This study is about the doctrine of Sharia criminal law. The author shows that this area of the Sharia is not as primitive as it is often made out to be. To appreciate this monograph, first, some basic information is required. Islamic criminal law consists of three separate domains, each with its legal principles and procedures. The first domain, that of ḥudūd, is the law of some major crimes, whose specifications and fixed penalties are mentioned in the foundational religious texts. Judges, having established the defendant's guilt, must sentence that defendant to the penalties fixed in the texts for each offense, ranging from flogging to amputation of hands and feet, to death. The second domain is the law of killing and wounding. Here the sanctions are retaliation (i.e., death or being subject to the same injury as the perpetrator has inflicted on the victim) or financial compensation. The prosecution for these crimes is the right of the victim or his heirs. Finally there is a residual domain, that of ta`zīr, which confers judges and executive officials the power to impose discretionary penalties to those who have acted unlawfully and/or immorally, even if the Sharia does not expressly define such acts as offenses. The laws of ḥudūd and of retaliation are strict in the sense that the definitions of the offenses are precise and restrictive, the standards of evidence and procedure are high, and there are many defenses. In the law of ta`zīr, however, the rules of procedure and evidence are more relaxed.
One of the defenses elaborated for the domain of ḥudūd, is the notion of shubha, doubt, uncertainty, or ambiguity. If there are circumstances that make it plausible that the defendant was not certain of the unlawfulness of acts committed, that defendant cannot be convicted. This is precisely the topic of Rabb's study. From the beginning, judicial practice accepted the principle of shubha, invoking a legal maxim to the effect that ḥudūd penalties must be avoided in cases of doubt. Later, this maxim was “upgraded” to a hadith, a saying of the Prophet Mohammed. This meant that the doubt canon, which originally was only just a customary principle of procedure, now became embodied in a foundational text and could compete on equal terms with the foundational texts on the ḥudūd offenses.
Islamic criminal law was administered both by the political authorities and by judges appointed by these authorities. Rabb argues that the legal scholars, who were independent of the state and aware of their limited role in enforcing criminal law, elaborated and textualized the canon of doubt, in order to articulate “the ideals of moral values, legal processes and interpretive authority by which they sought to define the legitimate use of force in Islamic criminal law” (17). Here, I have my reservations. Rabb generalizes the impact of the doubt canon. Although her study only covers the field of ḥudūd, she claims that the defense of shubha could be invoked in the whole domain of Islamic law. In the first chapter of her book, she claims that the canon of doubt was also applied in trials for ta`zīr offenses (38). However, her only reference (R.P. Mottahedeh, Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003], 6–8) speaks only of the pious opposition of religious scholars against the political authorities during the first centuries of Islam, and not of either the canon of doubt or the practice of ta`zīr.
During the first six centuries of Islam, the administration of criminal justice by state officials was not considered a part of the Sharia. Al-Māwardī (d. 1058), in his book on constitutional law, states that officials trying offenses were not constrained by the Sharia rules of procedure and evidence and had a great deal of latitude in punishing (Al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya [Cairo, 1966], 219–22). This changed in the thirteenth century, at least under Mamluk rule, when jurists began to elaborate the notion of siyāsa shar`iyya, the political function of the Sharia. This meant a legitimation of the relaxed rules of procedure and evidence followed by the executive officials, which resulted in a weakened position of the defendant in criminal trials (B. Johansen, “Signs as Evidence: The Doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) and Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya (d. 1351) on Proof,” Islamic Law and Society 9 [2002]: 168–93). It is improbable that the canon of doubt would play a role in this legal culture, and Rabb has not given any indication to the contrary.
Rabb has written a rich and well-documented study on the elaboration and development of the principle of doubt in the law of ḥudūd. However, by paying too little attention to the doctrine and practice of ta`zīr and to the administration of criminal justice by political authorities, she has not succeeded in substantiating her argument that the canon of doubt had an impact on the entire field of Islamic criminal law.
