Rancière's Sentiments is a whistle-stop tour of aesthetics in the work of Jacques Rancière. Engaging with emerging debates in the secondary literature, Panagia offers less an introduction for students, more an engagement on the level of aesthetic theory and practice. Inspired by his personal passion for literature, film, media, and art, Panagia's book brings to the fore the “simultaneity of aesthetics and politics in [Rancière's] oeuvre and … his styles of reading, writing, and thinking” (1), developing an affective pragmatics “for the occupation of everyday life” (103). He skillfully meshes a scenic narrative, wending his way through four chapters, each exploring a different line of division that Rancière's writing puts into question. Visiting and revisiting key themes throughout the chapters, Panagia flits between them to build layer by layer this elegant portrait of Rancière's corpus.
In the preface Panagia notes his initial struggle to fit Rancière into what he already knew of political theory. He acknowledges his frustration that Rancière's work just would not fit, for it resolutely refused to offer anything like a “theory of judgment” (1). This turns out to be the nub of this work. As Panagia's continuing engagement with Rancière developed, thanks to an opportune meeting and the flourishing of an enduing friendship, he increasingly came to appreciate that Rancière's work purposively refuses to pass judgment, based as it is on a political project that associates judgment with hierarchy and inequality. Rancière's writing thus presents a formidable hurdle to those earnest young scholars setting out on graduate programs each year, to be trained in the making of good judgments and joining the hallowed ranks of others who have already been judged to judge well. It indicates that this issue of judgment is problematic from the very start: “an appeal to the politics of judgment is an appeal to comprehension, to a specific form of intelligence, that some may have and others won't… . Such an intellectual qualification breeds inequality” (viii–ix). In response Rancière vows to undermine the possibility of judgment, to create blurs and confusions that confound our ability to judge properly and accurately.
The first chapter revisits Rancière's focus on division, or “lines” as Panagia refers to the partages that criss-cross Rancière's many texts, yet immediately he emphasizes Rancière's argument that partage is not just a division but also a sharing. It harbors a dissensus that marks the site of struggle. Who shares, who does not; for some to share, who has to not share; how can we change that? Borrowing from Frederic Jameson, Panagia argues that Rancière does not develop a theory of mediation but instead that his work in itself enacts a radical mediation that transforms existing divisions in both style and content (23). Similarly to Sam Chambers (The Lessons of Rancière, Oxford University Press, 2012), Panagia emphasizes the import of the term dispositif for Rancière, but he adds that Rancière breaks with Althusserian analysis of specific apparatuses towards a broader concern with the sensible milieus in which we exist which govern each and every particular arrangement of things (28–29). He draws out a central component of Rancière's argument—emancipation and equality involve transgressing dividing lines—and argues that Rancière's work itself seems to try to disrupt such dividing. He ends the chapter with a discussion of the epistemological break that Rancière's work effects against philosophy's usual task of organizing knowledge according to certain guiding criteria or principles, exemplified for Panagia in the Porphryian diagram, and develops from this a theory of sentimental reading that constructs “a distensive complex of inter-relational adjacencies that procure a regard for the occurrence of the unforeseen” (36).
The second chapter turns to consider the way that Rancière theorizes social order as police order, governed by an aesthetic sense of what is proper, or, in other words, decorum. Panagia notes our acceptance of “emplotment” as a decorous way of organizing knowledge rooted in Aristotle's discussion of muthos. He emphasizes the juxtaposition that Rancière's work effects by arguing that such ordering dominates knowledge, keeping us focused on plot at the expense of the power that knowledge effects. Indeed, Rancière tells us, our social order is a “police” order. It does not simply discipline us with force, but arranges our aesthetic sensibilities such that we accept its rule as normal. Thus Panagia notes a commitment within our everyday “police” order to momentum, keeping us moving through, to stop us from pausing to realize there may be other ways of ordering (50). He finishes this chapter with a sudden jump to the theme of democracy, performing the “shock” tactics he identifies in Rancière's own method, suddenly adding democracy to a list of various aesthetic forms that he says “thwart the relationship between sounds and vistas” (62).
The third chapter opens with a discussion of Rancière's style, in particular his use of the indirect free literary voice. Panagia notes that Rancière goes beyond Marx on equivalence to target the logic that enables any system of equivalence in the first place. Further he summarizes Rancière's argument on the literarity of the modern novel, emphasizing its democratic qualities and opening out to a discussion of amorphousness and the way it can be used to undermine the isomorphism of the reigning order (82–83). Returning to the note on pausing from chapter 2, Panagia devotes chapter 4 to developing the political relations as he sees them of emancipation and equality. He emphasizes the political import of “reverie” or doing nothing, such that it can break free of instrumentality. This is a “partaking in/of something that the established hierarchies of a social order denies” (85). This final chapter is a wonderful emphasis of the political urgency to resist the momentum of the work ethic in decorous society: the salience of pausing, reverie, moments of doing nothing; maybe even dreaming? It is a fantastic contribution to the literature on Rancière and one that I hope Panagia will develop further in future work. Here too he weaves in some tantalizing comments on democracy “as that form of association crafting without qualifications” (89). This poses a potential dramatic challenge to contemporary democratic theory.
Notwithstanding the poetic beauty of Panagia's composition, as with all finite works further questions emerge, particularly with regard to the inspiring and tantalizing politics of Rancière's sentiments. Is there no risk of reordering Rancière's work in developing a method of reading in chapter 1? Does mediation risk reintroducing the relations of depth and divisions of knowledge that Rancière aims to undermine? How might contemporary literary and artistic practice impose its own reordering, creating an initial break with order, but reimposing its own logics, even if they are less rigid than what came before? Is there too much faith here in artistic methods, such as montage, to do political work for us? Although propriety and properties are challenged by Rancière, does this not urgently need to be returned to the political question of the distribution of property in our contemporary societies? Finally, does the revalorization of pausing and indistinction problematize existing currents in affect theory, forcing us to consider more carefully the breakages of relations, the blockage of affective ties? Might a turn to reverie not undermine as much as it contributes to any affective pragmatics?
