Israeli-German relations can be divided into two periods: from the end of World War II in 1945 to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel in 1965, and from 1965 onward. The first period saw a dramatic, groundbreaking development in Israeli/Jewish-German relations. It began with a firm, steadfast Israeli-Jewish decision to impose an uncompromising, strict anti-German boycott for generations to come. Yet in March 1951, the issue of reparations arose, and the boycott idea suffered a major blow. In September 1952, after several month of negotiations, West Germany and Israel signed a reparations agreement (East Germany rejected the Israeli claim). This agreement was the catalyst for an accelerated and comprehensive process of normalization between the two nations, which culminated in the establishment of formal diplomatic ties in May 1965, by which point a rapport had already been established in most areas.

It would not, therefore, be unreasonable to assume that Israeli-German relations after 1965 were far less dramatic. Media reports about the two countries’ relations largely support this assumption. Instead of meaningful, revolutionary developments, publicly available sources indicate normal, routine interactions between Bonn and Jerusalem, with the occasional ups and downs typical of any friendly bilateral relationship.

Nevertheless, an exhaustive scholarly examination of the relations between the State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany following the official establishment of diplomatic ties is necessary, not least in order to paint a more complex picture than the one indicated by publicly available sources. To date, there is no single scholarly study dedicated to post-1965 Israeli-German relations that draws on a diverse selection of archival sources. Carole Fink has taken up this challenge and painstakingly examined the question of West German–Israeli relations in the period from 1965 till 1974, relying on an impressive variety of sources. And yet, the book only confirms what we already assumed, based on publicly available information: the relationship between Israel and West Germany saw no earth-shattering developments after 1965. This could very well have to do with the fact that, to quote Fink, the “West German–Israeli relationship was not a paramount one for either side. Third (and even fourth) parties large and small were always in the room” (295).

Fink scrutinizes the relationship between the two countries through two parallel prisms: one global, which revolves primarily around the Cold War, and the other intrastate, whether Israeli or German. Yet in the absence of substantial new findings, Fink assigns disproportionate, sometimes altogether unneeded significance to issues relating to the Cold War, international events, or local (Israeli and German) perspectives. Thus, in order to support her assertion that the world at large was in turmoil in 1967, Fink reports natural and environmental disasters around the world, a military coup in Greece, murderous purges in China, a devastating war in Nigeria, and riots of African Americans in several US cities. Elsewhere, she describes the State of Israel's economy in 1971 (including poverty statistics), socioeconomic gaps in Israeli society, and Jewish emigration from Russia to Israel. The relevance of these issues to the question of Israeli-German relations is doubtful.

Moreover, Fink does not discuss in depth or altogether avoids a number of issues that do have the potential to shed light on the book's subject matter. For example, she does not survey at all Israel's boycott of Germany after 1945. Without a discussion of this issue, it is impossible to understand fully the dynamics of the two nations’ ties after the establishment of diplomatic relations. Furthermore, an important event that took place during the period under examination—West German chancellor Willy Brandt's historic visit to Israel in June 1973—is handled on a mere handful of pages. The analysis of this visit also overlooks some important aspects, including how public opinion in both countries reacted; how both governments prepared for it; and how Germany implemented Israel's request that it mediate between the Jewish state and its arch-foe—Egypt.

Where Fink does tackle Israeli-German relations, a well thought-out, coherent thesis emerges. Her conclusions may have already appeared in other academic studies, but they are supported here by a rich corpus of archival materials. Fink posits that Israel founded its relations with West Germany on the memory of the Holocaust (a kind of “special relationship” between the two states) and, on those grounds, expected to receive privileged treatment from the Germans regarding security, economic ties, and foreign policy. The Germans, on the other hand, wished to unburden themselves of this weighty history and aspired to a more normal relationship. This German objective was not only psychologically motivated but had to do also with political interest in cultivating and maintaining robust ties with the Arab/Muslim world, which was hostile to Israel.

This rift deepened after the Six-Day War (June 1967), in which Israel defeated its Arab neighbors and occupied significant territory. Shortly thereafter, in 1969, Willy Brandt launched Ostpolitik, which aimed to thaw West Germany's relations with the Soviet bloc and as a byproduct also improve Bonn's relations with the Arab world. This became a recipe for political collision: Israel after 1967 adopted an increasingly nationalistic line that rejected a complete withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and supported a tougher stance toward its Arab neighbors, while Germany sought to strengthen its ties with the Arabs, which stipulated at the very least neutrality regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and certainly precluded blindly supporting Israel. Diplomatic skirmishes between Bonn and Jerusalem thus became frequent, lending a discordant tone to their relationship. Yet, Fink shows that the two countries’ opposing political approaches did not prevent the further development and enhancement of bilateral relations on a whole range of issues, above all economy and security. Fink ends her book by saying that “one might characterize the nine-year period between 1965 and 1974 as one of tenuous stability” (295). This is an apt description, but one that could have been demonstrated in a study much more modest in scope.