To the extent that Nicholas Copernicus (1473–1543) figures prominently in the broader narrative of the early modern Scientific Revolution, students of the Polish canon have taken up various positions concerning his relation to authoritative texts; the ontological and epistemological status which he accorded to models of the behaviour of visible things; the causes and motivations underlying his abandonment of a geocentric planetary model; and his precise relation to a timeless realm of ‘ideas’, ‘views’ and ‘doctrines’. This book addresses all of these issues at once, and does so on the basis of an erudite journey which took the author well over thirty years. Although his book has a clear argument to make, it is at least as important for the wealth of primary materials and evidence which he unearths, often in dialogue with a Polish scholarly tradition that remains largely unknown to most Copernicus scholars.
The title of this monograph nicely encapsulates Goddu's main point: despite the historiographical construction of Copernicus as member of a gallery of great minds who come up with influential ideas in natural philosophy and mathematical astronomy, it is perfectly possible – and historically more accurate – to understand him as a representative of the late medieval Aristotelianism which he was probably trained in at the University of Cracow (1491–1495). More precisely, Copernicus's Cracow teachers inculcated in him specific practical skills and ‘intellectual habits’, the latter turning him into a specific kind of reader, argumentator and scholar (p. 16). Chapters 1 to 5 provide a staggeringly careful and extensive ‘chronological examination of his intellectual development’ (p. 276), completed with a Chapter 6 on Copernicus's Italian period. Unlike many of his Cracow teachers, Copernicus deployed such habits over a much broader range of opinion, further enriched through personal reading and book acquisition (p. 206). The net effect, however, was that he continued to deepen ‘his understanding of Aristotle, and his revision of Aristotelian and scholastic traditions’ (p. 387).
In Goddu's capable hands, this general argument extends even to the million-dollar question of why Copernicus adopted a heliocentric hypothesis as the privileged, or at least ‘more probable’ (p. 291), route towards a ‘reformation of astronomy’ (p. 270). In Chapters 7 and 8, a close analysis of the logic of the early Commentariolus (1510), the preface, and Book I of De revolutionibus (1543), reveals Copernicus engaging in what one might call (although these are not Goddu's words) an ‘archiving’ of the astronomical tradition. Finding that this tradition had not identified a single centre of all heavenly motions, Copernicus adopts this absence as a fact (p. 291), apparently allowing it to function as an Archimedean point from where to advance the fundamental principle of ‘uniform, circular motions of the heavenly bodies’ and nothing else (p. 315) as a criterion for evaluating the credibility of astronomical models. Goddu shows how this fundamental move exemplifies a particular understanding of the Aristotelian claim that ‘astronomical phenomena (the observational facts, data) can follow only from true hypotheses’ (p. 387) which Copernicus was probably taught at Cracow, namely that ‘relevance between hypothesis and conclusion’ (p. 88) can work as a criterion in evaluating the credibility of astronomical hypotheses (p. 315). It is here that Aristotle exercised the ‘most important influence … on Copernicus’ (p. 387), even if the authority which Copernicus attached to a passage in Plato's Parmenides should not be underestimated (pp. 227–229).
Accepting Robert Westman's claim that ‘the revolutionary move in Copernican theory’ is his reversing of ‘the relation between mathematics and natural philosophy’ (p. 317), Chapter 9 proceeds to show how Copernicus ‘tried to adapt Aristotelian principles to the heliocentric system’ (p. 358); indeed, ‘it would take another thirty years after 1543 before explicitly anti-Aristotelian arguments in support of heliocentrism appear’ (p. 360). Chapter 10 considers the implications of this in the realm of ‘mathematical cosmology’, and especially in the relation between mathematical hypothesis and natural-philosophical truth. Goddu concludes with an epilogue that considers the ‘reception of Copernicus's interpretation’ (p. 403) down to Kepler, and may count as a suitable guide for further research into this area too.
As was said before, all this covers but a fraction of the wealth contained in this book, which is beautifully produced and has very few typos (but see pp. 242 and 254). This reader was especially impressed by the extent to which Goddu manages to integrate a long tradition of approaching Copernicus from the history of ideas in a more recent ‘history-of-reading’ approach (even a word like ‘appropriation’ appears near the end of the monograph, at p. 404). This may in turn make possible further developments later on. For instance, when Goddu states that the importance of education for a better understanding of Copernicus lies in the fact that it shapes ‘certain habits of mind’, rather than providing him with ‘sources that he quoted’ (p. xxiv), it is difficult not to be reminded of the theorization of habitus by Thomas Aquinas or Pierre Bourdieu. Fully aware that the mere invocation of French thinkers often suffices to be ‘laughed off the stage’, as Copernicus would put it, I cannot help but wonder at what would happen if one were to take Goddu's stance on ‘intellectual habits’ one step further, and approach it as a strictly individual and formal structure of acquired schemata, sensibilities, dispositions and taste (notice the ease with which the boundary between corporeal ‘skill’ and intellectual ‘habit’ is abolished here, in the best tradition of ‘good works’).
Much the same can be said about an even stronger focus on the history of reading. After all, Goddu does not seem to portray Copernicus's Cracow teachers as men who approach the Aristotelian corpus as the privileged site for an encounter with natural-philosophical truth. Instead, late medieval Aristotelianism is presented as a ‘tradition’ (p. 92) of philosophers presenting the results of their own natural-philosophical explorations as not deviating from, or as ‘preserving’, Aristotelian doctrine (p. 90). This interpretation of Aristotelianism is important, because it allows Goddu to posit a clear-cut distinction between the history of natural-philosophical thought and ideas (in which ruptures with tradition do occur) and the history of the relation of such thought with anterior texts (in which people can think that no such ruptures occur) – in other words a distinction between the history of ‘science’ or ‘ideas’ and the history of ‘scholarship’. It is not clear that such a distinction is as absolute as we would like it to be, especially when we remind ourselves that even the elderly Galileo still liked to portray himself as a true Aristotelian.
For reasons that may ultimately be unexplainable, Nicholas Copernicus has never failed to stimulate the patience, critical self-awareness and erudite efforts of historians of science. André Goddu's book is probably the finest example of this to date.
