Held since 1956, the Eurovision Song Contest is an annual event traditionally dedicated to the eternal themes of love, peace, and harmony. Yet Israelis asked to pick a song for the 2007 contest in Helsinki paid little heed to these themes. Instead, they settled for “Push the Button,” a controversial number by an Israeli punk group called Teapacks; the song is generally understood as a description of life under the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran with its “crazy rulers.”Footnote 1 Meanwhile, an Israeli fashion house (Dan Cassidy) commissioned a series of photos at a construction site in southern Tel Aviv that showed a topless model lying in a pit. The project was designed as a warning against the “holocaust” that would follow Iran's possible nuclear attack on Israel; the pit, as the project's creative director explained, represented “the mass grave of complacent Tel Aviv residents.”Footnote 2
These are merely two vivid expressions of the acute Iranophobia that has taken hold of the Israeli public sphere in recent years. With some notable exceptions,Footnote 3 this phobia has been disseminated by leading Israeli scholars, journalists, and politicians who argue that, should Iran be allowed access to weapons of mass destruction, the “nuclear ayatollahs” will quickly turn them against Israel so as to achieve their apocalyptic ambitions. “With a country the size and shape of Israel . . . probably four or five hits will suffice. No more Israel,” predicts historian Benny Morris. He adds, “A million or more Israelis . . . will die immediately. Millions will be seriously irradiated. No Iranian will see or touch an Israeli. It will be quite impersonal.”Footnote 4 The Israeli public has taken these doomsday scenarios seriously: a recent poll found that 71 percent of Israelis believe that the United States should launch a “preemptive” strike against Iran if diplomatic efforts fail to halt Tehran's nuclear program.Footnote 5
Needless to say, there are many good reasons why the Jewish state should be apprehensive of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the course of just one year—2006—Israel fought a war with the Iranian-backed Hizbullah on its northern border; saw the election of Hamas, another Iranian-backed organization, in the Palestinian territories; and watched the growing influence of Iran in Iraq. All the while Iran has kept up its Israel-threatening rhetoric (and Israel has reciprocated in kind) and is suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons capability with contempt for international opposition. As a result, “a rising tide of anxiety at the Iranian threat is afflicting Israelis at all levels.”Footnote 6 Nonetheless, there is something utterly irrational and exceedingly disproportionate in Israeli understandings of the Iranian threat—even if that threat is, in certain respects, very real.
In this article I inquire into the roots of Israeli perceptions of the Iranian threat. To do so, I relocate analysis from the realm of political–strategic issues, with which previous scholarship on Israel and Iran has been preoccupied, to the realm of culture.Footnote 7 Following works that read metropolitan and colonial cultures together, or contrapuntally, I emphasize the collapse of boundaries between Israel and Iran and view one history (Iranian) as both the condition and the effect of the other history (Israeli). By doing so, I demonstrate that Israeli perceptions of the Iranian threat have been connected to domestic constructs of identity and politics and fashioned on the basis of what Israelis believed to be the (dis)ordering of their society at home.
In the first section of the article I analyze various Israeli texts on Iran under the old monarchical regime, which appeared after the fall of the Shah in the 1979 revolution. These retrospective texts were often created by Israelis who had spent extended periods of time in the Shah's realm, either as state emissaries or as private entrepreneurs. Although I am aware that these texts cannot provide transparent access to the monarchical past—for, as Edward Said has noted, “there is no just way in which the past can be quarantined from the present”Footnote 8—they are likely to redirect attention to the kind of commonsense world that bonded Israel and Iran in the prerevolutionary era. This commonsense world was in keeping with the two states’ perceptions of themselves as outsiders in the Arab Middle East, as well as their desire to integrate their respective (Jewish and Iranian) populations into the Christian West. In addition, these retrospective texts show that the Jewish state's unqualified support for the Shah regime's oppressive modernity was firmly embedded in various colonial gestures, including the “bourgeois European evaluation of ‘unprogressive’ and ‘fanatical’ Islam that is required to be directly controlled for reasons of empire.”Footnote 9 As I argue, these aspects of Israeli–Iranian relations before the revolution at once complemented and outweighed many of the other (political, strategic, and economic) issues upon which the two states agreed.
In the second section of the article I demonstrate that Israel's perceptions of (and anxieties about) the Iranian threat cannot be sufficiently understood unless we keep in mind these conceptual mainstays of the Israeli–Iranian alliance before the revolution. While Israeli readings of monarchical Iran worked to reinforce self-images of the Jewish state as “the West,” the revolution and its aftermath equally worked to underline the precarious nature of these self-images. While the revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran showed the Shah regime to be “not even the replica of Europe, but its caricature,” to borrow from Franz Fanon's scathing critique of postcolonial ruling juntas,Footnote 10 they also brought to the fore the tensions, ambiguities, and contradictions in the process of demarcating and safeguarding Israeli society's Western character. Even if some of Israel's concerns with the Islamic republic may be justified, the anti-Iran phobias issuing from its public sphere should be examined within the context of heightened anxieties lest Iran's post-1979 realities turn out to be the Jewish state's dark future. In other words, manifestations of anti-Iran phobias in the Israeli public sphere are related not only to the emergence of a hostile Islamist regime in Iran, but also to the current and future direction of secular Zionism.
A “WONDROUS LOVE AFFAIR”: ISRAEL AND IRAN UNDER THE SHAH REGIME
To appease Arab states on the one hand and domestic opposition on the other hand, the Shah, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (reigned 1941–1979), conducted his relations with Israel under a thick veil of secrecy. He always refrained from granting the Jewish state more than de facto recognition.Footnote 11 Yet contacts between the two states intensified in various fields and reached what an Israeli expert described retrospectively as “a wondrous love affair” (roman mufla˒).Footnote 12 Indeed, as the same writer goes on to say, “Even if these relations were informal, their intimacy, scope and depth were extremely impressive.”Footnote 13
According to most scholarly accounts, apart from its concern for Iranian Jewry,Footnote 14 Israel's enchantment with Iran derived mainly from strategic and economic interests and considerations. Of the most importance, Iran was Israel's main partner in the strategic anti-Arab and anti-Soviet “alliance of the periphery.”Footnote 15 Accordingly, in the late 1950s Iran sought and obtained the assistance of the Israeli Mossad in building and administrating SAVAK (Sazeman-i Ettelaat va Amniyat-i Keshvar), the Shah's notorious secret police.Footnote 16 Then, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah undertook responsibility for ensuring peace and stability in the Persian Gulf region in accordance with the dictates of the “Nixon Doctrine.” As a result, Iran became a crucial export market for Israeli arms, about $500 million per year in the 1970s.Footnote 17
The literature further tells us that when the Shah embarked on his ambitious modernization programs in the 1960s, he became increasingly dependent on Israeli know-how in technology, transportation, construction, and agriculture. As a consequence, the initial security and intelligence alliances between the two countries expanded into sprawling business and financial initiatives that produced nice profits for Israeli companies and entrepreneurs.Footnote 18 It is little wonder that Eliezer (Geizi) Tsafrir, the Mossad's last resident agent in Iran before 1979, grieved over the “loss” of Iran in the revolution, saying that “if it were not for the fact that they destroyed the country, Iran could have been an excellent place to spend a few years in service.”Footnote 19 Tsafrir apparently agreed with what Benjamin Disraeli famously told his readers in Tancred, namely, that “the East is a career.”Footnote 20
Although these material aspects are crucial for understanding the Israeli–Iranian alliance before the revolution, they still fail to illuminate what drew Israel so powerfully to Iran under the Shah regime. After all, Iran was not the only Muslim state with a sizable Jewish community that cultivated strategic and economic ties with Israel: Turkey and Morocco are other examples. Nor was Iran the only Third World country that Israel ultimately “lost,” as its short-lived adventure in Africa during the 1960s demonstrates. However, as I have shown elsewhere,Footnote 21 Israel's relations with other Third World/Muslim countries have never evoked so much nostalgic reminiscing as Israel's relations with Iran under the old monarchical regime.
In order to understand what singled out Iran in the eyes of the Jewish state, we need to direct our attention to the cultural values at work in their bilateral relations. Much has already been said and written about the partitions and enclosures that designated the Jewish state as the forefront of Western, Judeo-Christian civilization in the Middle East—a “villa in the middle of the jungle,” in Ehud Barak's revealing image.Footnote 22 I suggest that Israel's enchantment with Iran under the Shah derived in no small part from that regime's analogous endeavor to shut itself off from the Arab Orient and to define the Iranian polity in classic Orientalist terms as Euro-American.Footnote 23
To achieve these ambitions, both states implemented colonial ideals of modernization, which involved the coercive secularization, or de-Orientalization, of their respective subjects, turning them into what anthropologist Stanley Diamond describes as “conscripts of civilization, not volunteers.”Footnote 24 In the Zionist case, the target communities were primarily exilic “Oriental” Jews—East Europeans (Ostjuden) and Middle Easterners (Mizrahim); they were to be molded in accordance with the image of Aryan masculinity, with a view of making them European in every respect except religion.Footnote 25 In the Iranian case, the Shah sought to progressively secularize religious identity into an autonomously conceived national identity by keeping with the 19th-century philological construct of the “Aryan hypothesis,” which designated Iran as part of the Indo-European family of nations.Footnote 26 Indeed, Aryanism had been a potent force in Iranian nationalism even before the Shah came to power.Footnote 27 However, as I have shown elsewhere,Footnote 28 the inculcation of Aryan identity became the highlight of the Shah's modernization programs in the 1960s and 1970s, the so-called White Revolution.Footnote 29
Thus, to varying degrees, both Israel and Iran at the time of the Shah were guided by political theologies with a strategic objective to transform Oriental subjects—Jews and Iranians, respectively—into deracinated replicas of Europeans, even while they remained affiliated to their own religious cultures. To paraphrase Gauri Viswanathan's analysis of religious conversion in colonial India, both Iran and Israel were committed to the idea of shading religious identity into the artificial fabrications of a secular Israel and a secular Iran, which were nonetheless made interchangeable with Jewish Israel and Muslim Iran. The two states were equally driven by the liberal, colonial idea of transforming their respective communities into nonreligious religious communities. The first sought to turn Israelis into “non-Jewish Jews,” and the latter sought to turn Iranians into “non-Muslim Muslims.”Footnote 30
Accepting the notion of “history” as a term referring to the Christian West was crucial in defining Jewish and Iranian identities as European and opposed to the Arab Orient. Each of the two states invoked a pre-Islamic, pre-Arab, and (purportedly) secular mythical past; interestingly, both these pasts stretched back to the great Persian Achaemenid Empire. In Israel's case, nationalist identity was constructed on the myth of return originating in the biblical narrative concerning Cyrus and EzraFootnote 31; in Iran's, it was built on the origin myth of the “Aryan hypothesis,” which encompassed the pre-Islamic imperial Persian past.Footnote 32
It goes without saying that many nationalist movements that developed in Asia and Africa embraced Eurocentrism as the informing principle in their constructions of history, and hence their “return to history” was necessarily to a Western context.Footnote 33 Yet for the most part this perception of history served as the basis for these movements’ resistance to European domination, which is another example of how “the legacy of Eurocentrism . . . continues to bedevil even its most ardent critics.”Footnote 34 In the cases of Israel and Iran, however, Eurocentric conceptualizations of history served as a means of joining—or “returning to”—all that was envisaged by the concept of “Euro-America.” If in the colonized world the objective was to dislodge “Euro-America” from the East, in Israel and Iran the objective was to implant the Western model and the Western image.
The “love affair” that characterized Israeli–Iranian relations before the revolution rested on mutually constitutive perceptions of each other as carriers of the Western mission to the Middle East. These shared perceptions of time, space, and civilization provided the essential condition for the various strategic, political, and financial contacts between Israel and monarchical Iran and not the other way around.Footnote 35
The so-called “alliance of the periphery” is a case in point. Devised by then prime minister David Ben Gurion and his close advisors after the Suez Crisis, its most immediate incentive was strategic, namely, to check Soviet advances in the Middle East and to curb the spread of Nasser's Pan-Arab ideology in Asia and Africa.Footnote 36 However, Israel's objective was far more ambitious: to delineate a de-Arabicized Middle East rearranged around non-Arab entities (such as Israel, Iran, Turkey, and even Ethiopia) that would be linked to each other, and to Israel, through their accommodation with the institutional logic of secular capitalist modernity. Particularly impressed with the Shah regime's inculcation of extreme anti-Arab, Aryan identity, Israel soon came to regard Iran as that alliance's “jewel in the crown.”Footnote 37 Cultivating relations with the Lebanese Christian Maronite community almost from the advent of the Zionist movement is beyond the scope of this article, but it falls neatly within this larger scheme. Constituted by the French colonial authorities as a people distinct from all others in the Orient—“one might say a European colony haphazardly cast into the midst of desert tribes,” as the French poet-traveler Alphonse de Lamartine contended in the 1830sFootnote 38—Israel also assigned the Maronite community an important role in its dream of a “new Middle East.”Footnote 39
Important as Israel's strategic, political, and economic interests may have been, monarchical Iran assumed a special place in Israeli imagination because it seemed to vindicate the innermost spatial, temporal, and civilizational assumptions of Zionist political theology. As both states shared a common space in the “imaginative geography of the ‘our land-barbarian land’ variety,”Footnote 40 Israel drew hope from Iran that its fantastic undertaking of constructing a Euro-American enclave in the heart of the Orient was a feasible task. Relating his experiences in Iran under the Shah regime, an Israeli immigration envoy noted with unabashed delight the proliferation of “the miniskirt model” among Iranian women, which he saw as clear indication that they “did not lag behind the Israelis and the Europeans.”Footnote 41
Support for my arguments can be further extracted from Israeli texts on monarchical Iran that appeared after the fall of the Shah. Aside from applauding the deposed and then-deceased Shah for having “taught [his subjects] the lessons of the twentieth century after having wallowed in the Middle Ages”Footnote 42 or for having “recognized the historical destiny linking [Iran to Israel] in their mutual confrontation with Arab pressure,”Footnote 43 what stands out distinctly in these texts is unqualified support for the Shah's oppressive modernity, a modernity that “betrayed every humanistic principle [which] modernity is supposed to represent.”Footnote 44 As will be seen, this endorsement of the Shah regime was rationalized by colonial gestures of various kinds, including the view that “collective suffering was often the price to be paid for historical progress.”Footnote 45
As mentioned, the texts I explore here were written after the fall of the Shah by Israelis who had spent time in Iran either as official emissaries or as private businessmen and entrepreneurs. Three memoirs deserve our immediate attention. The first is by Meir Ezri,Footnote 46 an Iranian-born Israeli who immigrated to Israel in the early 1950s only to be sent back to Iran in 1958 to “build bridges between the two states.” He remained there until 1973, first as chargé d'affaires and then as Israel's ambassador.Footnote 47 The second memoir is by Geizi Tsafrir,Footnote 48 who, as noted previously, headed the Mossad station in Tehran until (and even during) the 1979 revolution. The third memoir is by Ya˓kov Nimrodi,Footnote 49 who stayed in Iran for nearly twenty-five years, first as head of the Mossad station (1955–1959), then as military attaché and head of the Ministry of Defense delegation (1960–1969), and finally as a private businessman (1970–1979). During this last period, as Nimrodi himself stresses in his book, he established himself economically through lucrative financial ventures, including arms deals, with the Shah regime.Footnote 50
It is clear that these and other writers could not engage with (pre- and/or post-1979) Iran in an impartial way. In stark contrast to the prerevolutionary days, when they appeared in Iran as omnipotent figures, they are now denied entry into that country and can no longer influence the state of affairs there.Footnote 51 By using the genre of memoir—which is neither objective nor entirely fictitious—they seek to privilege their own historical roles in the Shah's realm, which, to their minds, was a land of endless opportunity now turned into a lost horizon.
However, what is at stake for these writers is more than nostalgia for bygone days of glory and power. Their main objective, which is never fully or consciously elaborated, is to exonerate the monarch from any wrongdoing that would account for the revolutionary movement. As a consequence, each casts his narrative as a tragedy—the story of Western “progress” overcome by a sinister and regressive revolution. Accordingly, they extol the virtues of a monarch who, although autocratic, was also enlightened and improved the lot of his people. The State of Israel and its emissaries also receive their share of praise for assisting the Shah in this noble task.
All the same, the authors end up implicating both royal despotism and themselves. As active players in Iranian history, they witnessed the Shah's political and social repression of his subjects, and some of them were even directly involved in it. However, even as narrators after the fact, they enthusiastically embrace the Shah regime's “Murderous Humanitarianism.”Footnote 52 Indeed, to their minds the suffering and grievances of the Shah's subjects and the injurious repercussions of his domestic policies on “Oriental” cultures and traditions were negligible when weighed against the implementation of such ideals as progress and civilization. In short, to these writers the Shah's subjects were nothing more than “spectral figures, transparent testimonies to the worldly triumph of a secular capitalist modernity.”Footnote 53
Consider, for example, Meir Ezri's account on the origins of SAVAK-Mossad relations. It seems there is nothing new in his story; the ties between the two organizations, says Ezri, were established in 1957 as part of the emerging alliance of the periphery to “exchange information and evaluations about developments in the Middle East in two main areas . . . the danger of Nasserism and the Soviet threat.”Footnote 54 Ezri's story is illuminating in other respects, however. It demonstrates that Ezri and his superiors in Jerusalem knew full well that SAVAK was a covert, cruel, and violent organization, yet they did not voice their objection to Israel's increasing cooperation with it.Footnote 55
Ezri is reminded of his own deep apprehensions about an interview set for him with one of the SAVAK heads in 1958, at the beginning of his Iran mission. He opens with an assertion that establishes his understanding as hindsight: “The name SAVAK is notorious all over the world today, especially since it carries entire burdens of hostility, vilifications and deep hatred following revelations in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.” Yet Ezri admits that even then, in 1958, he knew that SAVAK instilled “fear and terror in the hearts of all those taken for interrogations on the premises.” “I was fully aware,” he recounts, “that those who entered the gates of SAVAK didn't leave of their own accord.” Alas, having no other option, Ezri arrived at SAVAK headquarters at the appointed time:
All along the way it was on my mind. I pieced together bits of information that I had heard so far about the SAVAK's deeds. One rumor was that one day some one hundred and fifty members of the opposition were taken aboard helicopters and dropped to their dreadful death in the big salt lake south east of Qom. I also heard that all those summoned to [head of SAVAK] General Bakhtiyar's room had to stand at attention for about a quarter of an hour in front of his desk . . . On both sides of Bakhtiyar's desk there were always two loaded pistols. A quarter of an hour later few were those who did not fall at Bakhtiyar's feet to admit the suspicions and deeds attributed to them.Footnote 56
The Shah's autocratic rule did not go unnoticed by Israeli emissaries in Iran, but they would not allow this knowledge to detract in any way from the image they had created of him as an “enlightened despot.” On the contrary, his autocracy was deemed indispensable in the endeavor to abolish his subjects’ Oriental alterity and to bring them into the orbit of secular capitalist modernity.Footnote 57
Indeed, “the colonial,” as Fredrick Cooper observes, “evokes above all the marking of certain people as distinct, in need of special forms of surveillance and supervision, and unable to participate fully in the projects of a modernizing society.”Footnote 58 Accordingly, in January 1979, while the Shah was still trying to hang onto his throne, an anonymous Iran “expert” wrote a commentary in Ha˒aretz asserting that he sees “no alternative to an absolutist regime in Iran.” The Shah's subjects, he explains, “are not yet mature enough for an independent democratic government, and Iran has no entrenched, advanced and educated class of people who could take it upon themselves to actually run the government.” To ensure their compliance with his vision of modernity, the same “expert” even calls upon the Shah to massacre his own people:
Upon my return from Iran, when the riots started, I was asked whether the Shah's regime was in grave danger . . . I said that if the Shah and his officers will have the courage to do unto their opponents what these opponents are scheming to do unto them, the regime stands a better chance of survival . . . The army should use tanks and machine-guns against the masses, deploy firing squads facing the strikers, and give the secret police and its agents a free hand . . . Despite the aversion . . . to such steps, I witnessed what such an incited and zealous mass and its Shiite mullah leaders may do once they are allowed to act freely.Footnote 59
To stand decisively behind the Shah's autocracy also meant to think of the people who were on the receiving end of it as mute bearers of “bare life,” intrinsically deprived of language and political life. Thus, Tsafrir reminisces about a brief official visit to Tehran in 1974, noting that “the North/South divide exists there too”:
As in so many other places the North is rich and ostentatious, the South poor and crowded. One cannot escape the potential image of an outraged Southern mass striking at the North, and, like locusts, devouring every blade of grass and looting it all. Meanwhile, however, it all seems quiet and peaceful. The rich are ensconced in their rich mansions, driving their air-conditioned cars between home, office and fancy restaurant, or taking trips to the northern snow covered vacation sites. The masses, meanwhile, are in servitude in these very mansions, on the road, in stores, and so on. To each his own, and one has to bow down when receiving the tip.Footnote 60
Tsafrir of course is writing with the fall of the Shah in mind, which is why he foresees, as it were, signs of the calamity the Shah ultimately suffered at the hands of the very people upon whom he had exacted extraordinary inequalities and depredations. Yet by branding them a “southern mass” and “locusts,” Tsafrir does not endow these people with the same humanity he accredits the Shah and his elites. In doing so, he reduces Iranians to “shadowy ‘third things’ lodged between animal and human,” to quote from Paul Gilroy's critique of racist notions that establish “some human bodies [as] more easily and appropriately humiliated, imprisoned, shackled, starved and destroyed than others.”Footnote 61 In the final analysis, Tsafrir refuses to recognize that Iranians’ actions can be explained in terms of concrete historical experiences of repression and injustice. Rather, under Tsafrir's gaze, these masses soon return to accept the repressive order of the day as an unalterable fact of nature; they remain indifferent to their political selves as though history bypasses—or merely acts upon—them.
Nimrodi's book, Masa˓ Hayai (My Life Journey), offers many other examples of how the Iranian people are included as objects of sovereign power but excluded from being its subjects. Nimrodi did not once stop to consider that his financial ventures with the Shah regime actually worsened the condition of many an Iranian. This comes out most clearly in Nimrodi's account of his involvement in developing the Persian Gulf island of Qish as a high-class tourist resort, in tune with the Shah's modernization schemes. Here Nimrodi describes the project, in which he played central role:
The most conspicuous public building in Qish was the grand new “Shavan” hotel run by a Rothschild company. After paying an initial entry fee of fourteen hundred dollars, for twenty hundred a week, no meals included, the hotel offered every kind of pleasure offered in Monte Carlo . . . The menu was French, and a Concorde jet would carry fresh produce and fine cheeses from Paris, and once in a while pretty lady escorts too . . . The hotel itself had a small casino, but right next to it a bigger one was built and run by a British company. . . . On a hill overlooking the sea a new shopping mall was constructed with branches of the best European haute couture. According to the initial design only electric cars were to be used on the island . . . to allow the guests to move between the many attractions: casino, a spacious golf course, health spas, diving clubs, horse ranches and so on.Footnote 62
Needless to say, only a small fraction of Iranians could afford such luxuries at Qish, which Nimrodi crowns as “the paradise of the Persian Gulf.”Footnote 63 In fact, this island was off limits to Iranian citizens, except for the few wealthy patrons who allegedly passed the Shah regime's “ordeals of civility.” All hired staff came from outside the country: the hotel, says Nimrodi, “had two hundred and fifty rooms, and among its staff there was not a single Persian. The receptionists were Swiss, the telephone exchange was operated by a French woman, the waitresses were either Italian or French, and the chambermaids were Portuguese. Even the caretakers were mostly European.”Footnote 64 To sum up, in the accounts of these Israeli writers the Iranian people simply did not matter. Not unlike the subaltern classes in Indian historiography that Dipesh Chakrabarty critiques, they were “read as such telling figures of misery and privation that the violence and undemocracy of the state look[ed] like a small price to pay for the attainment, ultimately, of a more just social order.”Footnote 65
It is important to emphasize that the reluctance of Israelis to consider seriously the complicity of their state with the Shah's repressive policies is ingrained in the Israeli public sphere. Israel's run-of-the-mill historiography, for example, has tended to fluctuate between describing Israeli involvement in pre-1979 Iran in ostensibly neutral terms and assigning Israeli representatives there pure, even altruistic, motives. A leading historian of Iran thus remarks—somewhat testily, but also approvingly—that Israel “assisted . . . Iran by training its army, sold it army surplus and even helped with the founding of the secret police, the SAVAK. Israel also tended generous assistance to Iran in agriculture and regional development.”Footnote 66
Conversely, Israeli scholars have been keen to attribute Iranians’ misgivings with Israel not to any concrete historical experience but to the very nature of “their” culture—that is to say, to the pathologies that are supposed to inhere within their religious culture. As another historian of Iran concludes, “Iranian animosity toward Israel springs from the core of the regime's worldview, according to which the conflict between the Islamic Republic and Israel is pivotal to the larger conflict between Islam and the imperialist West and its materialistic culture.”Footnote 67 Although that may very well be true, the writer refuses to hold the Jewish state accountable in any way, as though nothing it has ever done could deserve such a hostile backlash: “The high visibility attached to the Israeli success story,” he claims, “has come with a pathetic size, territorially and demographically, and therefore invites aggression.”Footnote 68 This oversight introduces yet another colonial gesture that emerges from Israeli texts on Iran—what political geographer Derek Gregory defined as the asymmetry of “accepting the privilege of contemplating ‘the other’ without acknowledging the gaze in return.”Footnote 69
ISRAELI IMAGINARIES OF POST-1979 IRAN: ARTICULATING DIFFERENCE WITH INCORPORATION
We have seen that Israel's enchantment with the Shah regime derived from a complex web of sources. Among these was a heretofore unexplored, albeit highly critical, commonsense world, which encompassed the idea of “inviting the sub-men to become human, and to take as their prototype Western humanity as incarnated in the Western bourgeoisie,” to borrow once again from Fanon's critique of the “pitfalls of national consciousness.”Footnote 70
This dimension of Israeli–Iranian relations before the revolution opens up new possibilities for reexamining Israel's concerns with Iran since the revolution. Although these concerns are by no means unfounded, the expressions of Iranophobia issuing from the Israeli public sphere should be viewed as a disproportionate and fearful backlash against a revolution that, by shattering the foundations of the Shah's Euro-American enterprise, also jeopardized the theoretical edifice upon which the Jewish state was constructed as “the West.” In other words, Israeli concerns with the “Iranian threat” reveal a heightened sense of anxiety lest the Islamic Revolution and its aftermath prove to be the Jewish state's dark future.
In Israel, as in many other countries, “the media, academia and public were overwhelmed by the vision of a modernizing and pro-Western monarchy being overthrown by a mass movement under the leadership of men whose image matched the most deeply entrenched Orientalist stereotypes.”Footnote 71 Accordingly, Israelis saw the revolution as a “terrible detour” from the trajectory toward progress and civilization and (re)consigned the Iranians to static backwardness, regardless of how the revolution was shaped by interaction with Euro-America. Indeed, for the past three decades the Jewish state has been keen to assume the radical alterity of the Iranian polity, canceling out pre-1979 notions of shared histories and intertwined destinies. Deeply rooted in readings of Islam and Western (“Judeo-Christian”) secularity as two incompatible entities, and of Iranian history as a failed attempt to live up to the narrative of progress, the post-1979 Iranian polity became the bête noire, the nemesis, from which Israeli citizens should disassociate. By constructing Iran's Otherness, the Jewish state sought to confirm its self-image as a modern, secular, and Western society and to justify its utter isolation from the cultural zone of the Arab and Muslim Middle East.Footnote 72
Even if the revolution and its aftermath were instrumental in the endeavor to reinforce constructions of Israel as “the West,” they also unearthed and, in turn, radicalized the tensions and contradictions inherent in the very process of demarcating and safeguarding the Western character of the Israeli polity. I argue that Israelis set Iran apart as eccentrically Oriental, fanatically religious, and outrageously hostile precisely because they have come to see in it the Oriental and religious ghosts threatening their own identity.Footnote 73 Rebecca L. Stein has shown the ways in which Palestinian violence in 2002 against Israeli cafés—which she renders as a “defining feature of Tel Aviv's urban, Ashkenazi centers”—militated against the construction of Israel as a Western society, “a nation-state that, given both its Palestinian and Mizrahi histories, had never been.”Footnote 74 I suggest that the 1979 revolution and its aftermath have equally shown the fallacy of such constructions.
To fully understand this point, it is necessary to situate the revolution not, as one might expect, in its immediate Iranian context but rather in the context of Israeli domestic politics since the 1970s. Indeed, it is crucial to remember that the 1979 revolution unfolded in the streets of Iran at a particular moment when the “Israeli ethnocratic regime,”Footnote 75 which historically had buttressed the dominance of the Ashkenazi (European) Jewish ethnoclass, was coming under direct attack from various directions. Two years before, in 1977, the Likud party won the national election, ending nearly thirty years of Labor party rule. Personifying the antithesis to Labor's quasisocialist ethos, Likud appealed to many Mizrahi Israelis, mostly first- and second-generation Jewish immigrants from Muslim countries, who were continuously being treated by the Israeli ethnocratic regime as second-class citizens.
The entry of Mizrahim into Israeli politics as a force to be reckoned with was not the only serious threat to Israeli ethnocracy. So, too, were Likud's open embrace of “traditional” Judaism and the rise of the religious Zionist settler movement since the mid-1970s. Although the former militated against the “Euro-Israeli self-image,”Footnote 76 thereby threatening to assimilate the Jewish state into the surrounding Arab and Muslim Middle East, the latter drove home the message that the Jewish state could not fully subscribe to the separation between religion and secularity and that any attempt to do so within the Zionist framework would be tantamount to “a snare and a delusion.”Footnote 77
By virtue of its timing and its internal dynamics, the 1979 revolution concretized and dramatized these threats. Divisive politics of ethnicity, charismatic clerical leaders and their underrepresented “Oriental mobs,” messianic politics, and the conflation of nation and religion and state and religion—all those features that made their striking appearance in the 1979 revolution—seemed to represent and to underline the domestic, ethnic, and religious threats to the dominance of Israeli ethnocracy as well. In other words, the expulsion of the post-1979 Iranian polity to the realm of radical alterity was driven, at least in part, by Israelis’ perception of radical, religious, and ethnic alterities operating in their own midst.
Several illustrations from the past three decades substantiate this argument. In January 1979, while the Shah was still waging a battle of survival, Israelis already noted a resemblance between Khomeini's “religious reactionary regime” and the religious Zionist settlement movement. Yossi Sarid, then a Knesset Member from the left-to-center, secular Alignment (Labor) Party, lashed out at religious Zionist settlers, describing them as “Khomeini-style fanatics . . . gripped with convulsions.”Footnote 78 At about the same time, Michael Harsagor, a professor of European history, traced in the 1979 revolution the paradoxes of Jewish secularity. In an editorial bearing the suggestive title “Israel, Beware of the Ayatollah,”Footnote 79 Harsagor claims that “Ayatollah Khomeini was not the only person . . . putting into practice the ideal of backwardness in the East.” Participating in this endeavor, he alleges, were also ultraorthodox and religious Zionist political parties; “their objection to theater plays, autopsy, abortion under medical supervision, [and] women's rights . . . puts them in one front with the fanatic old man who is turning Iran upside down.”Footnote 80 In short, for Sarid and Harsagor (two avid secular Zionists), Israel potentially faced a fate similar to Iran's given that a sizable portion of the population closely allied religious heritage with political Zionism.
In 1980–1981, while reports from Iran focused on the descent of that country into anarchy and civil war, Israelis were preoccupied with an election campaign rightly described at the time as “befittingly violent.”Footnote 81 Attention was directed to what the Israeli press labeled as “Mizrahi mobs” entranced by Likud Party leader Menachem Begin. A parallel was immediately drawn between the political behavior of the Iranian masses and that of Likud supporters: both were assumed to be passive victims easily manipulated by cynical charismatic leaders—Khomeini on the one hand and Begin, whom Ha˒aretz branded a “perfect demagogue,”Footnote 82 on the other hand. It is no coincidence, then, that when the term “Khomeinism” gained parlance in Western media,Footnote 83 the term “Beginism” came to evoke undemocratic and unruly political behavior in Israel. “This time you really must choose between Beginism and an enlightened government,” reads an Alignment Party election ad.Footnote 84 Within this context, when Likud Party supporters interrupted an election rally arranged for Shimon Peres, the Alignment Party candidate for prime minister, and threw tomatoes at him, he rebuked them as follows: “You are a Khomeini-like unruly mob! I'm not afraid of your tomatoes. Khomenists! Fascists! . . . Go back to Persia—that's where your future belongs.”Footnote 85
The routinization of the postrevolutionary Iranian state in the 1980s and 1990s redirected attention in Israel to the theocratic foundations of Iran's Islamic regime. However, this, in turn, once again reinforced the understanding that the conflation of religion and politics also ruled out defining the Israeli polity as secular. A typical example is the phrase “This is Not Iran” (kan lo Iran), which was penned by Meretz, the center-to-left secular Zionist party, as its slogan for the 1992 election campaign. Meretz obviously rejected Iran, but at the same time it also suggested that Israel was becoming an Iran-like state, treading a dangerous path that might culminate in the establishment of a Jewish theocracy.
The phrase “this is not Iran” is intimately related to the increasing alarm with which secular Israelis from across the political spectrum have watched the ascendancy, since the 1980s, of Shas to the center of the political and public stages in Israel. Shas is an ultraorthodox party associated in the main with Israel's Mizrahi community. Support for the party was fueled in large part by prejudicial treatment the Mizrahim experienced from state institutions as well as from ultraorthodox Ashkenazi parties.Footnote 86 As Shas blends ultraorthodox Judaism with Mizrahi politics of identity (hence ushering the “Mizrahi-Haredi Revolution”), its electoral successes have unsettled the political status quo in Israel.Footnote 87 The secular mainstream, in turn, has mounted a campaign against Shas, charging that it aimed at instituting a theocracy that would remove Israel from the progressive First World—a scenario similar to the one they scripted for Iran, with clerics dominating politics under Khomeini and his successors. Accordingly, the liberal press has repeatedly warned that if Shas were to continue operating freely in the political field, the ultraorthodox Mizrahim would turn Israel into “an Iranian-style theocracy [medinat halacha].”Footnote 88 On other occasions commentators argued somberly that Israel had already been lost to an Iranian-style Shas regime: “There are those among us who warn against the danger of making Israel a theocratic state. They are probably too late. We are not only on our way to becoming a state of the ayatollahs, we are already in its midst.”Footnote 89
It is important to note that the striking electoral successes of the (now defunct “secular” and “liberal”) Shinui Party in the 1999 and 2003 elections, in which it gained six and fifteen out of 120 parliament seats, respectively, stemmed in large part from similar ethnocratic fears of an Iran-like ultraorthodox, Mizrahi regime taking over the country. Note, for example, the following statement by a businesswoman from Ramat Hasharon, a city that gave Shinui overwhelming support in the 1999 election:
When I watch [Shas supporters] on television, [that is] all those black people . . . I panic. Their appearance reminds me of Iran and [the] violent demonstrations in which the Shiites beat themselves until their blood comes oozing out. Sometimes I say to myself: “Good Heavens, they look exactly like them!” That's why I voted for [Shinui] at the parliamentary election.Footnote 90
A final example of the complex ways in which images of Iran underscored contradictions and tensions within the Israeli polity is taken from the 2001 prime ministerial elections. On election eve it became increasingly clear that Ehud Barak, the Labor Party's incumbent prime minister, would suffer a landslide defeat at the hands of his Likud Party rival, Ariel Sharon. As a result, secular and liberal Israelis once again voiced their alarm over what Talal Asad describes as “the potential entry of religion into space already occupied by the secular.”Footnote 91 In their forecast, Sharon was to be elected prime minister but would fail to entice secular Zionist parties to join Likud in a coalition government. Sharon would then have no other recourse but to seek the support of ultraorthodox and anti-Zionist factions. Submitting unconditionally to their sectarian demands, he would be forced to install a “fundamentalist” government. This would inevitably make Israel a “Jewish Iran.”Footnote 92
Russian immigrants in Israel, many of whom support separation of religion from state and espouse anti-Mizrahi sentiments,Footnote 93 were particularly alarmed by this prospect. Ya˓kov Kedmi is a case in point. Kedmi, a Russian-born Israeli, was Barak's onetime confidant and the person who headed the Mossad's Russian immigration bureau. Probably better than anyone else at the time, he knew that, unlike in 1999, the majority of Russian immigrants would not vote for Barak in the forthcoming election. Asked if it was still possible for Barak to restore his credibility among Russians, he replied, “Yes,” but only if these immigrants were to be told
You are not choosing between Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon, but between a democratic Israeli state, which is modern, free and does not discriminate among Jews of types A, B and C on the one hand, and a state dominated by a fundamentalist Jewish school in all respects on the other . . . This [latter] state will resemble Iran in terms of belligerency, aggressiveness, cruelty and influence on the life of its citizens. Today we must choose between Jewish fundamentalism and a normal Jewish state. . . . On February 6 we shall vote either for a democratic state or for a fundamentalist state.Footnote 94
Here Kedmi reinforces a secular, albeit distinctly Jewish, definition of the Israeli collective. He assumes that “a democratic Israeli state, which is modern [and] free,” is a state where no distinctions would be made among “Jews of types A, B, and C.” The overriding problem, of course, is that Kedmi excludes the non-Jewish, mainly Palestinian, citizens from his imagined community and does not view their exclusion as an obstacle to the kind of “democratic, modern and free” state for which he is calling.
It has recently been suggested that since the early 1990s, the mutually condemnatory rhetoric issuing from Israel and Iran has been driven less by “an ideological clash” than by a “strategic rivalry . . . for military preeminence in a fundamentally disordered region that lacked a clear pecking order.”Footnote 95 No doubt, there is much truth in that contention. Nonetheless, as the foregoing discussion has shown, the production of meaning about Iran in the Israeli public sphere is driven by concerns over the nature of Israeli identity no less than by any strategic rivalry between the two states.
CONCLUSION
What do we glean, then, from the great sway that the discourse of Western modernity holds over certain influential members of the Israeli public sphere? It is perhaps appropriate to start addressing this question with Talal Asad, who contends that “certain people in power” are well aware that “‘modernity’ . . . is not a verifiable object” and that contemporary societies generate, and are themselves products of, “disparate, even discordant, circumstances, origins, valences, and so forth.”Footnote 96 Still,
These people aim at “modernity,” and expect others (especially in the “non-West”) to do so too. This fact doesn't disappear when we simply point out that “the West” isn't an integrated totality . . . [and] that the modern epoch in the West has witnessed many arguments and several irreconcilable aspirations. On the contrary, those who assume modernity as a project know that already.Footnote 97
For Asad, the important question is not why the idea of “modernity” (or “the West”) is a misnomer but rather “why it has become hegemonic as a political goal, what practical consequences follow from that hegemony, and what social conditions maintain it.”Footnote 98
If we link these observations to my argument above—namely, that Israeli readings of Iran and the Iranian threat reveal domestic concerns over the current and future direction of secular Zionism—we may begin to understand why certain influential members of the Israeli public sphere continue to insist on Western modernity. In a country that has become increasingly entangled in the web of Western influence in the Middle East—“with Israel now serving as a Mediterranean Fort Laramie in America's ‘war on terror’”Footnote 99—the intrusion of diasporic-cum-Oriental religiosity and ethnicity within the body politic is seen by “certain people in power” as a grave threat. The more ubiquitous these features become, the more these people forcefully “aim at ‘modernity’”—in keeping with the practice of ethnocratic regimes to absorb, contain, or ignore the challenge emerging from its peripheries, thereby trapping the latter in their respective predicaments.Footnote 100 Take, for example, Yosef Lapid, leader of the Shinui Party. When asked in 2002 why he was so worried, Lapid replied:
Because we are in a corrupt, lazy, backward Middle Eastern environment. What keeps us above water is our cultural difference. The fact that we are a forward outpost of Western civilization. If our Westernism erodes, we won't have a chance. If we let the Eastern European ghetto and the North African ghetto take over, we will have nothing to float on. We will blend into the Semitic region and be lost within a terrible Levantine dunghill.Footnote 101
These are not words that befit only a politician such as Lapid, who is infamous for his racist—anti-Haredi, anti-Mizrahi, anti-Arab, and homophobic—ideas.Footnote 102 Israeli Jews across the political spectrum, and most notably liberal and secular Zionists, have voiced similar views, and they have done so by employing no less extreme terms.Footnote 103 Be that as it may, my discussion has shown that many of these ideas about Israeli modernity derive from commentaries about pre- and post-1979 Iran. These bestow coherence and aesthetic value upon the order of Israeli culture, and they compel Israelis “in power” to reexamine their assumptions about the domestic front in light of the challenges posed to them by the very people they rule.
In her fascinating work on the relationship between domestic and foreign policies of American empire and their cultural manifestations, Amy Kaplan has demonstrated the link between domestic and foreign affairs in the manufacturing of such an imperial project. As Kaplan explains, “The concept of foreign policy depends on the idea of the nation as a domestic space imbued with a sense of at-homeness, in contrast to an external world perceived as alien and threatening. Reciprocally, a sense of the foreign is necessary to erect the boundaries that enclose the nation as home.”Footnote 104 My analysis likewise has shown that perceptions of Iranians as alien and threatening were fashioned and comprehended based on what Israelis believed to be the (dis)ordering of their society at home. The Israeli sense of danger emanating from Iran is related to a perceived imperative to police and suppress “intruding”—Iran-like—domestic forces of ethnicity and religion. This interpenetration of the “foreign” and the “domestic” belies the premise, which is shared by most scholars of Israeli–Iranian relations and put forth most recently by Trita Parsi, that “internal developments . . . have little or no impact on [these two states’] respective foreign policies.”Footnote 105
Although Israeli readings of Iran have much in common with their American counterparts,Footnote 106 they also bear distinctive qualities that can help us develop a “post-Orientalist” approach to Israeli politics, culture, and society. The Orientalist paradigm à la Said, as we know, presupposes the homogeneity of the “Occident” (or “Judeo-Christian civilization”) and the “Orient” (or “Islam”), respectively, as well as the impenetrable gulf that separates “Occidentals” from “Orientals.” However, Israeli readings of Iran contested such notions of homogeneity and difference—specifically because they were informed interchangeably by an acute awareness of cultural differences at home and of commonalities between Israelis and Iranians.
Nonetheless, many Israelis “in power” continue to disseminate an Orientalist understanding of the non-West with a view to silencing critical reassessments of Israeli society and enforcing “a contradictory unity, a democratic despotism, in a single space.”Footnote 107 This Orientalism practiced by the Israeli state is thus in keeping with “the tendency of colonial regimes to draw a stark dichotomy of colonizer and colonized without themselves falling into such a Manichaean conception.”Footnote 108 The Israeli case also suggests, perhaps in another departure from the Said paradigm, that even producers of Orientalist representations know full well that these representations are not reliable and faithful reflections of reality.
Finally, the Israeli case also suggests that construction of national identity does not depend solely on the production of difference but also on the rejection of affinity with—or ambivalence toward—the Other, who is already included in the national self. Paradoxically, national identity becomes intelligible not only through a perception of threat that produces difference but also through a perception of threat that is produced by similarity.
