“It isn’t what you don’t know that will get you into trouble,
it’s what you know that isn’t true.”
(Attributed to Will Rogers, or Josh Billings, among others)
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1999 HOPE conference directed by Mary Morgan and Malcolm Rutherford changed how historians of economics, and historians of other social sciences, thought about the development of economics in the twentieth century. The various essays in their conference volume, From Interwar Pluralism to Postwar Neoclassicism (1999), told a new story of the transformation of economics after World War II. The older view that it supplanted was that, in the American case, institutionalism had been the dominant professional practice, and that over the 1940s and 1950s into the 1960s it was replaced by neoclassical economics. The various essays in the Morgan–Rutherford volume present a quite different picture, one in which a rich and varied set of conversations and approaches came to be replaced by a single mainstream with marginalized heterodox alternatives. The authors of the volume’s papers located this transformation in the 1940s, specifically in the wartime connections among economists, statisticians, psychologists, engineers, mathematicians, and physicists that produced the new disciplines of statistics, Footnote 1 operations research, and management science. After the 1999 conference new historical work, much of it archive based, examined the origins of this new mainstream economics with its new analytic techniques and methods. Scholars such as Judy Klein, Philippe Fontaine, Philip Mirowski, Roger Backhouse, Robert Leonard, Till Düppe, and Sonja Amadae went beyond the war’s end in 1945 to examine economics in the Cold War years. Scholars from outside of the narrow history of economics community—individuals such as Ted Porter, Andy Pickering, Hunter Heyck, Paul Erickson, Mark Solovey, Joel Isaac, George Reisch, Daniel Rogers, and Lorraine Daston—further identified how disciplinary border crossings shaped the new economics. This transformation in historians’ understanding of the development of twentieth-century economics resembled historians’ engagement with the continuity/discontinuity story of what some have called the “Marginalist Revolution.” World War II became the dividing line in the new periodization of “past” and “recent” economics (Backhouse and Fontaine Reference Backhouse, Fontaine, Backhouse and Fontaine2014).
The story of the mathematization of economics proceeded alongside narratives of the postwar stabilization of neoclassical economics (Weintraub 2002; Düppe and Weintraub 2014). Consequently, arguments about how this changed use of mathematics in economics repudiated Alfred Marshall’s views, or Thorsten Veblen’s, or Maynard Keynes’s, or Friedrich Hayek’s are irrelevant to the transformation story, no matter how important they may be in contextualizing the particular great man’s writings pre-1940.
Below the surface of this new transformation narrative, however, is a subnarrative that appears to lend intellectual weight to that larger story. Specifically, it is sometimes argued that in the United States the transformation of economics was also associated with economists’ desires to be safe, to seek the protective coloration of mathematics and statistics, during the McCarthy period. As McCarthyism was, of course, connected to the Cold War fears of communist infiltration and subversion of American institutions, particularly educational institutions, this McCarthyism argument seemed to fit easily within the economics-transformed-by-the Cold-War framework. Footnote 2
In what follows I will argue that this particular claim 1) is generally accepted, but 2) is unsupported by good evidence, and 3) what evidence there is suggests that the claim is false.
II. HISTORIOGRAPHY OF “MCCARTHYISM AND THE ECONOMICS COMMUNITY”
The secondary literature on McCarthyism is immense. Footnote 3 Political scientists, historians, sociologists, philosophers, linguists, activists of the left and right, and popularizers have all written about this period. Most economists, however, know very little about McCarthyism, and for historians of economics, what little they know comes from the explorations of a few individuals who have written about particular episodes of McCarthyite discrimination or harassment.
Two recent pieces by historians of economics concern the infamous harassment and purge of economists at the University of Illinois. The first paper on this subject, titled “Academic McCarthyism and Keynesian Economics: The Bowen Controversy at the University of Illinois,” by Winton Solberg and Robert Tomilson, appeared in 1997 in the journal History of Political Economy. That episode, because it was so egregious and involved so many individuals who became quite prominent in the economics profession, including, of course, Nobel laureates Franco Modigliani and Leonid Hurwicz, has long held economists’ attention. Recently, Antonella Rancan (Reference Rancan2008), an Italian historian of economics, has re-examined this episode from the perspective of Modigliani.
A recent important paper (Giraud Reference Giraud and Roy Weintraub2014) focused on the difficulties faced by MIT’s Paul Samuelson in the creation and publication process of his Economics textbook. Although these questions arose in the immediate pre-1950 period, the McCarthyite involvement was associated with the attacks first on the principles textbook of Lorie Tarshis and then on Samuelson’s book after they appeared (Backhouse Reference Backhouse2014). That Samuelson wrote articles for The New Republic in that period also drew attention. The attacks on academic economists by Rose Wilder Lane and members of other right-wing groups were brought to the fore by William Buckley’s 1951 polemic God and Man at Yale. Again, while the attention to these kinds of issues by historians of economics has been slight, Americanists and political historians of the 1950s period have long discussed them.
A third set of interpretations and narratives concerning that period were developed and collated by the late heterodox economist and historian of economics Frederic Lee. As part of his A History of Heterodox Economics (2009), Lee’s chapter three, titled “Radical Economics in Post-war America, 1945–70,” remains the best source on the postwar collapse of radical economics schools, communist and non-communist, and the persecution of radical individual scholars like Paul Baran. The Paul Sweezy case at Harvard had occurred earlier, but the McCarthy period was responsible for the disestablishment of labor union schools or worker schools with heterodox/radical/Marxist curricula. This period thus saw the demise of a truly radical economics subdisciplinary community in the United States. Those persecutions were real and damaged the lives and careers of a number of individuals who were not in fact mainstream economists or connected to such economists. This is well documented and had a permanent effect upon radical politics in the United States, effectively severing the pre-war radical movement from the radical heterodox movements that were to emerge in the 1960s.
Aside from these general histories, there are sets of institution-specific case studies, usually part of broader institutional histories, upon which to draw. As an example of this genre, the volume Economics and the World Around It, edited by Saul Hymans, was a set of papers delivered at the Centennial Symposium of the Department of Economics at the University of Michigan in 1980. Part two of that volume contains a paper by Marjorie C. Brazer titled “The Economics Department of the University of Michigan: A Centennial Retrospective.” She explored, in the course of her narrative, the case of Lawrence Klein, who was a subject of an investigation while on the faculty in the 1950s, and the difficulties he faced when caught between a couple of Neanderthal business professors in alliance with some members of the regents, and the Kit Clardy subcommittee of the US House Un-American Activities Committee investigating communists in the state of Michigan. In Klein’s testimony before that committee, Footnote 4 he renounced his past ties and named those whom he had met while briefly a member of the Communist Party. The committee cleared him by denying that he was a subversive security threat. However, the resistance to his being granted tenure by those right-wing faculty members, as well as a few regents, despite the enthusiastic support of the economics department’s head and nearly all the department’s faculty members, led him to accept an appointment at Oxford University. He did not return to the United States until 1957.
There is another set of commentaries on the McCarthy period that a number of historians of economics might recognize: accounts—first-person accounts—of the economist’s experiences during that McCarthy period. One such memoir is found in Martin Bronfenbrenner’s recollections (1993) of his time both as an economist with the occupation forces in postwar Japan (1988) and at the University of Wisconsin from 1947 to 1957. It was a source of pride to Bronfenbrenner that he had been scrutinized and investigated as a possible communist sympathizer during his years serving as an adviser in the American occupation of Japan. Footnote 5
Another such account appeared in Modigliani’s autobiography, Adventures of an Economist (2001, pp. 66–68), in which he recalled his experiences of the Illinois turmoil and remarked caustically on the McCarthyite attacks on both Howard Bowen and foreigners (read Jews) who were automatically assumed to be communist sympathizers. Footnote 6
In her pioneering study comparing development of the economics professions in the United States, England, and France, Marion Fourcade cited Craufurd Goodwin’s discussion (see below) concerning the relationship of the McCarthy era to changes in the way economics was done. She wrote (2009, pp. 88–89):
The Cold War had begun, and public and private patrons were nervous about the ideological implications of the research they supported. In 1952 and 1954 two successive congressional committees launched investigations into the activities of the major foundations on the suspicion they helped spread radical ideas. Similarly the social sciences were first excluded from the National Science Foundation at its creation in 1950 on the grounds that their messy politics might ‘compromise the perceived ethical neutrality and taken for granted disengagement of natural scientists (Gieryn, Reference Gieryn1999, p. 97).’
Fourcade went on to provide brief accounts of a number of events affecting both economists and some economics departments in that McCarthy period. Besides noting the Stanford experience of Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy’s at University of New Hampshire, and the University of Illinois’s problems concerning Dean Howard Bowen and his new economics department, she quotes Frederic Lee, who suggested that “at least twenty-seven economists were explicitly harassed, or worse, during the McCarthy era” (2004, p. 180).
Without linking those McCarthy era events directly to the Cold War period, Fourcade noted:
[W]ith a scientific competition with the Soviet Union accelerating, dominant institutions in the research economy … increasingly embraced the formal methods’ promise of efficiency, accuracy and mastery of the social and economic world.… A review of funding patterns by the National Science Foundation over the 1958–79 period shows its heavy involvement in quantitative research and econometrics, notably in the areas of productivity and large scale modelling … [Moreover] the centrality of mathematics and economics is by no means unique to the United States, of course … [British] economists, as well as a large segment of the French economics profession, are also very comfortable with mathematics as a theory-building tool. (2009, p. 90)
Fourcade leaves open the question of the retreat from political engagement by economists with the rise of technical economic analysis. She does not suggest that the former caused the latter. In other words, she makes no argument at all suggesting that the witch hunts of the McCarthy period led economists to damp their political commitments and seek refuge in technical analysis.
Instead, Fourcade refers to Mary Furner (Reference Furner1975), who “has shown [in] the case of economics … these pressures [i.e., political attacks against progressive social scientists] encouraged a retreat to a more narrowly ‘scientific’ discourse, which protected scholarship from easy vilification” (2009, pp. 79–80). For Fourcade, then, the witch hunts of the McCarthy period were similar in kind to the attacks on progressives around the turn of the twentieth century. The move to scientific objectivity was in part in response to those moves as the profession re-examined what it had to contribute to the larger conversation about economic well-being. Consequently, she draws no special inference about the transformation of economics into a mathematical–statistical discipline in the Cold War period.
At this point I must insist on emphasizing the distinction between “the Cold War” and “McCarthyism.” The two are not synonymous. The Cold War itself need not have produced the excesses associated with the junior senator from Wisconsin. There were, to be sure, ideological attacks on “progressives” going back in the United States as far into the nineteenth century as one would wish. Attacks on those who thought well of socialism, who supported labor unions, who wanted to talk about Marx, and so on, would bring the wrath of the community, mostly the American business community, and the leaders of churches down upon them. Indeed, after the Russian Revolution the US Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer organized the deportation of “radicals” to the new Soviet Union. Radical ideas were alien and revolutionary and thus un-American. McCarthy was a demagogue in a well-established tradition of Henry Ford, Father Coughlin, and Charles Lindberg, exploiting Cold War fears and thus building upon ongoing business and Wall Street attacks on New Deal policies. The anti-Semitic and xenophobic nativists who had and have been playing such a role in American politics were not born out of Cold War fear of the Soviet Union. But McCarthyism itself did grow out of the Cold War hysteria. We can agree at this stage on the argument that the mathematization of economics was associated with the projects that developed during World War II and that continued into the postwar Cold War era. It is silly to deny the influence of Cold War institutions like RAND in fostering the connections among operations researchers, game theorists, economists, political scientists, and defense planners. Many historians in recent years have been writing about these matters and have shown in important detail the Cold War connections among the postwar social sciences.
To claim, however, that this new mathematically inflected economics was a product of the Cold War period is not to say that it was a product of McCarthy’s predations. Embracing mathematics to escape McCarthyite scrutiny is a claim different from a claim about the Cold War’s important role in the transformation of the social sciences.
III. THE STANDARD VIEW
Before we go into more detail about possible evidence supporting the “McCarthyism produced mathematization” argument, let us examine several contexts in which the claim has been made. We will then better understand the claim’s curious role in historians’ construction of their now standard narrative of the triumph of neoclassical economics in the Cold War and post-Cold War period.
Craufurd Goodwin’s paper “The Patrons of Economics in the Time of Transformation” appeared in the volume by Morgan and Rutherford. Continuing his long-term interest in how economics evolved in connection with non-academic players—quasi-government policy groups, government institutions, and eleemosynary institutions—Goodwin focused precisely on the role of institutions like the Ford Foundation in shaping the new economics. Because his discussion has become canonical for historians of economics, I examine it in some detail:
Leaders of higher education during these years can perhaps be pardoned for having hesitated to appoint or promote an economist likely to bring down on the institution the wrath of … the governing body, legislators, donors, or alumni. So how are the administrators likely to respond? … The only administrative option was to appoint economists of a different kind. But what kind? … [T]here was another kind of economist who did speak in tongues mainly in the cloister. This neoclassical economist had all the virtues many of his ‘plural’ brethren lacked. Therefore, when hard-pressed administrators were faced with a choice between these two types of economists, can we doubt where their better judgment would have led? (1999, pp. 60–62)
Goodwin was a vice-president of the Ford Foundation in the 1960s and early 1970s, so his understanding of how such institutions “work” is both first-hand and as a scholar of the period. Moreover, both as James B. Duke Professor of Economics and Secretary of Duke University around that time, he saw how academic institutions, through their boards of trustees, eschewed controversial faculty appointments. His perspective provided more than usual weight to the idea that the mainstream of the economics profession moved to a politically quieter technical enterprise in the 1950s.
We can certainly agree with Goodwin that administrators shunned controversy. Many in those times were themselves representatives of the educational status quo, confident in the rectitude of their beliefs about the dangers of radicalism. The difficulty with Goodwin’s proffered solution for worried administrators, however, is that mathematical–statistical work did not differentiate neoclassical economists from “dangerous” collectivists. In the 1940s Harold Hotelling believed himself to be a socialist, as did Kenneth Arrow, Jacob Marschak, and many others. Appointing a mathematical economist, one who “spoke in tongues,” was no sure path to peaceful campus life.
Goodwin went on to remark:
Assessing the effects of administrative repression on the professional behavior of scholars, Lazarsfeld and Thielens (1958, p. 257) found that [a teacher who had himself been the target of an incident was especially likely to be apprehensive]. But how about the others? The result was not very different. Lazarsfeld and Thielens produced an ‘index of apprehension’ that shows a clear increase in apprehension with ‘increasing numbers of corroborated incidents reported’, even among those not directly affected (p. 259).… Lazarsfeld and Thielens did not ask the next obvious question: how might professors be expected to change their own behavior to relieve their apprehension? My speculation is that they would have foresworn interwar pluralism for postwar neoclassicism. (1999, pp. 60–62)
This is a strong claim, even if framed as a “speculation.” It offers a causal link between the Paul Lazarsfeld–Wagner Thielens apprehension index and specific changes in economists’ behaviors: apprehension produces, or makes life easier, for neoclassical economists, especially for neoclassical economists who speak in mathematical–statistical tongues. A specific difficulty arises with this claim, however: Lazarsfeld and Thielens asked exactly those questions about how social scientists changed their behaviors in the face of “apprehension.” We will attend to this point below as we re-evaluate the evidence for it. But since Goodwin’s argument has become canonical, we first ask, how did its logic travel?
Mary Morgan (Reference Morgan, Porter and Ross2003) early endorsed the claim in Theodore Porter’s and Dorothy Ross’s Cambridge History of the Social Sciences volume. She wrote (p. 296):
While war work supported tool-based economics, the American political movement against communism in the later 1940s and the McCarthyism of the early 1950s decided the issue in favour of neoclassical economics at the local level. Although the overall picture has yet to be filled in, it is clear that economists had to be careful in expressing their views.
Morgan went on to argue: “One economist [i.e., Goodwin] writing about this period suggested that moving to tool-based economics was a defensive option against ideological persecution, though this sometimes proved to be an inadequate defense, particularly for those whose values were not aligned with the new ideology” (2003, pp. 296–297). For Morgan, McCarthyism—in some measure to be determined only when “the overall picture is … filled in”—was to some extent responsible for the move of the economics mainstream toward a more tool-based (mathematical and statistical) mode of conducting and expressing research. She thus suggested that the mathematization of economics in the postwar period was related to economists’ desire to hide their political sympathies at a time when expression of left-of-center political views was professionally dangerous.
Goodwin and Morgan are both eminent historians of economics—both are Distinguished Fellows of the History of Economics Society—and their shared understanding that McCarthyism fostered the mathematization of economics has shaped the conventional view. What is curious, however, is the lack of evidence brought forward to support the claim. Consider how this line of argument developed. Morgan cites the earlier piece by Goodwin. Goodwin cites the earlier book by Lazarsfeld and Thielens. That original piece, however, provided only indirect evidence of something: namely, a correlation between the respondents’ reports of known incidents, and the respondents’ degree of “apprehension.” In fact, in my extensive search of the economics and history of economics literature, Goodwin’s citation of their report is the single such citation by any historian of economics of any type. Thus, there is scant evidence on offer for the claim that McCarthyism—even with the fears and concomitant sensitivities of university administrators who faced potentially hostile legislators, members of their trustees, visiting committees, and the local and national business community—was responsible in some part for turning the economics profession into a de-politicized tool-based community.
Before further examining the “McCarthyism produced mathematization” story, we need to attend to another important context in which the claim has been made. We will then better understand the claim’s curious role in historians’ construction of their now “standard” narrative of the triumph of neoclassical economics in the Cold War and post-Cold War period.
IV. CRITICS OF THE NEW MAINSTREAM ECONOMICS
The historical muddle that is associated with accounts of the development of economics in association with McCarthyism, the historiographical problems alluded to above, arise quite clearly in the work of several critics of mainstream economics. We must again caution the reader that “the Cold War” and “McCarthyism” were not the same historical episode. They cannot, as causes of anything, be the same.
Philip Mirowski, the most articulate of the historian critics of mainstream economics, launched his protest against mathematical economics and economic theory not from the point of view of its obscurantism, or its inattention to real world problems, but because of its connection to Cold War interests. His vision of mainstream economics as it developed in the postwar period is one of the capture of economics by individuals and institutions indirectly connected to John von Neumann, the person who, he argued, had facilitated economists’ engagement with Cold War theorizing (Mirowski Reference Mirowski2002). The fact that detailed analysis and solution of optimization problems appeared to be lodged at Cowles and that von Neumann had met Tjalling Koopmans (and Marschak) during their Princeton years led Mirowski to present a capture theory of Cowles economics. In contrast to the older stories of Cowles’ development in Colorado Springs, its focus on econometrics in those years, and its uneasy coexistence with the University of Chicago economists, Mirowski suggested that the more important Cowles story was that it was a hotbed of socialist planning devotees, who in the McCarthy period rushed to join von Neumann, RAND, and others in proclaiming their fealty to American ideals while masking their political loyalties under a veil of mathematical theory.
Whatever the wider doubts about the intellectual coherence of ‘Marschak’s market socialism,’ the American military was one place where unquestioned adherence to the virtues of the market cohabited cheerfully/truthfully with the most vaunting ambitions of centralized command and control, without ever provoking any hand-wringing about conceptual consistency or soul-searching over freedom. Indeed, for researchers of a certain political stripe, the security clearance required for military consultants could be worn proudly as a badge of legitimation, serving to ward off a modicum of superficial distrust or the ubiquitous pall of McCarthyite suspicion. (Mirowski 1999, p. 256)
Mirowski situated Cowles in a particular place, Illinois, at a time when anti-communists were investigating not only the University of Chicago but also the University of Illinois (Selcraig Reference Selcraig1982). Going into the political backgrounds of the Cowlesmen, Mirowski stressed their potential vulnerability in the McCarthy period. His narrative suggested that Cowlesmen were unprincipled opportunists, hiding their political sympathies in order to pursue their deeper theoretical interest in mechanisms of planning. With the vision of “planners need to plan” and “the military needs planners,” the marriage between Cowles people like Marschak and Koopmans and the interests of RAND in supporting military research was, for Mirowski, made in Cold War heaven. But this argument is difficult to sustain. Footnote 7 Would it not be equally likely that many of those who took up work for the military were anti-socialists and anti-communists?
Sonja Amadae developed a similar critique of postwar economics in her 2003 book Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism. For example, in her discussion of the Ford Foundation’s role in developing social science research in the 1950s, she pointed out that McCarthy’s investigations of the foundation were initiated in a letter from McCarthy to the foundation dated March 19, 1953. This led to “the Ford Foundation’s swing to the right [that] coincided with the anti-Communist sentiment then sweeping the nation and led by Senator Joseph McCarthy.” Her argument is quite focused and so I quote from it at length (p. 158 et seq.):
The priority given to mathematically articulated research findings has two rationales. First, in the wake of WWII, during which scientific analysis of strategic problems proved useful to the war effort, additional mathematically oriented research was supported as a response to the Soviet Union’s successful launch of the Sputnik satellites. Money was thus channelled to research endeavours that provide a quantitative analysis of social issues. Second, this preference for mathematical formulas and models served the function, as RAND leaders realized, of depoliticizing research by translating contentious social debates into the ‘objective’ language of mathematics.
There is no evidence provided concerning “RAND leaders and their realization.” This theorized assertion is curiously ahistorical as well when one recalls that Sputnik was launched in 1957: surely this was not part of the McCarthy period.
She went on (p. 159) to quote Thomas Bender’s finding that “by 1950 the intolerance generated by McCarthyism and the Cold War moved academics and intellectuals generally to make themselves and their work less vulnerable to attack” (Bender Reference Bender1997, p. 13). Bender’s observation, while acknowledging the impact that Cold War fervor had on American academics, was part of her own master narrative situating the formulation of rational choice theory as a direct response to the intellectual puzzles bequeathed to the Cold War generation by Marxists. Amadae wrote, “Bender claims that the ‘political scientist David Easton has found in McCarthyism a stimulus for development to a more scientific and objective political science’, for it provided a ‘protected posture for the scholar’” (Amadae Reference Amadae2003, p. 12). Her footnote ten, at this point, does not provide a source for Easton’s (1991) statement. One needs to go to Bender’s (1997) article to locate it.
Note that Amadae used Bender to present the views of David Easton. Easton himself was interested in the transformation of political science in the United States. In fact, he wrote (1991, pp. 43–44) about the social forces that encouraged a commitment to the introduction of science into the study of politics.
Early in the Cold War period in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union … Senator Joseph McCarthy inaugurated and led a reign of psychological and legal terror against liberals and others in the United States....
…
From this perspective, objective, neutral, or value-free research represented a protective posture for scholars, offering them intellectually legitimate and useful grounds for fleeing from the dangers of open political controversy.
Easton’s argument, presented without any evidence besides his common sense, was that the price of doing social reform and critical theory had increased, and therefore scholars demanded less of it. But it is crucial to recognize how Easton’s argument slides from “the Cold War” to “McCarthyism” as a causal mechanism for the change in political science research. Footnote 8
One of the most egregious examples of bemoaning the postwar mathematization of economics is found in the paper by Paul P. Streeten (Reference Streeten2000) in the Pakistan Development Review, though the paper has been reprinted multiple times. He wrote (p. 204): “One may be forgiven if one feels some forms of mathematical economics should be an activity permitted only between consenting adults in private, or that it resembles masturbation in that it yields enjoyment to the practitioner without having to make any contact with outside reality.”
He went on to ask:
What are the reasons for this dominance of mathematics[?] I suggest among the external reasons there may be one unto which little attention has been paid. The political pressures of McCarthyism in the 1950s played, I think, an important part.... To be accused of criticizing the capitalist system and pandering to socialism was very dangerous in the 50s. Yet, any honest economist looking at the real world would have had to come up with some criticisms. So mathematics provided a safe escape mechanism that drove economists away from political and economic reality. (ibid.)
This argument too is unsupported by any evidence. Streeten simply assumes that all right-minded individuals who happen to be economists will instinctively wish to criticize the capitalist system. And, from a position of criticizing the capitalist system, in the 1950s at least, one would have been identified with America’s Cold War enemies. The McCarthy period thus pushed economists, all “honest” right-thinking economists anyway, into mathematical economics in order to hide their views or protect themselves from being seen as enemies of America. Streeten does not recognize that many ethically responsible economists might have been proud to stand up and proclaim in front of congressional committees that the economic system of the Soviet Union was economically inefficient, and thus a slow-moving disaster. John Maynard Keynes and Calvin Bryce Hoover, following visits to the Soviet Union around 1930, had argued that the Soviet command economy was not only inefficient, but also cruel with respect to civil liberties and personal freedoms. Most right-thinking economists believed them both then and later.
There is a second issue that sits uneasily alongside Streeten’s primary argument. It is well to comment on it here for we will have to come back to it later. Streeten suggests that those who began to employ mathematical forms of argument in the late 1940s and 1950s were moral cowards. They did not in fact stand and fight the good fight against capitalism, but rather capitulated to the forces of oppression and fascism represented by American McCarthyism. Yet, on this argument, it is hard to see why outside the United States there should have been much interest in the mathematicization of economics. The growth of econometrics in Norway and the Netherlands and England becomes inexplicable. There was no McCarthyite push there. It confounds Streeten’s argument. Neither can it usefully address the obvious question of why, after McCarthyism died, economists still failed to fight that good fight against capitalism. Streeten is presenting a moral claim: it is good and right to criticize capitalism. But since criticizing capitalism was in his view inconsistent with, or probably incoherent in, a mathematical argument, those who used mathematical and formal arguments were shunning an ethical duty. We should not, therefore, respect them or the work that they did. This may seem extreme but it is fully consistent with the coherence of the anti-mathematical vision of those who self-identify as members of what is now called the “Real World Economics” community, a heterodoxy with its own journal that claims a moral superiority for anti-neoclassical economics. We will return to this point.
A more sophisticated discussion appears in Philo A. Hutcheson’s “McCarthyism and the Professoriate: A Historiographic Nightmare?” that appeared in 1997. He began by noting that “two key historical questions arise. The first, given the repeated attacks on professors and the conduct of higher education at the time is the historicity: ‘what happened?’ … The second question is fundamental to the nature of historical inquiry: ‘Can we know what happened?’” (1997, p. 610). He presented a lengthy discussion of the nature of McCarthyism, and, unlike Streeten’s, Hutcheson’s discussion was fully documented. He went through many of the notable cases in which McCarthyism produced difficulties for various colleges and universities as well as individual professors. His conclusion differed somewhat from those of a number of other authors:
[E]ven in de facto terms, the boundaries of autonomy for the professoriate are weak. The professoriate does not enjoy economic or social defences. Neither unions nor big business protect professors, and churches have contested professors and their ideas since the Board of Overseers dismissed the second master of Harvard College because of his opposition to infant baptism.... The historical political conditions of autonomy are extraordinarily problematic. In this regard, accusations of timidity or equivocation tend to lose their accuracy; courage without power is unlikely to endure, resulting more often than not in martyrdom or sainthood—conditions often found in the works on McCarthyism and the professoriate. (p. 620)
In the end Hutcheson portrayed McCarthyism as more rather than less characteristic of United States society, and so higher education was able to continue business as usual. The question remains, though: What was the economics profession’s response to these attacks? Footnote 9 We have not yet seen evidence that scholars redirected the modes of inquiry that they had employed. We have not seen how McCarthyism and mathematization were in fact connected. We do, though, have a privileged window through which we can study these issues.
V. THE ACADEMIC MIND
During the spring of 1955 Columbia sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and his research team conducted a set of interviews in order to answer questions that had been initially posed by Robert M. Hutchins of the Fund for the Republic. Hutchins, and others who were being harassed during the McCarthy period, was concerned about the pressure that was being put on universities and their faculties.
[To] understand the outcome [of the McCarthy period’s attacks on higher education] eventually, the positions generally taken by college teachers at the time will have to be known. What actually happens is always the resultant of both the forces which impinge upon people and the way they look at and feel about them. If in addition one wants to affect the course of events, an understanding of attitudes may be even more important. (Lazarsfeld and Thielens Reference Lazarsfeld and Thielens1958, p. vi)
The commissioned study was based on interviews with university teachers. Because of the authors’ belief that university faculty members in the social sciences were most likely to have been affected because of their professional engagement with the kinds of social issues that concerned McCarthy and others, they created a sample of such faculty. The sample size was 2,451 social scientists at 165 colleges and universities. The interesting part of that study for our purposes is that the total sample included 565 economists, 23% of the total group interviewed. The sample was generated randomly and the individuals were selected randomly. For this reason it is useful to think of the overall results as pertaining to the economists. However, and this is the key point, the original questionnaires and their answers, the actual records, are preserved among the Paul Lazarsfeld papers at Columbia University’s Butler Library. Examination of a sample of those questionnaires showed that although there were no identifiers of schools or individuals in the published work, the actual questionnaires contained exactly that information. In what follows I will describe the exact information available in a sampling from four boxes of questionnaires. Thirty-one economists do not make a generalization, but will give us some sense of the effect of McCarthyism on economists.
Some of the questions were designed to elicit views of social scientists on attitudes held about them by others. For example, “professors, at least social scientists, seem to consider themselves an occupational minority towards which significant sectors of the community hold relatively contemptuous attitudes” (Lazarsfeld and Thielens Reference Lazarsfeld and Thielens1958, p. 14; subsequent page references are to this source). Moreover, “Broadly speaking, from either the long- or short-range point of view, American social scientists felt in the Spring of 1955 that the intellectual and political freedom of the teaching community had been noticeably curtailed, or at least disturbingly threatened” (p. 37).
It is not necessary to go into much detail concerning the kinds of accusations that were made against faculty members. Being labelled a communist was not unusual in that period: “Such cases suggest that in this period an individual can be called a Communist for almost any kind of behaviour, or for holding almost any kind of attitude. … In one case a faculty member was accused of being a Communist. The president of the school stated ‘after all, he has been interested in interracial relations, which the communists are interested in.’ He was dismissed” (pp. 56–57).
The methodological core of the study was set out in chapter three of the book. From the preliminary interviews Lazarsfeld had supervised, he and his team created
a list of about 20 relatively specific experiences. Questions were then worded so that the respondent would simply have to say whether or not these things had happened to him.[Footnote 10] It was necessary to present a large number of situations related to academic life which might cause a teacher concern or induce him to act contrary to his convictions; depending on personality and background factors, one man’s apprehensions might express itself in regard to his publications, while for another relations with students or with neighbors might be more indicative. (p. 73)
The chapter’s title, as noted above by Goodwin, was “A Measure of Apprehension,” and the results suggested that eleven of the items could be used to create an index of apprehension. These were further divided into two categories: “One pertaining to feelings of worry about security, the other pertaining to precautionary behaviour” (p. 74).
It is the second of these that will concern us. The results of the questionnaires are compelling: “We thus arrive at a rather far-reaching conclusion. There is indeed widespread apprehension among these social science teachers, but in generally it is hardly of a paralyzing nature; the heads of these men and women are ‘bloody but unbowed’” (p. 95).
In other words, these individuals were probably worried but appear to have taken few if any actions as a result of that worry. And, contra Goodwin, there is no evidence brought forward to suggest that the kind of work they did was affected by those worries.
Taken together with those given earlier, these figures [based on the questionnaires] can indicate that the majority of teachers felt no curtailment of their own academic freedom or that of colleagues. But they also suggest consistently that a noticeable segment of our respondents and their colleagues felt intimidated by the difficult years —by fear of attack and harm to their careers that might result from a free expression of their views. (p. 196)
A small minority of respondents scored high marks on the apprehension scale. Nevertheless, the constraints on their professional work appear to be minimal. Various respondents said that they did tone down writings on controversial issues, and one economist said he “had developed a simple formula for avoiding trouble: ‘I just slant my writings to things that Congressmen can’t understand’” (pp. 218–219). But that did not translate to larger sets of modifications of professional behavior. There is no evidence in any of the questionnaires examined that any respondent changed the nature of his research. While there is some evidence of some toning down of classroom material that might be offensive and draw charges of sympathy to Communism, there seems to be no change in what they did as professionals.
The response to The Academic Mind was respectful and serious. It was reviewed in a very large number of journals, and appears to have been discussed and evaluated at many sites. It is incontrovertible that the book mattered and helped shape what became a standard view over time: that university faculty had indeed felt intimidated and distressed during the McCarthy period, worried about their own security and status. This book then helped form the overarching narrative of the threatened nature of academic freedom during the McCarthy period and the way in which free inquiry was threatened by the paranoia of rabid anti-Communism. However, the book’s specific conclusion that there was no significant evidence that academics changed the nature or direction of their academic work seems to have gotten lost.
There were only a few doubters or skeptics with respect to the book. Lionel Trilling, writing in The Griffin in 1958, suggested “the professor lives characteristically by his acute awareness of the particular pathos of his situation. It is one of the fringe-benefits of his underpaid profession that he can suppose that he is among the insulted and injured, a marginal man, and therefore, according to the modern calculus of morality, a morally justified man” (p. 4). Trilling went on to suggest that the status of the professoriate had changed in the postwar period and that the older view of the academic as being poorly paid and of low status no longer characterized academic life. He regarded the reaction of the academic community as somewhat overdrawn, though he agreed that the numerous episodes of harassment and firings were quite real. He remained unconvinced, however, that the spirit of the academic profession was crushed in that period.
Reinforcing Trilling’s belief, in a remarkable retrospective look at the volume, constructed for a law symposium on academic freedom, the book’s co-editor Wagner Thielens stated, “First, in key ways, the academic profession was vulnerable all along to attack from the right. Second, during the late 1940s and early to mid-1950s, the attack came, and caused considerable damage. Third, many signs in our data indicate that the damage was less than liberal authors like Mr. Hutchins thought certain” (Thielens Reference Thielens1996, p. 2).
Thielens went on to observe that academic social scientists were indeed more “left of center” than the American citizenry at large, and were thus, in their tolerance for non-traditional political ideas, more willing to accept a communist’s beliefs as private and unassailable: “I believe that by taking such a stance, in an era when disagreement and disapproval could quickly turn into open charges, social scientists made themselves vulnerable” (ibid., p. 3). The substance of the article supports Thielens’s central point: the attacks were real, did some damage, but for the most part were resisted both on personal and institutional levels. It is in the “for the most part” that disagreements may arise. He mused, “All together, in the two professional matters [of sanitized teaching and research], at least one conclusion seems fair: The situation was bad, but could have been much worse” (ibid., p. 6). The remainder of his paper attempted to explain, using the survey data, “why the academic persona … worked in several ways to limit the success of the McCarthyite attacks” (ibid., p. 7).
Ellen Schrecker, in No Ivory Tower (Schrecker Reference Schrecker1986), saw matters differently. In examining the history of the responses of the academic community to the external threats represented by pressure from the business community, congressional committees, and even from their own academic administrators, Schrecker convinced most readers that something had indeed happened, and it was not pretty. She developed her narrative with a history of progressive thought up through the McCarthy period. She showed how academic freedom was never as secure as academics wished it to be, and that the attacks on the academic community had gone on almost since the beginning of the academic community in the United States. Academic freedom was always under fire. Indeed, what constituted “academic freedom” was very much at issue. The weak responses to, or, at worst, collaboration with, the McCarthyite forces were not from the scholars, but from the colleges and universities themselves. The institutions of higher education all too infrequently either protected or defended their faculty from outside attacks.
But what of the economists? Where does the economics profession fit in the larger narrative of the attacks on the academic community during the McCarthy period? Were economists more or less likely to be singled out for attack?
VI. ECONOMISTS SPEAKING
In fall 2014 Mr. Harun Buljina, a PhD student in history at Columbia University, examined under my direction four boxes (boxes 9–12) out of ninety boxes of completed questionnaires archived in the Paul F. Lazarsfeld Papers at Columbia’s Butler Library. The four boxes contained completed questionnaires, among them those of thirty-one economists identified by institution and name. Each questionnaire had twenty-eight pages of structured questions and the economists’ handwritten answers. The interviewee could also elaborate on any answer on the blank facing page, which also contained the interviewer’s notes of explanation on follow-up statements made by the interviewee. My short synopses of the relevant responses appear in the Appendix. There, numbers preceding the names (redacted) refer to the questionnaire number. Note that question #26 specifically asked the interviewee whether the then current political climate had affected his [there were only two women in my subsample] research activity at all.
In this selection of thirty-one economists, there were expressions of concern about the general climate and the related belief that academic freedom was somewhat being harmed, but in no case was there any hint of change in research agenda, research techniques, research orientation, use of materials in research, and so on. People were doing whatever they had been doing and they continued to do it. Moreover, question #26 directly asked whether they knew of others who had had their research affected, and no one knew anybody in that category. There was some level of apprehension, but in terms of their job security and career prospects, it was extremely low. It’s difficult to see where any conclusion could be drawn about economists changing the way they did economics to make it more technical or tool-based and thus unassailable by bigoted legislators, headline-seeking congressional committees, union-hating businessmen, conservative trustees, and so on.
Surely, though, with the claims about how economics changed in the face of McCarthyism, we would have expected to see some trace of an “escape to mathematization” in our excavation of the ruins. The evidence, however, fails to confirm any such thing. What, then, does that evidence tell us?
First, it tells us that historians’ use of the phrase “economics community” during the McCarthy period is too biased in favor of a numerically small professional elite to be applicable to the larger actual American economics community. Historians of economics, mostly economists, Whiggishly focus on heroic narratives of progress, and so the relevant community for them, unconsciously perhaps, consists of economists who are thought to contribute to that progress. If one doesn’t publish, one won’t win a Nobel Memorial Prize. But of our thirty-one economists, only three can be said to have become well-recognized producers of new economic knowledge, and all of them taught in (now) elite Research 1 universities. Most of the others were primarily teachers of undergraduate economics, and were far from the towers of Harvard, Yale, and Chicago, and the offices of RAND, Cowles, and the Ford Foundation. Not all of the economists surveyed had PhDs, and many taught business-type courses, even though they were not in business schools. Most were either in public universities and colleges with service missions or in religious private schools, and appear to have lived non-controversial lives. Aware of McCarthyite attacks, they themselves were not much concerned. And their responses to question #26 denied that they changed any scholarly behaviors. Put another way, generalizations about how economists reacted to McCarthyism appear to be based on an unusually constricted view of who were those “economists” whose reactions “matter.”
Second, there is a stock-flow problem that is not addressed in discussions like those of Philip Mirowski or Paul Streeten. Put crudely, it is hard to teach old economic dogs new mathematical tricks. The number of academic economists dwarfs the number of new economists coming into the profession each year. There were around 125 economics (non-business, non-agricultural economics) PhDs granted in 1947, rising to around 131 in 1954, and only a small number of those economists would seek academic jobs. After the end of the worst of the Red Scare period, in the late 1950s, with creation of the National Defence Education Act and National Science Foundation training grants, graduate economics programs were able to increase the size of their graduate classes. So the average level of mathematical training possessed by economics department faculty members increased only slowly as new hires were, for the most part, matched with retirements. The entry of enough mathematical/econometric hotshots to effect the profession’s change would take another decade at least.
Third, the conventional narrative about the profession’s retreat into analytic rigor seems to suggest that most economists were hidden socialists who, out of political self-interest, learned how to solve, and loved solving, dynamic programming problems. However, surveys of faculty political commitments continuously showed, and show today, that business school faculty, engineering faculty, and economists are more conservative than science and humanities faculty members. The preserved questionnaires indeed show a lot of votes for Eisenhower over Stevenson. Why, if “I liked Ike” or “I liked the non-mathematical Veblen,” would I struggle to master the Hahn-Banach Theorem?
VII. PERHAPS A WEAKER CLAIM CAN BE MAINTAINED?
There is, however, a deep-seated belief that something about the political climate was “good for mathematization.” Surely, some have argued, Footnote 11 not just the Cold War but Cold War anxieties shaped economics; how could such fears not be connected to the evolution of economic ideas, practices, tastes, and advice offered in the postwar period?
Some historians of economics have argued that there is in fact support for a weak form of the argument I wish to discredit. That weak form would state that political concerns led patrons to look with favor upon projects that met the highest standards for scientific rigor, and to prioritize such rigor over immediate relevance to salient political issues. Mathematization was one of several approaches that fit with this general preference, though it was not the only one. And it likely was not pursued consciously as an escape from overt political scrutiny, except in rare cases. This weak form of the argument goes on to suggest not that economists with non-mathematical ways of doing economics started doing it mathematically, but they were permitted to go about their ways while administrators augmented their ranks, and replaced them on retirement, with mathematical types.
These and similar arguments suggest that political defensiveness in the McCarthy period indirectly led to the economics community’s becoming more engaged with mathematical argumentation. Such an unsubstantiated belief is too non-specific to be of much use. There is, of course, plenty of evidence that organizations like the Ford Foundation and the Social Science Research Council looked with greater favor on a more rigorous social science in this period. And, in the case of those organizations, the scrutiny of them by Senator McCarthy and others suggests that they would look with more favor upon technical data-based and theory-based projects. Yet, the number of projects being supported by those organizations was vanishingly small. The grant making by those organizations was significant in setting certain agendas, but not in reshaping professional activity. Yes, there was additional money to support, in a very small number of institutions, some new kinds of graduate research. But for most of the economics profession, the cash window at Ford was never opened. But what about other patrons? Certainly, there was a demand for technical economics on the part of a number of Cold War institutions like RAND, but, again, they were very small relative to the size of the economics community.
Historiographically, such arguments reveal an impoverished understanding of the development of economics in that period and reflect a self-congratulatory mindset at what economics was to become. From a present filled with technical Nobel laureates and a scientific enterprise well-enough organized to look down upon the other social sciences, non-historical economists can find in the past those particular centers of activity that became important. But what of other centers of activity that, from the present, produced no long-term effects? Why didn’t a number of institutional economists win the Nobel Prize twenty-five years later? Why did economic history fail to thrive over the quarter-century following the Cold War? A number of the folk theorems about what was “really” important in the postwar technical work are projections onto the past of current economists’ beliefs. When one looks closely at claims like Kenneth Binmore’s (2012) that John von Neumann’s projects in cooperative game theory were hopeless and that John Nash was the real hero for economics, one sees that they are Binmore’s projections and not history’s fabric. Such is likewise the case for most of the arguments about mathematics and the development of economics in the postwar period.
Consider the following thought experiment. You are an administrator looking to hire onto an open budget line. You wish to have your economics departments search for and hire an international economist. You have a naive belief that many international economists are, frankly, internationalists and probably less ready to defend American interests in international trade and other affairs. You are looking for some acceptable political personage. Suppose you act in accord with Goodwin’s conjecture and consequently inform the economics department search committee that it should give preference to international economists who do more technical work—mathematical or statistical—and less work that is overtly political. The committee duly returns with the names of several candidates, some of whom have backgrounds in theoretical or econometric modelling. The department puts forward some good candidates, perhaps former students of individuals like Paul Samuelson, Lawrence Klein, William Baumol, and so on. You, the administrator, are upset by these choices because you thought that technical work and political work were antithetical. What happened?
What happened is that you appeared not to understand that a great deal of the technical mathematical work that was done in the late 1930s through the 1940s was done by individuals who had very definite views on matters like economic planning. Those who were adamantly opposed to planning, like Austrian economists, were in full-scale denial that economics was, could be, or had any reason to be scientific. You see the catch. Looking for technically advanced economists in the postwar period would commit one to repeated draws from a sample in which social democrats are overrepresented. Making those draws is hardly a strategy to reconstruct the community of economists along safer, non-collectivist lines. Worse, the math guys might be Keynesians or, horror of horrors, Jews! Footnote 12
VIII. CONCLUSION
Social scientists today are quite aware that journal editors do not welcome submissions in which the author attempts to establish a result and fails to do so. Unlike in the natural sciences, where a failure to confirm or to replicate is regarded as an interesting event, such is not the case in the social sciences. So too in the history of economics.
I have attempted to assess the claim that a major contributing element to the mathematization of economics in the postwar period was economists’ defensive response to the era’s McCarthyism: political safety was to be found in formalization and quantification. This argument has been made on a number of occasions and seems to serve several different purposes. In tracking down the evidence for this claim, we found a circular set of references apparently based on a misunderstanding of the primary data source, the book The Academic Mind.
Pulling back the non-evidentiary curtain further, we’ve learned that the reasons for making such a claim appear to vary from writer to writer. For several of the scholars writing on the subject, their project developed from one of two particular stories in the history of economics: first, there was the increased mathematization of economics going into and then throughout the postwar period; and second, there were economists’ responses to McCarthyism of the Cold War years. Scholars engaged with the second of these topics appear further to divide into two groups. The first is concerned with the destruction of radical and heterodox economics traditions as a result of the very real persecution of radical economists in the late 1940s through the 1950s. Frederic Lee has written most powerfully about these events and concluded that economists who were both radical and in the public eye were systematically removed from colleges and universities. Even more destructive of the labor-based radical community was that the radical, socialist, Marxist, and labor union schools, which were long a part of the American urban scene, were nearly all shut down.
The second group of scholars examining this McCarthy Cold War period tell a story of the “capture” of the mainstream of the American economics community by Cold War imperatives organized around research undertaken at RAND and through the various funding agencies of the military, like the Office of Naval Research. Such scholars have as their larger project destabilizing the mainstream economists’ vision of a coherent and heroic past in which economic analysis moved from darkness to light, arguing instead that a robust and healthy community was corrupted by military imperatives and easy money.
Those concerned with telling a complex and multi-layered story of the transformation of economics in the postwar period are generally more willing to provide nuanced accounts of both internal and external moves on the part of the economics community as it adjusted to, and sought accommodation with, the new world of larger universities, reasonable availability of public research funds, and an increased demand for the services of technically trained economists.
There is, of course, behind all these stories, the larger effort of American political and intellectual historians to examine the postwar Cold War period of McCarthyism. They have provided a rich contextualization of these events in the history of American higher education and the history of abridgments and defenses of academic freedom. Some of these histories were meant to expose the roots of particular attacks on scholars and their institutions, while other historians have examined the backstories that eventuated in the turmoil.
Any economist or historian of economics familiar with the history of the American economics profession is well aware of the tensions and conflicts surrounding nineteenth-century economists who spoke openly on matters like free trade, bimetallism, monopolies, immigration, and unionization. The role of government in correcting or counterbalancing the worst tendencies of crony capitalism and its related vice of rent seeking is well known. It was not easy in the 1890s in Wisconsin for an economist publicly to defend labor unions against the political establishment. Neither is it easy in 2017 in Wisconsin to do so. In days past one might attempt, if one were a regent or legislator, to fire the economist. Today, the trustees or their legislative and executive bosses simply subpoena the scholar’s emails, as in Michigan and Virginia, or shut down the scholar’s Poverty or Labor Relations Center, as in North Carolina. Now, as then, calls for a larger public-service role for government, and for greater attention to economic injustice, can lead to the public accusation that those economists are socialists attempting to subvert American values. Then, as now, a concern for addressing issues of inequality of wealth, of income, of education, could have led to the grave accusation of anti-Americanism. Barack Obama is, or is he not, a socialist?
We have some sympathy for the argument that, in the postwar period, scholars in colleges and universities were becoming more—not less—important facilitators of achieving what was termed “the American Dream.” They taught the children of those Americans whose aspirations were that their children’s life experiences and economic successes would exceed their own. Economists played an important role in that period, providing a technical expertise to managers of the economy and managers of American business. In contrast, heterodox economists and social critics recirculated old arguments about the soullessness of economics and economists. That line of heterodox criticism of mainstream economics invariably located the sources of such coldness in the profession’s failure to deal with real problems. What could buttress their claim that economists’ models don’t correspond to reality? One of the uninformed answers given cited the moral cowardice of economists who, like victims of the Stockholm Syndrome, acquiesced in their own intellectual demise during the McCarthy period. It provided an easy explanation. That the explanation appears, upon examination, to be non-evidence-based has gone unremarked.
The postwar rhetorical shift in economics had deep roots and wide appeal. In an earlier study (Weintraub 2002), I showed how, from very early in the twentieth century, there were many intersections between mathematical lines of argument and economic analysis. The postwar mathematization was rooted in pre-war attempts by individuals like Irving Fisher and Griffith Evans and Ragnar Frisch and Harold Hotelling to develop more rigorous modes of economic analysis. They and their intellectual progeny—Charles Roos, Trygve Haavelmo, Kenneth Arrow—were to make significant contributions in the postwar years. Similarly important was the emigration to the US of refugee European economists who were mathematically or statistically sophisticated members of Rockefeller-sponsored business cycle research institutes (like Oskar Morgenstern, Abraham Wald, Gerhard Tintner, William Fellner, Jacob Marschak, Tjalling Koopmans, et al.). The Econometric Society, while small in the 1930s, was nonetheless active in holding meetings, publishing articles, and naming meretricious fellows. The Review of Economic Studies was developing a similar audience in Great Britain. Paul Samuelson’s important pre-war articles were recognized at the time as significant contributions to economic analysis. Certainly, the role of wartime connections among economists and mathematicians, physicists, statisticians, and engineers created a greater awareness of the role that mathematical and statistical modelling could play in a future economics. Two recent studies (Düppe and Weintraub 2014; Weintraub Reference Weintraub and Roy Weintraub2014a) have tracked the multiple ways that mathematics and economics came to be intertwined in the first postwar decade. The award of the first John Bates Clark Medal to Paul Samuelson in 1947 was an emblem of the decisive turn in the mathematization of economics. This was several years before the Red Scare frenzy produced McCarthy.
Not every contribution to the growth of scientific knowledge has a unique social cause. Historians of science long ago gave up such a Marxist determinism as providing satisfying explanations for scientific discoveries and scientific change. That some historians of economics continue to tell purely internalist stories of economic progress is no reason to tell uninteresting and unconvincing stories in which economic researchers have no agency. “McCarthyism made them do mathematics, teach it, and like it” hardly touches the larger set of personal beliefs, histories, and dreams that helped economists shape a new professional identity in the postwar years.
APPENDIX: EDITED SUMMARY OF SAMPLE ECONOMISTS’ QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
0154, Lafayette College. Middle-aged, permanent appointment. Never felt anxious or harassed. Their librarian was identified by the FBI as a member of the Communist Party and the president asked him to go before a congressional committee to answer questions. The librarian refused and he was fired. Works in area of labor relations and has felt no pressure in any fashion.
0422, Wooster College. Believed there were harmful effects due to McCarthyism. No difference in her own intellectual activity. Knew one case at her college. “A philosophy professor was asked to resign because of his atheistic teachings in the college (Christian).” Teaches Principles and Public Finance. Non-permanent instructor. No publications. Age 20–30.
0427, Wisconsin State Teachers College. Does not believe that he is being attacked and answered a question about if he followed civil liberties cases anywhere. Replied, “My mind is full of cases of civil liberties. The Negro questions; immigrants coming to this country, cases of justice, desegregation is foremost in my mind now.... Some colored people, talented people who’d been all over the US wanted to buy their home here in White Water. It was forbidden them.” In terms of research, no change. Local case of the president of the college who got involved in some teaching materials ordered by a faculty person on communism. At college 30 years or more. Former department chairman. PhD. Teaching Beginning Economic Theory, Labor Problems, Transportation, and the Economic Background of World War II. Full professor. Over 60.
0512, Dartmouth. General climate of McCarthyism is harmful. “Means a strong trend towards conformity.” Can’t help but express his own views in Labor Economics courses. No change in research. Notes that “Attorney General Wyman has an appropriation from legislature to seek out communist infiltration in state [NH] and in first report published beginning of 1955 he gave Dartmouth a clean bill of health. Was upset when President Dickey said that ’anyone who appealed to amendment 5 would be fired.’ Faculty didn’t like that one bit.” 30 years or more teaching. Past department head. PhD. Courses taught: Labor Relations. Books and articles. Over 60.
0607, South Dakota State. [There were seven from South Dakota State. Here, I summarize one.] Greater concern on the part of the public about teachers’ opinions. “It limits the social scientist as to what he dares say in his classes. It becomes impossible to give the true picture as to what is going on when you have to be concerned with the exact phraseology used in class.” Believes that he is very much more cautious when concerned about how what he says will be understood and reported. “In talking about British socialism, I wonder if it’s safe to say anything good about it. [There was a] son of a wealthy industrialist who obviously objected to what I was teaching. The son reported what I was saying to others on the staff [this in response to a question if he felt he had been watched in the classroom]."
In response to a question about academic freedom cases in his area: “North Dakota State College [has] four professors suspended on the basis of closed hearings and to date have had no opportunity to vindicate themselves.” The respondent, writes the interviewer, is a brother of one of the four professors suspended at North Dakota State.
Last January four professors at NDSC were asked, by the North Dakota board of higher education, to submit their resignations to it. The four professors refused and the board suspended the four, pending the outcome of a public hearing to air charges against the four. The controversy began as a result of an attempt on the part of the president of the college to dismiss a member of the faculty. Rather than go through the normal procedure set up by the college’s constitution for firing the professor with tenure, the president proposed to abolish the department of which the man in question was the sole member.
This action was actively opposed by the local chapter of the AAUP. Three of the four professors who were suspended were members of the Academic Freedom and Tenure Committee of the AAUP. The four were first suspended without any formal charges being filed against them. A closed hearing was held on the campus and as a result of these hearings the board asked the four to resign. The members of the student body, the faculty and the president called for an open hearing.
Been in college less than five years. Holds PhD in economics. Teaches Principles of Economics and Economics Seminar. Assistant professor.
0720, Whittier College. The McCarthyism conflict affects climate of freedom. “Some people have become fearful of expressing their opinions because they feel their opinion will be misconstrued. [It is all a] misconception on the part of the American people.” Argues that this climate of opinion prepares the ground for totalitarianism. Sees no change in the research or the papers or the books or speeches of his colleagues, or any difference in reference materials they recommend. His is a half-time position. Was employed there less than five years. Holds PhD. Teaches courses in Investments and Business Cycles as a lecturer.
0757, Ohio State. Doesn’t believe there’s any greater concern on the part of groups outside the college about political opinions. More worried about attacks from the right wing of the Republican Party and columnists such as Fulton Lewis Jr., Westwood Pegler, George Sokolsky. No change in research at all. No change in reference materials. Between 20 and 30 years’ service. Has PhD. Teaches Economic and Business History, Economics of the Firm, Population Problems and Economic theory. Tenured associate professor. No publications. Age 51–60.
1123, Oklahoma State. [Four from Oklahoma State. I will use one.] Answered question #26: No change in research, he or his colleagues. Question #27 [#27 asked respondent about any change in reference materials used in class]: Don’t know about reference materials but for himself no change. Made comment that at Oklahoma State, being conventional itself was considered of merit. Holds PhD for between 5 and 10 years. Teaches Basic Economics, International Economics, and Government and Business. Several publications. Age 31–40.
1290, University of Washington. Washington was the place where there was a very serious attack on academic freedom, including economists. Was member of Americans for Democratic Action (question #13). “I was criticized by employers’ groups in my work about my ability to be impartial judge or government policy maker.” In both his work and in research selection of reference materials, there has been no change. Many references to Canwell Committee investigation [that led to firings of tenured faculty]. Master’s degree only. Teaches Labor Economics, Union Management Relations, American Labor History, Graduate Seminar in Labor Economics.
1291, University of Washington. Comments, “No faculty member would dare apply for a visa to visit Russia and be able to keep his job. Question #11 [#11 asked respondent if statements made in or out of class have been reported to any higher authorities]: “Classroom statements have been distorted and reported to the administration and I have been called in. The administration has been sympathetic (only occasionally). Actually was not so much distorted—the students just didn’t like what I said.” Local community firing of people for past membership, grade school teacher and so on. No change in research. The Rader case at the University of Washington. He is accused by the Congressional Something Committee, a state committee on subversive activity—a totally false charge. The Veld Committee accused Abe Keller of past membership in the Communist Party and tried to cite him for contempt of committee for not giving information about his friends. The university watched it. They did not cite him finally and he is still teaching. The university itself brought action against a number of professors, alleging they were in close association with members of the Communist Party. They based this allegation on outside sources and brought their action on the basis of violation of the loyalty oath. Three faculty people were discharged. (Two were party members. One claimed he was not but he was guilty by association.) Taught between 20 and 30 years. PhD Economics. Teaches Economic Theory and Government Regulation of Business. Lots of publications and grants. Age 41–50.
1573, Iowa State. 20–30 years, BA and JD. Teaches Economics and Business Law. Full professor. Several publications.
1752, North Carolina A&T. No longer active in research as he is nearly blind.
1786, Wellesley College. “Our students are more conservative than the faculty. They’re such good Republicans!” No change in research or reference materials.
1833, Northwestern University. Doesn’t feel threatened. No change in his research or in colleagues’ research. Lots of publications, vice-president of Economic History Association. Has taught more than 30 years. Full professor.
1920, Western Reserve University. No change in his or his colleagues’ research. No change in reference materials. Taught between 20–30 years. Master’s only. Teaches Transportation and Industrial Economics. Full professor.
#1991, University of Chicago. On presence of McCarthyism: “Doesn’t permit as much freedom of discussion—especially of social sciences.” Has never felt threatened. Would report to the FBI if a student confessed youthful political indiscretions. If attacks would come, believes they will come from the Illinois state legislature. On research, checked he doesn’t know about any changes. Knew about [Val R.] Lorwin and [Daniel J.] Boorstin being accused of being subversive. Doesn’t know details. Whole affair was foolish since nothing illegal was ever proved. Taught at Chicago less than five years. Teaches Money and Banking. Assistant professor. Two papers written. Registered independent. Voted for Eisenhower in 1952.
#1993, Swarthmore College. Doesn’t feel threatened. Part of college administrative staff. “I know no one who would ever accuse me of leftist leanings.” No change in research. 10 to 20 years teaching. MBA. Teaches Business Administration. Does not publish. Republican who voted for Eisenhower and Dewey.
#2163, Yale University. Sees no difference in the threat to universities. No change in research or in selection of reference materials to his knowledge. Knew something about the case of Vern Countryman, who was rejected for tenure in the Law School because of accusations of subversive activity. The Law School faculty, however, was on the side of granting tenure to Countryman. 20 to 30 years at Yale. Only full professor at Yale without a Master’s or PhD. Teaches Economics and Transportation and Public Utilities occasionally. Has publications, books, and articles.
#2359, University of California at Berkeley. McCarthyism has caused harmful effects. Feels his own academic freedom has been threatened. No change in research. No change in selection of reference materials. Loyalty oath questions—UC Berkeley firings over refusals to sign oaths. Interference by the Board of Regents—believes that Clark Kerr as the new chancellor will help improve matters. Five to 10 years at university. PhD. Teaches Economic Theory and Statistics. Assistant professor. Articles and book.
