What is the meaning of the first sixteen words of the First Amendment? “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The question has instigated countless volumes of popular and scholarly rhetorical warfare, particularly over the meaning of the establishment clause.
In his splendid new book, Donald Drakeman storms into the breach once more with the provocative thesis that the Supreme Court's rendition of the establishment clause has largely been a story of creation-myth making. This claim isn't exactly new—the body of literature challenging the Court's version of history has grown steadily over the past half century, the most recent contributions coming from scholars like Michael McConnell, Daniel Dreisbach, and Philip Hamburger. But Drakeman goes further, arguing that the interpretive schools of accommodationist nonpreferentialism, strict separationism, and enhanced federalist jurisdictionalism each misunderstand the establishment clause. So he invites us to accompany him on an investigation, as objective as possible, of the historical record, which he argues indicates that the establishment clause was originally understood simply to forbid the establishment of a national church.
Drakeman lays out two tasks that structure the order of the book. First, how and why did the Supreme Court seek out an (allegedly) originalist interpretation of the establishment clause? Second, what would a reasonable originalist interpretation look like in light of all the evidence? Drakeman leaves it an open question whether originalism (and if so which version of it) is the best interpretive approach. In this context the debate seems out of place, because not only the Supreme Court but also scholarly interlocutors evaluate church-state disputes in the context of a true historical understanding. Since many don't agree on where exactly to look for compelling historical evidence, Drakeman widens his net to catch a wide range of possibilities: “framers' and ratifiers' statements or acts that might shed light either on their intentions or on what they saw as the clause's purpose or expected meaning, as well as materials that bear on how other Americans at the time might have understood the text” (19).
As to the first task, Drakeman focuses on two “crucial moments” in the Supreme Court's originalist treatment of the establishment clause: the 1878 Mormon polygamy case Reynolds v. US and the 1949 parochial-schools busing case Everson v. Board of Education (10). Drakeman argues that a deeper thread than Jefferson's famous wall-of-separation metaphor links these cases, namely, the respective jurists' reliance on the work of distinguished but unnuanced, Whiggish historians. Drakeman uncovers in Reynolds the influence of nineteenth-century historian, statesman, and friend of Chief Justice Waite, George Bancroft. Bancroft, himself a “deeply devout admirer” of Thomas Jefferson, directed Waite to Jefferson's Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom as the clue to the clause's constitutional meaning (46). Following Bancroft's suggestion, Waite searched for the meaning of the religion clauses in Virginia's history, and consulted Robert Reid Howison and eventually Robert Semple, Presbyterian and Baptist historians of Virginia, respectively. Through these historians, Waite was drawn into the “Virginia vortex,” a sort of church-state maelstrom of Jeffersonian secular separation, Madisonian remonstration, and triumphalist accounts of the influence of dissenting denominations (64). Notably, all three historians provided support for a common theme of the Virginian disestablishmentarian foundations of the First Amendment. However, Waite's Virginian blinders kept him from considering such clues to constitutional meaning as Thomas Cooley's and Justice Story's constitutional commentaries, the church-state practices of the New England states, and, glaringly, the actual constitutional debates of the First Congress. Drakeman concludes that Reynolds “is a case study of constitutional creation ex nihilo,” but it seems Drakeman's account leads us to believe that this was creation ex Virginia (73).
If Waite's opinion was ultimately a creation myth, at least it was promulgated in good faith. Drakeman argues that this much cannot be said for the Court in Everson, the modern cornerstone of establishment clause cases in which the Court incorporated it against the states. This time, the Court's opinion was a case of premeditated law-office history—“a search and deploy mission” conducted by the justices to arrive at a desired result (79). Drakeman examines the intra-Court memos, conference records, and personal papers of the justices and reveals the partisan motives of Justices Black and Rutledge that drove their historical research and opinions. Drakeman shows how Rutledge was actually the dominating force in the historical research and opinion writing and reveals Rutledge's professed anti-Catholic goals.
Substantively, both opinions are found wanting. Like Waite before him, Black commits the fallacy of composition by claiming that the acts and writings of Virginians Madison and Jefferson represented the country at large. As for Rutledge, he like Waite before him consults his old friend and Madison-loving Whiggish historian Irving Brant for the historical firepower to make Madison the embodiment of the First Amendment. Yet, as important as Madison is, this effort does not close the Virginia-America gap. The legacy of Reynolds and Everson turns out to be a failure to give a full and fair consideration of the range of evidence of the original meaning.
So Drakeman continues to his second task, to reconsider the evidence. Helpfully, he first retells the story of the scholarly fallout after Everson and concisely sets forth the dueling nonpreferentialist, separationist, and jurisdictionalist interpretations of the evidence. He then uses these schools as foils for his own meticulous review and interpretation of the constitutional facts including the amendment proposal, ratification, and varied understandings of “establishment.” Drakeman also devotes an entire chapter to several fascinating nineteenth-century loci of church-state legislative and executive reflection and practice, the highlights of which are his discussions of the Sunday mails controversy and Federal Indian policy.
The historical details cannot be rehearsed here. Suffice it to say that the narrative is captivating and all the more impressive for letting the historical actors speak for themselves. Drakeman's interpretation is not only insightful but dovetails with the spirit of the narrative. He argues that the contemporary schools have gone awry in their interpretations of the facts because they frequently search this history for “proof texts for modern propositions” (196). Hence, they fail to appreciate fully the importance of the fact that the Bill of Rights proposals were widely seen as “milk and water propositions” offered as a “tub to the whale” to secure ratification (213). Statements like these during the proposal, debate, and ratification of the religion clauses are key clues which Drakeman suggests are corroborated by the terseness of the congressional debate over the wording of the clauses as well as the resounding silence across the land. From the bounteous stores of eighteenth-century primary source material, the evidence consistently shows that people were saying virtually nothing about the establishment clause during proposal and ratification. This is the major clue interpreters have overlooked or misunderstood. The silence was not due to church-state bashfulness on the part of American colonials. On the contrary, they were frequently exercised about such matters and yet the establishment clause incited no public controversy. Drakeman's inference to the best explanation is that it therefore must not have been seen as a threat. A triumphant principle of secularist separation or nonpreferential aid or souped-up federalism each would surely have engendered a controversy. The silence indicates that the establishment clause guaranteed something all parties already agreed on, namely, that Congress would not team up with one of the Protestant denominations to establish a national church.
This conclusion, Drakeman admits, will sound shocking to modern ears. But he seems to leave it open just how shocking. He does not offer much on the implications of this understanding of establishment for understanding the free exercise clause. Did free exercise guarantee anything over and above freedom from national establishment? He notes Reynolds's influence on subsequent free exercise jurisprudence in Employment Division v. Smith, but he doesn't integrate into his discussion much engagement in the originalist debate regarding religious exemptions from neutrally drawn laws. While he limits his scope to the establishment clause, one would have liked to see a bit more here because arguably, the clauses are essentially linked. Inasmuch as the scope is limited to the establishment clause, the thesis seems subject to the Scylla-Charybdis criticism. That is, treating either clause in isolation risks encouraging a tension between the two clauses which may never have been intended.
That said, if in the beginning we were promised an investigation, we actually end up with a tour de force—an insightful discussion of landmark cases and a lucid, disinterested narrative of the historical materials. By the time Drakeman concludes that the original meaning of the establishment clause was simply to forbid the establishment of a national church, one senses that this is but a sober inference from the historical record. Anyone who thinks otherwise ignores this book at his own peril.
