Between the introduction of the telescope and the theory of universal gravitation, between Galileo's trial and the publication of Newton's Principia, astronomy – and natural philosophy at large – underwent ‘another Scientific Revolution’ (p. 19, added emphasis), claims Flavia Marcacci. According to her, this ‘period of “wait”’ (p. 11), rather than being understood as a watershed, is to be reappraised as the locus of debates and ‘contradictions’ between ‘perplexed scientists’ (p. 19) for whom Ptolemy's system was definitively obsolete, but Copernicus's universe was still a matter of indecisiveness. Midway between these two milestones, the Jesuit astronomer Giovanni Battista Riccioli (1598–1671), propounding a semi-geocentric universe based on Tycho's model, has consistently been seen either as in error or as an ‘apostate Copernican’ (p. 11). Complementary to Dinis's recent intellectual biography (A Jesuit against Galileo? The Strange Case of Giovanni Battista Riccioli Cosmology, 2017), Marcacci's stance on the issue is that a charitable in-depth study of Riccioli's astronomical work in all its complexity – more particularly of his Almagestum novum (1651) and Astronomia reformata (1665) – may unveil the consistency and rationality of a geometrical and physical model that can thus be conceived, in a ‘unitary and organic vision’ (p. 10), as ‘the third system of the world’.
By analogy with Riccioli's system, Marcacci argues that her interpretation must be philosophically oriented: refuting at once too blunt a historicism – understood as the reciprocal absolutisation of history and relativisation of science – and the converse idealism, she aims at finding a ‘middle way’ (p. 17), allowing her to address the ontological and epistemological issues raised by Riccioli. Indeed, against absolute certainty, the Jesuit's ‘probabilistic approach’ conceives of knowledge only as a good representation of reality (p. 17). Thus defining the ‘limits of knowledge’ and propelling science to the ‘edges of its possibilities’ (p. 13), the case of Riccioli is one in which the history of science provides philosophy with the ‘fundamental ingredients for discussion’ (p. 9).
The book follows a relevant progression structured around six well-defined chapters, each individually introduced and concluded. In the first chapter, starting with the publication of Copernicus's De Revolutionibus (1543), the author chronologically inventories early modern attempts at geometrically modelling the universe, emphasizing the influence of ancient heritage as well as reliance on the measurements made with new instruments of observation – telescopes, manuals, and mechanical models. After 1633, the stage is set for the confrontation between two competitors: heliocentrism and semi-geocentrism. In the midst of this transitional period in the history of astronomy, the figure of Riccioli is presented as emblematic, as the ‘most significant representative’ (p. 46), or the best ‘interpreter of this crisis’ (p. 57). In Chapter 2, Marcacci unfolds a brief intellectual biography of her subject, detailing the centrality of his Jesuit training (pp. 57–61) and the necessity of understanding his epistemological thought in order to discern the meaning of his astronomy (pp. 58 et seq.). More particularly, the author dwells on what she calls Riccioli's ‘realistic probabilism’. Indeed, in order to dodge scepticism, Riccioli developed a probabilistic understanding of knowledge that shaped his methodology (pp. 71–72): according to Marcacci, this stance, which is based on four postulates – the law of noncontradiction; the existence of God; the Earth at the centre of the world; and the conjectural, albeit consistent, character of science (p. 78) – rather than being a rhetorical tool aimed at justifying his beliefs, was in fact the ‘very engine of all scientific and intellectual operation’ (p. 73). Thus, perfectly aware of the status and limits of astronomy (p. 68) and very solicitous about his hypothesis, his use of instruments, his demonstrations, as well as his empirical data, Riccioli cannot be reduced to a simple compiler, nor to an erroneous scholar.
In Chapter 3, the author explains in detail the theoretical aspects of Riccioli's universe: its geometrical form; its dimensions; its finitude; and its semi-geocentric, as opposed to semi-heliocentric, character. Concentrating on its specificities and its consistency, Marcacci asserts that such a model then has to be understood as the ‘third system of the world’. Going hand in hand with the previous one, Chapter 4 adopts a practical perspective on said system. One by one, the author shows how Riccioli answered within his system all the problems raised by astronomical observations in the mid-sixteenth century: the phases of planets (pp. 113–119), Jupiter's satellites and spots (pp. 119–126), the form of planetary orbits (pp. 126–144), freefall (pp. 144–152), the immobility of the Earth (pp. 152–155), tides (pp. 155–159), the nature of the Sun (pp. 159–170), and the Moon and comets (pp. 170–177). Mixing ancient and modern knowledge, Riccioli's system appears as such: a consistent and rational endeavour, with its strengths and weaknesses, confronting a geometrical structure with empirical data. Moreover, offering probabilistic solutions to unresolved problems and handing speculative issues over to theology, Riccioli is careful not to confuse incommensurable modes of demonstration. Chapter 5 briefly deals with the ninth book of his Almagestum novum, in which the astronomer acknowledges entering the realm of speculation and, to that extent, highlights the need to ‘change modes of thinking and of writing’ (p. 186) in order to put Scripture in the service of natural philosophy and eventually ask ontological questions regarding the nature and the intelligence of the skies.
Finally, the sixth and last chapter provides Marcacci with the chance to put Riccioli's historical case to work and address epistemological and historiographical issues. First conceiving of history and philosophy as two absolutely separate fields – the former dealing with diachronic contingencies, and the latter with synchronic universals (p. 208) – she then intends to refine this common view by detailing their relationship as a dialectic, shuttling back and forth along top-down and bottom-up axes polarizing history (bottom) and philosophy (top) (p. 212). Drawing on Hacking's work, Marcacci's argument is a plea for a ‘historical ontology of science’, complementing historical epistemology, and working along the lines of her top-down/bottom-up methodology (pp. 217–218). Conceived simply as the making of theories (p. 218), such a narrow conception of science and such a simple view of history and philosophy – plus the lack of more recent references and tools taken from historical epistemology – ultimately fail to define adequately a ‘historical ontology of science’ which is nonetheless of utmost importance today. Yet, overall, Marcacci's erudite study of Riccioli's system through the prism of epistemology, supported as it is by a judicious use of figures and schematics (throughout a nice editorial object), makes an excellent case for the reconciliation of the history and the philosophy of science.
