In most classic ethnographies, children are almost invisible. In the past few decades, however, children’s important role in the functioning and evolution of culture has become much more well-documented and widely recognized. Lew-Levy and Amir bring all this work together in a very helpful way.
I would like to draw attention to a phenomenon mentioned but not highlighted in the target article. In keeping with the article’s focus on various kinds of cultural transmission, the claim is that “Peer interaction can be generative, leading to the discovery of information not initially possessed by either child” (sect, 3.4, para 2). But calling the outcome “discovery of information” undersells the unique structure and function of peer interaction within human cultures.
As compared with the social groups of other animal species, human culture has two unique dimensions. First is transmission. Although developing children learn important things from peers (as documented in the target article), becoming a competent and mature member of a culture still depends mostly on interactions with adults who already possess mature cultural skills and knowledge. Second is coordination. In this case, the issue is not so much acquiring mature skills and knowledge but learning to coordinate one’s cognition and action with others who are no more knowledgeable or skillful than oneself, which is of course what occurs during adulthood when everyone has more-or-less equivalent knowledge and skills. For this, it is not adults but peers who represent the key partners.
The outcome of coordinating with coequal peers is an understanding of others and their perspectives as fundamentally equivalent to the self and its perspective (Tomasello, Reference Tomasello2019). This understanding is of critical importance in two domains. First, Piaget (1932/Reference Piaget1997) stressed that children do not – indeed cannot – become moral beings through interactions with adults. Adults already know the right and wrong ways to behave, and they transmit these to children. But following a moral rule because an adult insists is not a moral act; it must be done for the right reason. Sharing a toy is not a moral act if it is done merely to please an adult; it must be done by considering the perspective and interests of affected parties as determined, for example, in moral discourse with them. Developmental research has found that children’s moral discussions with adults are markedly asymmetrical, as the moral expert impresses upon the child the “correct” perspective, with the child being relatively passive. In contrast, children’s moral discussions with peers are more symmetrical and active, involving more sophisticated argumentation with a need for reason-giving and justification for assertions (Kruger, Reference Kruger1992; Mammen, Koymen, & Tomasello, Reference Mammen, Koymen and Tomasello2018, Reference Mammen, Koymen and Tomasello2019).
Second, collaborative problem solving and decision making with coequal others – an important skill in adulthood – also rely on argumentation in discourse. In this case, there are not studies comparing children’s interactions with adults and peers, but much research shows that in interactions with peers, even preschool children employ sophisticated skills of justificatory reasoning, relying on judgments of common ground with the interlocutor (Koymen, Mammen, & Tomasello, Reference Koymen, Mammen and Tomasello2016) and giving meta-reasons for why one justification is better than another (Koymen et al., Reference Koymen, O’Madagain, Domberg and Tomasello2020; see Koymen & Tomasello, Reference Koymen and Tomasello2020, for a review). Examining the literature on collaborative learning in school-age children, Kuhn (Reference Kuhn2015) documents that peer interaction is especially important for problems that require individuals to take and respect different perspectives – whereas adult experts are best for transmitting facts.
One might think that processes of collaborative moral reasoning and joint decision making with peers should be the same across all cultures, and at some general level, this must be true. But children in different cultures possess different common ground knowledge acquired from others in the culture, as well as different valuings of various forms of evidence and reasons (perhaps modeled on adults). And in some cultures, children have more opportunities to engage in unsupervised interactions with peers, during which they make truly joint decisions. For all of these reasons, peer interactions may contribute to the development of moral and rational reasoning skills somewhat differently in different cultural settings.
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In most classic ethnographies, children are almost invisible. In the past few decades, however, children’s important role in the functioning and evolution of culture has become much more well-documented and widely recognized. Lew-Levy and Amir bring all this work together in a very helpful way.
I would like to draw attention to a phenomenon mentioned but not highlighted in the target article. In keeping with the article’s focus on various kinds of cultural transmission, the claim is that “Peer interaction can be generative, leading to the discovery of information not initially possessed by either child” (sect, 3.4, para 2). But calling the outcome “discovery of information” undersells the unique structure and function of peer interaction within human cultures.
As compared with the social groups of other animal species, human culture has two unique dimensions. First is transmission. Although developing children learn important things from peers (as documented in the target article), becoming a competent and mature member of a culture still depends mostly on interactions with adults who already possess mature cultural skills and knowledge. Second is coordination. In this case, the issue is not so much acquiring mature skills and knowledge but learning to coordinate one’s cognition and action with others who are no more knowledgeable or skillful than oneself, which is of course what occurs during adulthood when everyone has more-or-less equivalent knowledge and skills. For this, it is not adults but peers who represent the key partners.
The outcome of coordinating with coequal peers is an understanding of others and their perspectives as fundamentally equivalent to the self and its perspective (Tomasello, Reference Tomasello2019). This understanding is of critical importance in two domains. First, Piaget (1932/Reference Piaget1997) stressed that children do not – indeed cannot – become moral beings through interactions with adults. Adults already know the right and wrong ways to behave, and they transmit these to children. But following a moral rule because an adult insists is not a moral act; it must be done for the right reason. Sharing a toy is not a moral act if it is done merely to please an adult; it must be done by considering the perspective and interests of affected parties as determined, for example, in moral discourse with them. Developmental research has found that children’s moral discussions with adults are markedly asymmetrical, as the moral expert impresses upon the child the “correct” perspective, with the child being relatively passive. In contrast, children’s moral discussions with peers are more symmetrical and active, involving more sophisticated argumentation with a need for reason-giving and justification for assertions (Kruger, Reference Kruger1992; Mammen, Koymen, & Tomasello, Reference Mammen, Koymen and Tomasello2018, Reference Mammen, Koymen and Tomasello2019).
Second, collaborative problem solving and decision making with coequal others – an important skill in adulthood – also rely on argumentation in discourse. In this case, there are not studies comparing children’s interactions with adults and peers, but much research shows that in interactions with peers, even preschool children employ sophisticated skills of justificatory reasoning, relying on judgments of common ground with the interlocutor (Koymen, Mammen, & Tomasello, Reference Koymen, Mammen and Tomasello2016) and giving meta-reasons for why one justification is better than another (Koymen et al., Reference Koymen, O’Madagain, Domberg and Tomasello2020; see Koymen & Tomasello, Reference Koymen and Tomasello2020, for a review). Examining the literature on collaborative learning in school-age children, Kuhn (Reference Kuhn2015) documents that peer interaction is especially important for problems that require individuals to take and respect different perspectives – whereas adult experts are best for transmitting facts.
One might think that processes of collaborative moral reasoning and joint decision making with peers should be the same across all cultures, and at some general level, this must be true. But children in different cultures possess different common ground knowledge acquired from others in the culture, as well as different valuings of various forms of evidence and reasons (perhaps modeled on adults). And in some cultures, children have more opportunities to engage in unsupervised interactions with peers, during which they make truly joint decisions. For all of these reasons, peer interactions may contribute to the development of moral and rational reasoning skills somewhat differently in different cultural settings.
Financial support
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests
None.