Historians and commentators have spilled much ink trying to explain why, in 1969, Daniel Patrick Moynihan accepted a job in the Nixon administration. Those close to Moynihan have attributed this “psychologically vexing decision,” to his desire to be at “the center of the political world,” and the sense of alienation from his Democratic Party colleagues that he felt after the publication of the “Moynihan Report” (Hess 2015, 10 and 13; Hodgson Reference Hodgson2000, 144–5). Taking issue with these arguments, others have suggested that Moynihan and Nixon occupied a similar position on the political spectrum during the second half of the 1960s and that Moynihan shifted to the Left once he became a US Senator (Finn Reference Finn Chester2008, 92; Perlstein Reference Perlstein2008, 395).
Both of these interpretations fit neatly with popular and scholarly narratives, which portray the second half of the 1960s as the start of a long period of liberal decline and factional conflict within the Democratic Party (Miroff Reference Miroff2007; Tomes Reference Tomes1998; Bloodworth Reference Bloodworth2013). According to this interpretation, Cold War liberals, the Left, and the decade’s new social movements became bitter opponents during the second half of the 1960s and in the process helped to fracture the fragile New Deal coalition (Cowie and Salvatore Reference Cowie and Salvatore2008; Flamm Reference Flamm2005). In these accounts, Moynihan is depicted as a figure that played an important role in provoking the Democratic Party’s identity crisis and widening schisms between Cold War liberals and the newer generation of rights conscious liberals. Yet in many respects, this conventional narrative of Moynihan as an influential neoconservative and adversary of the Left is flawed. Indeed, as this article shows—at the very moment in time that post-war liberalism was facing great challenges from the Left and the Right, and neoconservatives and traditional conservatives were denouncing those engaged in anti-war protests and inner-city rebellions—Moynihan was spending much of his time doing the opposite and trying to formulate a new liberal politics. Footnote 1
MOYNIHAN’S YEARS AS A CAMBRIDGE POLICY ENTREPENEUR
Prior to 1969, Daniel Patrick Moynihan spent nearly four years outside of Washington. In 1965 he resigned as assistant secretary for labor in the Johnson administration in order to run for president of the New York City Council. However, Moynihan’s first foray into electoral politics ended in failure after he was defeated in the Democratic Party primaries (Clymer Reference Clymer2003). Consequently, Moynihan—who had become a highly controversial figure in the summer when Rowland Evans and Robert D. Novak published excerpts from “The Moynihan Report” in their syndicated newspaper column—found himself without a job in politics for the first time in more than a decade.
After losing the Democratic Party primary Moynihan immersed himself in the world of academia. In 1965 Moynihan spent a year as a fellow at Wesleyan University’s Center for Advanced Studies. After his time at Wesleyan came to an end Moynihan took over from James Q. Wilson as the director of the Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Affairs. By bringing important speakers to Harvard and organizing a highly popular faculty seminar, Moynihan played an important role in transforming the Urban Affairs Center into what his biographer, Godfrey Hodgson, terms an “intellectual powerhouse” (Hodgson Reference Hodgson2000, 131). However, Moynihan never detached himself from the political world. Indeed, despite his limited influence in Washington, Moynihan spent most of his time as tenured professor writing articles, penning op-eds, and delivering speeches that were designed to be read by intellectuals and elected officials in Washington, rather than academics in Cambridge.
The Social and Political Tumult of the 1960s
Moynihan’s first full year at Harvard coincided with a period of profound social turmoil. Between 1960 and 1967 the rate of violent crime (murder, robbery, aggravated assault, and rape) rose by more than 50% (Flamm Reference Flamm2005, 125). During this same period many of America’s cities were rocked by violence. In 1964 New York, Philadelphia, Rochester and at least six other cities experienced major unrest. These proved to be the first in a long series of urban rebellions. In the summers of 1965 and 1966 violence broke out in impoverished and predominantly black neighborhoods of Los Angeles and Cleveland. These rebellions caused huge physical damage, injured thousands, and cast a huge shadow over the Johnson administration. Indeed, as the historian Gareth Davies has persuasively argued, the urban unrest of 1967 “discredited the Great Society’s ideology and seriously undermined its electoral coalition” (Davies Reference Davies1996, 78).
During the same period the Johnson administration also received much criticism over its Vietnam policies. Between 1965 and 1967, more than 8,000 Americans died in Vietnam and official troop deployment numbers increased from 23,000 to 362,000 (National Archives; Young Reference Young1991, 333–4). Protests against the war had begun in earnest in 1965 when the first American combat troops landed in Vietnam. Initially demonstrations were small, protestors were well behaved and the majority of newspapers, elected officials and members of the public backed the Johnson administration’s war policies. However, as the war widened and became more lethal, the size of demonstrations grew and protestors adopted more militant tactics.
During the spring of 1967 a large number of new organizations and individuals joined the anti-Vietnam War movement. In April, Martin Luther King Jr. denounced the Vietnam War and attacked American Cold War policy. After his announcement the civil rights leader became a key figure within the anti-Vietnam war movement. Indeed, by mid-April there were newspaper reports that King was considering standing as a third party candidate in the 1968 presidential election (New York Times 1967).
Although Martin Luther King’s opposition to the Vietnam War was troubling to the Johnson administration, other forms of protest offered a much more direct and immediate challenge. As frustration with the war grew, greater numbers of Americans attended anti-war demonstrations. On April 15, 1967, for example, 200,000 people gathered in New York and 50,000 assembled in San Francisco for the Spring Mobilization (DeBenedetti and Chatfield Reference DeBenedetti and Chatfield1990, 175). Many members of the antiwar movement embraced more radical tactics and directly challenged the authority of the federal government. In December 1966 the national board of the Students for a Democratic Society endorsed anti-draft activity and announced that they would establish regional draft resister unions (Foley Reference Foley2003, 58). Alongside this, a number of prominent celebrities including Muhammed Ali and Carl Wilson, a member of the Beach Boys, took high-profile public stands against the war by refusing to be drafted for military service.
Given the events that were happening on America’s university campuses and its cities—and the debates that were raging over domestic and foreign policy—it was hardly surprising that Moynihan began his June 1967 address to the Harvard chapter of the Phi Beta Kappa fraternity by declaring that “one of the defining qualities of the period of current history…has been the emergence of widespread, radical protest on the part of the American youth” (Moynihan Reference Moynihan1973, 116).
Moynihan’s Phi Beta Kappa Address
Given the events that were happening on America’s university campuses and its cities—and the debates that were raging over domestic and foreign policy—it was hardly surprising that Moynihan began his June 1967 address to the Harvard chapter of the Phi Beta Kappa fraternity by declaring that “one of the defining qualities of the period of current history… has been the emergence of widespread, radical protest on the part of the American youth” (Moynihan Reference Moynihan1973, 116). However, rather than dismissing the “radical protest on the part of the American youth,” “the flamboyance of the hippies, the bitterness of the alienated college youth, [or] the outrageousness of the New Left,” as part of the “never-ending conflict of generations” or “the persistence of neo-Marxist radicalism,” Moynihan argued that it was possible “not only to sympathize with the new protest, but see much that was valid in it” (Moynihan Reference Moynihan1973, 117). Going beyond simply expressing empathy for those young people participating in organized political and social movements, he ended his Phi Beta Kappa speech by urging policy makers to “respond to signs of danger” and listen to what young people were trying to say (Moynihan Reference Moynihan1973,133).
Moynihan’s speech to the Phi Beta Kappa fraternity startled many of the intellectuals that he had developed professional and personal relationships with during his ‘wilderness years.’ After he left the Johnson administration, Moynihan had begun writing for the Public Interest, a journal that expressed cynicism about the capacity of the federal government to cure social problems (Moynihan Reference Moynihan1966; Moynihan Reference Moynihan1967). As a contributor to the Public Interest, Moynihan worked closely and developed friendships with Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, and Seymour Martin Lipset. However, these first age neoconservatives were shocked by many of the positions that Moynihan took in his Phi Beta Kappa speech. Footnote 2
It is easy to see why Moynihan’s Phi Beta Kappa speech troubled his intellectual friends. Both Nathan Glazer and Seymour Martin Lipset reacted to student protests on Berkley’s campus by publicly expressing a Nixon-esque disdain for Left-liberal social movements (Glazer Reference Glazer1965; Lipset and Seabury Reference Lipset and Seabury1965). Glazer and Lipset weren’t alone. Indeed, between 1965 and 1967 a number other contributors to the Public Interest and Commentary voiced similar contempt towards the New Left and their critique of American society (for characteristic examples, see Kristol Reference Kristol1965; Kahn Reference Kahn1966). For these individuals Moynihan’s Phi Beta Kappa speech was highly confusing. By distancing himself from Great Society liberalism and criticizing the law and order approach of conservatives, he echoed the opinions of first age neoconservatives. However, by publicly expressing a large amount of sympathy with the New Left and student protestors, Moynihan also distanced himself from his friends at Commentary and the Public Interest.
It is tempting to try to resolve the disjuncture between the public and private Moynihan during this period by arguing that his speech to the Phi Beta Kappa fraternity was a calculated stand that was designed to win over an audience of 100 would-be student protestors (Harvard Crimson 1967). However, a close examination of the other major public speech that he made during the final months of 1967 reveals that his views on the New Left and social protestors—as well as the failures of Great Society liberalism—were remarkably consistent.
Great Society Liberalism Under Siege
Between Moynihan’s Phi Beta Kappa lecture and his address to the board of Americans for Democratic Action in September of 1967 violence rocked America’s largest cities. In July violence erupted in Newark and Detroit. These riots resulted in the death of 64 people, the destruction of hundreds of businesses, and more than $120 million of property damage (Flamm, Reference Flamm2005 83–103).
After the Newark and Detroit rebellions Moynihan became an emergency urban affairs consultant for the nation’s liberal elite. Indeed, during Harvard’s summer break he presented his ideas to a dozen different people and committees in Washington and was flown to Detroit to explain the causes of the riot by the city’s high profile liberal mayor (Time 1967).
At the same time as he was travelling across the country to provide advice to liberals policy makers, Moynihan was also talking to reporters and journalists. Urban affairs analysts working at the nation’s most prestigious universities received a great deal of media attention in the summer. Given his personal history and record of controversial statements Moynihan was an attractive subject. Indeed, when Life and Time published major articles on the work of urban affairs analysts in the summer and fall of 1967, Moynihan was the person that they focused on and chose to interview in depth (Powledge Reference Powledge1967; Time 1967). As a result, by the fall of 1967 Moynihan was well and truly back in the political and media spotlight.
After the Newark and Detroit rebellions Moynihan became an emergency urban affairs consultant for the nation’s liberal elite.
Vietnam also continued to be a huge source of social tension and the focus of many newspaper and magazine articles during this period. Although there was a lull in antiwar activity during the summer months, there was strong evidence that this would only be a temporary phenomenon. Throughout the summer the leaders of the radical and liberal wings of the anti-Vietnam War movement were organizing large protests that were scheduled for October. Increasingly concerned that the polarized public discussion of Vietnam War movement was dividing America, Moynihan, in the winter of 1967, provided private assistance to the leaders of an anti-Vietnam War group that rejected direct action protest, but urged the Johnson administration to take further steps to encourage a negotiated settlement (Rowe forthcoming).
Moynihan’s ADA Speech
By the time Daniel Patrick Moynihan addressed Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) at the opulent Willard Hotel, the group that had done so much to shape post-war liberalism and consolidate the Cold War liberalism was bitterly divided. During the previous 12 months many prominent liberals had denounced the Johnson administration and raised objections to the White House’s controversial domestic and foreign policies. The student organizer Allard Lowenstein, for example, spent 1966 and 1967 desperately trying to convince the ADA to support someone other than Lyndon Johnson in the 1968 election. Initially, these appeals failed and the ADA remained supportive of Johnson. However, in the spring of 1967, the group’s National Board voted in favor of a resolution that, in the words of the historian Steven Gillon, effectively made “Vietnam the sole test of ADA support in 1968” (Gillon Reference Gillon1987, 198). However, this only increased divisions among competing strands of liberalism. Prominent members of the group that were keen supporters of Great Society initiatives such as former Illinois Senator Paul H. Douglas and Gus Tyler, the leader of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union were particularly appalled by the group’s decision to oppose Johnson and threatened to resign.
Given Moynihan’s reputation for controversy and the outspoken attacks that he had made against the Johnson administration’s War on Poverty, many members of the ADA’s board nervously awaited his speech. However, fears that Moynihan’s ADA speech would open up rifts within the organization proved unfounded.
Moynihan began his speech by pessimistically predicting that “the violence abroad and the violence at home…have the potential for polarizing, then fracturing, American society” (Moynihan Reference Moynihan1973, 186). Footnote 3 Arguing that Great Society liberalism could not address the racial and social divisions that Vietnam and urban uprisings had brought to the surface, Moynihan urged members of the ADA to recognize that their “essential interest [was] in the stability of the social order” and to “seek out and make more effective alliances with political conservatives who share that concern” (Moynihan Reference Moynihan1973, 188). Warning the ADA members of the consequences of not taking this course, Moynihan delivered a nuanced critique of New Frontier and Great Society liberalism, denounced the New Politics contingent of the Democratic Party, and declared that in the present climate members of public were “more amenable to conservative solutions than to liberal ones—or to solutions carried out by conservatives” (Carter Reference Carter2000, 373).
There was no new material in Moynihan’s ADA speech. Indeed, anyone who had read his writings or listened to his speeches while he was at Harvard would have found the speech’s major themes very familiar. Throughout 1966 and 1967 Moynihan argued that popular support for Cold War liberalism had slipped and suggested that liberals needed to adapt their creed in light of the social upheavals of the 1960s. However, because of the speech’s timing and its high profile audience, it caught the attention of America’s political leaders in a way that his Phi Beta Kappa speech did not.
Advisers for Richard Nixon were particularly taken with the speech’s hard-hitting message about the depth of the social crisis that America faced as well as Moynihan’s call for members of the Democratic to stop “pointing fingers” and work with like-minded Republicans to devise solutions to America’s social problems (Moynihan Reference Moynihan1973, 187). In a December 1967 speech to the National Association of Manufacturers Nixon quoted from Moynihan’s ADA speech and in the months that followed the two privately discussed America’s urban problems (Garment Reference Garment1997, 123–4 ). Impressed by Moynihan’s expertise and convinced that he could bolster his bipartisan credentials by appointing a prominent liberal to his cabinet, Richard Nixon asked the Harvard professor in December 1969 if he would head the White House’s new Urban Affairs Council. Accepting the President-elect’s offer, Moynihan in January 1969, brought down the curtain on his time in the political wilderness.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of Moynihan’s public activity between 1965 and 1968 reveals that he remained committed to liberalism throughout and identified much more closely with the organized social movements of the 1960s than the Nixon White House or the emerging neoconservative tendency. A year before the election of 1968 Moynihan fervently believed that policy makers needed to act urgently to ensure that widening social and racial divisions didn’t cause Americans to lose faith in basic values and institutions such as the presidency and liberalism. Footnote 4 Convinced that something urgently needed to be done to ensure that this didn’t happen, Moynihan followed the advice that he had given to liberals in his ADA speech and accepted an offer to work with Republicans. Thus somewhat paradoxically, Moynihan’s decision to join the Nixon administration was driven not by his alienation from the liberal establishment, but by his deep-seated commitment to liberalism and his desire to protect the Democratic Party’s future.
