indicative of England’s national productive wealth (Strelin 1788, p. 162). Modern research on the English fiscal-military state, the Glorious Revolution, and the origins of Britain’s industrialization has confirmed this. Low interest rates on government borrowing were part and parcel of the fiscal-military state and the British economic miracle of the post-1688 early industrial period (Yun-Casalilla and O’Brien Reference Yun-Casalilla and O’Brien2012; Stasavage Reference Stasavage2011). Once again, this line of argumentation sounds almost Keynesian to the modern ear, and we know that Keynes was so appreciative of the mercantilists that he devoted an entire chapter of his General Theory to them (Keynes Reference Keynes1936, ch. 23; although he never mentioned the Cameralists, who may have given him the better historical precedent). Vivacity of circulation could be stimulated through population growth—i.e., a rise in domestic demand induced independent of a possible increase in per capita income; the expansion of manufacturing as well as auswärtige Kommerzien (exports, mainly manufactures; Strelin 1788, p. 150). Later Cameralists, such as Eduard Baumstark, would stress, on top of population level and density, the level of division of labor, economic specialization, and diversification within the economy (Manchfaltigkeit von Gütern, Nutzungen und Leistungen) as factors upon which level and vivacity of circulation were contingent (Baumstark Reference Baumstark1835, p. 570). Banks—land banks, giro and deposit banks, extending credit, and clearing bills of exchange—as well as “foreign trading companies” were also seen as a generic and powerful means to stimulate monetary circulation (von Justi [1756] 1782, pp. 201–213). The rather long entry on “Geld,” which appeared in the first edition 1779 (2nd ed. 1787) in volume 17, Geld—Gesundheits=Versammlung of Krünitz’s great economic encyclopedia, on which large parts of later works were based almost verbatim, including Strelin’s above-mentioned entry in his “Realwörterbuch” Footnote 30 —stressed that circulation would be stimulated mostly by “useful and necessary goods,” not luxury wares. This was standard mercantilist fare. Manufactured exports outside the luxury range—everyday textiles, ironware, etc.—were better suited to generate lasting income and employment effects within the domestic economy that produced such goods (Reinert Reference Reinert1999 and Reference Reinert2007; Reinert and Rössner Reference Reinert, Rössner, Reinert, Ghosh and Kattel2016).
Justi, Germany’s most famous and most prolific economist of the early modern age (Wakefield 2009; Reinert Reference Reinert and Backhaus2009), wrote in his Grundsätze der Policeywissenschaft (Principles of policy and economics, 1756) that government should take care to keep a good amount of money in circulation (Umlauf): “Allein der Umlauf des Geldes ist eine so wichtige Sache für die Commercien und Gewerbe, daß eines ohne das andere unmöglich stattfinden kann” (Justi [1756] 1782, I, p. 161). He then went on to establish a functional relationship between Umlauf (i.e., M.V) and the price level (P). If there was less “circulation” vis-à-vis a constant number of goods and services produced, prices will decrease, as silver-based currencies will appreciate. Goods will become cheaper, but employment and incomes will also decrease, which is not good for the economy—classical signs of a trade or even “macro-economic” depression. And with this slightly ambiguous phrase of “circulation” (Umlauf), which is more than merely the amount of money, von Justi also had a grasp of velocity of money in circulation. Government should take care that enough money was circulating at a “healthy” velocity, as Justi maintained, so as to keep the economy running at capacity (Justi [1756] 1782, I, pp. 194–204). He was more afraid of deflation than he was of inflation: he opined that a modest inflation might lead to a boom in economic activity, filling the order books, inducing people to spend more, somewhat spiraling the whole system upwards. Two hundred years later, in 1972, German Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said exactly the same (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 July 1972, p. 8: “Lieber fünf Prozent Inflation als fünf Prozent Arbeitslosigkeit”). Obviously, this could be achieved best by putting more money into circulation. But this was difficult if silver reserves were scarce and currency debasement was to be ruled out as an option—the latter jeopardized social and economic equilibrium and created rifts and tensions within society. Footnote 31 As has been seen above, the German lands—with often uncompetitive domestic manufacturing economies and no native silver resources (with the exception of those states where silver mines were located)—faced a structural downward pressure on their domestic balance-of-payment and were habitually short of money. One alternative to straight currency debasement, in order to stretch the available money supply (M) was, Justi said, to play around with money’s velocity.
But the same strategies and recipes were available elsewhere and widely shared. In the preface to his translation of Anders Berch’s Inledning til Almänna Hushålningen, innefattande Grunden til Politie, Oeconomie och Cameralwetenskaperna (Stockholm: Lars Salvius, 1747) Footnote 32 from Swedish into German, Leipzig professor of Cameralist economics Daniel Gottfried Schreber highlighted how every Swedish university at the time (Schreber’s translation was published in 1763) now had a chair in Cameral sciences, something which the German lands were still far from, and how this had already generated manifest economic advances within the Swedish economy (Berch 1747, preface [Ger. trans. 1763]). Clever economic policy would entail avoiding standstill (Anhalten) of the monetary flow and the lying idle of capital (i.e., a decline in velocity through the vicissitudes of hoarding), Berch wrote in his successful magnum opus (Berch 1747, pp. 417–423; see Reinert and Carpenter Reference Reinert, Rössner, Reinert, Ghosh and Kattel2016, pp. 36–39). Wilhelm Roscher, alongside Gustav von Schmoller, one of the towering figures of the German Historical School in economics, put forth the hypothesis that velocity was a variable rather than a constant, but somewhat culturally contingent. He hypothesized that in the process of development, the amount of money would increase first, and then, when the populace had become accustomed to habitual money use and adjusted their demand for money accordingly, velocity would decrease (Roscher Reference Roscher1854, p. 213). The speed with which money changed hands was dependent upon factors such as political stability (war, peace), economic development, institutions, property rights security, and fluctuations in the business cycle (Roscher Reference Roscher1854, pp. 209f.). It is obvious that this functional relationship or mechanism worked in both ways. But where did Roscher—and many others—get their knowledge of what velocity was and how it was culturally and societally contingent? One historical example may suffice; it means going back to Martin Luther’s life and times.
As we have seen, the Cameralists seem to have devoted increasing attention to circulation, of goods (P.T) as well as money (M.V)—i.e., the idea of a high velocity of money and a low demand for money to hold, which translated into the holding back of money from the market by neither spending nor saving—that is, investing it in return for interest. A low velocity and a high demand for money to hold may lead the economy into a cycle of deflation and depression. The interesting thing is that the eighteenth-century Cameralists made almost exactly the same point as modern (twentieth-century) economists, Keynesians, and many monetarists alike, by establishing a functional relationship between a high demand for money to hold (Keynesian hoarding of money) and a low velocity or “vivacity” of circulation. Think of the famous “Cambridge equation,” which interprets V to be the inverse of the demand for money to hold (k), thus V=1/k and k=1/V. Money that was put to rest idle harmed the economy, as it increased interest rates (Interessen) and lowered disposable income and thus potential (aggregate) demand for goods. This was standard fare in early modern mercantilist and Cameralist economic thought, with a long pedigree dating back to the age of Martin Luther.
As is well known, Martin Luther (1483–1546) was a great critic of religious donations, liturgical luxury, and idolatry. Footnote 33 Part of his new or reformed theology of 1517 evolved around this. His sermons of the early 1520s are full of references to indulgences, luxurious chalices, monstrances, church bells, and altar pieces—i.e., money invested in economically as well as religiously unproductive ways (in Luther’s view). Rather than giving the money to churches and priests for indulgences and other religious or devotional purposes, the money should be allocated to those in need, the poor, the hungry. Sometimes Luther picked up directly on the practice of hoarding or burying money (Rössner Reference Rössner2016d). In his Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen (On translation, 1530), as well as on many other occasions, Luther quoted scripture whilst strictly condemning the practice of burying money: “Thus is why the master in the gospel scolds the unfaithful servant as a slothful rogue for having buried and hidden his money in the ground [Matt. 25:25–26]” (Bachmann and Lehmann 1960, p. 81). Many contemporaries would, during the 1520s and 1530s, reiterate this stance. The abolition of payment for indulgences (one form of unproductive hoarding, as the money was sunk within churches and cloisters), coupled with vicious anti-hoarding debates in the early sixteenth century, mark a pillar of “Reformation economics” (Rössner Reference Rössner2015a and Reference Rössner2016d). Indirectly, therefore, Luther and the early sixteenth-century discourse on hoarding and spending during the early Reformation had developed the idea that money was an economic resource. Money was more than its amount (M): velocity mattered, i.e., the number of times a particular stock of money would circulate within the economy (Rössner Reference Rössner2016d).
The discovery of velocity as a historical protagonist, therefore, happened much earlier than is usually assumed by historians of economic thought. It was known in the German lands in the 1500s and may reflect a specifically German discourse and idiosyncratic response to silver scarcity and balance-of-payment constraints that were specific to post-1500 German states. Geld im kasten ist dem Lande ein schade (“money kept away in a chest will do the country much harm”), Wilhelm von Schröder, alongside Becher and Hörnigk (the third of the seventeenth-century “Austrian mercantilists”), summarized in his major economics work, Fürstliche Schatz- und Rentkammer (Princely treasure chest) (Schröder [1686] 1705, p. 194). So one means of economizing on money as a scarce resource, especially when M was declining, would be to increase its velocity: by dis-hoarding of treasure, or decreasing the demand for money to hold, putting it back into circulation if need be at moderate rates of interest. The current scenario, with interest rates hovering around zero in the EURO zone, even negative rates (as in 2016), shows that we have moved more than full circle, ever since the late medieval and early modern economists—up to Keynes, who confirmed their “rationality”—had advocated a general interest rate ceiling at 5%. Footnote 34 And the difficulty of stimulating Japan’s ailing economy through monetary expansion since the 1990s has widely been acknowledged to be due to a failure of velocity to increase (or, rather, velocity to be increased by suitable economic policy).
VI. CONCLUSION—WHY DOES MONEY MATTER?
Why does all of this matter? The answers have been given already, mainly by the voices of the contemporary discourse, especially those on the pro-Stable Money side (section II) of the doctrinal divide. The majority of the pre-1800 period—bar the Advocati Diaboli (section III) —agreed that currency must remain stable, measured in terms of the intrinsic value of current coins as the main means of monetary circulation. In reality it never did, as the longue durée monetary history of Europe shows. The Scholastic stability command was almost constantly violated. Revaluations (upwards adjustment of currencies’ precious metal content) took place only during less than a handful of years within the 500 years or so of almost continuous debasement, 1400 to 1900 A.D. (Sargent and Velde Reference Sargent and Velde2003; Cipolla 1956; Rössner Reference Rössner2014a). Between 1400 and 1900 German small-change currencies, measured in terms of precious metal content of a sample of seven southern German penny currencies, lost 90% of their intrinsic value (Rössner Reference Rössner2014a). Whilst debasement had been the norm for ages, contemporaries had, for the same time, continuously reminded rulers and kings that it mustn’t. Why the rulers did not adhere to the call, and why medieval and early modern European monetary policy exhibited such seemingly schizophrenic traits of cognitive dissonance, are another matter and beyond the present paper’s remit. Footnote 35 With the exception of the Ernestine (1530) and Johann Joachim Becher, most Germano-phonic economic authors between 1500 and 1800 would have argued that coin debasement did more harm than good to society.
Later authors, such as German Cameralist Johann Friedrich von Pfeiffer (1718–1787), formulated explicitly what rulers and merchants had implied for ages: only within the full-bodied currency segment, i.e., the upper spheres of exchange—florins/gulden, thalers, and good groats—should extrinsic and intrinsic value of the coins coincide (metallist theory) (Pfeiffer 1781, pp. 157–160). These coins were what German language has known for a long time as Handelsmünzen, coins that were used for settling large and long-distance trade balances. Small-change coins, on the other hand (German: Scheidemünzen), had a limited regional area of circulation and may in theory be minted purely as fiduciary money, i.e., be completely made of copper in the extreme, following our modern concept of nominalist or chartalist money (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1954). This strategy has been dubbed by two economists as “getting the formula right” (Sargent and Velde Reference Sargent and Velde2003), by managing and sticking to the “correct”—meaning welfare-maximizing—relation between small-change and full-bodied money in total coin supply. The problem was, of course, that you couldn’t these days mix a fiduciary element (for the regionally circulating small-change coins) with a commodity money standard (high or full-bodied coins), without the common people opting out of this system by creating their own rules, effectively returning to a commodity money standard or payment by weight system for all coins of all denominations, regardless whether full-bodied or small change (Rössner Reference Rössner2012, ch. IV). Wherever the two theories of money coexisted side by side, they opened up possibilities of usury, arbitrage, and rent seeking. Wherever different coins of similar denomination circulated, foreign and domestic, old and new alike, people with insider knowledge would take the opportunity and charge unjust spot exchange rates, i.e., demand more than some coins were officially worth, putting those who had no good money or only little means of attesting to a coin’s factual value at a disadvantage. These manipulations fulfilled all contemporary criteria of usurious behavior. And yet they represented an intrinsic feature of the contemporary monetary landscape, as complaints about such transactions were ubiquitous in early modern Europe until the 1870s (ibid.). Transaction costs increased due to the enhanced coin exchange rates and increased haggling, bargaining, and renegotiating of individual exchange rates between the different coins (ibid., chs. II and III for detailed empirical analysis).
So money was never neutral. It had its inner life. And there was much more to it. The pre-classical economists—from the neo-Aristotelian or late Scholastic authors and bullionists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries until the late Cameralists such as Justi and the German Historical School of the nineteenth century (Dreissig Reference Dreissig1939, pp. 7–9)—were aware of this. Money was an economic resource that could be potentially used to the benefit, if not gain, of the common weal. As monetary policy was one of the more obvious means of doing so, by getting the parameters right, stabilizing economic exchange and property rights, a positive silver balance was seen as a panacea not only for balanced economic development but also for a reliable and credible Ordnungs- und Stabilitätspolitik or policy of order: all subsequent principles of economic policy were derived from it. This policy seems to have worked well in the post-World War Two western German model of coordinated capitalism, the Soziale Marktwirtschaft, based on the stability paradigm of the Deutschmark; but this paradigm had, as the present paper has shown, a prehistory of about 600 years! If currency and monetary policy were managed well, this could lead to economic growth. None of the authors discussed in the present paper seem to have confused silver with wealth (“Midas fallacy”): Adam Smith and those who followed him were simply wrong in this assessment of mercantilism. Most of the “German” authors discussed above, from Biel and Copernicus to the Cameralists such as Seckendorff, Becher, and Justi, knew quite well what money was and what it was not, what it could do and what it could not do, and which functions it was supposed to fulfill as an institution directed at lowering transaction costs, stabilizing property rights, and effecting economic growth and development. They distinguished clearly between money and real wealth.
This is yet another answer to the famous question of why the medieval bullionists and early modern mercantilists/Cameralists were so adamant about a positive balance of payment. It was not that they did get their Game Theory wrong or looked for rent-seeking opportunities, as many later authors have suggested anachronistically. If one followed this line of reasoning, one may in the same way and with the same sense of reasoning sketch the history of cars by starting with the technique of stage-coach building since the 1500s and arrive, quite naturally, at the somewhat logical, yet probably meaningless, conclusion that the sixteenth-century coach makers had not yet worked out the “correct” theory or way of building cars.
We should, therefore, bring back idiosyncrasy as an epistemological tool or “looking glass” into the history of economic analysis and also acknowledge that modern economic reasoning did not start with Adam Smith. It is only from a more modern vantage point—here, a monetary landscape that knows only fiduciary currencies—that Cameralist ideas as discussed at present seem a bit lost on us. This is because we have not learnt to understand the fabric of the canvas on which they were painted. And they may also act as a warning against all modern voices of reintroducing the Gold Standard—because returning to a precious metal-based or “metallist” monetary standard may open more cans of worms than it solves problems.
