Valerie Sperling's aim is to uncover what is wrong with the world and who is responsible (2). More particularly, she sets out to examine the ways in which a variety of transnational forces alter existing accountability relationships within and between states and institutions. (Despite the book's subtitle, she prefers the term “transnational” to “global” because border-crossing forces and institutions need not extend over the whole world—they may simply be regional, as in the case of the EU or NAFTA.) An introduction and conclusion sandwich five substantive chapters, in which Sperling deals in turn with transnational economic, political, military, judicial, and civil forces. Having shown that each of these forces can erode popular accountability to local constituencies, she concludes with a plea for conscientious global citizens to hold governments and other institutions accountable for what happens elsewhere, in effect making each of us trustees of global interests.
Chapter two examines the effects of international economic forces, in particular international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, and the way that neoliberal “structural adjustment policies” tied to loans can not only impoverish workers in developing countries but undermine government accountability to them. The impacts of political forces are taken up in chapter three, via case studies of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia and intervention in Bosnia. In both cases, despite transnational attempts to establish accountable, democratic government, it seems that little has changed. The fourth chapter concerns transnational military forces, particularly private companies and peacekeepers, this time with reference inter alia to Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone. Chapter five explores how transnational judicial institutions have affected accountability, with emphasis on Russia and the European Court of Human Rights. Finally, the influence of civil society and NGOs is discussed in chapter six. In each of these cases, outside pressure may force governments to live up to their commitment to human rights, but there is a potential cost to their accountability to local groups.
As can be seen from this list of examples, the focus is largely on the developing world. When reference is made to Western powers, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, it is usually as potential sources of foreign interference, rather than as states whose sovereignty and accountability are being undermined by transnational forces—though Sperling does suggest that this is also the case (e.g., 181). While there are occasional cross references to earlier examples, and some common concerns running throughout, such as a particular emphasis on the plight of women (84, 128, 198, 282), each chapter is essentially self-contained and can be read in isolation. Taken as a whole, they provide a detailed—if, necessarily, not comprehensive—picture of how globalization is changing familiar patterns of accountability. Sperling is careful not to be too one-sided, pointing out how in many cases the various forms of transnational interventions both promote and obstruct accountability relationships at domestic and international levels. For example, the presence of foreign human rights groups such as Amnesty International may hold a particular government accountable for meeting international and domestic standards, but at the same time may actually undermine the government's accountability to its own citizens if it becomes more responsive to the demands of foreign observers.
This nuanced approach seems to reflect the complexity not only of globalization, which is well appreciated, but also of the notion of accountability, which is perhaps less well appreciated. While Sperling draws several contrasts, such as between vertical and horizontal and between external and internal accountability (8–12), and identifies three different ways in which globalization is altering accountability—transnational institutions may hold states accountable, transnational forces can promote or obstruct government accountability to citizens, and transnational institutions have themselves become subject to demands for accountability (12–13)—these distinctions seem to threaten the usefulness of continuing to talk of accountability tout court. Unfortunately, these notions are not so clearly separated during the course of the following discussion, so it is rather unsurprising to find that certain forces contribute to accountability in some respects, while hindering it in others. Moreover, Sperling raises the issue of to whom governments (or transnational institutions) should be accountable (e.g.,7, 36, 82, 321), but does not engage with recent literature in political theory on this issue. Nor does she clarify the relation between accountability and democracy, which sometimes seem to be conflated, though I would have thought that a constitutional monarch could be accountable to both his people and the wider world. These theoretical shortcomings are disappointing, because they make it harder to draw any overall lessons from the painstakingly researched examples.
Sperling has clearly gone to considerable trouble to investigate several case studies, in various levels of detail, consulting a range of experts (historians, sociologists, economists, and international relations scholars) and conducting interviews with those directly involved (both elites and ordinary people). This research makes for interesting reading, but it is unclear how far one can generalize from a few examples, except to conclude (as she does) that there are cases where transnational forces have successfully promoted accountability and others where they have undermined it. Even here, however, one could question the interpretation placed on the evidence. That, for instance, outside intervention failed to produce a functioning democracy in either Cambodia or Bosnia does not show that these forces undermined accountability for, as Sperling concedes, these are difficult cases (127, 148). The relevant counterfactual is presumably the condition these countries would likely have been in had it not been for any outside interference whatsoever. Moreover, it is possible that Sperling's standards of accountability are too demanding. She condemns the Cambodian political system as undemocratic on the grounds that the Cambodian People's Party continued to rule, despite losing the popular vote to the main opposition parties, FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party (125, 138). By this standard, however, UK politics could also be branded undemocratic, since the government rarely polls as many votes as the two main opposition parties—and in some notable cases, such as 1951 and 1974, one party has won the largest share of parliamentary seats, and formed a government, without even a plurality of the popular vote. Perhaps it would have been profitable to compare the accountability of transnational forces to the actual levels of accountability in supposedly democratic states, rather than to unrealizable democratic ideals.
The problems explored in this book are complex and multifaceted. Sperling should be applauded for her detailed research and for refusing to reduce the phenomena to simple theories or sound bites. Nonetheless, this makes the conclusion that “[t]ransnational forces and institutions are destructive to accountability when they constrain a government's autonomy by restricting information and limiting policy choices on issues where the public could otherwise assert itself … [but they] enhance popular sovereignty when they encourage the expansion of political participation and freedom of information” (319) rather less interesting, being as it is a near tautology.
