In recent years, substantial scholarly research has been done on relations between Zionist leaders and Jordan's King Abdullah I and between Israeli leaders and King Hussein. There are insider accounts of conversations, contacts, meetings, and negotiations and even allegations of collusion between the Zionist leadership and the Hashimites. For two countries in a state of war that persisted more than forty-five years, the chronicle of Jordanian–Israeli relations reads more like the development of an intimate set of strategic bonds between like-minded allies than the story of contests between enemies. The truth, we know, is that the vital national interests of the Zionist movement/Israel and of the Hashimites brought them together to talk peace and cooperation with far more frequency and intensity than in other conflict situations. These neighbors, even periodically at war, simply had much to talk about.
Dona Stewart's short monograph—the substantive text runs to 145 pages—adds a new and interesting dimension to the literature on Jordanian–Israeli relations. Stewart examines the first ten years of the formal peace relations between the two states. Not unexpectedly, she concludes that the relationship between Jordan and Israel “is both strong and quite fragile” (p. 137). Given the centrality of security in Israeli thinking, both sides have invested heavily in trying to ensure quiet along the long border that divides them. In this respect, there has been much success. Jordanian–Israeli security cooperation is quite advanced, and the result has been relative quiet along the border.
Stewart reports on the 1997 assassination attempt against Khalid Mishʾal, the Hamas leader, by Israeli Mossad agents operating in Amman under Canadian cover; she notes that this probably was the low point in relations not only between security services of Israel and Jordan but also between King Hussein and Israeli leaders. However, deep, mutual security interests prevailed over time, and the Mishʾal incident did not derail the basic components of cooperation between the two countries.
In her historical review of the relationship, Stewart leaves some traditional questions unanswered. For example, she quotes another scholar (p. 17) to the effect that Jordan's role in the Arab world meant that Jordan would always side with the Arabs in a confrontation with Israel; however, in the next paragraph, she points out that Jordan sat on the sidelines during the 1973 war. Explaining Jordan's poor track record of fighting Israel when it should not have, and standing down when it probably should have fought, is not the objective of Stewart's analysis. However, the issue is too interesting to have been left in contradiction.
Among the more significant contributions in this book are the data that Stewart has collected on various aspects of normalization. In each aspect of bilateral relations, Stewart methodically chronicles a story of hopeful expectations and far fewer successful realities. Because the analysis and data in the book cover the period ending in 2004, Stewart does not show the impressive numbers that have been registered in recent years as a result of the Jordan–Israel Qualified Industrial Zones—notwithstanding the fact that Asian investors and manufacturers have been substantial beneficiaries. Stewart does show, however, how the competing interests of the two countries—they want to cooperate but too often find narrower interests prevailing to stymie such cooperation—often work at cross-purposes.
Although the normalization components of the peace treaties between Egypt and Israel and between Jordan and Israel have never worked well, it is important that Stewart has prepared a dispassionate report on the subject. Further analysis will help scholars and politicians better understand the pushes and pulls of bilateral relations between former adversaries.
