In this scholarly, yet deeply personal, volume, sociologist Silvia Pedraza explores the political changes that gave rise to four successive waves of emigration from postrevolutionary Cuba—each of which was marked by distinct socio-economic characteristics and worldviews and motivated by unique anxieties and concerns.
Pedraza herself was a first-wave émigré; her family left the island for the United States soon after Castro came to power. As such, she is particularly well qualified to analyze both the political disaffection and personal imperatives that have episodically compelled Cubans to flee their homeland since 1959. However, the thrust of Pedraza's analysis rests not on her own experiences, but rather on a combination of in-depth interviews with 120 Cuban exiles and ethnographic observations from within U.S.-based Cuban exile communities. A significant subset of these data is examined through the lens of Nelson Amaro's five-stages of revolutionary social change model: namely, democracy, humanism, nationalism, socialism and Marxist-Leninism (Amaro, 1977). Specifically, in part 1, Pedraza traces how and why political and economic shifts within Cuba during and in the wake of the Revolution drove first Cuba's elite (wave one: 1959–1962) and, subsequently, much of its petite bourgeoisie (wave two: 1965–1972) to take flight.
In Part 2, she turns her attention to the second and third generation of émigrés, so-called children of Communism. Herein, the data focus principally, but not exclusively, on the groups widely known as the Marielitos and the balseros. The Marielitos, who comprised the third wave, came to the United States as part of the mainly orchestrated 1980 Mariel boatlift. They were overwhelmingly young, male, politically disillusioned and largely working-class. The fourth wave balseros, or rafters, on the other hand—most of whom departed after the fall of the Soviet Union—migrated largely autonomously and principally out of perceived economic necessity.
Pedraza's study is not the first to examine the changing stages of the Cuban revolution; both Jorge Dominguez's Cuba: Order and Revolution (1978) and Susan Eckstein's Back from the Future: Cuba under Castro (1994) are noteworthy and valuable precursors. Nor is her book the first to explore the shifting nature and motivations of Cuban migrants; previous worthwhile exemplars include Felix Roberto Masud-Piloto's From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the US, 1959-1995 (1996) and Miguel Gonzalez-Pando's The Cuban Americans (1998). Alejandro Portes's body of work is likewise worthy of note.
However, Pedraza's undertaking is both more ambitious than its predecessors and, ultimately, more rewarding. For one thing, Pedraza's study is unique in that it examines Castro's accession to power and the subsequent episodic exoduses “not only as cause and consequence but also as profoundly social and human processes that were not only political and economic but also cognitive and emotive”(2). For another, she artfully combines analyses of the roles of broad political seismic shifts and of intimate personal lifestyle issues—such as gender, religion, and sexuality—in driving Cubans' decisions to leave (and, in some cases, to stay). This unusual intellectual marriage should make Pedraza's volume of interest to a broader variety of audiences—political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists, among others—than would likely otherwise be the case. In short, as Damian Fernandez has so aptly put it, Pedraza has accomplished a feat that eludes many social scientists; namely, “seamlessly weav[ing] the macro and the micro, the structural and the personal, the conceptual and the empirical. The result is a textured portrait of the many faces of the Cuban diaspora over the last five decades” (quoted on the back cover of the paperback version).
All this said, the book does have one curious shortcoming: namely, that it largely trivializes or glosses over the critical and direct role played by Fidel Castro in stimulating and catalyzing at least three of the waves of emigration upon which Pedraza focuses. Yet it is by now widely recognized that Castro self-consciously both engineered and exploited Cuban outflows not only to rid himself of political dissidents and malcontents, but also to influence the behavior and the policies of the state that would receive the vast majority of them—the US (see e.g., Smith, 1987; Masud-Piloto, 1996; and Greenhill, 2002, 2004, forthcoming). Given that Pedraza concludes her study with an extended discussion of the critical “triangular” relationship between the United States, Cuba, and the exiles, this oversight is particularly unfortunate.
For instance, in Pedraza's account, the 1965 Camarioca outflow originated with U.S. President Lyndon Johnson's October 3rd “open arms” speech at the Statue of Liberty (120). However, in point of fact, Castro had actually announced on September 28th that he would open the port at Camarioca on October 10th. He further declared that any Cubans who wished to leave for “the Yankee paradise” could do so, and any exiles living in Miami were welcome to come to Cuba to retrieve their relatives. It was, therefore, Castro's opening gambit that drove Johnson's response, not the other way around. Moreover, although Johnson originally responded with contempt to Castro's threat, once it became clear that the United States was facing a much larger (and uncontrolled) influx, he blinked and began a series of secret negotiations with Castro to normalize the outflow. The result was the Memorandum of Understanding that established procedures and means for the movement of Cuban refugees to the United States. On the same day the Memorandum was signed, Castro closed the port of Camarioca.
Similarly, Pedraza writes that the Mariel boatlift originated with the Peruvian Embassy crashings in early April 1980 (152). However, even at the time, close observers recognized that the crashings were simply a proximate catalyst for the crisis. Indeed, Castro had publicly warned on several occasions in the months leading up to the outflow that he was seriously considering replicating Camarioca, if the United States failed to take actions to address several ongoing diplomatic sore points, including the punishment of Cuban hijackers, visa issues, and others. And, as was the case in 1965, the outflow ended—and the port at Mariel was closed—only after the United States concluded an agreement with Castro on terms that largely comported with those he had been demanding since the early days of the crisis. The 1994 balseros crisis—which ultimately resulted in the most comprehensive reform of US-Cuban immigration policy in three decades—followed a similar, if much abbreviated, trajectory. In short, Pedraza's accounting of the origins and outcomes of these outflows is not so much wrong, as it is regrettably incomplete.
Still, these shortcomings are minor flaws in the context of what is otherwise an excellent and important contribution to the still-too-limited literature on Cuba's 1959 Revolution, those who fled from it, and the implications of such exoduses for immigration, more generally. In an era characterized by profound changes and political transformation within Cuba itself—now that Castro has finally relinquished power—and by heightened anxiety about refugees and migration throughout the world, the contributions offered by Pedraza's volume are more important than ever.
