In this book, Alex de Waal provides an insightful perspective on the study of governance in the countries of the Horn of Africa. Employing the concept of political marketplace, de Waal contends that politics in the region has been reduced into a system of financial transaction where rent-seeking political actors at different levels of the political hierarchy are engaged in buying and selling loyalty and use violence as a means of bargaining and signaling value within the marketplace. In such a system, issues such as public interest, social justice, and morality do not enter into the calculations of the political elite and are merely background noise. Drawing on his vast knowledge of the region, the author provides a large number of examples of negotiations of financial transactions by political entrepreneurs to show the strength of the political marketplace framework in explaining the region’s real politics. He candidly describes the relations of the political elite with their populations in the following manner:“Those who rise in the system are men who can mobilize money . . . men who are ruthless and inured to sentiment, who reduce human beings and human dignity to instruments and commodities” (p. 34).

De Waal attributes the rise of the political marketplace to the existence of four conditions: a) Political finance is in the hands of individuals; b) control over violence is dispersed or contested; c) political disputes are not resolved by institutions; and d) the countries are integrated into the global political and economic order in a subordinate position. Stated differently, the political marketplace arises in developing countries where the state lacks strong structures and institutions of accountability and transparency. The countries of the Horn of Africa thus face a vicious cycle whereby structural deficiencies of the underdeveloped state lead to the rise of monetization of politics, which, in turn, hinders state building. De Waal also identifies some developments that have reinforced the political marketplace and benefited the political entrepreneurs. The inflow of new resources from security cooperation with external powers, which is enhanced by the war on terror, is one such development. The eclipse of coups, perhaps in part due to the African Union’s resolution to withhold recognition of leaders who come to power through coups, is another.

The political marketplace framework no doubt sharpens the analysis of the nature of the ruthless autocrats who have risen to rule the countries of the Horn of Africa and many other countries in the rest of Africa. Yet the model could have been strengthened if it had also incorporated the struggle of various elements of the population against the system and its peddlers, the political entrepreneurs. States without strong structures of horizontal accountability within their component organizations easily fall victim to the rise of self-serving autocrats, who, in the pursuit of their own private interests (staying in power and accumulating wealth), hinder the processes of state building and democratization, and thwart development and the advancement of public interest, while grossly violating the human rights of their populations. But there is also another side to the politics of the region. The region’s populations are not submissive to the scourge of the political elite. It is also debatable if money (political budget) is the vehicle for the rise to power of the political elite. Many of the current political CEOs in the Horn of Africa became wealthy and accumulated funds for a political budget after coming to power, often through violence. The leaders of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) are good examples. They both used violence to come to power before they accumulated the funds for a political budget. It is also likely that such factors as ethnic ties and nationalist/subnationalist mobilization impact the price of loyalty. Political CEOs often succeed in securing the loyalty of their ethnic or clan groups with little spending of their political budget, while the cost of loyalty of other ethnic groups may be much higher.

Though highly enlightening, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa is also highly disheartening. It provides very little compelling argument about how the marketization of politics, which the author finds repugnant, can be avoided or surmounted. He suggests that economic development that reduces reliance on rent-seeking activities is a possible way out of the system. Ethiopia’s development project, Sudan’s economic boom, and Somalia’s entrepreneurship are presented as developments with the potential to generate productive economic sectors that will create a new nonrentier political economy. Unfortunately, Sudan’s economic boom has not been sustainable, Somalia’s entrepreneurship (economic survival without a state) has not brought any transformation over the last two decades, and Ethiopia’s growth has been accompanied by rising inequality and entrenched poverty and ethnic strife. More importantly, it is not clear why or how political CEOs, who care little about the public well-being and whose foundation is the rentier economy, would promote economic transformation, which would create contending points of power. Though still feeble, the struggle for democratization by the slowly growing ranks of the middle class, civil society, and the educated class perhaps provides greater hope for change.

De Waal does not explore such possibilities fully, even though he notes that social movements, spearheaded by university students, played a major part in bringing down regimes, such as those of Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia and General Ibrahim Abboud in Sudan. Needless to say, such regime changes do not necessarily lead to a systemic change, but sometimes they do point to progressive improvements. The EPRDF government, for instance, is advancement over the Derg’s rule. Perhaps the political marketplace framework, which is focused on the motivation of the elite, hinders full investigation into the dynamics of the broader society. Surprisingly, the ray of hope that the struggle for democratization might present is extinguished by de Waal’s contention that “the logic of political markets generates today’s paradox of democratization; political competition and an open public sphere increases the marketization of politics” (p. 214). No doubt, political openness can foster the monetization of politics, but it also creates mechanisms of accountability that can deter would-be political CEOs.

Readers of this fascinating book may have a number of questions about certain issues or statements. They may even have some doubts as to the strength of the conceptual framework. Yet they will benefit from it immensely. This reviewer certainly did. The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa provides compelling analyses of the motivation and modus operandi of both the political entrepreneurs who run the countries of the region and the leaders of the rent-seeking rebellions who challenge them.