Traditional conceptions of justice pertaining to liberal democracies are based upon the assumption that its citizens are self-governing and autonomous persons. The definition and basis of this assumption itself, however, is not without controversy. This is especially true in democracies characterized by marked differences between its citizens. In an age of increasing globalization and spread of culture, ideas, and interests, understanding the true nature of persons, and thus a valid account of justice based on this, is essential to avoiding conflict. In The Politics of Persons, Christman attempts to create a theory of individual autonomy grounded in a specific conception of the self, leading to what he believes to be a more acceptable theory of justice.
In this book, Christman promotes a conception of the self based upon socio-historical factors and also seeks to defend individual autonomy-based conceptions of justice and thus democratic functioning based upon this conception. He sees “autonomy as the chief characteristic to be recognized and promoted in citizens” (p.15) and aims to break away from the liberal conception of the self (and thus, from autonomy and justice). The book itself is split into three chapters: the first on selves, the second on autonomy, and the third on justice.
In a brief introduction, Christman argues that contemporary western political philosophy dictates that “the subject of principles of justice is first and foremost the individual as such” and that “the model person, in the liberal tradition, is characterized without essential connections with past or present others or social factors external to ‘him’ ” (p. 2), aspects such as race, sexuality, or culture, and other identifying factors that many people would probably mention when describing themselves. Christman’s argument is that we are socio-historical selves, and that “the aspect of persons that must be assumed as well as promoted and respected in normative political principles is their autonomy” (p. 3).
However, to Christman, our socio-historical selves are made up of not just our pasts and futures and our memories and future preferences, but also factors that were beyond our control to begin with such as who our parents are, the years or places in which we were born, the medical conditions that we were born with, and many other factors. Thus it is not only the material factors that are often beyond our control, but also our social relations and social context, which often are defined and curtailed by society and not by the self.
Part one, “Selves,” opens with arguments for a socio-historical conception of the self and presents the problem of this conception’s combining with an individualized conception of autonomy, as well as a “conception of justice built upon such a conception” (p. 46) (which, as Christman later argues, is not actually a problem at all). He then progresses to examine various aspects of postmodern thought concerned with “conceptions of the self and the possibilities of self-understanding” (p. 48). The conclusion that he draws from this is that “we commit ourselves to fixed meanings even if the meanings of our internal reflections are rife with fluidity and ambiguity” (p. 65), as postmodernists claim. Christman argues that even though the postmodern community uses this argument of fluidity and ambiguity to argue against “self-government (and hence autonomy) as a normatively coherent model of the political subject” (p. 65), utilizing this socio-historical conception of the self necessitates for consistency that “what makes a collection of beliefs, attitudes, or dispositions (located in a single biological body) a self is that the set is structured in a certain way, in particular in a narrative form” (p. 66). To Christman this ability to form a narrative is very important, since “the reflective capacity to interpret the elements of one’s life (experiences, beliefs, acts) into a unique and coherent structure is what makes the person who she is” (p. 66).
Part 2 of the book focuses on autonomy, again reinforcing that a socio-historical conception of the self does not preclude that autonomy is a “characteristic of individual persons, rather than groups or relations among people” (p. 109), and that autonomy is the central political value. The main aim of this section is to show how individual autonomy being a fundamental value is compatible with the “social, temporally extended, and embodied elements of personhood” (p.110).
Building on both the conception of autonomy outlined earlier and the elements necessarily present in order for an entity to be considered autonomous, Christman now begins to explain two types of people who could be classified as heteronomous; the first being someone unable to reflect adequately and thus “should not be counted in collective decisions” and the second being someone “who feels trapped or alienated from some central commitment or other” (p.162). He argues that the person who is unable to reflect might well be open to paternalistic care instead of egalitarian respect, and that the alienated person should be included in collective decision making but that “her situation calls for reform of the conditions that result in her alienation and constraint” (p.162).
Toward the end of second part of the book, Christman argues that we must adopt a relational view of autonomy—autonomy being a property not just of “an individual and her capacities, but of the relations that comprise those conditions” (p. 185). This relational conception of autonomy seems to avoid all the criticisms of incompatibility between socio-historical selves and individual autonomy, and is a very clever move on the part of Christman. Flowing on from this relational account, it means that we must then put emphasis on “securing the social conditions that are required for the enjoyment of autonomy” (p.185), things like access to health care services, education, social welfare, etc., again showing how this relational account is in tune with our moral intuitions concerning a just society. There is one worry here, however: that those people who reject these types of social relations demanded by those views may be excluded from this collective decision making itself. Given Christman’s anti-perfectionist view, this could well hold true.
The final part of the book is a small chapter of some 25 pages, but considering this is given its own part in the book, obviously Christman holds its contents to be of considerable importance, which indeed he should. This final chapter aims to sum up the socio-historical conception of personal identity and the individual conception of autonomy then bring them together to provide a foundation for principles of justice in a democracy. He does this by considering this conception of justice based on these two principles in relation to history, public reason, and political legitimacy—to create a conception of democratic legitimacy “that places autonomy, as we have conceived it, at its center” (p. 219).
The upshot of Christman’s conception of autonomy is that basic rights/resources no longer need to be justified by appealing to some independent ideal which is often very arbitrary and hard to find, but rather can all be couched in terms of promoting the creation of conditions conducive for autonomy to flourish. Underpinning the conception of justice is also the view that autonomy relies on the ability of the individual to effectively reflect and “make one’s desires effective under favorable conditions” (p. 242). This thus necessitates the ability to autonomously participate in politics through access to, e.g., free speech, freedom of association, and equality of opportunity, again showing how Christman’s conception of individual autonomy can lead to an acceptable theory of justice.
Overall Christman outlines a very novel theory of individual autonomy, successfully defending it against many criticisms that plague other similar conceptions of justice. It does so due to its inventive “relational conception of individual autonomy,” thus allowing it to circumvent problems caused by autonomy’s being a property of an individual and his/her capacities. I thus recommend this book for anyone working in the field of autonomy theory, or even political philosophy in general, as it provides new and novel ideas presented in a well-argued and comprehensive manner.
