I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

This study investigates the problem of natural universals (kullī ṭabīʿī) in the philosophy of the 17^th century Persian philosopher, Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (d. 1640). The “problem of universals” is a universal philosophical problem that has engaged philosophers from the time of Plato until Quine and even beyond,Footnote ¹ and continues to shape current philosophical debates where it is often formulated as the problem of “the ontological status of properties.”Footnote ² The problem, in the Western tradition, originates in Plato's famous theory of Forms and Aristotle's apparent opposition to it.Footnote ³ Plato argues that what we observe in the sensible world are always particular substances. For instance, if we reflect on the idea of “justice,” what we see in our immediate experience of reality are the particular instances of justice, not its universal form. But the very fact that the idea of justice would remain even if all of its instances are destroyed, claims Plato, necessitates an independent order of reality for all such forms (which are inexhaustible) including beauty, goodness, equality, largeness and so on. So the very idea that things can partake in the same “property” leads us to the problem of universals, which is closely related to the theory of Platonic Forms, the real sources of particular things.Footnote ⁴

Aristotle distances himself from Plato concerning his theory of universals (katholou) and claims that the latter makes universals particular substances (see n. 1). Aristotle's interpreters such as Alexander of Aphrodisias (2^nd–early 3^rd cent. CE) and Neo-Platonists (or simply Platonists) such as Porphyry (d. c. 305 CE) took up the problem and reformulated it, each in their own way.Footnote ⁵ In fact, it was Porphyry who bequeathed the problem of universals to both Arabic and Medieval philosophy when he announced it as a “problem” in his Isagoge. Porphyry in his Isagoge, which is an introduction to Aristotle's Categories, states the problem thus:

1. (a) Whether genera and species are real or are situated in bare thoughts alone, (b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and (c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them. Such business is profound, and requires another, greater investigation.Footnote ⁶

It is noteworthy that when Avicenna inherited Alexander of Aphrodisias' distinction between “nature” and “universal,” he linked this to his own original notion of quiddity (māhiyya) and its various [analytic] considerations (iʿtibārāt) (see section II). Alexander clearly asserts that different individuals may possess the same nature (fusi/physis). More strikingly, he argues that this nature is neither universal nor particular, and that universality is accidental to this nature. Also, such a nature exists prior to both the universal and the particular.Footnote ⁷ In fact, in the long of history of the problem of universals, “the Avicennan turn” of it lies in restating it in terms of natural universals and their “supposed existence” in the extra-mental world. And this became known as “the problem of common nature” in Medieval philosophy, thanks to Thomas Aquinas' response to the relevant sections of Avicenna's magnum opus, the Healing (al-Shifāʾ).Footnote ⁸ At any rate, three different kinds of universals are distinguished in Avicennan philosophy:Footnote ⁹

1. 1) Natural universals

2. 2) Logical universals

3. 3) Mental universals

As regards the properties of the last two, there is less disagreement concerning them among Avicenna and many of his followers. However, as for the “natural universal,” which is an Avicennan invention, a great deal of contention exists as to whether it is universalia ante rem (universals existing prior to the thing), in re (in the thing) or universalia post rem (universals existing after the thing). Before delineating both Avicenna's and Mullā Ṣadrā’s views on this issue, it is important to note that a group of philosophers deny the existence of natural universals altogether.Footnote ¹⁰ They negate natural universals in the extra-mental world based on their assumption that quiddities existing in concreto possess numerical unity (al-waḥda al-ʿadadiyya):Footnote ¹¹

Now if a natural universal does not have a numerical unity, its relation with its individual instances would be that of a father and his numerous children. And if that happens to be the case, natural universals cannot be concurrent with their individual instances. However, Avicenna argues forcefully that natural universals are concurrent with their particulars.Footnote ¹² Both Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā concur that natural universals are found in external reality, and since the latter's exposition of the natural universal forms a continuity with that of the former (i.e. Avicenna), it is necessary to analyze the former's position on the issue before moving on to delineate Ṣadrā’s views which will be the main focus of this paper.

Also, this study will look at how Ṣadrā discusses the notion of an “all-inclusive universal” (kullī siʿī) (section III, pp. 25–6). This notion of an “all-inclusive universal” is used to account for the existence of Platonic Forms in the Ideal world that is denied by Avicenna.Footnote ¹³ For the purposes of the present study we will analyze the Sadrian reinterpretation of natural universals in light of his novel doctrine, the primacy of being (aṣālat al-wujūd). Based on the premises of the primacy of being, Ṣadrā argues that natural universals are not ante rem, i.e. existing prior to things.Footnote ¹⁴ Accordingly, Ṣadrā claims that natural universals are post rem. Thus, although Ṣadrā frequently uses the word quiddity (māhiyya) in his philosophy, it takes on a different meaning and significance in his philosophy (section IV). Moreover, since the problem of “natural universals” is intimately connected with the concept of “quiddity,” it is readily distinguishable from the same problem that the philosophers of Antiquity were grappling with. It should also be noted that Avicenna was perhaps the first person to lay out a full-blown doctrine of “quiddity and its different analytic considerations” such as lā bi-sharṭ (unconditioned by anything), bi-sharṭ lā (negatively conditioned) and bi-sharṭ shayʾ (conditioned by something).Footnote ¹⁵

In addition to investigating the Ṣadrian reformulation of natural universals, this study will also analyze how the former uses the concept of natural universals to argue for the reality of mental existence (al-wujūd al-dhihnī) (section V). Toward the end, this study will also sketch philosophical debates in the post-Ṣadrian period in which quiddities had been reformulated in relation to natural universals in ways that were not foreseen by the earlier peripatetic philosophers. The development of highly technical expressions such as “māhiyya lā bi-sharṭ maqsamī” and “māhiyya lā bi-sharṭ qismī” bears testimony to the further development of the problem of natural universals, and well-known Iranian philosophers such as Murtaḍā Muṭaharī (d. 1979), Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1981) and Mehdī Hāʾirī Yazdī (d. 1999) have written about this issue (section V).

II. THE AVICENNAN BACKGROUND

It was pointed out earlier that there are three different types of universals, viz., natural, logical, and mental. The natural universal refers to the common nature (al-ṭabīʿa al-mushtaraka) that is shared by individuals falling under a particular universal term such as man.Footnote ¹⁶ Although the epithet “universal” is being used with it, it is, strictly speaking, nothing other than being as such (bimā huwa huwa). That is, in itself it is dissociated with the notion of universality or particularity, unity or multiplicity and so on.Footnote ¹⁷ Also, since it is unconditioned by anything (lā bi-sharṭ), it can exist simultaneously with its particular instances. The term “natural” in the expression “natural universal” refers to the nature, essence, or quiddity of the thing being considered. As such, a complete account of the natural universal is inconceivable without the different analytic considerations of “quiddity”. Similarly, a logical universal is the very notion of “universality” itself that can only exist in the mind.Footnote ¹⁸ Concerning its definition, Taftāzānī in his Tahdhīb al-manṭiq says the following: if it is impossible to suppose the predication of a notion/concept of many, then it is a particular; otherwise, it is a universal (al-mafhūm in imtanaʿa faraḍa ṣidqihi ʿalā kathīrayn fa-juzʾī wa-illā fa-kullī…).Footnote ¹⁹ In other words, the notion of universality allows a common property (or nature) to be shared by its particulars. Finally, a mental universal is a combination of both natural and logical universal; that is, a combination of both the nature itself and the logical notion of universality.Footnote ²⁰ A mental universal exists only in the mind when universality as an “accident” of the mind occurs to a natural universal such as man.

In order to explain Avicenna's views on the natural universal and the quiddity of a thing, it is necessary to take into account different statements concerning it as found in his major works such as al-Najāt, al-Shifāʾ, and al-Ishārāt. In al-Najāt for instance, which is the earliest among these, Avicenna says the following:

The above passage suggests that universals can exist in two different ways. In the first case, quiddities exist in external reality, and are predicable upon many, while in the second case, they are either existent in things or related to things by way of their intellectual form, both in the mode of potency. Unfortunately, Avicenna does not explain further how one should understand “potency” in this context. But the passage does not fail to make a distinction between these two modes of being a universal and being a universal “in itself”, which would be crucial to keep in mind as we move on to analyze other relevant passages in his later works. In the Madkhal I.2 of al-Shifāʾ, Avicenna provides a clearer exposition of the different considerations (iʿtibārāt) of quiddity:

In this crucial passage, Avicenna clearly states that quiddities, with respect to their various considerations, are found either in the mind or in the external world. In both mental and extra-mental modes of existence, the quiddities are accompanied by their respective accidents. However, apart from these two modes, quiddities can also be considered with respect to their suchness, i.e. without being related to either mental or extra-mental modes of existence. It is significant to note that in the passage cited above, Avicenna does not suggest that quiddities can be considered prior to their existence (wujūd). The question of the priority or posteriority of quiddities is discussed elsewhere in his al-Shifāʾ (see below). But before we proceed to analyze the ontological of status of quiddity qua quiddity in the relevant passages, it would be helpful to look at the Ishārāt as well, where Avicenna introduces further twists to this whole issue. Avicenna says:

In the above, Avicenna seems to make a distinction between quiddity qua quiddity (i.e. wāḥid al-ḥaqīqa) and quiddity insofar as “primary reality” is attributed to it (i.e. al-insān al-wāḥid).Footnote ²⁴ Given his earlier position in al-Shifāʾ, the nature of quiddity qua quiddity thus expressed has to be other than the mentally considered quiddity. And he claims that such a quiddity is purely intelligible. The interpretation of the above passage is also supported by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 1209) Sharḥ al-ishārāt:

After delineating the possible objection of an imaginary opponent of Avicenna, Rāzī now defends the former's position:

To fully explore the complexity and multifacetedness of Avicenna's exposition of quiddity and its various considerations, we must now turn to the Ilāhiyyāt of al-Shifāʾ, where the issue has been dealt with from other angles. Avicenna begins with the example of a “horse” as it relates to the question of universals. In Avicenna's own words:

From the above quote, it becomes evident that for Avicenna a natural universal (horseness in this case) qua itself is neither existent in the world of objective existence nor in the mind. But at the same time he contends that it would be permissible to conceive of such an “entity” because its essence (dhāt) belongs only to itself. He goes on to argue that even though such a natural universal exists with its particulars, it is still “itself” in such a mode of being. Moreover, he claims that a natural universal considered in this way is “prior in existence” to its individual instance, that is, the natural universal man would be prior in existence to the particular man, e.g. John. Avicenna says:

Naturally, given such a claim it behooves one to ask what is the ontological status of the “natural universal” as delineated above?Footnote ²⁹ Before attempting to present Avicenna's response to this question, it is necessary to explain the different considerations of quiddity in some detail that are central to the understanding of this issue. A quiddity is normally used in two senses: 1) the specific sense (māhiyya bi-al-maʿnā al-akhaṣṣ) and 2) the general sense (māhiyya bi-al-maʿnā al-aʿamm).Footnote ³⁰ It is known that quiddity in the second sense refers to the reality of things in which it is not opposed to the meaning of existence. Now, quiddity in the first sense responds to the question “what is it” as opposed to “who is it,” in which it is immediately noticed that the question is directly related to the notion of the universal since when asking “what is it” of someone we get the response “man,” and not John or Harry. The standard definition of quiddity that is provided in most text books states that a quiddity qua quiddity is neither existent nor non-existent (al-māhiyya min ḥayth hiya laysat illā hiya lā mawjūda wa-lā maʿdūma).Footnote ³¹ A quiddity in its purest state is free from all conditioning and determinations such as being one or many, universal or particular. For example, if we consider the quiddity of man as a universal (i.e. mental universal) then it cannot include all the particular men that have concrete existence. On the other hand, if that quiddity is a particular, then by definition it would exclude other particular instances of that quiddity, which is clearly inadmissible. Therefore, the quiddity of man is only “man” (no more, no less). But when existence, non-existence, universality and particularity are predicated of quiddity, they are not done so with respect to its very essence. This brings us back to the different considerations of quiddity. A quiddity, if considered conditioned by something, that is, with all accidents and individuating factors of the thing being considered, then that quiddity appears to be an extra-mental existent.Footnote ³² Now, if the same quiddity is considered devoid of all the individuating factors and accidents, that is with the condition that nothing can accompany it, it exists only in the mind.Footnote ³³ However, a quiddity can also be thought of as transcending all forms of conditionality.Footnote ³⁴ That is to say, a quiddity in such a state is utterly neutral to the possibility of accompanying both positive and negative conditioning, which enables it to be tilted to one side or the other or none at all. Avicenna in his Ilāhiyyāt of al-Shifāʾ states:

According to Avicenna, the “ontological status” of the natural universal (quiddity in and of itself) remains unaffected when it exists with a particular instance of it because a natural universal such as “humanity” would exist as long as a particular human being, e.g. Jenny exists. Avicenna argues:

To explain: there is no contradiction between the propositions “John exists with all of his necessary accidents [that are specific to him]” and “John is a man.” Inasmuch as John exists with the characteristics that are only particular to him, he also exists as a “man” which is inseparable from his essence or which “is” his essence. The first proposition is an instance of quiddity “conditioned by something” while the second is that of “unconditioned by anything.” The subtle point to note is that “māhiyya lā bi-sharṭ” does not become “māhiyya bi-sharṭ shay ʾ” when it exists as a part of it.

So far we have solved the conundrum of how the kullī ṭabīʿī can exist in the external world in spite of its being a “kullī.” But we have not yet treated the “ontological status” of the natural universal when it is considered in and of itself. Avicenna has repeatedly stated that a quiddity insofar as it is a quiddity, e.g. man, horse or animal, is only “itself” without any further consideration. He has also said that we can conceive of such a quiddity or the natural universal prior to its existing with a particular object.Footnote ³⁷ Such assertions immediately make one ponder whether or not Avicenna is affirming “the primacy of quiddity” here since he seems to be claiming “independent existence” for quiddities. However, one has to be careful before making any categorical statements concerning this, since in other places e.g. al-Ishārāt he affirms that “the cause (al-sabab) is prior in existence (mutaqaddim fī al-wujūd)”:

That is, although the quiddity of a thing can be a cause of one of the attributes of that thing, the “attribute” which is the existence of that very thing cannot be caused by its quiddity, since not only is the cause of a thing prior in existence, but also nothing is prior to existence before existence. This passage can be further elucidated through citing another passage from the Ishārāt, in which Avicenna suggests that things in the external world have both essential and existential causes (e.g. agent causality):

So the combined interpretation of both of these passages indicates that Avicenna does not embrace an essentialist position with respect to the quiddity of a thing.Footnote ⁴⁰ Nevertheless, it may be asked if quiddities per se neither exist in the mind nor in extra-mental reality, where do they exist then, since Avicenna also denies the ontological validity of the Platonic Forms? Avicenna's response to such a crucial issue may at first seem akin to the Sufic notion of “fixed entities” (al-aʿyān al-thābita) or the Muʿtazilite “theory of subsistence” (thubūt), depending on how one interprets it.Footnote ⁴¹ However, one can only reach a balanced conclusion after considering all the subtle varieties of interpretations that exist concerning this matter.

At this point, it is worth bringing here the analysis of Amos Bertolacci's recent article on the essence-existence distinction in Avicenna.Footnote ⁴² According to Bertolacci, essence (māhiyya) and existence, “thing” and “existent”, have different intensions, and essence and “thing” are prior to existence and “existent” from a cognitive point of view with respect to the absolute consideration of quiddities.Footnote ⁴³ However, existence and “existent” are intensionally prior to essence and “thing”, since the meaning of essence is also expressed by a particular sense of existence (esse propium), and existence is not reducible to being explained by means of a different notion, such as by the notion of essence in the case of “thing.”Footnote ⁴⁴ In other words, existent and existence are, in some respects, logically prior and more universal than thing and essence. On this interpretation, the concept of “thing” is synonymous with quiddity (or essence), which in turn is synonymous with the notion of proper existence, while the concepts of existence and “existent” are to be understood as being synonymous with “being established in reality.” However, it should be noted that even though the notion of “existence” may have a broader extension based on the above analysis, it is nonetheless not clear how this should also imply “priority” for existence. This is so because Avicenna, following Fārābī, makes it clear that existence is lāzim ghayr muqawwim Footnote ⁴⁵ (non-constitutive concomitant) of a thing/essence in that whenever the latter (i.e. essence) is implied the former is also understood.Footnote ⁴⁶ That is to say, the notion of existence always accompanies the notion of thing because the “thing” is either existent in the particular or it is existent in the mind. So for instance, even the “shapeness” of a triangle should possess existence in order to be applied to the triangle, implying their “co-extensiveness” rather than “priority”. Moreover, as Bertolacci himself affirms, with respect to the absolute consideration of quiddity, which is the issue most pertinent to the present inquiry, essences are prior to existence as far as their cognition is concerned. Thus it is necessary to analyze Metaphysics 5.1 from other viewpoints.Footnote ⁴⁷

In Metaphysics 5.1, Avicenna states that the cause of the natural universal or quiddity inasmuch as it is quiddity is divine providence (al-ʿināya al-ilāhiyya). Thus it appears that natural universals exist in God's foreknowledge before their instauration (jaʿl). Avicenna says:

The first thing to note from the above passage is that even though Avicenna argues that natural universals possess prior existence, he probably has in mind “priority” with respect to essence (dhāt) rather than temporal priority.Footnote ⁵⁰ This interpretation sits well with the Madkhal I.12, in which Avicenna explains the status of quiddities “before”, “in” and “after” a state of multiplicity. There he claims that the relationship between all things and God and the intellects is similar to that of the ideas of a craftsman/designer to her ideas (inna nisbatahā ilā Allāh wa-al-malāʾika nisbat al-maṣnūʿāt… ilā al-nafs al-ṣāniʿa). He also asserts that before the state of multiplicity, natural entities (al-umūr al-ṭabīʿa) exist both in God's and the intellect's knowledge.Footnote ⁵¹ The reference to the intellects (lit. angels) in plural may imply either all of the ten intellects or the Agent intellect alone, who is the giver of forms of in the sublunary world. This interpretation is in line with the Madkhal I.2's portrayal of the three different considerations of quiddities, where temporal priority is clearly not implied.Footnote ⁵² However, in the passage cited above, Avicenna seems to locate natural universals in divine providence, which bears a close resemblance to Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī’s claim that the latter have divine (ilāhī) existence. In his On the Existence of Common Things and On the Three Kinds of Existence, Ibn ʿAdī criticizes the view that an essence exists in only two ways, i.e. mental and extra-mental. He asserts that quiddity can also exist in itself prior to other modes of existence mentioned above and in his view, such a quiddity or the natural universal represents existence in the highest degree.Footnote ⁵³ Avicenna follows Ibn ʿAdī as regards two mental and extra-mental quiddities, but he disagrees with the latter concerning whether quiddities can exist by themselves or whether their existence is the most real (aḥaqq). However, in contrast to Ibn ʿAdī, Avicenna maintains that the cause of the being of natural universals is divine providence, which calls for an explanation of the term ʿināya.Footnote ⁵⁴ He writes:

Thus, the divine providence is the overflowing of the order of the good without a view to any preponderance (tarjīḥ). That is, the First's (al-awwal) knowledge of how to best arrange the existence of everything is the source of the emanation (fayḍ) of everything and natural universals have the status of “divine existence” when they subsist on this level (i.e. at the level of divine undifferentiated knowledge),Footnote ⁵⁶ because within the realm of possibilities, these universals will manifest themselves as one and many, along with various other accidents. The natural universals descend, as it were, through the celestial intellects (al-ʿuqūl al-samāwiyya) which contain them, to the sublunary world and become united with matter.

An issue that might be raised here is the question of the gradation (tashkīk)Footnote ⁵⁷ in regard to the changing status of the natural universal. Since an extensive treatment of this subject is well beyond the scope of the present endeavor, a few brief remarks may be offered.Footnote ⁵⁸ The discussion of tashkīk in Islamic philosophy up to Avicenna's time centered on the issue of how the term “existent” should be predicated.Footnote ⁵⁹ In this debate, Avicenna is to be credited with the earliest formulation of the doctrine of transcendental gradation of existence, which played a significant role in Ṣadrā’s philosophy as we shall see in the next section.Footnote ⁶⁰ In line with Aristotle's treatment of the various kinds of predication, Avicenna takes up the subject in the corresponding book of al-Shifāʾ (i.e. Maqūlāt).Footnote ⁶¹ In Maqūlāt I.2 and I.4, Avicenna discusses tashkīk extensively.Footnote ⁶² According to him, a term can be predicated 1) as a “shared name” (bi-al-ittifāq al-ism) and 2) as a pure univocal (ʿalā sabīl al-tawāṭuʾ). Further, (1) can be divided into i) graded univocal (ism mushtarak), ii) mixed equivocal (bi-tashābuh al-ism), and iii) unmixed equivocal (bi-ishtarak al-ism). Now as far as the present analysis is concerned it is (i), i.e., graded univocal that admits of “gradation” in strength and weakness, priority and posteriority etc. The discussions in the Maqūlāt I.2 and I.4 explain “predicamental gradation” of existence, whereas in his Mubāḥathāt he extends the gradation of existence from the predicamental to the transcendental level (i.e. how existent can apply to both the Necessary Being and contingent beings).Footnote ⁶³ This perspective, as stressed by Treiger, is a significant shift in the history of tashkīk, since Ṣadrā and his predecessors drew on Avicenna to formulate their own responses to the issue. At any rate, Avicenna says that existence is differentiated into the Necessary Being and contingent beings, and further into the ten Aristotelian categories. What is important to note is that existence is differentiated not as a genus by differentiae, but by the very quiddities of the entities of which it is predicated:

In the later period, Ṭūsī would defend and elaborate further on Avicenna's notion of tashkīk, when theologians such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī called philosophers into question for failing to demonstrate how God too can “exist” in a similar sense that a creature exists.Footnote ⁶⁵ In any event, notwithstanding Avicenna's transcendental gradation, he does not say anything explicit as to how the former is related to the ontological status of natural universals. However, he affirms unequivocally that being qua being (wujūd bimā huwa wujūd) does not admit of any variance in strength and weakness (al-shidda wa-al-ḍuʿf) or in being more diminished and deficient (al-aqall wa-al-anqaṣ), which is to say that he denies gradation in the structure of wujūd itself.Footnote ⁶⁶ Thus, it is clear that even though Avicenna allows existence to be applied to both the Necessary and the contingent, he has in mind conceptual gradation rather than ontological gradation.Footnote ⁶⁷ Otherwise, this would flatly contradict what he says in the Metaphysics (6.3, 26) as cited above. Moreover, the text from the Mubāḥathāt cited above, along with Ṭūsī’s interpretation of tashkīk confirms such a view. A typical example of Ṣadrian interpretation of tashkīk would further clarify the issue. So for instance, in Ṣadrā’s ontology wujūd is a gradational reality (al-ḥaqīqa al-mushakkika) that self-determines itself due to its unconditioned nature, and consequently becomes conditioned into various entities that after mental analysis are identified as quiddities.Footnote ⁶⁸

Finally, it may be noted in passing that Avicenna also claims that universals can be said of in three ways.Footnote ⁶⁹ In his view, a human being is an instance of the universal because it can be predicated of many individuals. However, universals can also be predicated of things that do not have extra-mental existence as for example, a heptagonal house. Nonetheless, it is a universal because it can be predicated of many at least in the mind. In other words, the condition of existing in the external world is not among the conditions of being a universal. In addition, there are universals that have no more than just a single referent, for example, the sun or the earth, but they are nevertheless called universals since there is nothing in their essence that prevents them from being predicated of many.Footnote ⁷⁰

III. FROM AVICENNA TO MULLĀ ṢADRĀ: THE INTERMEDIARIES

The previous section evinced the multifacetedness of Avicenna's exposition of the natural universal and key issues associated with it. Before attempting to investigate Ṣadrā’s theory of the natural universal, it would be pertinent to look at some of his notable predecessors who had taken up the issue from Avicenna and interpreted him in various ways. Since I have already dealt with Ṭūsī’s and Rāzī’s views, I would like to begin this section with Mīr Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī who was born in Gurgān in 1339 CE.Footnote ⁷¹ Based on current scholarship, we have precious little information about Jurjānī’s life. He was a contemporary of Taftāzānī (d. 1390), as well as a pupil of Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī (d. 1374) and a teacher of Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī (d. 1502).Footnote ⁷²

Thus according to Jurjānī, there are fundamentally three considerations of quiddity:

1. 1) the mixed quiddity (māhiyya makhlūṭa)

2. 2) the disengaged quiddity (māhiyya mujarrada)

3. 3) the absolute quiddity (māhiyya muṭlaqa)

What is important to note is that by Jurjānī’s time, the Avicennan considerations of quiddity were taken up by the philosophers and theologians alike and were systematized with well-defined terms such as those mentioned above.Footnote ⁷⁴ However, it should be noted that the substance of what Jurjānī is saying is not far from what Avicenna explicated in his al-Shifāʾ, except that in the case of the former the terms had been refined further. As we shall see in the next section, Ṣadrā adopts much of the vocabulary developed by Jurjānī et al. in his analysis of the natural universal.

To provide more background to Ṣadrā’s reading of Avicenna's exposition of quiddity and its various considerations and the notion of tashkīk, I will now analyze the work of some of the key figures of the Safavid era philosophy. Among its major figures who became famous as founders of one of the two strands of philosophy in the School of Shīrāz are the two Dashtakīs, namely Ṣadr al-Dīn (d. 1498) and his son Ghiyāth al-Dīn (d. 1542). In his path-breaking study, Reza Pourjavady avers that together with Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī (d. 1502), the Dashtakīs are the three best-known scholars who were teaching Islamic philosophy and theology (kalām) in the late 15^th century Shīrāz.Footnote ⁷⁵ The revival of Arabic/Islamic philosophy in Iṣfahān during the Safavid period, and especially the synthesis of Avicennan philosophy, Illuminationism and ʿirfān that came to characterize the philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā himself, owes much to the Dashtakīs and Dawānī.Footnote ⁷⁶ The philosophical contribution of the Dashtakī family had its effect in the subsequent debates in Arabic/Islamic philosophy, for instance, in his general metaphysics (al-umūr al-ʿāmma), Mullā Ṣadrā brings up the debate between Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī and the two Dashtakīs and evaluates their views concerning several key issues including the primacy (aṣālat) and gradation (tashkīk) of being, mental existence (al-wujūd al-dhihnī), and primary and essential predication (ḥaml al-awwalī al-dhātī), all of which lend support to the underpinning of his own philosophical project.Footnote ⁷⁷

In a rather surprising way Dawānī claims that natural universals do not exist in the external world.Footnote ⁷⁸ He self-consciously refutes such a view, which is held by Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī, Avicenna himself and others.Footnote ⁷⁹ In his view, the external accidents of quiddities are distinct from their essence (dhāt), and the latter does not necessitate a common universal (al-kullī al-mushtarak) among them. Moreover, he claims that the species (nawʿ) has the attribute of being eternal (qadīm) and when it is originated it “exists” by means of wujūd.Footnote ⁸⁰ This is in accordance with what he says elsewhere, namely that that only the Real (al-ḥaqq), whose existence is His quiddity, is truly existent. As for other entities, given that they are all caused, they are only existent in the sense that God causes them to exist.Footnote ⁸¹ For instance, he asserts that the fixed entity (al-ʿayn al-thābit) of the human being, which is a quiddity distinct from the Necessary Being, does not exist at all.Footnote ⁸² For Dawānī, contingent beings are called “mawjūdāt” only because they derive their wujūd from the Necessary. Otherwise, it is known that their existence is unreal (ghayr ḥaqīqī), since wujūd does not subsist in them.Footnote ⁸³

As was indicated above, Ṣadr al-Dīn, on the contrary, asserts that existence has priority over quiddity, which is in line with the doctrine of the primacy of being. In his view, the existence of the thing precedes what makes it distinct from other entities, namely, quiddity. For him, it is the existence that determines the quiddity, and not the other way round:

Just as Ṣadr al-Dīn seems to uphold the primacy of being, his son, Ghiyāth al-Dīn, takes the next step and explicitly affirms that the natural universal exists in the external world.Footnote ⁸⁵ And like Jurjānī et al. he too reiterates the three considerations of quiddity. As for wujūd, he divides it into mental and extra-mental existence and asserts that it is a “gradational” reality (maqūl bi-al-tashkīk). He asserts that wujūd admits of variance in strength and weakness.Footnote ⁸⁶

The Natural Universal contrasted with the All-Inclusive Universal (kullī siʿī):

Before we move on to the next section, it would be helpful to introduce a novel concept in Ṣadrian metaphysics, which plays a notable role in describing the relation between natural universals and wujūd. Ṣadrā argues that the concept of being is a universal much like the natural universal in that it is predicable upon its particular instances just as a natural universal such as man is predicable upon on all particular instances of man. However, the concept of being (mafhūm al-wujūd) as a universal remains valid as long as it refers to “the reality of being” (ḥaqīqat al-wujūd) since by itself it cannot shed light on the essence of the latter whereas a natural universal such as man does show the essence of all particular men. Whatever exists in the objective world are the instances of the mental notion of wujūd but external entities themselves are innumerable aspects and particularizations of the reality of being. Therefore, the reality of being is characterized by a peculiar kind of universality, which later commentators of Ṣadrā termed as “kullī-yi siʿī” in Persian.Footnote ⁸⁷ Ṣadrā himself uses the word “shumūl” which is a synonym of siʿī (siʿa in Arabic) to describe wujūd’s (i.e. reality of being) encapsulation or embracing of all things in the cosmos.Footnote ⁸⁸ Since there is nothing in the cosmos that is devoid of the “particular portion” (ḥiṣṣa) of the reality of being when it manifests itself and becomes self-determined, without the addition of anything else, into myriad of things, wujūd's “universality” is more universal than anything else.Footnote ⁸⁹ Hence Ṣadrā claims that wujūd’s [ontological] vastness is envisioned as an existential flow (sarayān) and expansion (inbisāṭ) on the [ontologically neutral] quiddities. Imagining the reader's difficulty in conceptualizing of such a reality, Ṣadrā states:

IV. THE PRIMACY OF BEING AND THE NATURAL UNIVERSAL

This section will argue that Ṣadrā’s views on the kullī ṭabīʿī and māhiyya rest on the doctrine of “the primacy of being.”Footnote ⁹² What Ṣadrā does, as the following analysis will show, is obliterate the fundamental reality of “quiddity” altogether so that all that remains are the self-determinations, modalities, and particularizations of Being.Footnote ⁹³ For Ṣadrā, quiddities are ultimately relegated to the manifestation (ẓuhūr), bound/borderline (ḥadd), determinations (taʿayyunāt), shadows (aẓlāl), aspects (shuʾūn) and signposts (asmāʾ) of existence.Footnote ⁹⁴

The doctrine of the “primacy of being” states that it is wujūd that precedes and constitutes things. Its story begins thus: if one accepts the self-evident axiom that there is “reality” (lā shakka anna hāhunā wujūd, as Avicenna says in the Metaphysics of al-Najāt, §II.12, 383) as opposed to the sophistical belief that one is under the spell of an evil genie somehow tricked into believing things exist in the world that otherwise do not exist, one can investigate two distinct possibilities regarding [external] objects.

1. 1. The concept of existence which is shared by all mental propositions and external realities and which shows traces of all existing things.

2. 2. The concept of quiddity which is the narrator of the whatness of the same realities, that is, it describes differences or particularities of objects, for example, a man is other than a mountain or a table is other than a tree and so on.

The point of contention between the proponents of the primacy of being and the primacy of quiddity lies in that the former claim that objects are the external instances (maṣādiq) of the concept of existence while the latter believe it to be just the contrary (i.e. external objects are the instances of quiddity). It should be noted that in the discourse on the primacy of either existence or quiddity, the term “aṣāla” refers to the entities that are existent by essence (mawjūḍ bi-al-dhāt) as opposed to existent by accident (mawjūd bi-al-ʿaraḍ).Footnote ⁹⁵ Taking into account the technical meaning of primacy, one may argue that neither being nor quiddity has any relation with things in the external world, but such a standpoint entails closing off of all discussions as it renders the objective world a mere illusion. On the contrary, one may put forward the idea that both of the aforementioned concepts can have objective reality and that each of them as a “real” concept can be applied to things in the external world. The impossibility of this argument too becomes obvious since it implies that every entity, while being just “one thing,” is understood to be two things. Hence by logical necessity one is forced to embrace either the position of the primacy of being or the primacy of quiddity since what is at issue is a sole entity in the extra-mental world, e.g. a man, which is the referent for both being and quiddity. It may be justifiably asked whether or not one object can be analyzed from more than one standpoint, as for example, a pen may be an instance of a number of concepts such as form, matter, substance, extension, being, quiddity and the concept of pen itself, all of which refer to the miṣdāq of pen. However, the dispute over the primacy of either being or quiddity involves asking which of the two, being or quiddity, is the underlying reality of entities found in concreto, and not whether an entity can be considered from various conceptual points of reference.Footnote ⁹⁶

As is well-known, the proponents of the primacy of quiddity relegate being to a mere philosophical secondary intelligible (al-maʿqūla al-thāniya al-falsafiyya) and claim that it is only a generic concept without any reality of its own and has no representation in the external world.Footnote ⁹⁷ Moreover, in their view, the concept of being is something abstracted from quiddities which are real. Against such claims Mullā Ṣadrā brings the following arguments:

The above citations can be re-framed in the following syllogistic form:

So far we have established that for Ṣadrā being (and not quiddity) is primary in the order of reality. Now it will be observed how quiddity along with its modalities (i.e. different iʿtibārāt) takes on a completely different meaning than what is found in the analyses of Avicenna. Based on his theory of the manifestation of being (ẓuhūr al-wujūd) which itself is premised on the oneness (waḥda), primacy and gradation (tashkīk) of being, Ṣadrā asserts that quiddity as “manifestation of wujūd” precedes quiddity qua quiddity (min ḥayth hiya hiya), which is to say that he reverses the Avicennan position.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ According to Ṣadrā, “quiddity as manifestation of being” possesses “concrete existence” while quiddity qua quiddity or the natural universal is abstracted in the mind (intizāʿ al-dhihn) from the former as he says:

The “common meaning” in the above quote refers to the natural universal and the example that he cites for it is the absolute man (al-insān al-muṭlaq), which is found in all men. The “absolute man” is free of all determining factors (as found in the individual) because of which it is their common meaning or essence. But he hastens to add that this “meaning” is not found in the extra-mental world because it is an abstraction of the mind, hence a post rem universal. He clarifies his position further in the following passage:

The reference to individual instances in the above passage is the existent by essence (mawjūd bi-al-dhāt). In keeping with the notion of the primacy of being, quiddity is reinterpreted as the existent by accident (mawjūd bi-al-ʿaraḍ), that is, something that inheres in the container of wujūd. Ṣadrā states:

It is important to note that Ṣadra does not eliminate the concept of quiddity altogether. In fact, he uses it to advance the claim of the primacy of being because quiddity qua quiddity is neutral to either existence or non-existence; hence it becomes existent through the mediation of wujūd. But he argues that kullī ṭabīʿī does not exist in the external world as an existent by itself since as soon as it is found in the external world, it exists as a manifestation or determination of wujūd. Once a natural universal is found in concreto as a manifestation of wujūd, then it can be intuited in the mind where it exists as a “universal.” Ṣadrā states:

Thus, it is no surprise that Ṣadrā uses the notion of the natural universal to prove mental existence (al-wujūd al-dhihnī), which I shall analyze in the ensuing section.

V. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE SADRIAN THEORY OF NATURAL UNIVERSALS

The Ṣadrian theory of natural universals has several implications for issues related to epistemology and mental existence. In particular, Ṣadrā makes use of the notion of the kullī ṭabīʿī to demonstrate the validity of mental existence. His argument in this regard is as follows:

The multitudes of individuals with all their accompanying accidental factors such as shape, size, color etc. that fall under one species and different species with varying characteristics that come to be classified under a common genus allows one to derive a “common meaning” (al-maʿnā al-mushtaraka) from them, for example, the meaning of man can be obtained from John, Jack, Jonah etc. while that of animal from man, horse, camel etc. At this stage, Ṣadrā argues that this common meaning cannot exist in the extra-mental world as an “individual unit” since in that case it will imply contradictory properties being predicated of the same unit, which is impossible. For instance, an individual cannot be both black and white at the same time. Therefore, the above-mentioned common meaning of species or genus with the attribute of “oneness” must find its way into the container of mind, thereby proving the validity of mental existence. In Ṣadrā’s words:

However, Ṣadrā is fully aware of the argument of those who claim that the “kullī ṭabīʿī” exists in individuals or exists as a part of them. Ṣadrā responds to it by arguing that the mistake of such people (Avicenna included) results from their putting the [notion] of universal in the place of “the absolutely unconditioned nature” and the verification of this [matter] falls back on the issue of the difference between quiddity and its various considerations (fī al-kalāmi khalaṭa, yūjibu al-ghalaṭa… min jihati waḍʿi al-kullī mawḍiʿu al-ṭabīʿati lā bi-sharṭ shayʾin wa-taḥaqquqi al-amri fīhi marjūʿun ilā mabāḥithi al-māhiyyati wa-al-farqi bayna iʿtibārātihā…).Footnote ¹⁰⁷ In Ṣadrā’s view, natural universals cannot exist in the extra-mental world with the attribute (waṣf) of universality for this would involve conjoining of contraries (ijtimāʿ al-naqīḍayn), which is inadmissible.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, if natural universals exist as particulars, it would lead to the transformation of essence (inqilāb fī al-dhāt) which is also impossible (i.e. the universal will no longer remain a universal). To evade such a dilemma, Ṣadrā suggests that since natural universals are natures that are totally unconditioned, they exist in the extra-mental world with the condition of being determined and individuated (mutashakhkhaṣ) while they exist in the mind with the condition of “universality.”Footnote ¹⁰⁹ Thus, for him the natural universal also proves mental existence.

The debate over the natural universal and the absolutely unconditioned quiddity did not end with Mullā Ṣadrā and his reinterpretation of it on the basis of the primacy of being. As is well known, Islamic philosophy in Iran has remained a living tradition and contemporary practitioners of it (not all of whom are Ṣadrian in orientation) have engaged with the problem of universals with new insights. Thus we find two contemporary philosophers, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1981) and Hāʿirī Yazdī (d. 1999), presenting contrasting views as regards the concept of the kullī ṭabīʿī.Footnote ¹¹⁰ What seems interesting from a scholarly point of view is that with the passage of time, the tradition developed concepts such as “māhiyya lā bi-sharṭ maqsamī” and “māhiyya lā bi-sharṭ qismī,” which are loaded with technical discussions embracing both logic and metaphysics.Footnote ¹¹¹ The word “maqsam” literally means a place of division, but in logic (manṭiq) it has several ruling properties (aḥkām) some of which are discussed in Ṣadrā’s logical treatise, al-Taṣawwur wa-al-taṣdīq.Footnote ¹¹² In short, a maqsam is a logical term that has the property of being the source of division of its numerous kinds. However, a maqsam lacks any separate existence apart from its determinations or divisions. Thus considered in itself the status of a maqsam remains ambiguous.Footnote ¹¹³ For example, the term “mafʿūl” (object) in Arabic grammar is a maqsam since it has six divisions apart from which it lacks any independent existence, i.e. in itself it is non-actualized (ghayr mutaḥaṣṣal) and inherently ambiguous. Using the concept of “maqsamī,” and “qismī,” Yazdī (pace Ṣadrā) argues that the natural universal is neither “māhiyya lā bi-sharṭ maqsamī” nor “lā bi-sharṭ qismī.”Footnote ¹¹⁴ In his view, since the natural universal alludes to the “essence” (Pr. gawhar) of things, it is not ambiguous in nature. According to him, a natural universal is only a natural universal – pure and simple, beyond even the condition of “maqsamī,” and “qismī.”Footnote ¹¹⁵ On the other hand, Ṭabāṭabāʾī observes that quiddity has three different considerations, each of which corresponds to bi-sharṭ shayʾ, bi-sharṭ lā and lā bi-sharṭ respectively.Footnote ¹¹⁶ These in turn correspond to mixed quiddity (māhiyya makhlūṭa), divested quiddity (māhiyya mujarrada) and absolute quiddity (māhiyya muṭlaqa).Footnote ¹¹⁷ In his view, the quiddity of which these considerations are sub-classes is called the natural universal, which would correspond to “māhiyya lā bi-sharṭ maqsamī.” Thus, he conforms to the Sadrian position.

As for the epistemological implication of the problem of natural universals, some brief remarks may be offered, although they are by no means exhaustive. If things have nothing common in their essence then what we perceive in the external world is but particulars and this would lead to the murky of waters of nominalism (acknowledging that there are varieties of nominalism).Footnote ¹¹⁸ On the other hand, if universals only exist in the mind then it would imply the closing of realism, which again would result in an epistemological impasse. Yet the idea of imagining universals existing in the external world is something inherently unconventional to the mind. And if realism is denied than the alternative becomes either phenomenalism or representationalism, both of which are acutely problematic.Footnote ¹¹⁹ Thus, Avicenna's theory of quiddity and the natural universal and its further development at the hands of Mullā Ṣadrā seem to offer an alternative route to the age-old aporia of universals as it safeguards collective essences in the extra-mental world.