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Saving incentives, old-age provision and displacement effects: evidence from the recent German pension reform

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 May 2008

AXEL BÖRSCH-SUPAN
Affiliation:
Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA), Mannheim University
ANETTE REIL-HELD
Affiliation:
Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA), Mannheim University (e-mail: reil-held@mea.uni-mannheim.de)
DANIEL SCHUNK
Affiliation:
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich
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Abstract

In response to population aging, pay-as-you-go pensions are being reduced in almost all developed countries. In many countries, governments aim to fill the resulting gap with subsidized private pensions. This paper exploits the recent German pension reform to shed new light on the uptake of voluntary, but heavily subsidized private pension schemes. Specifically, we investigate how the uptake of the recently introduced ‘Riester pensions’ depends on state-provided saving incentives, and how well the targeting at families and low-income households works in practice.

We show that, after a slow start, private pension plans took off very quickly. While saving incentives were effective in reaching parents, they were less successful in attracting low-income earners, although Riester pensions exhibit a more equal pattern by income than occupational pensions and unsubsidized private pension plans.

We also provide circumstantial evidence on displacement effects between saving for old-age provision and other purposes. Households who plan to purchase housing are less likely to have a Riester pension. The same holds for households who attach high importance to a bequest motive. Occupational pensions and other forms of private pensions, however, act as complements rather than as substitutes.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Cambridge University Press
Figure 0

Table 1.State incentives for supplementary pension provision

Figure 1

Figure 1.Development of Riester pensions

Source: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2006).
Figure 2

Figure 2.Spread of private pension provision

Note: The thin line shows the 90% confidence interval. Weighted figures.Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.
Figure 3

Figure 3.Spread of different private pension instruments

Note: The thin line shows the 90% confidence interval. Weighted figures.Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.
Figure 4

Figure 4.Households with several pension instruments

Note: The thin line shows the 90% confidence interval. Weighted figures.Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.
Figure 5

Figure 5.Supplementary pension provision by age group in 2005

Note: The thin line shows the 90% confidence interval. Weighted figures.Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.
Figure 6

Figure 6.Demand for private pensions by number of children in 2005

Note: The thin line shows the 90% confidence interval. Weighted figures.Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.
Figure 7

Table 2.Development by number of children

Figure 8

Figure 7.Demand for private pensions by vocational training in 2005

Note: The thin line shows the 90% confidence interval. Weighted figures.Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.
Figure 9

Table 3.Development by vocational training between 2002 and 2005

Figure 10

Figure 8.Demand for private pensions by monthly household disposable income in 2005

Note: Weighted figures.Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.
Figure 11

Table 4.Development by income brackets between 2002 and 2005

Figure 12

Table 5.Riester pension plans by income brackets in 2004 and 2005

Figure 13

Table 6.Determinants of the demand for Riester and other private pension products (bivariate probit estimates)