These two books challenge core assumptions popular within the micro political economy analysis of institutional selection. Both focus on institutional choice in the context of international commerce but that is where their similarity ends. Joseph Jupille, Walter Mattli, and Duncan Snidal have written the more explicitly polemical book, Institutional Choice and Global Commerce, which directly targets current institutional theories and seeks to evaluate the relative merits of alternative explanations. While authors Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal engage with the more theoretical literature on institutional choice and are without a regional focus, Oscar Gelderblom, in his book Cities of Commerce, focuses on the institutional foundations of the rise of the West, not the polemics of institutional choice. He concentrates on collective action in a European context and engages with scholarship on the rise of Europe.
Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal ask: Why do institutions persist when alternatives could be created that would be better at serving society’s long-term welfare? Given a range of options that vary from “use, selection, change, and creation” why do decision makers select suboptimal choices persisting in “use” when “change” or “creation” would be optimal? (p. 4). They show that rationality—the preferred behavioral specification in the standard decision-making theory of political economy—does not do justice to this question. The authors argue that “[i]n standard theoretic analysis (and optimal design theory), actors are synoptic searchers (optimizers) able to canvass the whole range of possible choices and sequences of choices in light of their knowledge of the entire payoff structure. … They anticipate the distant consequences of their choices and thus fold back the ‘decision tree’… to determine the best strategies given the available alternatives” (p. 7).
Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal counter that if the agents are all hyper-rational decision-makers seeking to maximize their goals, then institutional adaptation would be a smooth process and suboptimal institutions would cease to exist once decision-makers acquired knowledge about opportunities for improvement. Selecting optimal institutions would be easy if the only barrier to overcome was a deficit of knowledge.
However, dilemmas of cooperation exist. These dilemmas and the question of why it is such a rocky process getting agents to design and agree on the optimal design has been explored in economic history by Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast (Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, 2009); with neo-Marxist political sociology by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, 2012); with game theory by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. (The Logic of Political Survival, 2003); and with public choice by Mancur Olson (The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, 1982). An array of formidable concepts have been used (e.g., transaction costs, inclusive versus exclusive coalitions, winning coalitions, collective action, and the theory of rent seeking), but all share the same rationality assumptions; the agents are optimizers that can assess the range of all possible choices to determine their best strategies, given the choice of alternatives.
Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal claim that bounded rationality offers a far more realistic model of the capacity of decision-makers and that it performs better when tested against the empirical world. They use an eclectic range of cases to back their assertions, ranging from the mixed courts of Egypt that opened their doors in 1876 and were not shut down until 1949 after handling nearly 24,000 cases, to the better-known International Trade Organization, the GATT, and the WTO. In each case the rationality assumption would predict a smooth process of institutional design and adaptation once the distributional shortcomings of the status quo institutions are observable. Yet, in all the cases under review decision makers do not make optimal choices, but settle on satisfactory ones, “departing from the status quo to consider alternatives further down the tree only when earlier options fail to satisfy a minimum threshold requirement for acceptability” (p. 7). The mixed courts persisted for twenty years from the time that the search for a more suitable arrangement began. After the failure to agree on the International Trade Organization in 1947, the GATT was approved although it was considered to be suboptimal. Cooperation was not effortless and reform was not smooth. Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal also critique standard approaches for addressing end points while downplaying the process of getting there. In each case bounded rationality is critical in determining why sub-optimal institutional choices persist.
The preference for “good-enough” takes into account agent assessments of risk and uncertainty, which the authors claim reinforce the status quo bias of the bounded rationality assumptions and explain why radical reform and deep-reaching searches are so rare, while “use what already exists” is so common.
Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal join a growing literature that challenges the rational choice assumptions in institutional analysis. Kurt Weyland (Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion, 2000) describes how bounded rational agents acting in their own best interests can construct inferior economic institutions by adopting various heuristics in the face of uncertainty. For James Mahoney (Studies in Comparative International Development, 2000) and Paul Pierson (Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis, 2004) positive feedback and increasing returns cause substandard institutional selections to become “locked in.” The initial choice is reinforced because setup, learning, and coordination costs predispose agents to actors to invest in defending status quo institutions. In Kathleen Thelen’s work, (How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan, 2004), institutions, once adopted, are resources that enable groups to consolidate power. The authors conclude that “how the interplay between power and self-reinforcing mechanisms can generate unintended consequences, nicely complements our own analysis of the way in which the interaction between bounded rationality and power variables may have unexpected consequences” (p. 212). All of this research brings us closer to an understanding of the persistence of suboptimal choices.
Oscar Gelderblom’s main goal is to probe the source of Amsterdam’s institutional adaptiveness and its status as the guardian of inclusive commercial interests. His narrative conflicts with a number of contemporary writers that correlate open access with strong governments.
The argument that Gelderblom contests and successfully refutes is that institutional best practices originated in states with strong central governments and that these institutions were eventually emulated. Gelderblom claims that to the contrary, the strongest governments in pre-modern Europe were often the most inimical to the interests of commercial classes.
During the 16th and 17th centuries while Amsterdam was consolidating its position as a central hub in European commerce, the Hapsburgs of Spain, the Stuarts of England and the Bourbons of France acted in a much more restrictive fashion toward local merchants than did the Dutch. In these dynastic states, merchants paired their ambitions with the military ambitions of sovereigns. Yet, if we were to conduct our analysis simply by comparing the commercial institutions of these more centrally governed territorial states, we would likely conclude that political constraints on the executive were critical. But once we consider the broader European context, the role of strong central governments sinks to secondary importance in explaining what brought about inclusive legal regimes for the conduct of international commerce.
Gelderblom painstakingly establishes that if not for Europe’s decentralized political system, local elites would have lobbied more successfully for exclusion of local competitors. They were obstructed from attaining exclusionary privileges because they “faced strong competition from other potential gateways with good overseas and overland connections to each other and to a hinterland with marketable surpluses. To attract as many merchants as possible the municipal governments… created the kind of inclusive, open access international markets that institutional economists have long recognized as a key to the growth of European trade” (pp. 199–200).
Gelderblom’s argument gives pride of place to Europe’s fragmented political and legal structure. This gave merchants freedom to choose the contracting institutions that were most conducive to their interests and it gave local authorities an incentive to create opportunities for more efficient trading. Thus legal fragmentation, not concentration, underpins Europe’s distinctive mercantile culture. The adaptation of trade enabling institutions became a general European phenomenon because merchants had the freedom of action to choose their own contracting rules. Within the Netherlands, intra-city competition provided strong incentives for cities and their leaders to reduce the impediments to trade and to be as inclusive as possible. In this context, Amsterdam gained its comparative advantage from being able to leverage the weakness of its central authority to support thriving local markets. Amsterdam provided inclusive protection of commerce that originated within its jurisdiction because it had to compete against other powerful cities controlled by merchants.
Gelderblom’s study reveals the tautology of a significant body of existing scholarship that uses rational choice models of behavior to argue deductively that states acted to protect merchants to gain access to revenue and resources for defense. Thus he refutes synthesizers like Douglass North, Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson and David Stasavage, who argue that a legal environment conducive to inclusive trade is a top down creation. Here, Gelderblom’s criticisms mirror those of Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal, and take exception to rational choice notions of optimization and institutional choice.
Gelderblom specifically addresses the iconic role of England vaunted as a universal template of property rights protection by Douglass North and others. Within England, Gelderblom counters, London’s rise was actually detrimental to other English cities. An exclusive relationship between the London based business elite and the crown sustained efforts by London merchants to monopolize England’s trade with the continent. If all the rulers of Europe were similarly able to protect the trading interests of local elites, it would have been detrimental to European economic development.
Gelderblom consistently argues that the larger territorial states are prone to act in defense of the monopoly rights of politically connected elites. It was decentralized political rivalry that made commercial prowess indispensible to regime survival and this had the systemic impact of promoting European-wide innovation in contracting and in financial technology. A comparison with China would be illustrative—there, political centralization limited merchant autonomy and emperors saw the international ambitions of merchant elites as a threat rather than an opportunity.
The depth of Gelderblom’s archival work makes this book indispensible to future scholarship. As a contribution to understanding Dutch commercial and institutional history in a broader European context, it is destined to be a classic.
Both books offer a critical corrective to current literature and together contribute to a refinement and critique of the rational choice models that have dominated academic political economy analysis. Both help to establish that the optimization models that are derived from rational choice rest on behavioral mechanisms and rules of agent interaction that are without a justifiable basis in human behavior.
