The modern fiscal state was a precursor to the fiscal institutions now prevalent in developed economies. Under a modern fiscal state, the central government employs tax collectors who implement national tax policies under strict bureaucratic rules. Tax revenues are then amalgamated by a central financial institution, like a national bank, who then issues bonds or paper notes to pay for government services. Despite its social value, the modern fiscal state has been absent for most of human history. Rampant tax evasion, abuse by tax officials, and instability in the monetary system were the norm. How did societies escape this fiscal trap and create the modern fiscal state?
In Paths Toward the Modern Fiscal State, Wenkai He examines the fiscal path taken by England, Japan, and China. It offers a rich comparative analysis which is often lacking in the literature. He's main thesis is that credit crises were necessary for the emergence of the modern fiscal state. Crises focused the search for new solutions to fiscal problems and encouraged experimentation. The idea is that a central fiscal bureaucracy was sufficiently novel—and potentially damaging to some groups—that societies would have rejected it without a crisis. England's fiscal crisis came in the mid-1600s when the Crown's traditional sources of revenues were being depleted and the costs of European warfare were rising. According to He, it was in this period that new fiscal devises like the excise tax were introduced. The fiscal crisis continued through the late 1600s and was only eased by further innovations like the Bank of England. For Japan, the crisis came during the Meiji Restoration of the late 1860s when internal conflicts created new fiscal pressures. Another key moment was the abolition of the domain system, which made the Meiji government responsible for local debts and services. The Meiji first responded by issuing paper notes, but this led to a bout of inflation following by a massive deflation. The Meiji then responded by centralizing its fiscal system, most notably by reforming the excise tax. Within a few years, taxes on liquor yielded nearly as much revenue for the Meiji government as the land tax, its traditional source of revenue.
The Chinese case is interesting because its credit crises in the nineteenth century did not lead to the modern fiscal state. The Taiping Rebellion in the 1850s marked the first major crisis as it dramatically increased government expenditure. Like England and Japan, the Qing government responded by issuing paper notes and expanding indirect taxes. However, it was less successful in floating notes and the Chinese fiscal system remained decentralized. The economy came to rely on copper coins and notes minted and issued by provisional governments. Military expenses and public works were also paid by provisional governments using indirect taxes. According to He, one reason the modern fiscal state did not emerge in China was the absence of a severe a fiscal crisis. There was less motivation to use risky credit instruments and centralize finances as in Japan and England. The argument is buttressed by fiscal innovations introduced in China following the large indemnity imposed by Japan in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895.
As a general proposition, few historians would deny the importance of fiscal crises in shaping institutions, but in practice it is not always obvious when a society was in a severe fiscal crisis. Much conflict in England during the mid-1600s was associated with religion and thus it is not obvious that it was experiencing a deep fiscal crisis as opposed to social crisis. In a similar vein, it is not clear whether the Taiping Rebellion engendered a smaller crisis for China than the Japanese Indemnity. Both events added around 300 million tael of silver in expenses for the Qing government.
He's analysis of the modern fiscal state also analyzes the role of “socioeconomic structures,” which includes political and economic factors. The book explains nicely how these structures were different in England, Japan, and China and helped produce different paths of fiscal development. The reputation of the central government and its relation to elites provides one example. Market participants had to trust that the central government would honor its financial commitments. In England and Japan, trust was not immediate but it grew with time. Why? In England, and to a similar degree in Japan, governments could credibly commit or had political coalitions favoring commitment. Thus they were more likely to establish modern fiscal states. According to He, the Qing government had to consider the risk that provincial governments and citizens would defect to rebel groups if central taxation was pushed too hard. Similar pressures were present in England and Japan, but they did not stifle innovations by the central government.
Industrial organization and the density of economic activity were other socioeconomic factors influencing the path to the modern fiscal state. It was more costly to collect excise taxes from small firms dispersed across space compared to large firms concentrated in a single city. In England, the brewing industry, a key sector for excise revenues, was relatively concentrated and centered in London. A similar pattern applied to Japan's sake industry, which also provided a large portion of excise revenues. In China, market concentration levels appear to be far lower. Perhaps the most important reason is that China was much larger in size. Technology and communication costs prevented a few large firms from dominating the Chinese market. Thus it was far more difficult for the Qing government to develop a centralized excise department like those in England and Japan.
Readers interested in the comparative development of fiscal systems will find a wealth of information in Paths Towards the Modern Fiscal State. Readers will also appreciate the analytical framework which skillfully combines socioeconomic structure, contingency, and agency.
