In Human Rights and Global Governance, William Meyer, professor of political science and international relations at the University of Delaware, applies the idea of global governance to internationally recognized human rights. He considers the concept of global governance a theory rather than a phrase that summarizes a multifaceted effort to manage international problems in the absence of global government. If so, his is a static theory rather than a dynamic one—it is a way of looking at world affairs to organize information rather than a set of if-then hypotheses capable of prediction. In fact, he claims that social scientists should not be in the business of predicting (p. 211). If we find more populist or nativist national governments, does this mean then that we should not predict more hard times for universal human rights?

To examine his subject Meyer chooses six case studies across three areas of concern: “the dispossessed,” “markets,” and “war and peace” (p. 3). His cases focus on “the Pinochet precedent” and “indigenous rights”; “corporate social responsibility” and “labor rights and development”; and “torture, terror, and unjust wars” and “human rights treaties and the pacific interregnum.” One could debate endlessly which sets of rights to emphasize, but these serve his purposes reasonably well: they seem a reasonable sample of universal human rights today. Both “the Pinochet precedent” and the focus on “torture, terror, and unjust wars” deal with torture and forced disappearances, but that is a minor quibble. The cases are mostly well researched, with clear writing and organization. Undergraduate students can certainly learn much about human rights from his core chapters.

Meyer’s concluding chapter will be especially useful in courses oriented to matters of concepts and theories. He attempts to summarize his case studies into two models of global governance: the first he calls “synergy” and the second “institution building” (summarized on p. 195). The first combines “symbiosis” of different actors; the second emphasizes the construction of both norms and organizations. He then considers examples of successes and failures of each model of action. His models cannot explain in general why there are successes and failures; for that, one has to return to the particulars of his case studies. His models are static, intended to organize general observations and hence are theoretical in that sense; they are not dynamic, with a theory or theories of why change does or does not occur.

There is much to debate about these models, and a short review like this is not the place to go into great detail about them. National action concerning Pinochet and torture in Chile, initiated by a Spanish official who wanted him extradited for trial there and then approved by British decision makers (who later sent him back to Chile), is said to be a matter of Model I. National debate concerning the legal liability of corporations for links to human rights violations abroad, as in the US Supreme Court, is said to be a matter of Model II. One difference between the two cases is that the Pinochet debate occurred in light of the established international legal principle of universal jurisdiction for torture. There is no clear international norm about corporate legal liability for links to human rights violations in foreign jurisdictions. The conflicting views in SCOTUS were about how to interpret a national statute. Yet both processes involved national political and legal processes, rather than recourse to more centralized international bodies like the UN Security Council or the International Criminal Court.

Similarly, Meyer considers the campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines as an example of Model I behavior (synergy), but the Ottawa Treaty banning such mines as part of Model II action (institutions), as if the two should be separated. Readers will have to decide whether these kinds of theoretical distinctions are helpful. On the matter of the Supreme Court, corporations, and human rights abroad, for example, those interested have a choice between Meyer’s case study cum theory, multiple law review articles, and some analysis by social scientists (e.g., David P. Forsythe and Patrice C. McMahon, American Exceptionalism Reconsidered, 2017, ch. 5).

Three decades ago Ernst B. Haas published a book with a detailed theory of human rights change in international relations (When Knowledge Is Power, 1990). Haas was one of the leading scholars of international relations in his time, yet his theory of human rights evolution is rarely cited by anyone these days. Only time will tell the fate of Meyer’s preferred term “global governance,” which may be like “regime” or “integration.” Such terms come into general usage, and then social scientists try to build theories around them. Some time ago Haas helped lead the journal International Organization in a more theoretical direction with an emphasis on regimes and integration, largely driven by developments related to the European Union. Some of those dissatisfied with all this theoretical complexity about what Leon Gordenker used to call “organized international relations” started the journal Global Governance to return to a focus on less theoretical studies. But a strong trend remains in the social sciences to build complicated theories or models and test them with statistics or other empirical evidence. Scholars remain divided on the utility of these competing approaches.

Meyer, going beyond his models, concludes by observing that global governance is here to stay, although it is facing short-term pressures and is driven by economic globalization (p. 210). Building on the insights of the philosopher Michael Walzer, he ultimately devises a list of desirable policies leading to a global pluralism that improves the status quo (p. 217). His first suggestion is that the United States should become a full member of the International Criminal Court. He believes such policies related to global governance can be implemented in the coming generation. This reviewer finds his timeline optimistic.

Overall the book represents solid research, much knowledge, and considerable creativity. It fits with the mainstream social science effort to construct some kind of overarching “theory” for the general understanding of its subject matter. Whether Meyer’s two models of global governance actually advance our general understanding and are thus endorsed and refined by other scholars of international relations—and prove superior to other approaches—will be interesting to see.