In his review of From Qajar to Pahlavi: Iran, 1919–1930 (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2008) published in the November 2010 issue of IJMES, Pezhmann Dailami denigrates my book for relying on U.S. State Department archives instead of the usual British records, and claims that “Majd's story has an obvious purpose, and that is to justify the deep sense of vulnerability and the violent anti-Western paranoia of the Iranian regime.” First, given that the available British records have been used extensively in other studies, I saw no point in reproducing them yet again. Second, American records have not been used before and provide a fresh perspective. My book uses nearly 800 new documents, one for every five days of the period covered; to call it an attempt “to justify” the policies of the Islamic Republic is absurd. Moreover, Dailami claims, “Evidence that the 1921 coup was a British design is largely circumstantial. Of course, Reza was Britain's perfect man. He could resist the advances of Soviet Russia while remaining friendly to the old imperial power.” But Dailami then contradicts himself in the next paragraph when he writes, “In any case, that Reza got rid of the last remnants of British political influence in Iran does not appear to matter to anyone. It must be admitted that he did so under Soviet pressure.”
Russia had long tried to contain British influence in Iran with little success. Dailami would have us believe that Reza Shah gave Russia what it could only dream of. If so, he had no cause to fear the Russians. As recorded in the archives, however, on 29 August 1941 Reza Shah sought asylum in the British Legation, citing his fear of the Russians, who were getting closer to Tehran. Reassuring him, the British minister, Sir Reader Bullard, asked Reza Shah to remain in Tehran. Two weeks later Bullard gave him the bad news: on the evening of 15 September 1941, he informed the shah that abdication was his only option, and that “no other course remained open.” Reza Shah abdicated and left for Isfahan the next day. On 17 September 1941, the Allied armies occupied Tehran and Reza Shah's son became shah. The British quickly took the ex-shah and his other children to Mauritius, and thus saved him from the wrath of his people. They were on the way to Canada when he fell ill in South Africa and could not continue.
Calling the argument “flimsy,” Dailami dismisses the fact that the British did not confiscate Reza Shah's wealth in foreign banks. Fortunately, the American press reported extensively on Reza Shah's money abroad. The New York Times reported that Reza Shah had banked £55 million ($275 million) in London, “and additional millions said to be deposited in New York, San Francisco and elsewhere abroad.” As to the “additional millions” in New York and San Francisco, the Washington Post reported that Reza Shah had U.S. deposits of $20 million. We know that this is accurate because it was based on a census of foreign bank accounts in the United States undertaken by the Treasury Department in June 1941. The Chicago Daily Tribune reported that the ex-shah had $300 million in foreign banks, “and the government hopes to recover it.” The latter figures did not include his money “elsewhere abroad,” most notably his Swiss deposits, known to have been considerable, nor the $50 million in his Tehran bank accounts on his abdication. In short, Reza Shah's fortune in foreign banks was two to three times greater than my earlier estimate of $150 million given in From Qajar to Pahlavi. Having banked some $500 million (at least $20 billion in current terms), he was likely the wealthiest man in the world, a remarkable achievement for a man born into a humble peasant household who was practically illiterate.
