Al-Farabi (870–950) is considered the founder of political philosophy within the medieval Arabic Islamic tradition, and he had a profound influence on thinkers who followed, such as Avicenna, Averroes, Maimonides, and Aquinas (through Avicenna if not directly). However, al-Farabi was following a tradition of antecedents originating in Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates. Unlike his Greek predecessors, however, who could consider how to live as individuals and in organized political communities through a discourse that would fall roughly within what we would call today the social sciences, al-Farabi lived in a world in which the divine revelation of the one God was understood to have surpassed Greek thought. The Qurʾanic revelation of the one omniscient and moral God was understood by the Muslim world to have trumped the thinking of the Greeks, and the interpretation of that revelation, which emerged during the imperialist period of the Abbasid caliphate, demonstrated amply for Muslims how Islam should be the dominant and ruling religion, entitled or even required to rule the world because it would rule justly. The vehicle for that rule in this consensus interpretation was the caliphate.
Al-Farabi considers what would actually be necessary for Islam to rule justly, and he tries to envision the kind of government and religion needed to fulfill Islam's ambition of universal acceptance. Joshua Parens examines al-Farabi's views by concentrating on his work, The Attainment of Happiness, in which al-Farabi most fully develops his own position through insights derived from Plato in the Republic. Parens treats relevant material in other al-Farabian works, as well, such as Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle and Selected Aphorisms. Like Leo Strauss (and his student, Harold Bloom) in relation to Plato, Parens does not read al-Farabi as attempting to construct a truly ideal governing system, for such a goal would be impossible. Both the Republic and Attainment of Happiness are thus pedagogic works intended not as a blueprint for a real system, but “as a cautionary tale promoting political moderation” (pp. 2, 121). For Parens, therefore, al-Farabi represents a model for the Muslim world that can be accessed by those who are seeking an authentic, Muslim discourse in moderate government.
Parens' argument unfolds in three parts. First, he argues that al-Farabi compares the ambition of Muslims to spread their virtuous religion to the entire world with the model of the virtuous city in Plato's Republic. Like Plato, al-Farabi demonstrates in the Attainment of Happiness that truly virtuous government is impossible. Second, al-Farabi develops his “a fortiori argument,” namely, that if Islam achieved its ambition of bringing its virtuous religion to the entire world, then every individual city and every single nation must become virtuous. If it is impossible for even one truly virtuous city to come into being, then a fortiori it is impossible for a virtuous regime of the inhabited world to come into being. Third, al-Farabi adds his “multiplicity argument.” Every nation or people is distinct, each with a particular character deriving from a combination of factors such as climate, food supply, language, and education. Every religion must be suited in every time and place to the national character of every people. A virtuous regime of the inhabited world, then, would have to include a multiplicity of virtuous religions, thus obviating the religious homogeneity of a world under an Islamic ruler as most traditionalist Muslims have come to expect. Consequently, even if a virtuous universal regime were possible, each part of the inhabited world under its rule would possess a different religion.
Parens lays out his reading of al-Farabi in six chapters (including his introduction, in Chapter 1). He contextualizes the discussion in Chapter 2, with a reading of the Republic that concludes that Plato considered a planned regime to be impossible. The third chapter addresses the “a fortiori argument.” Chapter 4 discusses al-Farabi's position on jihad, which, according to Parens, subtly demonstrates that the traditional Muslim jurists' ideal of Muslim conquest for the purpose of creating a virtuous regime of the inhabited world is implausible. The fifth chapter lays out al-Farabi's “multiplicity argument,” and Chapter 6 treats the limits of knowledge. Because of the impossibility of possessing adequate knowledge (particularly of final causes), even the positive exploitation of the ruled by the ruler cannot succeed in achieving the ambition of establishing a virtuous regime of the inhabited world.
Of particular interest to the general reader is Parens' analysis of al-Farabi on jihad, based on al-Farabi's Aphorisms as well as his Attainment of Happiness. Al-Farabi was critical of the jurists' endorsement of offensive jihad, but because the sanction of jihad was the norm in his day and provided a certain justification for the caliphate, we should not expect al-Farabi to declare boldly and loudly that it is un-Islamic. Parens writes, “Alfarabi was not a revolutionary; he was an educator. Indeed, his message was subtle enough that some authors have argued plausibly that he looks quite favorably on war for the spreading of justice and happiness” (p. 58). Parens clearly disagrees and makes a strong case for his position.
To Parens, a key question is whether the virtuous city is capable of engaging in unjust wars. He finds that al-Farabi demonstrates how, due to erroneous opinion or incomplete knowledge, for example (as opposed to, say, bad character), even a “virtuous city” can engage in unjust wars, thereby causing the city to become nonvirtuous. Moreover, al-Farabi does not accept that individuals or groups will adhere to any particular set of beliefs through compulsion. Inculcating virtuous and just beliefs in a populace governed by a Muslim regime is thus impossible. By extension, therefore, engaging in jihad for the spreading of Islam and the eradication of unbelief or misbelief, even in a universally virtuous regime, will fail.
Parens claims that the turn away from al-Farabi's kind of political rationalism among Muslim thinkers in the 13th century had “deleterious” effects caused, in part, by Islam's relative absence of deep theological differences until relatively late in its development. He contrasts this situation with the deep theological basis to the religious wars between Catholics and Protestants in the 16th and 17th centuries, which “compelled political philosophers to think anew about the proper relation between religion and politics” (p. 4). The result of that tragic European crisis was the emergence of the Enlightenment. One wonders whether a similar crisis is occurring currently in the Muslim world.
Parens' works on al-Farabi's ideas in a philosophical context and does not attempt to apply them to our contemporary political world. Nevertheless, he does suggest that, presumably because al-Farabi was working his political philosophy within the context of the Muslim state, both Muslim and non-Muslim would benefit from reading and thinking about al-Farabi's analysis.
This book is not easily readable for the philosophically uninitiated, and it will be helpful to have a copy on hand of Mahdi's Alfarabi: The Political Writings: Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle and Butterworth's Alfarabi: The Political Writings: “Selected Aphorisms” and Other Texts. Parens' style is nonetheless clear, somewhat conversational (which I found helpful), and modest.
The book is an important theoretical contribution to the discussion on “political Islam” and contemporary religious and political movements in the Muslim world. It expands the offerings in the field of authentic Muslim thought about politics and political philosophy, and provides a cogent and compelling example of alternative thinking to the current political direction in much of the Muslim world today.
