In July 2015, Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Pursuant to that agreement, Iran committed to limiting the scope and content of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories.Footnote 1 By law, the U.S. State Department is required to certify Iran's compliance with the agreement every ninety days.Footnote 2 The Trump administration first certified Iran's compliance with the agreement in April 2017, albeit reluctantly.Footnote 3 In its first certification, the Trump administration expressed ongoing concern about Iran's sponsorship of terrorism,Footnote 4 and repeated previous criticism of the JCPOA as “fail[ing] to achieve the objective of a non-nuclear Iran.”Footnote 5
In the following months, the Trump administration continued to criticize the agreement as it conducted an interagency review of its policy toward Iran. In an address to the Arms Control Association on June 2, 2017, a senior National Security Council official noted that the Trump administration was reassessing the United States’ commitment to the JCPOA:
We are in the middle of an ongoing Iran review. … It is a broader review than just of the JCPOA. … One of our complaints, as we see it, about the previous administration was the degree to which, having gotten a nuclear deal it was a tempting conclusion to make other aspects of Iran policy sort of hostage to that deal. … We felt that there is a—an unwelcome reluctance to press back and hold Iran accountable on those fronts for fear that oh, my goodness, if you make them too mad they'll walk away from the deal. We are determined not to make everything hostage to the nuclear question.Footnote 6
On the same day, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—which has monitored and verified Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related JCPOA commitments—released its seventh report concluding that Iran had again implemented its commitments under the JCPOA.Footnote 7
The Trump administration nevertheless continued to criticize at a UN Security Council meeting later that month. While the EU and other UN nations praised Iran for its implementation of the nuclear deal, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley focused instead on Iran's repeated violations of UN Security Council Resolution 2231.Footnote 8 UN Security Council Resolution 2231, adopted in part to facilitate JCPOA implementation, provides:
Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology, until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.Footnote 9
Ambassador Haley cited “repeated ballistic missile launches, proven arms smuggling, and illicit procurement of ballistic missile-related technology” as violations of the resolution.Footnote 10 She reiterated that the administration was conducting an ongoing review of its policy toward Iran, but noted that the United States would comply with its JCPOA commitments at least until the review was completed.Footnote 11
Despite these criticisms, the Trump administration issued its second formal certification of Iran's compliance with the nuclear agreement on July 17, 2017.Footnote 12 The press release announcing the certification, stated:
[T]he United States continues to waive sanctions as required to continue implementing U.S. sanctions-lifting commitments in the JCPOA, and is certifying to Congress that, based on available information, the conditions of Section 135(d)(6) of the of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended, including as amended by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-17), enacted on May 22, 2015, are met as of July 17, 2017.Footnote 13
The press release also stressed, however, that “Iran's continued malign activities outside the nuclear issue undermine the positive contributions to regional and international peace and security that the deal was supposed to provide.”Footnote 14 Accordingly, the statement also announced that the Trump administration had sanctioned eighteen entities and individuals for “supporting Iran's ballistic missile program and for supporting Iran's military procurement or Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)” as well as an Iran-based transnational crime organization.Footnote 15 The State Department specifically designated the IRGC Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (ASF SSJO) for involvement in Iranian ballistic missile research and flight test launches and the IRGC Research and Self Sufficiency Jehad Organization (RSSJO), for responsibility in the research and development of ballistic missiles.Footnote 16
In a press briefing, administration officials emphasized that the decision to combine recertification with a new round of sanctions reflected the U.S. view that Iran has failed to comply with the “spirit” of the JCPOA.Footnote 17 For its part, Iran condemned the new round of sanctions as illegal under the JCPOA and promised to “in turn impose new sanctions against a number of other American persons and entities that have taken hostile steps against the Iranian people and other Muslim nations in the region.”Footnote 18
On July 27, 2017, Iran launched a Simorgh space launch vehicle, testing a rocket that could deliver satellites into orbit.Footnote 19 Although Iran denied that the rocket was a missile designed to carry nuclear warheads,Footnote 20 the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement condemning the launch.Footnote 21 The United States viewed the launch as “inconsistent with” Resolution 2231, noting in particular that “[s]pace launch vehicles use technologies that are closely related to those of ballistic missiles development, in particular to those of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.”Footnote 22 Accordingly, “Iran's program to develop ballistic missiles continues to be inconsistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and has a destabilizing impact in the region.”Footnote 23 The United States did not, however, describe the launch as a violation of the JCPOA.
In response to the space launch, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on six subsidiaries of Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), a company that is central to Iran's ballistic missile program.Footnote 24 OFAC explained that the sanctions were issued in response to “Iran's continued provocative actions,” since “[s]pace launch vehicles use technologies that are closely related to those of an intercontinental ballistic missile and this launch represents a threatening step by Iran.”Footnote 25 These sanctions were issued just hours after the U.S. Senate unanimously approved a U.S. House of Representatives bill imposing additional sanctions on Iran in response to Iran's ballistic missile program and for human rights abuses.Footnote 26 President Trump signed the bill into law shortly afterward on August 2, 2017.Footnote 27
Iran lodged a formal complaint with the Joint Commission alleging that the new administrative and statutory sanctions violated the JCPOA.Footnote 28 Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani stated: “With regard to the imposition of new sanctions by the US, in addition to diplomatic measures, which should be taken, a complaint had to be filed with the relevant commission (the Iran-P5 + 1 Joint Commission) and this has been done.”Footnote 29 Mr. Larijani alleged that the new sanctions contradicted paragraphs 26, 28, and 29 of the JCPOA,Footnote 30 which provide, respectively, that the “U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions,”Footnote 31 that the United States, as a member of the EU/EU + 3, “commit[s] to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation,”Footnote 32 and that
the United States, consistent with [its] laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with [its] commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.Footnote 33
Per the procedures outlined in the agreement, the Joint Commission has fifteen days to resolve such an issue before Iran can request the issue be elevated to an Advisory Board, which after an additional fifteen days will provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue.Footnote 34 The Commission, however, did not publicly comment on Iran's complaint. A spokesperson from the office of Frederica Mogherini, Joint Commission Chair, confirmed only that Iran's views about the permissibility of new sanctions had been “extensively discussed” at recent meetings.Footnote 35
While continuing to express dissatisfaction with the JCPOA, U.S. officials also emphasized their commitment to monitoring Iran's compliance with the agreement. On the day Iran filed its complaint with the Joint Commission, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson acknowledged that, although President Trump had “been pretty clear on his dissatisfaction with the JCPOA as a tool or instrument,” the United States was
working with the other parties to that agreement, our European allies in particular, to ensure that we are fully enforcing all aspects of that agreement, holding Iran accountable for its commitments, and challenging whether Iran is, in fact, living up to its commitments and the spirit of that agreement.Footnote 36
For his part, President Trump warned on August 10, 2017, that “I don't think Iran is in compliance . . . and they are certainly not in the spirit of the agreement in compliance. And I think you'll see some very strong things taking place if they don't get themselves in compliance. But I do not believe they are in compliance right now.”Footnote 37
On August 15, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani warned that the United States’ sanctions activity might cause Iran to leave the JCPOA. He asserted that Iran could return to pre-JCPOA conditions “not within months and weeks, but in a matter of hours and days.”Footnote 38 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley responded with the following statement:
Iran cannot be allowed to use the nuclear deal to hold the world hostage. Iran, under no circumstances, can ever be allowed to have nuclear weapons. At the same time, however, we must also continue to hold Iran responsible for its missile launches, support for terrorism, disregard for human rights, and violations of UN Security Council resolutions. The nuclear deal must not become “too big to fail.”Footnote 39
On August 23, 2017, Ambassador Haley met with IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano to express concern about the IAEA's monitoring and verification of Iran's compliance with JCPOA.Footnote 40 Ambassador Haley specifically pressed Director General Amano to seek new access to additional suspected Iranian nuclear facilities and other military sites.Footnote 41 Under the text of the JCPOA, “if the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, at locations that have not been declared under the comprehensive safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol, the IAEA will provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification.”Footnote 42 Under such circumstances, if Iran's clarification does not resolve IAEA concerns, “the Agency may request access to such locations for the sole reason to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at such locations. The IAEA will provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant information.”Footnote 43
After Ambassador Haley's meeting with Director General Amano, there was no public indication that the Trump administration had presented any evidence that could serve as a basis for an IAEA concern or request for clarification. A statement from the United States Mission to the United Nations indicated that if such evidence were presented by the IAEA, Iran would have to “follow the unambiguous access provisions of its IAEA safeguards agreement, the Additional Protocol, and the JCPOA.”Footnote 44 In response to reports about this meeting, Iranian government spokesman Mohammad Baqer Nobakht stated: “Iran's military sites are off limits. … All information about these sites are classified. Iran will never allow such visits. Don't pay attention to such remarks that are only a dream.”Footnote 45
Shortly after Ambassador Haley's meeting with the director general, on August 31, 2017, the IAEA issued its eighth verification of Iran's compliance with the JCPOA.Footnote 46 Despite this verification, Ambassador Haley emphasized in a speech several days later that the question of Iranian compliance requires more than evaluating Iran's execution of “the technical terms of the nuclear agreement”; indeed, “[i]t requires a much more thorough look.”Footnote 47 She insisted Iran be evaluated not only by its compliance with the terms of the JCPOA, but also by “its violations of Resolution 2231 and its long history of aggression,” its “repeated, demonstrated hostility toward the United States,” its “history of deception about its nuclear program,” and “its ongoing development of ballistic missile technology.”Footnote 48 Accordingly, Haley stressed that “we must consider the whole picture, not simply whether Iran has exceeded the JCPOA's limit on uranium enrichment. … That's the judgment President Trump will make in October,”Footnote 49 when the Trump administration is next scheduled to certify Iran's compliance with the JCPOA to Congress.
