I.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church (39), referring to the First Vatican Council's dogmatic decree, Dei Filius, which deals among other matters with the ability of the human mind to come to a knowledge of the existence of God, states,

In the first place, the Church is here making an assertion about the capacities of human reason. But since the Church is engaged not merely in communicating a vague theism, but in preaching the Gospel of Jesus Christ, this assertion also necessarily raises theological questions, particularly about the possibility of communicating the Gospel to the entire world. We are faced with two interrelated questions, then, the first about “the ability of human reason to know God,” and the second about the dogmatic proclamation of the Gospel.

Although we can speak of the human intellect in general, since human nature is the same in each member of the human species, the actual exercise of our intellectual powers is shaped and conditioned by the various human cultures with their variety of languages, traditions and ways of attempting to express truth. Therefore our two questions have two further ramifications in that both of them concern not just the capacities of the intellect considered in itself, but human cultures and languages as well. These questions involve both philosophy and theology, as well as the data provided by other human sciences, such as sociology and history. Moreover there is need of a philosophy that is aware of revealed truth and open to the insights of revelation, even while still remaining philosophy.Footnote ¹

In historical context the statement from the Catechism points primarily toward the philosophic tradition associated with Thomas Aquinas. That is, it was on the basis of his thought that the Church, especially at the First Vatican Council, claimed “the possibility of speaking about [God] to all men and with all men.” But a question may be raised here: Aside from any specifically philosophic objection to the use of Thomism, are we not privileging Western culture as such, tying the Church and Christian thought to one particular culture? However, there is no question here of the Church attempting to privilege Western culture as such, that is, we are not concerned with the Christian civilization that arose in Europe in its totality. We must carefully distinguish the Church's appropriation and use of elements of European civilization, a civilization of course that the Church herself helped create, from an approval of every aspect of that civilization either in the past or especially today. To affirm that the Church asserts a universal value for elements of her own philosophical tradition has absolutely nothing to do with attempts, political or otherwise, to claim a universality for the West as a whole. The Church's concern here is with human reason, not with Western culture as such. Thus this concern is both more limited and more fundamental: the ability of the human mind to know reality, specifically the existence of God, and to understand, despite cultural differences, the fundamentals of the Christian revelation. How and whether that is possible will be the subject of my argument.

II.

In what is arguably the central Christian intellectual tradition we have a basis for philosophical exchange even across the boundaries of cultures in that “the Thomistic approach enables one to dialogue with all other human beings on the basis of human reason to determine what is the moral good for society” as well as other matters.Footnote ² Any assertion that we can “dialogue with all other human beings” must be ultimately based, as far as philosophy is concerned, on the facts of biology which force upon us the truth that the human race is a unity. If this is so, then it would seem to follow that the human mind everywhere in the world has essentially the same capacities, and that any apparent differences are the result of the formation of those minds by the very different cultures of the world. So if on the basis of biology, not to mention revelation, we can agree that the human race is fundamentally one, then a philosophy that takes human reason as such, and reason's ability to discover truth, for its starting points can be a means “to dialogue with all other human beings.”

But is such a contention still tenable? And if so, how? Can we overcome either the existence of various cultural modes of expression or of the limits of human language itself? Without denying that a philosopher, like anyone else, is marked by a cultural origin, can philosophical statements notwithstanding ever be transcultural? Or, to put it another way, is it possible that a philosophy which arose in a particular culture nevertheless is essentially an expression of the human intellect as such? There are certainly thinkers who believe that philosophy either cannot be universal, or at least that up to now it has not achieved that status. For example, the philosophical movement known as Universalism is an intellectual enterprise that claims to be a metaphilosophy, and as such to transcend the limitations of any Western philosophy.Footnote ³ But it seems to me that at the outset one can offer an objection in the form of a dilemma to such a project. Either any possible philosophy claiming to be a metaphilosophy will be enunciated by one or more persons, all of whom were formed intellectually within particular cultures, in which case one is hard put to understand why the same cultural limitations which other philosophies supposedly suffer from will not apply to this project; or, if this is avoided, we are left with an enterprise that seeks to somehow include all points of view in itself, which is the actual way that Universalism wants to proceed.

But since the many and various “religions, ideologies, and cultures of the world” hardly agree on very many points, one wonders what such a philosophy or metaphilosophy would look like in the concrete. Would we actually have a philosophy and would such a metaphilosophy actually say anything? Thomism, at least, would hardly deny the many insights and truths which have been enunciated by the most diverse intellectual traditions or cultures.Footnote ⁵ It is not the case, as some supporters of Universalism appear to think, that one must either support something such as Universalism or else affirm the goodness of the contemporary West or of Western culture in general.Footnote ⁶ The fact that Greek philosophy developed in a European cultural context does not mean that that philosophy is indelibly marked with all the cultural traits that existed or exist in Europe. It must be judged on its own merits as an exercise of the human mind.

Moreover, if we try to deny the possibility of communication across cultural boundaries on the basis of the multiplicity of languages or cultures we involve ourselves in other initial difficulties. For we must either regard our denial as addressed to the rest of mankind indiscriminately, and thus comprehensible by them despite cultural differences, or as the speech of a uniquely privileged portion of mankind, those who can talk about others, while those others cannot comprehend or talk about us. And indeed, our very efforts to understand the approaches of the most diverse cultures, even if imperfect, show that we do not in principle regard culture or language as an impassable barrier for the human intellect.

Aside, moreover, from any criticisms of intellectual constructs such as Universalism, we have the fundamental point to consider that I have already mentioned. This is the obvious fact that all human persons are the same things, the same species, all endowed with essentially the same capacities. This certainly argues for a common ability to discover truth, however differently cultures have understood the most diverse matters through the centuries. Indeed, this key point seems to be conceded by at least some of the supporters of Universalism itself.

My argument, though, is that we can say the same thing about philosophy, that it is a product of the human mind, or human experience, as such, even though, historically speaking, a philosophy that gives expression to the essential human intellectual powers came to maturity only in Europe. Although there is no denying the existence of a rich tradition of speculative thought outside of the European cultural orbit, still we can reasonably maintain that this is not philosophy in the strict sense, at least not metaphysics. “In Oriental civilization, specially in Chinese, Japanese and Korean culture, there was no room to think in an abstract way,” and “Metaphysics seems to be the domain of the Western mind.”Footnote ⁸ Earlier Jacques Maritain had said much the same thing in the following words:

So in the first place we can assert that Europe was unique as the sole possessor of metaphysics.Footnote ¹⁰ But if the European philosophical tradition is correct, it is precisely by means of metaphysics that we can transcend appearances and approach to the being of things. Without this, genuine abstract thought cannot exist.

The Church's appropriation of the heritage of Greek thought cannot be regarded as an accident, but as part of the providence of God. As John Paul II stated in his encyclical Fides et Ratio,

Not only is the Church in possession of a philosophy which is able to attain and describe reality, but the Church has used concepts and terms taken from this philosophy in formulating her theology and even defining her dogmas to such an extent that to abandon this would be to undo the entire intellectual fabric of Christian thought.

In the light of these considerations, then, we can understand the Church's confidence in “the ability of human reason to know God” and “in the possibility of speaking about him to all men and with all men.” We can rightly call the tradition of thought that makes this possible Thomism, not because after St. Thomas that tradition ceased to develop or to refine or to correct itself, but because after Aristotle he was a second founder of the tradition and preserved and refined its fundamental structure, a structure that corresponds to and reflects reality itself. This philosophic tradition, even though it developed within one culture, is the common property and heritage of mankind as a whole, since it reflects essential human factors and intellectual powers, not accidents of culture. In this way the unity of the human intellect reflects the unity of humanity itself and allows us to speak about God and man, about nature and every other matter of interest “to all men and with all men.”

III.

If what I have said about philosophy and the human intellect is correct, what can we say further about the proclamation of the Gospel as a whole? For here we are dealing not just with a way of thinking that may reasonably be seen as among the “essentially human experiences,” but with a complex message that goes well beyond simply the postulates of reason. Is it possible to speak to other cultures about such matters?

One may reasonably argue from the parting words of our Lord, “Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you…” (Matthew 28:19–20), not to mention the actual historical record, that it is possible to communicate the Gospel to the entire human race. Indeed, as Pope Benedict noted, “Christians of the nascent Church…saw their faith as belonging, not to cultural custom that differs from one people to another, but to the domain of truth, which concerns all people equally.”Footnote ¹¹ But philosophically how can we understand or justify this?

At the outset we must make an important distinction. This is the profound difference between speaking to those who are committed to a religion which claims its origin in a historical revelation from God and those whose religion is ultimately based on tradition, however venerable, and cannot point to specific times or events when a divine communication to mankind is alleged. With adherents of the first type there is in principle no fundamental difficulty. If Catholics can show the credibility of the divine revelation in Jesus Christ made to his Church, this is, again in principle, a sufficient means of demonstrating the truth of the Gospel. Since truth cannot contradict itself, only one such revelation can be true, or at least final. It is a question of investigating the historical credibility of what purports to be a revelation from God.

But only within the Jewish, Christian and Muhammadan traditions is a claim of this sort made. The rest of the religions of humanity we may classify as various forms of paganism.Footnote ¹² As a result, their fundamental approach to truth questions concerning God or the gods may be summarized in these statements of a modern Hindu. “Many sects professing many different beliefs live within the Hindu fold,” and “Hinduism is wholly free from the strange obsession of some faiths that the acceptance of a particular religious metaphysic is necessary for salvation…” or, “[Hinduism] did not regard it as its mission to convert humanity to any one opinion.”Footnote ¹³ The same may be said about classical Mediterranean paganism, for example, which certainly contained a wealth of sometimes contradictory tales about gods, but never insisted that these were true, even if they were widely believed by some sectors of the population. Paganism thus contains a relativism or skepticism since it cannot justify itself by appeal to a divine communication. Pagans are apt to regard the Christian revelation as simply another religious story which can be adopted along with other such stories according to the taste of the devotee.Footnote ¹⁴

Such an approach is clearly unsatisfactory to a Christian. How then has the Church been able to speak to those cultures which are accustomed to regard teachings about the divine as in the end so many poetic speculations of the human mind? One method that was used as early as Apostolic times, and moreover has received the endorsement of the dogmatic teaching of the Church, is illustrated in Holy Scripture in the account of St. Paul's journey to Athens in Acts chapter 17. As a first step in speaking to the Athenians, Paul appeals to their own ideas and writings about religious matters, mentioning an altar inscribed, “To an unknown god” (v. 23). He then continues, “What therefore you worship as unknown, this I proclaim to you,” proceeding after that to quote favorably from the literature of their own poets (v. 28). But then he goes on to make a concrete historical claim, one that could not possibly be misunderstood or explained away as simply human speculation. “The times of ignorance God overlooked, but now he commands all men everywhere to repent, because he has fixed a day on which he will judge the world in righteousness by a man whom he has appointed, and of this he has given assurance to all men by raising him from the dead” (vv. 30–31). The raising of someone from the dead is obviously a supernatural event, that is, an event which cannot be accomplished by the natural powers of visible creation, in fact a miracle. The response of Paul's hearers, though unfavorable for the most part, does show that they understood Paul was making a definite factual claim about something to which the actual evidence of our eyes and touch could bear witness. And it is likewise to miracles, as well as to the fulfillment of prophecy, that the First Vatican Council points as “most certain signs of divine revelation and adapted to the intelligence of all.”Footnote ¹⁵ Thus even to those shaped by cultures and intellectual traditions which are not accustomed to make strict truth claims for their religious speculation, concrete statements about miracles, and particularly about our Lord's resurrection, coupled with Christ's assertion of his own divinity, present the claims of the Church in such a way that they can be understood, at least sufficiently to be accepted or rejected.Footnote ¹⁶

On the other hand, paganism, however, because of its very inability to point to a specific event which is claimed as a divine communication, can sometimes willingly yield to those who do make such a claim. The account in the Venerable Bede of the encounter of the missionary St. Paulinus with King Edwin of Northumbria illustrates this. The King, who was already inclined to embrace the Faith, wished to “confer about it with his principal friends and counsellors, to the end that if they also were of his opinion, they might all together be cleansed in Christ the Fountain of life.” One of the king's counselors spoke in this way.

The royal counselor was aware that he could not justify his own traditional practices by either an appeal to a definite revelation or by arguments from reason. Therefore he is ready to accept a faith that can make such an appeal and which “contains something more certain” than the tales which were handed down by his own forefathers. Thus a pagan culture presents a situation which can be resolved in various ways, depending on historical and other factors.

IV.

The question we will consider in this next section is that of the evangelization of entire cultures rather than of individuals, and what that says about the human ability to communicate and receive new religious ideas across cultural boundaries. Now historically most of the expansion of the Faith has been at the expense, so to speak, of traditional paganism and, especially in earlier centuries, this was done not piecemeal by individual conversions, but by conversion en masse, or at least by the acceptance of Christian faith by the rulers and elites, usually followed by a more or less voluntary acceptance by the rest of the population. We already saw one instance of that in the account from St. Bede quoted above. Let us look at Christopher Dawson's reflections on the actual historical process.

Historically much of the evangelization of Europe, and to some degree of Spanish America and elsewhere, was accomplished, or at least begun, in this manner. What does this say about the ability to transcend cultures in communicating complex systems of religious ideas? How does it differ from a single individual's reception of ideas which originated in another cultural milieu?

Before considering that, however, let us briefly dispose of the question whether such mass conversions necessarily involved an unjust forcing of consciences. We must distinguish between actual coercion in religion, which is always wrong, and the legitimate power of a culture to shape a society and those who live within it. One result of the individualistic society in which Western man has lived since about the eighteenth century is that we assume the isolated and autonomous decisions of the individual are the only possible or legitimate basis of thought or social life. But in fact this is a largely a fiction. Every culture shapes those who live within it to one degree or another and most people do not seriously question the fundamental assumptions of their society. My point here is that it is not correct to posit the extremes of, on the one hand, intellectual coercion or, on the other, deliberate and considered choice as the only options. Rather, there is a continuum and the experience of most people is found somewhere between the two extremes. It is true, of course, that a conversion made for intellectual reasons, in the teeth it may be of all contrary cultural pressure, is both possible and laudable. One who is accustomed to intellectual reflection can hardly otherwise embrace the Faith. But this is not the situation of most people at most times. I reiterate that forced or coerced conversions are always wrong. But we should not regard our only options as the forcible conversion of a tribe or nation, on the one hand, or on the other, individual conversions without reference to the culture. The conversion of a culture need not involve the forced conversion of its inhabitants. It means rather the beginning of the conversion of the political and cultural milieu, the framework in which people live their lives and attempt to make sense of their experiences and environment. It is doubtless historically true that in most such cases, even without the pressure of law, the population would have sought baptism, would have sought to follow what they saw as the superior guidance of their rulers.Footnote ¹⁹ Is this wrong? I do not think so, at least not necessarily or in every case. For we will err if we expect the traditional peasant in a pagan society to behave as the product of universal education of the last century is said to, for it is obvious that the approach of each to truth questions was very different.Footnote ²⁰ The assertion of individual opinion, informed or not, is characteristic of modern Western liberal civilization. The Internet, by means of which anyone can voice his views, however absurd, on any topic, is simply the logical endpoint of this civilization. But traditional pagan societies, which were wont to justify their practices simply by an appeal to what their fathers had done, was something very different. As we proceed with our discussion this will become more clear.

Our question, then, concerns the adoption by one culture of ideas, specifically religious ideas, which originated in and developed within another culture or cultures. Although many instances of such cultural adoption have occurred, we want to understand what this means and how such ideas can be transplanted, so to speak, from one culture into another. As we saw in the case of St. Paulinus and the king of Northumbria, whatever cultural renewal might later occur as a result of this corporate conversion, at first we have simply the beginnings of the conversion of the cultural and political milieu, the framework in which people live their lives and attempt to make sense of their experiences and environment. What in fact happens in such cases? I think we can understand this process better if we reflect on some words of John Paul II in the encyclical Centesimus Annus (no. 24).

When, because of the conversion of a society's rulers or other cultural leaders, its way “of facing the question of the meaning of personal existence” changes, culture change must also begin, and this obviously will affect individuals in their own personal beliefs and ways of acting, sooner or later. The heart of the culture has been changed or is beginning to be changed and necessarily this must have effects throughout the culture. Instead of a single individual having to step outside his traditional way of understanding – an act perhaps nearly impossible in some circumstances – now the integrating principle of the culture is changed at one instant. It is no longer necessary for individuals to do this alone. No doubt confusion and imperfect understanding persist, perhaps even for some time, but the culture is now changing and individuals are able to change with it. Indeed, to resist the change now requires a specific act, an act that often was tantamount to a political revolt, since religion was not seen as merely a private affair.Footnote ²¹ This understanding of the shaping role of culture explains the Church's awareness of the necessity for evangelizing not only individuals, but cultures. Pope Paul VI, in the apostolic exhortation Evangelii nuntiandi (December 8, 1975), wrote,

Thus when a culture is evangelized there is created at least some subtle pressure of persuasion upon the minds of men. The Faith is no longer something entirely alien, something whose claims had previously been unable to be considered, at least by most people. But now, with a culture beginning to reflect in its practices a new way of approaching God, that new way suddenly or gradually makes an appeal of some kind. Individual conversions do then occur, with varying degrees of awareness and sincerity, to be sure. But such an embrace of the Church's Faith should not be regarded as ipso facto inauthentic, unless we reject the actual means by which our ancestors did receive the Gospel. In fact, one can say similar things about many who were raised within the Church regarding their understanding of doctrine and the kind of commitment they make to the Church's Faith.

Of course, I do not intend to disparage explicit intellectual adherence to Catholic belief or genuine intellectual conversions. An intellectual can hardly hold or embrace the Faith in any other way. Rather I simply point out the fact that both today and in the past this has not been the situation for most Catholics, or for adherents of other religions either.

In fact, this very process occurs today, but as part of the process of de-christianization. The loss of the Christian framework for interpreting reality tends to work the loss of faith by individuals, so that the de-evangelization of a culture proceeds in much the same way as its evangelization.

So much the more is this the case when Christian cultural practices are no longer even “an omnipresent landscape in the culture,” which is the case today in many formerly Christian locales. Over eighty years ago Hilaire Belloc wrote the following about France.

The christianization of European cultures usually began with the effective establishment of a new cultural framework, one which understood and interpreted reality according to the Church's faith.

So in an opposite manner proceeds the de-christianization of Europe. But in each case, the effective conversion of the culture allows the easy adoption by individuals of the new religious – or anti-religious – outlook. In both cases people need not look outside their culture for a new understanding of existence, for the culture itself provides this new understanding. Although in the past resistence to the new cultural understanding was difficult for most people, since it often required an armed revolt, today one can essentially choose which cultural world one inhabits. Culture remains the framework in which we understand the world, but the existence of competing frameworks means the existence of competing cultures. Why individuals choose one or the other is beyond the scope of this article, but cultural boundaries clearly still affect the communication of ideas. But at the end of our considerations, what does the philosopher conclude? What is his task and what contribution can he make beyond that of the historian or sociologist? I will briefly address that in the next section.

V.

The mission of the Church to preach the Gospel to all peoples and cultures continues until the end of time. But it is no secret that within what was once Christendom a theological and philosophical relativism, naturally hostile or indifferent to such preaching, is now the rule.Footnote ²⁵ This has come about not from a process of rigorous argumentation but – one must be frank – because of changing intellectual fashions.Footnote ²⁶ The task of the philosopher in this is modest but perhaps essential: It is to reassert and justify the truth that cultural barriers do not and cannot constitute a definitive bar to speaking about God or to understanding and receiving the Gospel. The unity of mankind, the essential sameness of the human intellect, our ability to communicate truths despite differences of language or culture – all these questions philosophy can fruitfully address. At the same time the philosopher can point out that a change in the integrating principle of a culture naturally will begin to work changes in individuals. At times this will benefit the Church's mission, at times the opposite. Philosophy, while appropriating the data of history and sociology, can only address the essential question of the legitimacy of communication of meaning across cultures and of the legitimacy of the individual's response to a changing culture. Philosophy discovers reality and tries to understand it, but does not create it. The fact that both today and in the past people embraced a new faith or lost their faith without being fully conscious of that is simply a fact of human experience. Those charged with communicating religious truth must recognize and work with this reality. Meanwhile, philosophy has performed its task in the matter if it can help to vindicate the essential point, “the ability of human reason to know God [and] the possibility of speaking about him to all men and with all men….”