Osama Abi-Mershed begins his well-researched book with a question posed in 1895 by Arthur Girault, a prominent French jurist and author of a classic work on colonialism titled Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale (Paris: Larose, 1895), as to what should be done with the natives of Algeria. The possibilities were three: exterminate or expel them to the Sahara, abandon Algeria to them, or assimilate them. Because the first two options were unthinkable, Girault concluded that the natives should ideally be assimilated. The natives, however, were not assimilable because of racial and cultural differences, so he concluded that the French colonial authorities should coerce them to accept the benefits of French rule by improving their material circumstances. Muslims would be subject to separate policies and laws, and European settlers would enjoy special privileges plus full civil rights. The goal therefore would be “association” rather than “assimilation.”
“Association” meant denying the natives the benefits of modern or progressive reforms on the principle that such reforms would be harmful to their traditional values. Abi-Mershed demonstrates that French policymakers derived their notion of association from Saint-Simonian ideals. He quickly dispels any cheery notions the reader may hold about the progressive, feminist, egalitarian, and utopian ideals of the Saint-Simonians. They may have been well meaning, but their autocratic tendencies and advocacy of militaristic pacification of the natives were anything but benign. Saint-Simonians hoped to lift Muslims from their barbarism by forcing them through the stages of feudalism and communalism to a final amalgamation with France. This process was to be accomplished through the militarization of native affairs. The firm hand of an enlightened military would pacify the natives and force them to reform. For the Saint-Simonians, the use of extreme force to repress the natives, as the enemies of progress, was entirely acceptable and even virtuous.
During the first decades of the colonial administration, Arabist officers influenced by the ideas of Henri de Saint-Simon, Prosper Enfantin, and Thomas Ismaÿl Urbain imposed a dual administration with one policy for the natives and another for European settlers. The Saint-Simonian convert to Islam, Thomas Urbain, was the principal architect of French colonial policy in the mid-19th century. An advocate of indigenous rights, which for him meant the formation of a semiautonomous native protectorate in the interior of Algeria euphemistically dubbed “the Arab Kingdom,” he presided over the formalization of the army's separate executive command over the natives. Unlike their Ottoman predecessors who were content to obtain tribute through clan leaders and nomadic networks, French colonial authorities sought to pacify and subjugate what they saw as backward, obsolete, and uncivilized tribes.
Abi-Mershed argues that most historians of French colonial Algeria hold that assimilation was the dominant colonial policy. In contrast, he finds that colonial policies were based more on political expediency and on assumptions of racial and cultural superiority. He further argues that whereas historians have typically viewed colonial policies as uniform, there were in fact widely varying political practices, bureaucratic policies, factional rivalries, and struggles for power within the colonial administration. In addition, while many historians consider the Third Republic to have been based on republican and modernist ideals, Abi-Mershed contends that it was also based on Saint-Simonian, militaristic, and monarchical tendencies exhibited in Algeria and before that in Egypt. Finally, the author argues that the distinction between metropole and colony was in reality more of a continuum; social policies tested in the colony were later introduced into metropolitan France.
Abi-Mershed focuses on French colonial educational policy because it allows him to get at the tensions and contending forces in Algeria. Muslim parents, with the exception of those few who worked with the colonial authorities, resisted sending their children to French colonial schools, fearing with good reason that the goal of these schools was to convert students to all aspects of French culture, including Christianity. After the pacification of Abd al-Qadir in 1847, the colonial authorities expropriated the habus (waqf) funds that had supported indigenous schools. By mid-century, the Arab Bureau controlled schools, mosques (some of which were reconsecrated as churches), and zawāya throughout Algeria. There were policies and laws for natives and entirely different policies and laws for European settlers. For a time, the Saint-Simonian officials created an Arab Kingdom where natives were administered under separate laws, but the Arab Kingdom was abandoned after the fall of the Second Empire. If France and Algeria were to have one hegemonic identity, there could be no separate kingdom. Association had not proven feasible. Yet the European settlers and their representatives in government insisted on different policies for themselves and the natives. Given the Darwinist ideas of the time and the settlers’ appetite for Muslim lands, the equal coexistence of two different societies in one political entity with uniform laws was unthinkable.
Abi-Mershed argues that the ideals of the Saint-Simonians led to the brutal policies of the colonial authorities. I would argue that the colonial context itself led to the brutality and inequalities of French Algeria. The events depicted in this fascinating book seem to lead inevitably to the Algerian War of Independence and to the abrupt and violent end of the settler project. Yet was it indeed inevitable? Might not another scenario, such as the one witnessed in South Africa a few decades later, have been possible?
