After decades of civil war in Sudan, a peace was brokered in 2005 between two principal parties to the conflict: the Northern ruling government, the NCP, and the main Southern Sudan political party, the SPLM. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement intended to facilitate peace and set out a process for South Sudanese self-determination, the outcome of which was a near-unanimous vote in the South for independence, which was achieved on 9 July 2011. Yet despite delivering the objective of self-determination, John Young argues here that the CPA and its implementation has brought to power a regime in the South that only serves to replicate the repression and marginalisation of citizens that the South experienced in a unified Sudan.

Young's book is the first comprehensive retrospective evaluation of the peace process, the decades leading up to its signing, and the legacy of the CPA. It brings to light the opinion informally held by many throughout this process, providing a measure of relief from the inertia that stifled public debate in the years leading to independence. Young contends that the CPA failed to deliver peace because it focused on a relationship between two power brokers, rather than addressing the underlying centre–periphery dynamics that span across Sudan from the South, to Darfur, to the Nuba Mountains, to the East. In essence, the CPA missed the point entirely. Because the CPA so completely failed to manage this broad-based marginalisation, Young argues that the legacy of this agreement leaves little scope for an inclusive democratic transformation in North or South. Because the nature of the conflict was about the exclusion of the margins across the country, a solution was unlikely to be viable if it did not include those margins into the central political landscape.

International peacemakers, according to Young, were keen to assure the success of the CPA, which to their minds rested heavily on a liberal peace agenda that allowed for the right to self-determination, and dealt less with the more nuanced issues around enabling conditions for a broader peace. This allowed for much to go overlooked during the CPA period – citizens were insufficiently informed on the implications of secession versus unity, and the militaristic, authoritative leadership of the SPLM/A under John Garang was largely ignored behind the rhetoric of inclusion. As a result of the misplaced focus of the CPA, and the international support it received, Young observes that it is no wonder the South upon independence has resisted the very democratic reforms the peace processes and its backers were trying to establish.

Whilst presenting a fresh and compelling take on this complex and protracted conflict, Young's book will not be without critique. Main concerns will likely argue two principal points: that there was no real will on any side for any alternative – that this was the only practical option, and that self-determination in itself is a sufficient aim. These are both important questions for peace processes in Sudan and globally. In examining these positions, it will be useful to investigate whether the CPA itself, which remains largely unimplemented, was in fact a practical if imperfect solution. It will also be beneficial to consider this context in the broader debate on ethnic self-determination, balancing this right against issues of peace, development and justice.

Though the book makes a strong case against the CPA, the reader cannot help but want more detail on possible alternatives. Young's major assertion implies that a democratic transformation may have been feasible in Sudan, but he does not sufficiently detail what that might have entailed. He does, however, explore why conditions have not led to a broad-based domestic political uprising that may have resulted in regime change and his continual referral to this broader Sudanese context outside the CPA is one of the book's main strengths.

His work would also be better served by further exploring the root causes of the conflict, though these are highlighted, and elaborating on what might be done better and differently going forward, an issue which is relegated to brief closing remarks. In the end Young provides an exemplary critique of the CPA, but does little to give us detailed, promising, politically viable alternatives, perhaps because Young's optimism for Sudan has been defeated.

Young adds a considerable new chapter to the discussion on the Sudans. His strong contextual knowledge and accessible language, as well as the courage of his candour, will provide stimulus for introspection on the CPA and, indeed, the fate of Sudan, so that future interventions in Sudan, South Sudan and beyond, might, given the will of those involved, benefit from this experience. Young is careful not to extrapolate lessons too far: the nuance of conflict varies greatly across contexts. But the book serves as a reminder to critically check assumptions, to look behind the rhetoric, to invest in understanding before advocating a rigid path forward. Young's book is a compelling and important indictment of the current state of peace-building and our inability, in the face of unfolding failure, to stand up and change course.