Book reviews for The Journal of Pension Economics and Finance reflect reviewers' own views and in no way represent the views of the institution(s) with which they are affiliated.
In 1976, Peter Drucker, one of the great management theorists and keen observers of political-economic events, wrote a little-known book entitled The Unseen Revolution. In that 205-page treasure, he predicted the rise of pension ownership and power in American society, and it was one of his most prescient works. Exactly 30 years later, his message and themes have been updated and repackaged in The New Capitalists, by three highly experienced pension and corporate governance practitioners, Stephen Davis, Jon Lukomnik and David Pitt-Watson. These authors offer a fluid and well-organized description of how pension power in the 21st century is transforming the relationship between public corporations and their pension fund owners. This book also introduces a new lexicon to its readers including the “circle of accountability” that integrates the interests of tens of millions of workers and retirees as individual shareowners (the “new capitalists”), through institutional investors, with the interests of boards of directors, corporations, and corporate executives.
The authors see a great transformation occurring from a conventional to a “civil economy,” in which arrays of institutions foster economic dynamism in conjunction with democratic accountability. In fact, the authors call for establishing fair competition by shifting the focus to sustainable, long-term corporate performance backed by new civil economy metrics and reporting standards, while insisting that corporations gain profit without shifting expenses to society as a whole. In boldly redefining the purpose of the corporation in the context of a “civil economy,” they spell out their recommendations to corporate boards in a 10-point “New Capitalist Manifesto” (what would Karl Marx think?). These will resonate with most stakeholders in the civil economy, because these rules of engagement exude common sense and fair play.
This volume identifies many of the dangerous conflicts and market distortions that threaten the very survival of pension funds today. In this, the book would be a viable selection for a college or MBA course on the role of the modern corporation in society. The authors speak to an “ecosystem of information moguls,” namely credit agencies, investment banks, and other market intermediaries, that prevent transparency and personify the agency costs identified first by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. The breakdown of traditional accounting standards witnessed in Enron and WorldCom and the recent debacle in the world credit markets and the conflicted role of the credit agencies comes to mind. The authors also suggest, wisely, that the new capitalists must undergo self-evaluation. Pension funds have not been paragons of the best-practice governance expected of corporations. Pension management and governance needs to become a major priority, setting a good example for the civil economy. In recent years several academic programs have begun to provide teaching and research support for best-practice pension management. Pension funds can also exert their role in the global economy in terms of regulating capital markets and preempting market dislocations that can endanger pension benefit security and distort income distribution.
In their next book, the authors must wrestle with some threats to their new capitalist vision. Second-pillar retirement systems cannot survive in their current form. Traditional defined benefit pensions face extinction, but defined contribution plans fail the sustainability test because they defy the lessons of behavioral economics. Society must renegotiate new risk-sharing pension arrangements and rules that promote an alignment of stakeholder interests, if they are to be a financially sustainable component of a new social contract. If pension funds disappear, it is unclear what institution can step in to enforce economic dynamism and democratic accountability.
