Some months ago, a student approached me after class. During the previous week, we had discussed the significance of small states in the Cold War and I had given a skeptical assessment of their ability to play a significant role in smoothing the conflict. Since then, my student said, he had studied the indexes of a dozen standard textbooks without finding Austria or Bruno Kreisky, the foreign minister and later chancellor, even once. What then, he asked me, is all this Austrian talk about being an international “bridge builder” and “mediator” about?

The tension between Austria's sometimes exaggerated self-image and actual achievements is analyzed in a new book, written by two experts. Austrian diplomats rarely share their views with the general public. Ambassadors Franz Cede and Christian Prosl break with this tradition; both are specialists in international law and both look back on a distinguished career in foreign service. In the 1990s Cede coined the term “Avocado Doctrine” to describe the post–Cold War reduction of Austria's hitherto inflated interpretation of peacetime duties of a neutral state to their core (not joining a military alliance, not tolerating foreign bases on its soil, not starting a war). Besides Michael Gehler's 1,200-page history of Austria's postwar foreign policy (Österreichs Aussenpolitik der Zweiten Republik: Von der alliierten Besatzung bis zum Europa des 21. Jahrhunderts [Innsbruck, 2005]), this handy textbook—a translation of a previously published German version (Anspruch und Wirklichkeit: Österreichs Außenpolitik seit 1945 [Vienna, 2015])—is the only overview currently available. While not explicitly addressing practitioners, this highly informative introduction will serve them well, combining solid knowledge with sometimes critical approaches.

After outlining the restoration of Austria's foreign service in 1945 and the prevailing foreign political doctrine, the book analyzes features and topics of postwar Austrian foreign relations: the constraints of the Cold War; the country's reconstruction with US aid, in particular the Marshall Plan; the negotiations for and conclusion of the State Treaty; and the adoption of the Neutrality Law of 1955. Further chapters are dedicated to crises affecting Austria's neighborhood such as the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the breakup of Yugoslavia after 1991, and the migration crisis of 2015—as well as cultural and economic foreign policy, development policy, the human dimension, restitution, and other fields, although not security. Political actors such as Chancellor Leopold Figl, who was preceded as foreign minister by Karl Gruber, find their due place.

In contrast to Switzerland, the declared model for Austrian neutrality, the country became active in the United Nations, providing soldiers for peacekeeping missions and hosting many of its agencies. In Vienna, the conventions on diplomatic relationships, on consular relations, and on the succession of states were concluded; the country served as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council three times, and Kurt Waldheim was twice elected UN secretary general. That Austria succeeded in positioning itself as a host even for the 1961 and 1979 US-Soviet summits and in gaining international prominence that was by far exceeding the country's size was the result not only of Austrian neutrality and shrewd and sometimes skillful diplomacy but also of the superpowers’ interests: while the United States was interested in bolstering Austria's international position against the Communist East and making neutrality attractive for East Central European states, the USSR, in contrast, aimed at promoting Austria's neutrality as a model for NATO members. The end of the Cold War paved the way for Austria's integration with the European Union, which had been blocked due to resistance from the Soviet Union and other countries. While the end of the East-West conflict, European Union membership, and changes in its interpretation of neutral policy increased Austria's security, these factors also reduced the country's international visibility.

Not all Austrian endeavors were successful: efforts to achieve self-determination for South Tyrol, which in spite of its overwhelmingly German-speaking population had to be ceded to Italy, failed, as did Kreisky's experiment to have a conciliatory influence on the hitherto terrorist Palestinian Liberation Organization and its leader, Yasser Arafat. Austria's relations with the Communist regimes fluctuated between genuine attempts at improving the human rights situation behind the Iron Curtain and trade interests. The same Kreisky, who struggled to improve the fate of imprisoned human rights activists in the USSR, later let Solidarność leaders know that Polish workers should deliver coal rather than fight for democracy. From 1956 to 1991, Austria became notorious for visiting or receiving Communist leaders who had just slaughtered civilians and suppressed uprisings.

Displaying a firm grasp of the events, Cede and Prosl's interpretation of historical developments mostly confirms standard narratives. Remarkably, Austria's relations with its postwar protector, the United States, are described as “ambivalent” and the ones with Austria's most important trading partner, West Germany, as “complicated,” while the certainly no less ambivalent and complicated relationship with the USSR is not characterized at all in the title of the respective chapter. Nonetheless, this book is to be commended for its frank and critical approach. Indeed such an approach is appropriate with regard to Austrian acquiescence with Communist violations of international law or suppression of civilians, or to Kreisky turning a blind eye to the dubious credentials of Palestinian, Libyan, Iranian, and Nicaraguan leaders. The book openly states inconvenient truths, such as that Austria owes the long-awaited Soviet consent to the State Treaty, at least in part, to West Germany's decision to join NATO and that Austria's “permanent neutrality” is not “eternal,” as often claimed. In contrast to its legal obligation to defend its neutrality “with all means,” Austria relies on NATO and the United States for its security and contributes rather little to European defense, while often demanding other states’ “solidarity.” Neither does the book avoid provocative questions such as whether Austria has a foreign strategy today and what Austria's “added value” to international politics might be. This compact, balanced, reliable, and thought-provoking interpretation will be an indispensable introduction for all students of Austrian foreign policy.