At first glance, Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East may appear to be another book on a stale subject. However, this collection of essays is a valuable resource in understanding why the concept of “failed states,” to a great extent, is a porous umbrella. By taking a multidisciplinary approach, Fragile Politics pieces together creative visions on an equivocal subject. For instance, in chapter 6, Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf founds her analysis on Sudan in the socio-political work Rectifying the Wrongs in Working Amongst the Masses: Report Presented to the Central Committee of the Sudanese Communist Party (1963) by secular intellectual and communist party leader Abdel Khaliq Mahjub (1927-1971). Based on the 1956 conflict, it remains a crucial historical text for understanding politics in Sudan today, with its analysis of fanaticism, marginality, and cultural democratization.
Before the 2000s, the nomenclature of “failed states” was nearly absent from academic literature, policy narratives, and press articles. For many years, its frail conceptualization impeded careful scrutiny of the term. When used, it was often confronted with scepticism. Whereas only a few hundred academic articles contained the words “failed states” before 2000, many thousands have flourished since then.
In his introduction, Mehran Kamrava admits that his book focuses on a contested field. However, he chooses to explore the chronic “weakness” of several states in the Middle East, defined as the “inherent structural and institutional features that compromise their capacity, devoid them of legitimacy, and make them prone to weakness” among others (1). Eleven chapters follow, covering Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Sudan, Pakistan, and Palestine, without forgetting to address two important features: the influence of diasporas and aid effectiveness. Many of the chapters underscore the failures of Western development policies and good governance narratives when addressing the issues of alleged “failed states.”
In chapter 1, Charles Schmitz relies on history to show how the development of political institutions in Yemen relied on a “complex blend of foreign pressures and domestic interests” (30), among them the British wish to protect their assets in the valued harbour of Aden, or the fight between Nasserist pan-Arabism and Saudi conservatism during the Cold War. Schmitz identifies the history of personal loyalties among tribal relations as the bedrock of political relations in Yemen. Hence, when the British deemed emirates and sultanates “small territorial states rather than tribes” (32), their framework for building alliances challenged the former order of local political relations. Consequentially, the Yemeni regime used tribal divisions to strengthen its rule. Sarah Phillips queries the validity of the concepts of “state failure” or “state weakness” in chapter 2, in as much as they “are used by policy makers to construct specific policy objectives, many of which are informed by security issues and military concerns” (53). Phillips denounces the link between lack of development and growth of terrorist groups as too easy. In chapter 3, Daniel E. Esser concentrates on Afghanistan and Iraq, as examples of a “statist conceptualization of governance,” which, emboldened by a hegemonic discourse, eclipses “state-building through sub-national non-violent collective action” (81). The concepts of state weakness and failure are seen as incentives to pursue military intervention and foster U.S. interests. Esser underscores how technocrats, called upon from exile to create order in Afghanistan and Iraq, created “hegemonic policy towards democracy promotion [that] emphasized manageability and stability over local accountability and pluralism” (94).
Security is at the core of the essays proposed by Frederic Wehrey, Shoghig Mikaelian, and Bassel F. Salloukh in chapters 4 and 5. Wehrey illustrates the societal fissures in Libya through the relations among the numerous militias in the territory, and their interaction with institutional fragility. On Lebanon, Mikaelian and Salloukh retrace how, in three decades, Hezbollah has strategically transformed “from a little-known, secretive security apparatus founded by Iran's Revolutionary Guards into one of the most powerful non-state domestic actors in Lebanon and a major player in regional politics” (119), using a strongly sectarian context, vulnerable to external influences, to impose a form of impunity.
The following chapters offer more examples of non-state actors and their role in negotiating political power. In chapter 7, Alex de Wall uses a “political marketplace” framework to demonstrate how Omar al-Bashir relies on “retail patronage” in Sudan, where “political conflicts are managed by bargaining with individuals and not resolved by rules and procedures” (172). Zahra Babar and Dwaa Osman, in chapter 8, draw parallels between the missions of NGOs working with women in the regional provinces of Pakistan and Sudan. While their commitment appears fruitful at a micro-level, the authors note that the effect on global society is irrelevant. Glenn E. Robinson points towards the major sources of dysfunction with respect to the statehood of Palestine in chapter 9. While Palestine is internationally discussed as a one entity, it fails to deliver the attributes of a state and notably effective control inside its boundaries. Robinson reminds the reader how in the late Ottoman period, no Palestinian national movement could be witnessed, and how British policy supported Zionist interests until 1939, impeding the development of state-building (229). Finally, in chapters 10 and 11, Laurie A. Brand interrogates the multiple patterns, which lead to the existence of diasporas, and their ambiguous role in conflict and peace, in state weakness or strength, and Mark McGillivray, Simon Feeny, and Ashton De Silva provide an insightful account on the issue of the absorptive capacity of states towards development projects.
All in all, the authors unveil the paradoxes of the “failed state” literature by recognizing the destabilizing power of sub-national and international political interests. While “neglect of the countryside or of other non-central areas . . . can have perilous consequences for state weakness and failure” (12), Esser shows how the exportation of democracy to Afghanistan and Iraq was backed by manageability, not pluralism. “What is in the label of ‘failed states’? Who owns the right to apply it?” (150), asks Abusharaf, while Esser urges us to “reconsider the possibilities of a different kind of internationally supported state-building, one that puts local priorities, coalitions and institutional legacies first” (97).
