In their recent books on Rousseau's key political writings, the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men (Second Discourse) and The Social Contract, Frederick Neuhouser and David Lay Williams contribute two meticulous interpretations and analyses that offer excellent up-to-date resources for students and scholars. In light of the ever-increasing socioeconomic inequality in today's globalized world, Neuhouser directs us to Rousseau's trenchant critique of inequality in the Second Discourse; whereas Williams's commentary guides readers through The Social Contract. Williams draws on Rousseau's less influential works and the Genevan political (republican), social (Calvinist), and intellectual contexts to give a nuanced and historical rather than purely analytical interpretation. Ultimately, Williams wants to give readers the tools to make informed judgments on contentious passages that have provoked divergent readings of Rousseau's Social Contract as either radically democratic or totalitarian (3).
Neuhouser composes his book to rearticulate Rousseau's answers to the question posed by the Dijon Academy on the “origins” and “foundations” of inequality and to help students understand the Second Discourse. More importantly, he presents his study of this discourse as a way of thinking about and addressing the problem of inequality not only in terms of its detrimental impact on freedom and well-being, but also to reconsider why inequality arises, takes root, and becomes insidious and difficult to eradicate. To Neuhouser, Rousseau is not a utopian who promotes sameness since not all types of inequality are pernicious. Rather Rousseau “offers a set of criteria for distinguishing acceptable from inacceptable forms of inequality” (2).
In addressing Rousseau's work on the “origin” and “foundations” of inequality, Neuhouser adopts a genealogical approach and further claims that Rousseau develops a genealogy of inequality that allows him to “explain the origin and evaluate the legitimacy of social inequality” (208 and 4–5). This genealogical approach enables Neuhouser to read Rousseau as distinguishing descriptive and explanatory functions from normative and evaluative functions of nature and human nature, alongside distinctions between natural and artificial aspects of human existence, freedom, and equality. This underpins the argument that inequality does not originate in nature or human nature, but rather arises in society through human relations and psychology. Thus Rousseau can demonstrate that inequality arises through contingent events and has negative consequences not only for those who suffer disadvantage, but for society as a whole (208–11).
To Rousseau, social and economic inequalities arise from the distinctions men draw between themselves when they quit their solitary state and begin to live together. There are natural inequalities in strength and intelligence, for example; yet these are not pernicious and are negligible. To Neuhouser, Rousseau demonstrates that inequalities in social standing, wealth, power, and privilege are not the result of nature or lottery, but of social arrangements and artifice that are contingent, not necessary, and that can be altered. Although social inequalities are not the result of agreement, they are maintained by it. Such agreement is often unreflective; individuals consent through everyday practices (19). Neuhouser develops an insightful discussion on consent: beliefs and opinions are reiterated through practices and institutions and unreflective performance of these can amount to free assent to societal structures and hierarchies. To this extent, such unreflective consent authorizes social inequalities (20–21, 30).
Neuhouser disentangles Rousseau's understanding of human nature into descriptive and normative parts. The former includes the drives that motivate men, self-love, pity, amour propre, and the capacity for perfectibility. The latter refers to the human capacities for freedom and well-being. Accordingly, human beings have the capability and freedom to choose how they live and also to live well, by satisfying their needs without being ostentatious or domineering. To Neuhouser, the distinction between explanatory and malleable, normative aspects of human nature allows Rousseau to show that men can determine their social and political institutions, that inequality does not originate in nature and predetermined structures. Rather it is a relative phenomenon that arises in society. Neuhouser emphasizes that although society is artificial, Rousseau considers it essential to human well-being and existence. Moreover, the attributes (love, reason, language, and amour propre) that human beings develop in society are “essential to a good human existence” (30). Society is “a product of human belief and will” and “it is up to us how our social relations are configured” (30).
Amour propre, “the drive to be esteemed by others” is a social phenomenon (30). To Neuhouser, on its own amour propre is not necessarily a negative sentiment, yet it is artificial and as it grows can become inflamed as human needs increase from simple to complex material and social needs. Amour propre is the source of inequality. When individuals rely on others for their basic needs and have no choice but to obey the better-off to fulfill those needs, they lose their capacity to act as free agents. Likewise, they lose their free agency when they come to rely on other people's opinions to measure their own worth. They depend on others and consent to the authority of the wealthy and of those from whom they seek approval. Such consent in practice authorizes economic and social inequality.
Social inequality is the result of one's need to be recognized by others, for honor and public esteem, whereas economic inequality is the result of the ownership of property and the division of labor. As soon as someone lays claim to land, institutions are established to protect and maintain that claim. Such inequality is maintained through human conventions. As needs multiply and become more artificial, amour propre and inequality become inflamed, and no one is free. Those who dominate depend on the less well-off to prove their superiority and those who are dominated are oppressed and forced to consent to the rules of the wealthy few to meet their basic needs. These social, moral, and economic inequalities are dangerous as they lead to the ability of some to command the obedience of others. This, Neuhouser observes, is the object of Rousseau's critique (175).
Neuhouser outlines the importance of freedom and free will to Rousseau. He explains that metaphysical (moral) freedom refers to free agency, the human capacity to resist instinct. Moral freedom is the freedom to obey a law that one has prescribed to oneself. Neuhouser points out that it is hard to conceive of free will as a characteristic of human nature when reason is but latent and that perfectibility contradicts free will (47–51). Nonetheless, the notion of free will allows Rousseau to show that inequality is pernicious since physically free individuals who depend on the regard of others or are enslaved but not in chains are not psychologically free. Here it is important to distinguish between metaphysical and physical freedom. The former refers to the freedom of the will to resist and to deliberate; the latter refers to the freedom of movement. The hindrance of movement is quite different from the unfreedom of the will. Rousseau argues that economic, moral, and social inequalities restrict the freedom of the will. Rousseau's conception of free agency, in contrast to Hobbes's denial of free will, is key to understanding how one might be unfree, even if one enjoys free movement, in an inegalitarian society by consenting to the authority of some either through need or unwittingly. On this question Neuhouser does not situate Rousseau in Philip Pettit's republican freedom-as-nondomination tradition because the nonarbitrary nature of law is not a sufficient condition to be free (134). Yet this distinction between moral and physical freedom that Neuhouser hints at deserves more attention (122–36).
The wider object of Neuhouser's invocation of Rousseau on inequality is to show how inequality in the present globalized world endangers the two normative ends that most Western liberal societies aim at—freedom and a decent life. His conclusions draw on John Rawls's liberalism and the difference principle; one might even argue that his book is a genealogy of this idea. Yet as a means to understand the roots and insidious nature of inequality today, Neuhouser could address contemporary forms of race, gender, and disability inequalities and show how these intersect with social, moral, and economic inequalities. Even though he mentions patriarchy and gender inequality in the family (20, 223n30), Neuhouser could clarify that Rousseau's account is problematic precisely because it maintains the subjugation and dependence of women by conjugal right and asserts that women lack adequate reason. Yet this is precisely the type of domination that he vehemently opposes and it is difficult to excuse his attitude as reiterating moral norms of the time, for he was aware of contemporaneous feminist arguments and writers. To deploy Rousseau today as a way to think about inequality requires engagement with such issues, including identity politics.
Rousseau's solution is to create a social contract that includes all male citizens on an equal footing. However, a key problem is that the contracting men strip themselves of their particularity, make themselves the same, and even if they reason to maximize self-interest, the lack of difference means that they will reason in the same way and generate the same conclusions. At bottom, not only are their nature and drive the same, but also their reason and capacity for free will. This act is meant to create political equality, to situate all on equal ground in the public space and to generate ideas to which all can reasonably agree. Yet this type of social contract, public reason, and abstract sovereign state take the politics, its inherent messiness and myriad of differences, out of politics. A standard of an abstract citizen stripped of specificity and identity is created. Unsurprisingly, this standard accords with that of the dominant nondescript male. The problem then surfaces that in order to be “equal” or to overcome relative inequality, those whose differences contribute to their unequal standing, power, and wealth have to conform to or seek to be part of this standard to overcome domination.
Perhaps our contemporary inability to achieve parity is due to the fact that we address the problem of inequality through making people equal to a standard rather than reshaping that standard. Certainly Rousseau attempted to change the standard of his day. This is why his social contract situates sovereignty within the body of the people; yet that body was established with certain exclusionary boundaries and failed to overcome all types of inequality or inadvertently reiterated the standard through the abstraction of individuals. Nevertheless, Rousseau's claim that rather than suffering personal dependence, individuals ought to be dependent on the impersonal state for their well-being and freedom does provide a strong argument for the welfare state. Rousseau's arguments for popular sovereignty and dependence on a benevolent impersonal state were radical in his day.
In Rousseau's “Social Contract,” Williams closely examines and brings out the complexity of that work. His commentary is exegetical and there are times when the book reiterates Rousseau's writing and does not illuminate the original text. The book includes a conclusion that outlines the intellectual influences on Rousseau as well as his impact on later thinkers and two appendices on the general will and the position of women. His reconstruction of Rousseau's views on the international order through Rousseau's writings on this topic is insightful. However, this chapter would be better presented as part of the appendix rather than commentary on the actual text, for Rousseau ended this work abruptly and we can only go with what he published. To understand his views on international relations as something apart from The Social Contract is illuminating, but to integrate these where Rousseau neither put them nor subsequently added is misleading.
Williams's commentary focuses on the general will. He claims the general will is Rousseau's greatest legacy and that Rousseau's goal is to create a virtuous citizenry by slaying amour propre, rescuing fallen man and creating the good man (7, 23–25). To Williams, the general will aims to solve the problems of modernity associated with the sovereign, egocentric individual driven by amour propre (23–24). Williams observes that Rousseau does not give the general will a single definition, referring to it sometimes as sovereignty, sometimes as the common good (24). In my view, the concept throughout Williams's book is presented in a confusing manner and he does not get to the heart of what the will is and how it can be general and universal in relation to a single body.
For Rousseau, as for Hobbes, when a people unites and creates a unity they form a singular body, an artificial person, and this person has its own will. The will of the sovereign body is the general will; at the same time, for Rousseau this will is reflected in the union or coincidence of all individuals to unite and form a collective association. This, Rousseau claims, forms the social bond without which society could not conceivably exist. Furthermore, this constitutes an act of all individual wills to unite and form a body politic regulated by the laws they author and by their collective will which, once established, Rousseau depicts as a rational entity. The common good is defined by the ends of the association. For Rousseau, the body politic, created by the will and artifice of those who compose it, sets its ends as freedom and equality. The common good is a particular object defined through time and space, in terms of each society. It is not a timeless, universal concept. Finally, Williams's discussion of the sovereign and government, legislative and executive powers is salient, especially since Rousseau recommends undivided sovereignty but curtails its power to legislative authority and distinguishes it from a subordinate executive power that acts as the state's administration or government.
Much criticism of Rousseau's ideal state focuses on its impracticality. For both the population and territory must be very small and isolated, as in Corsica or Geneva. Williams could make a better case as to why we should read Rousseau today as our contemporary world is not constructed of small, discrete states in which there is little movement of people; we live in multicultural states and a globalized world. The final chapter reiterates Rousseau's influence on German philosophers and Rawls. Yet for a contemporary audience the book could do some really interesting work by moving beyond familiar scholarship and showing how Rousseau's conceptions of popular sovereignty, freedom, and equality influenced nineteenth-century radical republicanism and anticolonial movements for self-determination. Such an enterprise would contribute original insight and would shift our approach from the confines of a particular way of thinking to the exchange of political ideas across global time and space. Nevertheless, both Neuhouser and Williams's books reinvigorate Rousseau studies and demonstrate his continued relevance as a rigorous thinker on inequality and democratic governance.
