I want to thank Justin Crowe for his thorough and generous review of my book. I wish our paths had crossed when I was still at the revision stage of the manuscript. I could have used his fresh perspective to strengthen the book's message to a wider audience.
Crowe's first point is that virtually no contemporary public-law scholars would disagree with my claim that institutional safeguards are not enough to guarantee the development of an independent judiciary. As Crowe succinctly puts it in his review, “judicial independence is as politically constructed as it is legally provided.” He may be right that the judicial politics literature is converging around this point. Beyond our subfield, however, and outside of academic political science, the myth that successful judicial reforms are predicated exclusively on the adoption of the “right institutions” persists. The European Union, the American Bar Association, the World Bank, the US Agency for International Development, the Council of Europe, and any other organization that runs a rule-of-law promotion program in the postcommunist region puts exclusive emphasis on institutional reforms when assessing the countries' progress toward building independent courts. I will deem it a small victory if my book manages to convince an audience of practitioners that we need to focus less on institutional engineering and consider the politically determined incentives that motivate incumbents to either provide independent courts or turn the judiciary into a tool of politicized justice.
Second, Crowe wonders whether my selection of two highly politically salient groups of legal cases is not setting too high a bar for judging the independence of the Russian and Ukrainian judiciaries. He correctly anticipates my response. Independence from politicians is at the heart of the normative importance of independent courts to the rule of law. In addition, in postauthoritarian settings, politicians who may be used to subservient courts are probably the greatest threat to judicial independence, and therefore, examining those judicial decisions that politicians are likely to care about is particularly crucial. Finally, my book seeks to estimate the level of judicial independence in legal issue areas that are central to the provision of basic democratic institutions, such as fair elections and a free press. Other scholars, most notably Kathryn Hendley, have extensively researched the performance of the Russian judiciary in the less politicized area of civil litigation and have found that the Russian judiciary functions fairly well when state actors do not have a stake in the outcome of individual cases (Trying to Make Law Matter, 1996; “Legal Development in post-Soviet Russia,” Post Soviet Affairs 13 [1997]: 228–251; “Resolving Problems among Neighbors in Post-Soviet Russia: Uncovering the Norms of the Pod,” Law & Social Inquiry 36, no. 2 [2011]: 388–418; etc.).
Crowe's third question zeroes in on the puzzle that is at the center of my current research agenda: Is it virtually impossible for new democracies to display high levels of judicial independence? Is building the rule of law a painfully slow process that brings tangible results only after democratic norms have firmly taken root? In short, yes. Cross-national data paint a straightforward picture of the variation in the availability of independent courts: In old, consolidated democracies, independent courts are the norm: in new democracies and hybrid regimes, independent courts are rare exceptions. There must be a reason for this sharp contrast. In a recent working paper that analyzes cross-national, longitudinal data, I find empirical support for the strategic pressure theory I propose in Politicized Justice. In new democracies across the world, intense political competition undermines the rule of law, and new democracies or hybrid regimes are very often rather competitive. As democracies become more established over time, this effect disappears (Andrew Faisman and Maria Popova, “Political Competition, Judicial Independence, and Electoral Regime Age,” paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA, August 30-September 2, 2012).
In my reading, Crowe's Building the Judiciary also provides evidence consistent with this view. His book masterfully illustrates that the power and independence of the American judiciary developed steadily but slowly over time. I think that the US experience actually offers cautious hope to those who wish to see the emergence of strong and independent courts in their new democratic regimes. If the US judiciary, which is now seen as a paragon of independence and power, started from humble beginnings as a largely irrelevant institution with limited branch independence, maybe the same process can eventually unfold in today's young democracies, albeit decades from now.
