The Politics of Controlling Organized Crime in Greater China is an informative survey of organized crime in Greater China (the mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau) in the 21st century. The booming economies in the region, mainly driven by a rising China, are associated with the increasing incidence of organized crime activities. The politics is chosen by author Sonny Lo to help us understand causes and solutions of organized crime in Greater China. The significance of this research is clear, given the deepening integration of this region and its intensifying impact, for better or worse, upon the world.

In addition to an introduction and a conclusion, the book consists of nine chapters. Noticing the neglect of “the intertwined relationships between state capacity, state autonomy and state legitimacy,” Lo develops a central argument in the book: “[I]f a nexus between crime and politics is forged, the state capacity for crime control is destined to be curbed and limited. The separation between crime groups and political elites on the one hand, and the clear dichotomy between criminal elements and political institutions on the other, can protect and enhance state capacity in controlling general and organized crime” (p. 2). Chapter one offers a historical review of various states dealing with organized crime, especially the triads (it seems to me too arbitrary to apply this concept to organized crime in China, or to equate triads to heishehui), under different forms of political regimes (communist, nationalist and finally colonial). Chapter two gives a sketch of organized crime activities and the responses from the authorities of China, Hong Kong and Macau in the 21st century. Chapter three covers the fourth territory of Greater China, namely Taiwan, where heidao and heijin have been a stigma on its liberal democracy. Chapters four to seven cover four issues as case studies: terrorism, prostitution, casino/gambling, narcotics/drug trafficking, and how authorities try to gain the upper hand over these. Chapters eight and nine examine the cross-border law-enforcement cooperation within Greater China and with the larger global community.

In the “Conclusion” chapter, the author has several interesting and debatable arguments. First, the central government of PRC has the political will to control organized crime: “the crux of the problem is how to control the local governments” (p. 230). It seems that Lo agrees to the use of mass mobilization and campaigns by the central state as part of the remedy to control crime. Second, “the city-states of Hong Kong and Macao have been maintaining their relatively stronger capacity for controlling organized crime” (p. 232). The Hong Kong police force provides a “good model for the PRC counterparts to imitate” and the “Hongkongization” of the mainland police is encouraged. Third, the autonomy of the Taiwan state vis-à-vis criminal groups is comparatively limited, “mirroring the politics of Italy.” Fourth, the governments of the four places “have become more like national security states than ever before.”

Despite Lo's meticulous data collection, his book lacks a tight theoretical framework and careful methodological design, and some weaknesses, in particular some unsubstantiated conclusions, ensue. Overall, the reading is slowed by the cumulative journalistic cases, in which data have not been aggregated in a systematic way for generalization and few theorizations can be accomplished. To some extent, the book resembles a commentary that lies between journalism and theoretical analysis. The rich data undoubtedly provide leads for further research in a more rigorous comparative research design. In Lo's book, the central state of the PRC is assumed but not critically discussed. As more scandals involving the top brass of the communist government have been overwhelming the world, it is not easy for the readers to swallow this argument in the book: “The divergence between the capacity, autonomy and legitimacy of the central state and that of local states remain a hallmark of the difficulties of organized crime control in the PRC” (p. 232). In contrast to the easy writing-off of the central state as a problem in the PRC, the author easily lumps the central and local states in Taiwan together and leaves an impression that the PRC model at the central level has been working better. Because of this under-estimation of the threat from the very top of the PRC leadership to capacity (due to corruption), autonomy (due to criminal-political nexus) and legitimacy (due to repression and brutality), the author has not seen the looming danger of the “mainlandization” of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. With such an orientation, Lo presents the case of Islamic “terrorism” in Xinjiang uncritically. For these reasons, whether the emergence of a security state in the PRC, or the “stability-maintenance regime,” is a good thing for state-building and crime control can be debatable in the context of globalization and democratization.