The title of Daniel Richter's new book declares, once again, that colonial historians study a period that deserves to be considered as more than mere prologue to the struggle for independence and the nation's founding. Early national and even contemporary America is more connected to its “ancient pasts” than is often acknowledged. Richter conceives of these earlier influences as layers, submerged and obscured, upon which later periods drew – layers that provided foundations for future structures and, like sedimentary deposits or seams, lay uneradicated, usually unacknowledged, beneath later periods. The geological metaphor is carried through the book, which is presented in sixteen chapters organized into six sequential parts, each focussing on distinctive agents of change: progenitors, conquistadores, traders, planters, imperialists, and Atlanteans. In its organization, one is immediately struck by the greater weight the book places on the early period and the seventeenth century, which takes us through to page 295 and the end of chapter 11. As a preeminent historian of Native American history and of the seventeenth century, one might expect Richter to offer more on the earlier period. But it is striking that the remainder of the colonial period, down to Britain's victory in the French and Indian War, is covered in a little over a hundred pages. The real beneficiary of this chronological recalibration is the late seventeenth-century burst of Stuart-backed imperial energy culminating in the Glorious Revolution – often treated as a minor event in the colonies but here afforded more attention than in previous surveys. This late seventeenth-century and imperial perspective provides for one of the book's major achievements: a break with the inveterate particularism and regionalism of previous studies to give us a history which connects New England puritans, Chesapeake planters, Indians, English imperialists, Dutch merchants, the French crown and the multiplicity of others who contested power and trade in the early North American Atlantic.
The first two chapters compare medieval North America and Europe – noting that in both places a warming climate after the tenth century fostered changes over the longue durée in attitudes to agriculture and community. In both places social power depended on kinship and economic obligations and opportunities that generated inequalities and warfare, leading to change – for example the abandonment of the Cahokia civilization sometime in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the rise thereafter of multiple, decentralized societies, evident in the archaeological record of more egalitarian rituals and customs. This transformation, together with the development of language and culture, produced the differentiated Native civilizations which varied around similar commitments to subsistence (combining agriculture, hunting and gathering), extended and often matrilineal kinship, long-distance trade, decentralized chieftain forms of political organization, and common understandings of power relationships. This process of social change and differentiation was not dissimilar to that evident in Europe, following the demographic crises of the fourteenth century and consequent challenge to feudalism and the rise thereafter of dynasties, cities and long-distance trade. There were, however, two major and ultimately defining differences between early Native American and European histories. In the latter the rise of the Catholic Church (also after the tenth century) generated a pan-European and warlike culture, most evident in the Crusades against Islam. Added to this was the European custom that individual warriors and their families might accumulate land, bequeath it to their descendants, and thus possess it in perpetuity – which fed the fire of dynasties and state conflicts. By the mid-fifteenth century the combined influence of religious and warlike culture driven by individual and monarchical ambition had generated an expansionist political economy and culture that provided the basis for European incursions into the New World.
These incursions are taken up in Part Two, the “crusades” in the New World. Early figures, such as Prince Henry the Navigator and Columbus, are reinterpreted as conquistadores driven more by concerns of faith, chivalry and dreams of empires based on re-created feudal relations than by “modern” desires for access to the spice trade and commerce. Conquistadores also brought justifications for the enslavement of infidels and captives taken in a just war. Richter's focus is very much on North America, arguing that Spanish empire had little impact on northern settlement, other than to inspire exploration and provide models to envy, ape and abhor. In this vein he surveys the English and French sixteenth-century navigations, but it is not until the easing of the religious turmoil occasioned by the Reformation (chapter 4) that northern European colonization proceeds. At this point it is worth pausing to applaud Richter's enviable talent for concise encapsulation of complex stories. One would expect, at the least, a seamless and convincing integration of Native American history of the last thirty years, and we get that – in spades. But the sections on the background to English Protestantism, its adaptation and trials in New England, and shenanigans in the later Stuart court (and much more besides) are all deftly handled, making Richter's book a real competitor for the current first-pick survey text – Alan Taylor's American Colonies (2002) – on undergraduate reading lists. In this fashion we move from late sixteenth-century English privateers through Roanoke and early Virginia to the 1622 massacre – in which developments, Richter argues, the English continued to pursue the earlier Spanish fantasy of establishing feudal empires in America with grateful Indians, who turn out to be more warlike and less tractable than expected.
By Parts Three and Four, chapters 5–9, we are on the familiar narrative terrain of seventeenth-century Virginia and New England. But integrated into this story, and giving its coverage greater scope and insight, are the connections to international affairs and the French, Dutch and Spanish geopolitical and imperial considerations. In America the English sought to dominate and in some cases erase the Indians. The French and Dutch used alliances and trade to secure a colonial position way beyond their demographic presence and capital investment. When relations broke down, not least because of the epidemics that decimated Indian populations and so destroyed long-standing and delicate social and cultural balances, warfare forced through changes in a political and social landscape previously dominated by shifting alliances and isolated trading posts. One of the earliest of these conflicts, the Pequot War, indicated that planters were displacing traders. Tracing the origins of these English planting ventures to their beginnings in Irish colonial ventures, Richter notes the continuity of earlier desires for the establishment of landholding and personal estates. The difference was that the American colonists who inherited and pursued these ambitions were not the military crusaders of the later sixteenth century but “men of small means” with more moderate economic – and in the case of the puritans, religious – aims. Once again the tale is familiar but the telling so fresh and lively that one reads on for the next twist. Here, for example, is Richter on Anne Hutchinson and the antinomian or “free grace” controversy:
In the rarefied air of a pre-Laudian Cambridge college, in an underground conventicle in late-1620s Lincolnshire, or even in the giddy early days of Boston's “most glorious church in the world,” the debate over just how far to push the doctrine of free grace might have been one on which the godly could agree to disagree. Yet once a woman and a newly arrived male aristocrat attempted to turn the population of male voting church members against the fragile regime of men of small means who were fighting a morally questionable war against the Pequots for control of the Connecticut Valley the crisis of authority became acute. (199)
In Virginia the same “men of small means” adapted the conquistadores' feudal fantasy and justifications for slavery to meet the needs of an expanding settlement dedicated to the production of tobacco. In the Dutch, French and Spanish colonies, by contrast, the authorities favoured private and maritime trade (including the slave trade), seigniorial tenures and lordship over diminutive and subordinate European populations. And until at least the mid-seventeenth century it was far from clear whose approach was the most likely to succeed. The turning point came with the mid-century English Civil Wars, the Navigation Acts and Cromwell's Western Design. With these new approaches to their old Spanish enemies and recent Dutch friends the English intensified their interests in the New World. English colonization would no longer be carried on by religious zealots and private companies but by the state. After 1660 the restored Stuart monarchy took up and adapted this strategy, once again dreaming of a feudal empire in America – an ambition captured best by the experience of the planters who settled in Barbados and then the Carolinas, where they hired John Locke to produce the infamous 1669 constitution.
The final two parts, concerning imperialists and Atlanteans, chapters 10–16, tell the story of this Restoration scheme and its ultimate failure with the collapse of the Stuart dynasty and the emergence thereafter of a fiscal–military state and reformed monarchy. After 1660 the Stuarts' desire to enrich the dynasty and assert royal prerogatives were manifest in the intensification of central authority and a series of wars fought against the Dutch Republic. The English empire would not be built from scratch, Richter argues, but taken from the Dutch. Thus in 1664 the English seized New York and established a royal colony. Thereafter the Stuarts turned their attention to puritan New England and especially Massachusetts and its chartered autonomy. The monarchical forces who disdained colonial assemblies and rights were also keen supporters of the slave trade, which flourished after 1660. In the 1670s and 1680s, however, the “men of small means” – now in their second colonial generation – resisted the tightening of imperial bonds. As Richter admits, it is difficult to establish meaningful connections between the outbreak of Bacon's Rebellion, King Philip's War and the Pueblo Revolt within a few years of each other. But each in their own way responded to the late seventeenth-century extension of European central imperial authority. In Virginia William Berkeley, a major planter and restoration imperialist, attempted to establish a neo-feudal regime but fell foul of the ambition of small planters and their hatred of Native Americans. In New England the colonists faced off with Wampanoag Indians and others, whose weakened position Richter traces, in part, to the expulsion of the Dutch. In New York, too, imperious royal officials and their merchant backers were cast out by the city's inhabitants concerned for the security of their rights and privileges and inspired by a cadre of religious zealots who feared a conspiracy against the Protestant Church. That the Spanish were briefly expelled by a Native American revolt and the English colonists defeated their Native American antagonists and ultimately won concessions from the empire attests to the durability of the English colonization model over the Spanish.
The Glorious Revolution did for the Stuarts, but according to Richter the imperial vision remained more or less intact. The reformed monarchy and emerging fiscal–military state exercised centralized authority in a manner that would have pleased the Stuarts. However, there were differences which nurtured the formation of a colonial gentry and loyalty; in particular the fact that London gave up on the distribution of manorial land grants and accepted the role and utility of provincial assemblies. Thereafter three further amendments ensured the success of the first British empire. First, it was resolutely Protestant and thus ended the confusion of Protestant/Catholic loyalties that bedevilled the seventeenth century. Unequivocal Protestantism also made for nice, clear enemies – France and Spain – and an important role for the settlers and Indians as colonial allies. Second, government after 1688 was contractual and much vaunted as the defender of property and liberty. Third, and perhaps most important, the expansion of the Atlantic trade ensured economic prosperity and growing consumer markets. In a few short decades the empire became the provider rather than the denier of rights and prosperity. Now the colonists benefited from the Navigation Acts, and imperial policies stabilized tobacco prices and tripled colonial exports to Britain by mid-century. The Atlantic economy even gave a new lease of life to the old feudalist dynamic of social differentiation, as an aspiring middle class set off in pursuit of gentility and distinction from the lower orders. The combination of religious toleration, an administrative light touch and prosperity secured the colonists' allegiance and a series of wars, beginning with Queen Anne's War from 1702 to 1713, entrenched the settlement of 1688 and made it seem glorious.
There were losers, of course. And in his final chapters Richter surveys the conditions and culture of slaves, servants and poorer immigrants. We close with the French and Indian War and the violence of imperial conflicts that leaves settlers fighting Indians for land and ultimately colonists in the thirteen colonies rebelling against the empire. If the chronological rethinking is original and stimulating, Richter's decision to claim the continent in his title while focussing on North America and, really, British America and the thirteen colonies is likely to earn him some criticism. But no survey that aims for the concision and sheer readability of Before the Revolution can or should try to cover everything. My students will certainly be reading it and I don't imagine they'll be the only ones.
