Nietzsche occupies an ambiguous position in Leo Strauss's thought. On the one hand he is one of the small number of truly great philosophers, sometimes on par with Plato himself, who was the first to see that nihilism ensued from modern historicist relativism, thereby standing at the beginning of the third and final wave of modernity. Yet if Nietzsche was the great diagnostician of modernity's crisis, he also left “no choice except that between irresponsible indifference to politics and irresponsible political options,” as Strauss concluded in his seminal text “What Is Political Philosophy?” (1959). This has led some commentators, such as Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind, to hold Nietzsche responsible for the very moral relativism he decried, thereby seemingly confusing the object with the cause.
Laurence Lampert, in contrast, has gone in the opposite direction, arguing that Nietzsche not only is the best diagnostician of our time, but that he also offers, at least philosophically, a way out. Over the span of a thirty-year career—he is now emeritus at Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis—Lampert has produced a number of classic texts, including Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of “Thus Spoke Zarathustra” (Yale University Press, 1986), Nietzsche and Modern Times (Yale University Press, 1993), Nietzsche's Task: An Interpretation of “Beyond Good and Evil” (Yale University Press, 2001), and The Enduring Importance of Leo Strauss (University of Chicago Press, 2013). In doing so, he has established himself as one of the world's leading experts on Nietzsche and Strauss.
But if we are agreed that Nietzsche is indeed a great philosopher, how did he become that philosopher? This is what Lampert in his latest book, What a Philosopher Is: Becoming Nietzsche, sets out to explore. He does so by innovatively rereading (most of) Nietzsche's books up to Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883–1885): The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Schopenhauer as Educator (1874), Richard Wagner in Bayreuth (1876), Things Human All Too Human, volume 1 (1878; in the use of this alternative naming [the use of “things”] Lampert follows Paolo D'Iorio), and the fourth book of the Gay Science, “Sanctus Januarius” (1882). Lampert reinterprets these through the lens of Nietzsche's self-styled “autobiography” Ecce Homo (1888), his preparatory notes, and, perhaps most importantly, the various prefaces Nietzsche wrote for them in 1886.
Autobiography is key here because it gives access to how the philosopher-to-be understood his own work, and therefore gives a privileged insight into how a philosopher comes into being. Beyond Ecce Homo, Nietzsche was in fact quite a fan of the genre, writing up to six autobiographies by the age of twenty-four, as Daniel Blue's recent biography The Making of Friedrich Nietzsche (Cambridge University Press, 2016) has brought to the fore. Lampert also reads Thus Spoke Zarathustra itself as a form of autobiography, and that book serves as the study's natural end-point because it is there that Nietzsche has in his grasp his two main philosophical ideas: the will to power and the eternal return. The other texts are selected because they bring to light Nietzsche's early thinking on what a philosopher—and indeed an artist—is, which Lampert does brilliantly through reading Schopenhauer as Educator and Richard Wagner in Bayreuth respectively.
If Thus Spoke Zarathustra is the study's final destination, another work that stands behind much of What a Philosopher Is is Nietzsche's subsequent book Beyond Good and Evil (1886). That text was the centerpiece of Lampert's 1996 Leo Strauss and Nietzsche (University of Chicago Press), which offered a close reading of Strauss's “A Note on the Plan of Beyond Good and Evil.” “Center” is indeed the operative term here, as Strauss placed that study centrally—numerically eighth out of fifteen chapters—in his final published work Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, with all the implications that has for Straussian hermeneutics (it is the most important text). In What a Philosopher Is, Lampert contends that Nietzsche started to write his prefaces of 1886 because he wanted to get rid of his earlier Things Human All Too Human, which had been superseded in his eyes by Beyond Good and Evil. But instead he wrote new critical introductions to all his previous works to explain how he had developed since.
So what is a philosopher? For Lampert a philosopher is someone who has reached the highest point of human activity through understanding the world in which they live, and who proposes a new way of life suitable to it. Nietzsche, therefore, is a philosopher because he fundamentally understood the (modern) world through his concept of the will to power, and proposed a new way of life through his notion of the eternal return.
What Lampert has achieved here is a close reading of Nietzsche at its Straussian best. That framework, which demands a deep and profound textual analysis, yields a number of insights, notably in illuminating the role the Greeks, and in particular Plato, play in the elaboration of Nietzsche's philosophical views. While Straussian readings of texts sometimes focus on esotericism, Lampert prefers to concentrate on Nietzsche's various notebooks in which he prepared the published texts to come. Of particular interest is the workbook (M III 1) that served as preparation for the final chapter of the 1882 version of the Gay Science (Nietzsche added a fifth chapter in his 1886 reissuing of it). From that Lampert draws two essential insights concerning the eternal return: that the “thought” of the eternal return has to be slowly incarnated, and that the best way for this slow, yet fundamental, incarnation to happen, so that it might withstand the test of time, is through art, especially festivals.
Close reading of texts; comparisons with Plato; autobiography as the privileged form to understanding the philosopher themselves: Straussian themes are ever-present throughout the work, and Lampert also seems to slip into a certain Straussian trope in his own conclusion when he writes that free minds who “embrace a strict intellectual conscience in pursuit of truth” should accept “temporary blindness to truth” (324). Although Nietzsche does believe that truth should be in the service of life, this demand for “temporary blindness” to truth seems closer to the position adopted by the ascetic priest Nietzsche denounces at the end of the third essay of the Genealogy of Morality than the type of Free Spirit he was advocating. Moreover, the conflict between life and truth Lampert posits is more reminiscent of Strauss's opposition between reason and revelation—or again, nature and reason—than anything Nietzsche would have wanted. Indeed, in maintaining his allegiance to an untruth—God's existence after the “death of God”—instead of abandoning it to create new values, the ascetic priest only succeeds in deepening nihilism.
In his preface to the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche asks that his readers develop a new art of reading—what he will call “rumination”—so that he may be understood. Lampert is undoubtedly one of the best readers Nietzsche has ever had, and in identifying the eternal return as the way out of nihilism he has transcended the type of close textual reading Strauss offers. With What a Philosopher Is, Lampert has started to practice this new art of rumination.
