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Can Anyone Stop the President? Power Asymmetries and Term Limits in Latin America, 1984–2016

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Javier Corrales*
Affiliation:
Amherst College. jcorrales@amherst.edu
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Abstract

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Since the late twentieth century, numerous Latin American nations have launched efforts to relax presidential term limits, often successfully. This article discusses the conditions under which countries succeed in relaxing term limits. Drawing from bargaining models and reviewing 36 cases, it makes three arguments. First, actors' preferences are fairly predictable on the basis of officeholding: presidents are the most prominent actors pushing for expansion of term limits; opposition parties lead the resistance. Second, power asymmetry, measured by presidential approval ratings, is the best predictor of success, better than ideology or share of seats in Congress. Third, the only hope for stopping popular presidents rests with ruling parties and the courts, but only when the latter are sufficiently independent.

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Type
Research
Copyright
Copyright © University of Miami 2016
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