Since the late 1990s, classical realism has enjoyed something of a revival in the field of international relations. If the end of the Cold War brought realism into disrepute, scholars such as Richard Ned Lebow and Michael Williams remind us that the type of realism discredited—simultaneously socioscientific theory and apologist defense of power politics—owed its existence to systematic misreading. Attending to the complexities of thinkers as varied as Thucydides, Clausewitz, Hobbes, and Rousseau, Lebow and Williams are part of an identifiable cohort of scholars interested in demonstrating the virtues of a more sophisticated realism. Jütersonke joins the foray into the rich intellectual terrain of realist thought by reconsidering the twentieth-century heavyweight Hans Morgenthau.
The book's central purpose is to trace Morgenthau's intellectual development, “fleshing out why and on what basis Morgenthau came to take on the views that he did” (x). Jütersonke defines this task in terms of what Niklas Luhmann called redescription, or the contexutalization of texts in the “communicative situation of [their] time” (19). Faced with myriad interpretive possibilities, he examines Morgenthau's juridical thought and its transformation in the intellectual and disciplinary context of American political science. Jütersonke wants to convince IR scholars that a comprehensive account of Morgenthau's realism is impossible without appreciating his critical engagement with “the formalist norm-positivism of German and American legal theory” in the 1920s and 1930s (ix).
The first two substantive chapters deal with Morgenthau's formative legal background, particularly his earliest encounters with the limits of international law and the sociopolitical “reality” of norms. Morgenthau's doctoral dissertation on the justiciability of international disputes is contextualized in the legal debates of late Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany. Its pivotal contribution, Jütersonke claims, is its crucial distinction between two types of state conflict: disputes, capable of adjudication by existing international law, and tensions, characterized by a gap between the legal status quo and the distribution of power. Jütersonke further details Morgenthau's response to the critical reception of his dissertation, exploring the defense and reformulation that Morgenthau gave of its key arguments in a 1933 French volume, La notion du “politique” et la théorie des différends internationaux. This is followed by a similarly situated account of Morgenthau's Habilitationsschrift, La réalité des normes, en particulier des normes du droit international, as well as a 1935 French article on sanctions.
The latter chapters connect the dots between Morgenthau's legal heritage and his realism. They feature an intellectual émigré in transition, narrating his disengagement from legal scholarship and his ambivalent entrance into the world of political science. Jütersonke discusses the convergence between the twentieth-century legal realism of American progressivists and Morgenthau's radical legal realism, his unsuccessful attempt to reframe realism as a functional theory of international law, and his disillusionment with behavioralist social science after moving to the University of Chicago in 1943. Finally, Jütersonke links Morgenthau's critique of legalism to political realism's anxieties about irresponsible statecraft. It is legal formalism's ideological capacity, ripe for exploitation by those who wish to conceal parochial ambitions under the guise of universal moral principles, that informs Morgenthau's fifth principle of political realism.
As a work of intellectual history, Morgenthau, Law and Realism successfully demonstrates how Morgenthau's earliest legal scholarship prefigures his later theorizing about law and politics. Many of the crucial concepts and arguments that appear in Scientific Man Versus Power Politics and Politics Among Nations—whether regarding the ontology of international politics; the limits of international law, morality, and world public opinion; or the prospects for a world state—are traced to Morgenthau's doctoral dissertation, his Habilitationsschrift, and his legal scholarship throughout the 1930s. With great patience, Jütersonke laboriously excavates the underappreciated imprints on Morgenthau's thinking. Thanks to William Scheuerman, scholars know of the fascinating intellectual cross-pollination between Morgenthau and Carl Schmitt. Jütersonke carefully discerns the marks left on Morgenthau by less (in)famous legal scholars, including Hersch Lauterpacht, Hans Kelsen, and, more speculatively, Arthur Baumgarten. He thus proves that Morgenthau's many intellectual debts are not exhausted by such eminent figures as Nietzsche, Weber, Freud, or Schmitt.
When it comes to reading Morgenthau, Jütersonke is right about the need to open up the “hermeneutic horizon” beyond Anglo-American IR (176). Yet he seems to mistakenly view political and legal interpretations of Morgenthau as mutually exclusive. For example, he begins the book with the bold claim that “Morgenthau was not a political theorist, nor a philosopher” (5), despite the fact that Jütersonke's own narrative provides overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Disciplinary training notwithstanding, Morgenthau's early titles are instructive: Die internationale Rechtspflege, das Wesen ihrer Organe und die Grenzen ihrer Anwendung; insbesondere der Begriff des Politischen im Völkerrecht (The judicial function in the international realm, the nature of its organs and the limits of its application; in particular the concept of the political in international law) and La notion du “politique” et la théorie des différends internationaux (The notion of the “political” and the theory of international disputes). He gravitated toward a dissertation topic that, “‘while legal in nature[,] lent itself to philosophical and political considerations,’ the latter being far more interesting than ‘run-of-the-mill legal problems’” (51–52). Morgenthau recognized the centrality of politics early on, displaying “broader theoretical aspirations” and adopting a critical stance toward the discipline of international law. Continually challenging the premises and boundaries of legal scholarship, Morgenthau embraced the role of the “external critic,” distancing himself from a formalist discourse that “did not have the necessary tools to fully grasp the concept of the political” (58–60). Critical reaction to Morgenthau's inaugural lecture (perhaps, Jütersonke conjectures, owing to “the (lack of) legal substance”) suggests that he was never lawyerly enough for his colleagues (77). Morgenthau's dominant concerns—the political underpinning of law, formalism's apolitical delusions, and the worrisome trajectory of American political science and political theory—leave no doubt about his intellectual affinities. At every stage of Morgenthau's development, Jütersonke's own intellectual history demonstrates the primacy of the political.
The significance of Morgenthau's legal heritage for IR scholars would be clearer if Jütersonke had made a solid case for its added value. Does one actually need a contextualized account of Morgenthau's earliest “legal” scholarship to understand his later “political” work (say, everything after Scientific Man versus Power Politics) and its implications for the study and practice of politics? Jütersonke's intellectual history, as interesting as it may be, provides little additional torque on the relations between law, politics, and ethics beyond the insights gained from close reading of Morgenthau's most well-known texts. After all, who would be surprised to discover that Morgenthau was “sceptical of both the normativity and applicability of international law” (36) or that he was disappointed in legalism's blindness to “social forces and the power aspirations of states” (189)? Careful reading of Politics Among Nations alone would reveal that Morgenthau “never went as far as asserting that ethics and law had no place in the international realm, nor that international institutions were futile creations” (158). Jütersonke's book is unlikely to deter those who willfully misread (or fail to read) Morgenthau in order to substantiate a dubious tradition of political realism.
Morgenthau, Law and Realism will appeal primarily to Morgenthau aficionados across disciplines. It also inadvertently speaks to hermeneutic debates between textualists and contextualists. Legal scholars surely ought to take Jütersonke's book as an opportunity to reflect on their understanding of international law and the imbrications of the legal, political, psychological, and sociological. Political theorists and political scientists, on the other hand, will likely question the critical and constructive upshot of Jütersonke's intellectual history.
