The Adam Smith that emerges from Ryan Hanley's complex and richly rewarding book belies conventional wisdom and much current scholarship. Hanley's Smith is not an uncritical champion of commercial society; his social science is not ethically neutral; his aim is not to liberate greed; he is guarded in his support of laissez-faire and economic inequality; and above all, he does not enter the battle between ancients and moderns decidedly on the modern side, wedded to bourgeois values, lowering human aspirations, inimical to excellence. Hanley's interpretation rests on the recognition that “Smith is not only a founding father of commercial society, but also a father of the critique of it that would come to dominate European political thought in the next two centuries” (p. 24). The book's focus is Smith's diagnosis of capitalism's ills and the remedy he offers to ameliorate them.
Hanley begins, however, with Smith's defense of capitalism, explaining why he thought it was worth saving. Smith belongs to a tradition of liberal theorists, from Locke to John Rawls, who endorse markets—if not necessarily capitalist markets—because they foster affluence and safeguard economic liberty. But Smith anticipates that strain within liberalism that “launches each defense of commercial society from the perspective of the worst off” (p. 22).
First, the justification of capitalist inequality is plainly consequentialist. Smith offers a “paradox: even as the rich man ‘appears to be the most destructive member of society we can possibly conceive,’ the limits of his capacity for personal consumption, in conjunction with the stimulus his desires give to production, render him advantageous to society” (p. 17). He challenges the view that there is any close relation between “desert and reward,” and he is repelled by “the vulgarity of the selfishness of the rich” (p. 16). To be sure, he rejects naive celebrations of the world we have lost: the equality of primitive communities condemns all of its members to equal destitution. Economic inequality is nevertheless morally defensible because it alleviates poverty.
Second, Smith contends that commercial arrangements safeguard liberty. Here, too, his analysis stresses “the benefits of commercial society for the poor” (p. 19). He draws a sharp contrast between premodern, especially feudal, modes of personal rule, in which “the absolute dependence of laborers and retainers on feudal lords” relegated them to virtual slavery (p. 20), and commercial interdependence, in which property is stripped of its political incidents and the relationship between capitalists and their wage workers is mediated by contract (see pp. 22–23). This orientation—his “fascination with and gratitude for the harnessing of the powers of the strong for the relief of the weak”—is “the fundamental fact uniting Smith's separate defenses of … commercial society” and underlies “his specific vision of virtue” (p. 19).
Capitalism's benefits for the poor made it worth preserving, but Smith was not blind to its discontents. Hanley distinguishes Smith's diagnosis from other widely received criticisms—from civic humanist analyses of capitalism's impoverishment of public life, Marxian studies of capitalist exploitation, and Christian concerns about the consequences of its consumerism for the health of the human soul. Smith shares these concerns but, as Hanley shows, his deepest debt is to Rousseau's analysis of bourgeois society, especially its toxic consequences for human happiness. Smith's critical engagement with Rousseau began with his review of the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality in the Edinburgh Review (1756). He adopts Rousseau's insight that “commerce stimulates the desire for esteem to the degree that men can live only in the opinion of others” (p. 28). The love of esteem destroys happiness. First, vanity is relative and boundless, producing the characteristic anxiety and restlessness of bourgeois life. Second, relative superiority may be earned or feigned, corrupting our relations with others, producing the characteristic duplicity and hypocrisy of capitalist society. Third, the drive to emulate the wealthy erodes the sympathy for the poor, undermining capitalism's greatest achievement. Fourth, the desire for social recognition produces human beings with little appreciation for excellence or the drive to excel. Smith's critique anticipates Mill's indictment of the mediocrity and conformity of modern liberal society and Nietzsche's portrait of the last man. The bill of particulars, writes Hanley, contains “quite a list: selfishness, restlessness, anxiety, inauthenticity, duplicity, mediocrity, alienation, and indifference” (p. 52).
Hanley contests an interpretation of Smith as capitalism's uncritical advocate, and equally one that reads him as tragically resigned to its failings as the necessary price of opulence (p. 12). Smith's principal efforts do not lie in reforming capitalism's central institutions. His remedy for commercial corruption, developed fully in the revisions to the sixth edition (1790) of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in particular Part VI, “Of the Character of Virtue,” is the cultivation of virtue. He offers a view of moral education indebted to Aristotle's understanding of character formation. Smith's contribution to virtue ethics distinguishes his normative theory from utilitarian and deontological approaches. His aim is realistic: to elevate human beings' strongest passion—self-love (see p. 107). The heart of his educative strategy is to close the gap between desert and reward, between the love of esteem and the love of being justly esteemed. Smith offers a succession of virtues—prudence, magnanimity, and beneficence—as progressive remedies for capitalism's discontents, elevating self-love to a pinnacle of human flourishing in commercial society.
Prudence is the lowest virtue, intended to ameliorate the restlessness and anxiety of bourgeois life and the duplicity and hypocrisy of commercial relations. Prudence consists in the bourgeois virtues: “[T]he model citizen of Smith's commercial society resembles less an interest-maximizing caricature of homo economicus … than the more moderate, sober prudent man,” bearing “the stamp of the familiar set of virtues Benjamin Franklin sought to inculcate through his autobiography” (p. 112). He offers us a portrait of a life in commercial society largely free of “the anxiety, busyness, and restlessness encouraged by the love of praise,” and “from the selfishness that leads to duplicity and inauthenticity via the encouragement of a more admirable desire to be esteemed for possessing genuine virtues” (pp. 103–4). But prudence has its costs. Although Franklin was neither dull nor conventional, the person guided by his virtues assuredly is. Smith worries that prudence renders human beings indifferent to excellence; their aspirations do not extend beyond comfortable self-satisfaction. (Gustave Flaubert's description of Charles Bovary in Madame Bovary may be the epitome of the dull bourgeois.)
Smith's treatment of magnanimity foreshadows the liberalism of Tocqueville and Mill. It constitutes a commitment to correcting the ills of mediocrity and conformism, resurrecting classical aspirations in a bourgeois world. “Smith's position,” argues Hanley, “suggests that magnanimity is not merely the province of antiliberal reactionaries, but rather that a robust liberalism can accommodate—indeed perhaps require—magnanimity” (p. 134). The education of self-love beyond merely prudential aims turns on Smith's distinction between the love of praise and the love of praiseworthiness, requiring the individual to overcome conformity, learning to “transcend the solicitude for the opinions of others” (p. 137), orienting himself instead toward a transcendent standard of worth. Magnanimity flourishes above all in a life dedicated to politics: It is the virtue of the patriot, whose self-love is elevated by love of country, and whose central aspiration is political greatness (see pp. 130–31, 156–58). Smith's appropriation of the classical ideal of excellence is not inegalitarian. His aim remains wedded to a liberal vision of equal individual dignity: “The natural object of such self-love is the encouragement of a disposition necessary for justice itself: the recognition of one's equality with others” (p. 150). Magnanimity, however, is itself susceptible to corruption. Domination is the chief temptation of a political life. The self-approbation of great statesmen, warriors, and legislators degenerates easily into impatience with the painstaking work of persuasion necessary for real political success. Plato and Aristotle were equally concerned with the dangerous consequences of spiritedness, but Smith rejects their claim that “the life superior to these flawed political lives is the philosophical life” (p. 171). He echoes Cicero's critique of the philosopher's “propensity toward excessive self-admiration and if not an outright indifference to justice and humanity, at least a subordination to such concerns” (p. 171).
Smith's remedy for hubris is beneficence, the virtue of the wise and virtuous man. Hanley provides two ways to understand its telos. The elevation of self-love proceeds from bourgeois prudence to classical magnanimity to encompass the Christian virtue of caritas (p. 175); alternatively, beneficence tempers the masculine virtue of self-assertion with the feminine duty of care (p. 191). Its essence is the extension of the love of God “to all of God's Creation, manifesting itself ultimately in the love of one's neighbor as one's self” (p. 176). Hanley largely sidesteps the question of Smith's own religious commitments, and he stresses that the Christian notion of caritas is shared, despite profound differences, by other religious traditions. But he is surely correct is underscoring the debt that liberalism, especially its commitment to the equal respect due each human being, owes to Christianity. “It is difficult to see where,” writes Hanley, “other than the religious tradition of his society—and specifically its claim … that God has, in creating man, ‘created him after his own image’—Smith could have derived the idea that the cultivation of an appreciation of the ‘full sense of the merit’ of others is a goal to which those ambitious for the best possible life might properly aspire” (p. 201). This highest form of human flourishing sheds a dependence on the love of esteem. The wise and virtuous man undertakes works of beneficence—friendship, generosity, charity—in the spirit of gifts, as authentically other-regarding actions. Smith's claim, writes Hanley, is “that we discover our natural ends in the promotion of the well-being of others, and indeed that only in beneficent activity do we find our fullest flourishing as a unified being, purposefully at work in promoting the ends for which we have been made” (p. 183).
The virtue of beneficence returns the discussion to Smith's defense of commercial society as an economy that merits saving because it promotes the well-being of the most vulnerable. The wise and virtuous man disinterestedly pursues this end: “[T]he duty of the greatest is service to the least” (p. 203). He serves as the embodiment of an ethical society, offering it a model of itself as one in which humble work to provide the means of life is a noble calling (see p. 202).
Smith's efforts to ameliorate capitalism's ills by means of a normative remedy, Hanley acknowledges, were unsuccessful (p. 210). Smith would doubtlessly celebrate contemporary capitalism's prodigious productivity, but he would be equally revolted by its excesses and dismayed by the inexcusable persistence of poverty amid plenty. But Hanley also offers Smith's own writings, especially the Wealth of Nations, with its commitment to the welfare of the poor, as “a proper beneficence marked by the benefactor's commitment to the equality and dignity he shares with other human beings” (p. 208). This is high and indeed merited praise. Smith's work provides an enduring model for the sciences, and especially the social sciences, to pursue the unfinished project of ameliorating the circumstances of the least advantaged.
