Plato banned tragedy from his ideal cities, while Aristotle gave it a pedagogical role. Nietzsche argued that the rationalism embodied in the figure of Socrates destroyed tragedy, and Hegel thought that Greek tragedy remains an important exploration of the historical and political dimension of human life. Goldhill (Reference Goldhill, Rowe and Schofield2000), in a chapter of The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, argues that this “long and not yet finished tradition of contest between philosophy and tragedy […] is nothing less than the question of the boundaries and limits of political theory” (p. 61)
Tragedies and comedies were a central part of the festival of the Great Dionysia, the largest public gathering of the year, and this was a political occasion. Special seats were reserved for the members of the Boulē, priests, foreign ambassadors, ephebes, foreigners, metics. Various ceremonials opened the Great Dionysia and they glorified the polis and their leading citizens. The playwrights were chosen by the Eponymous Archon, the productions were funded by the polis, a special fund, called the Theoric fund, paid citizens to attend the theatre, and the judges of the dramatic competition were chosen by lot so that each tribe was represented. All this is amply discussed by Goldhill (Reference Goldhill, Rowe and Schofield2000), who concludes: “theatre is a fundamental factor in the politicization of the Athenian citizen, in putting political reflection in the public domain.” (p. 65)
In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche (Reference Nietzsche and Kaufmann1967) claims that our culture was founded by Socrates—a culture characterized by “the triumph of optimism, the gradual prevalence of rationality, practical and theoretical utilitarianism, no less than democracy itself.” (p. 21) In contrast with this world view stands that of the Greek tragedy, which confronts reality as it is: cruel, chaotic, and beyond human comprehension. For Nietzsche, Sophocles’ Oedipus is a paradigmatic exemplification of the tragic world view, and Sophocles himself a critic of rationalism. Since Nietzsche, this way of seeing Sophocles has been very influential, although in the last two decades a number of scholars have challenged it by stressing important similarities between Sophocles and the rationalist thought embodied by Socrates—see for instance Euben (Reference Euben1990) and Saxonhouse (Reference Saxonhouse1992).
In Greek Tragedy and Political Philosophy Ahrensdorf acknowledges that he is indebted to Euben and Saxonhouse in important ways, but claims that he goes further than they do. (Some readers would certainly have liked to know more about how his interpretations differ from those of Euben and Saxonhouse.) Ahrensdorf argues that although “Sophocles is cautiously critical of political rationalism—namely, the attempt to base political society on reason alone—he clearly points to the need for a theoretical rationalism—namely, the attempt to steer one’s own life by the compass of unaided reason” (p. 6; all further quotations are from Greek Tragedy and Political Philosophy). Ahrensdorf undertakes a detailed textual analysis of Sophocles’ Theban plays—Oedipus the Tyrant, Oedipus at Colonus, and Antigone—and concludes that “Sophocles is not a critic of rationalism, that he does not endorse the denunciations of reason made by such characters as Teiresias and the blind Oedipus, even though he also does not simply endorse the secular, anti-conventional, political rationalism represented by Oedipus’s ‘tyrannical’ rule.” (p. 7)
Greek Tragedy and Political Philosophy has a short introduction; three chapters, each devoted to the analysis of one of the three Theban plays; a concluding section; a bibliography, and an index.
After solving the riddle of the Sphinx through his reason alone, Oedipus becomes the ruler of Thebes. He is young, and his “title to rule is objective merit—his superior intelligence and character”. (p. 18) For fifteen years, until the coming of the plague, he rules without consulting oracles or soothsayers. His rule “marks an experiment in political enlightenment or rationalism, during which religion is separated from politics, and reason rather than revelation is the ruler’s sole star and compass.” (p. 18) Oedipus the Tyrant begins with the end of Oedipus’ rational rule: faced with the plague that threatens Thebes, he sends Creon to the Delphic Oracle and summons the soothsayer Teiresias. In the first chapter, “Oedipus the Tyrant and the Limits of Political Rationalism,” Ahrensdorf argues that it is not “Oedipus’ rational, tyrannical rule but rather his abandonment thereof that leads to his downfall.” (p. 19) Why does Oedipus ask for the help of the Oracle? Because his reason, Ahrensdorf claims, told him that there was simply no remedy for the plague, and that Thebes might very well perish. Oedipus “rejects reason and fervently embraces instead the pious hope and belief of the chorus that it is beneficent and moral gods, rather than indifferent gods or blind chance, who rule over human beings.” (p. 23) “In the face of death, Oedipus’ experiment in political rationalism collapses and he returns to the pious belief in the ‘deathless, eternal’ rule of gods who reward the righteous and punish the wicked.” (p. 46) Once Oedipus realizes that he committed parricide and incest, he tries to kill Jocasta and then blinds himself. Why? Because, Ahrensdorf argues, both actions were prophesied by oracles and soothsayers. By fulfilling the prophecies, Oedipus hopes to secure the gods’ favour and avoid everlasting punishment from them. In Ahrensdorf’s view, however, Sophocles disagrees with Oedipus. What Sophocles suggests is that politics must somehow “accommodate human beings’ hopes for immortality, and therefore that some element of piety is necessary for a stable political society”; but Sophocles also suggests that “that a genuine understanding and acceptance of our mortality […] fosters the even more impressive qualities of human wisdom and human compassion.” (p. 46)
At the beginning of Oedipus at Colonus, Oedipus is a poor blind man without a city and a home. At the end of the play, we are told that the gods rewarded him after his death. In Oedipus at Colonus, Oedipus “repeatedly addresses the gods and invokes the gods because, in his darkness, he beholds the gods and gives himself entirely to their guidance.” (p. 53) “Oedipus’ blinding of himself symbolizes his attempt to reject reason altogether. By destroying his eyes, he attempts to destroy his mind and surrender himself entirely to the gods” (p. 54), and the gods reward him for doing this. In “Blind Faith and Enlightened Statesmanship in Oedipus at Colonus”, the second chapter of the volume, Ahrensdorf argues that Oedipus’ religious anti-rationalism is self-contradictory and self-destructive: “The play reveals that Oedipus’ piety is ultimately based, not on his ‘blind’ or pure rejection of reason, nor on his ostensibly rational, but actually self-contradictory, argument that he deserves the reward of immortality, but rather on his longing for immortality and, above all, on his anger at his mortality.” (p. 82) The true hero of the play, claims Ahrensdorf, is Theseus, a representative of political rationalism and humane wisdom. What Sophocles actually advocates in the play taken as a whole is then a “sober and cautious political rationalism, one that recognizes and seeks to address the dangers of religious passion to political life, but also recognizes the permanence of religious passion within political life.” (p. 83)
In Antigone, a solitary, pious girl, Antigone, bravely opposes the edicts of Creon, King of Thebes, who doesn’t allow her to bury the corpse of her brother. In the end, she triumphs. “On the surface, Antigone celebrates piety in all its moral grandeur, for it reassures us that there are gods who ensure the triumph of the righteous, no matter how weak, and who visit destruction of the wicked, no matter how strong.” (p. 85) Antigone, however, questions her convictions on piety and justice and commits suicide. In the last chapter, “The Pious Heroism of Antigone”, Ahrensdorf argues that this play, through the character of Antigone, “invites the audience to go further along the path of doubt and questioning … [and] us to ascend from the pious heroism of Antigone to the humane wisdom of Sophocles.” (p. 150)
Ahrensdorf argues that individual characters do not embody Sophocles’ thought. The true model of rationalism to be found in the Theban plays does not belong to one of their characters, but to Sophocles himself, “who presents the problem of politics, reason and piety with genuinely philosophic clarity, calm, and depth, but whose rationalism differs from Socrates and even from Thucydides, most notably, in its somber reserve.” (p. 7)
In the last section of the volume, “Conclusions: Nietzsche, Plato, and Aristotle on Philosophy and Tragedy”, Ahrensdorf argues that “the outlook of the classical philosophers is less optimistic, more somber, and therefore closer to the outlook of the tragic poet Sophocles than it first seems.” (p. 178) The space devoted to Plato and Aristotle is fairly limited, and some readers would have welcomed a longer discussion of them (the volume has just 192 pages). The sub-section devoted to Plato is entitled “Socrates: The Softness of the Tragic Heroes”. In it, the author discusses Plato’s view on tragedy in the Republic; he mentions that he speaks about “Plato’s Socrates” (p. 156), but then he just refers to Socrates (“Socrates’ account of tragedy”, p. 158; “Socrates argues that”, p. 159; “Socrates may mean to suggest that”, p. 160; etc.), and a less seasoned reader may find this confusing. Ahrensdorf’s thesis is that in the Republic, “Socrates’ criticism of the heroes of Homer and the tragic poets may be a criticism that the tragic poets themselves share.” (p. 168) The view “that the tragic poets themselves may be critics of the tragic view of life” (p. 168) is also to be found in Aristotle. Aristotle’s key thesis, Ahrensdorf argues, is that the best tragedy “does not present its tragic heroes as exemplary human beings. They are impressive, but flawed.” For Aristotle, ‘tragedy purges or weakens our pity [for the hero] and fear [for ourselves] by showing us that the heroes suffer as a result of a great error of understanding”; and what tragedy ultimately teaches us is that “the greatest human being is the one who has the wisdom to avoid such error—namely, the wise or philosophic poet.” (p. 169) In contrast to Nietzsche, Ahrensdorf concludes, “Aristotle contends that the best tragic poets present a rational account of the world, a world governed not by mysterious forces or gods but by intelligible, natural necessity.” (p. 172)
The words and expressions in Greek do not have spirits and accents, but this error will hopefully be corrected in the forthcoming paperback edition. The volume reads well and will be of interest to both scholars and graduate students working in the fields of political theory, classical literature and philosophy. It will also make an excellent material to be included in undergraduate classes of political theory. Ahrensdorf’s interpretations are supported by a careful examination of the texts of Sophocles, and its main conclusion, that Sophocles is not a critic of rationalism, is convincing.
