Political scientists have recently taken greater interest in the role religion plays in politics, but they are only discovering what scholars of Augustine have known for a long time. However, most work on Augustine's political thought is conducted largely by scholars working in fields other than political philosophy, including theology, philosophy, and classics.Footnote 1 While each author considered here has his disciplinary commitments and interests, all allow the fundamental problems of political order to come into focus in a way that surpasses the achievements of previous generations of scholars.Footnote 2 They now grapple with a wider array of fundamental questions of political order, and in framing their questions, they have drawn upon major political philosophers, including Hannah Arendt, Michael Oakeshott, Eric Voegelin, and Leo Strauss (through the lens of Ernest Fortin). The net effect of this openness and influence is, as Todd Breyfogle notes in his contribution to Augustine and Politics, conceptual clarification that goes some way toward overcoming obfuscations caused by previous scholars' uncritical use of political terminology.Footnote 3
In differing ways, all are attentive to the paradox noted by Thomas W. Smith, in his contribution to the edited volume, Augustine and Politics: “Augustine has no political philosophy, if that means a disinterested, theoretical inquiry into the nature and purpose of politics. His goal is practical: to offer a praise of the city of God with a pedagogical and hortatory dimension. He does have a political philosophy, if that means working toward a conception of the earthly community which would harmonize with the transformative fruits of belonging to the City of God.”Footnote 4 For Smith and for the other authors considered here, humans' transcendent longings limn the human project of politics, and “getting politics right” entails clarifying the proper object of those longings and their relation to the this-worldly activity of politics. If one needs to step beyond a category in order fully to understand it, then Augustine paradoxically provides a clear understanding of the nature of political life, indeed.
Whereas the previous generation of scholars saw a limit to politics based on the irreconcilable gap between politics and religious longings, today's scholars are more astute at considering the nature of that gap. On the one side is Robert Dodaro's Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine, which revises the previous generation's insights by treating politics as the result of sin (the so-called propter peccatum view). On the other side is Peter Burnell's description in The Augustinian Person of the “Incarnational continuum,” according to which no division exists between Augustine's doctrine of society and doctrine of the Incarnation on account of caritas being inherently incarnational: love of God gets expressed through love of neighbor, which upsets the categories of this-worldly and transcendence. The other interpretations considered here reside somewhere between these two viewpoints.
Dodaro's book is a rigorously reasoned and documented account of how Augustine considered Christ as the completion and fulfillment of the justice teachings of the ancients. Caritas in Christ perfects iustitia. Augustine develops a statesmanship teaching that perfects that found in Cicero's understanding of the eloquent rhetor. In so doing, he reforms Cicero's heroic ideal statesman and treats Paul as the new ideal (the only Christian referred to in the City of God as optimus vir) (213).
Paul's Christian virtue supersedes pagan virtue for many of the reasons familiar to readers of Augustine's work: his glory is based on humility instead of pride; Christian virtue does not aspire to self-sufficiency and, therefore, is more conducive to peace; and political life is founded on a fundamental lie of the soul, which gives it its satanic character (68). Dodaro documents the development of Augustine's new political vision via his critique of the false eloquence of Cicero's optimus vir (chapter 1), his critique of Rome's lack of justice in the early books of City of God (chapter 2), the manner in which Christ creates the just society through the mediation of divine humility to human beings through his incarnation (chapter 3), the role of Scripture in turning the soul to Christ (chapter 4), the mystical role of the sacraments (chapter 5), and Augustine's account of Christian justice (chapter 6).
Dodaro provides a rigorous analysis of the many ways Christian love supersedes pagan virtue, and the ways the latter fell short of creating a just society. Unfortunately, he leaves too many questions unanswered. His Augustine does not leave much left for what is normally taken as politics because he gives little indication of what social existence one can find in the Christian just city. While Dodaro claims love of neighbor is the perfection of justice (169), he gives little guidance on the identity of one's neighbor. Augustine considered caritas as harmonious with preferential amicitia, which seems to justify at least minimal attachment to one's political society. Yet, Dodaro is vague on this point, as when he points to Augustine emphasizing that the “commandment to love one's neighbor obliges the statesman to love all human beings without discrimination” (211). This raises difficult questions, including whether this means a statesman should not prefer the well-being of his subjects to that of others. Stated bluntly: can one love one's neighbor while killing him to prevent him from killing your citizens?
Augustine grappled with this problem, and the general problem of moral evil, in City of God 22.6, as he pondered the decision of the Saguntines (mentioned by Cicero) who chose to allow Hannibal to destroy their city instead of surrendering to him and thereby breaking “the faith which held them to the Roman commonwealth itself.” Augustine observes choosing honor through death might be an option for an individual, but “the death of a whole city is always a punishment.” For Augustine, the statesman's care for his citizens, which includes the well-being of future generations as represented by their children, can put him into a tragic position of either having to break faith or to choose safety. He says it “merits questioning” whether, in fact, the Saguntines should have kept faith with the Romans.Footnote 5 Cicero seems mistaken for thinking honor and safety can be reconciled. For his part, Dodaro leaves the two choices unattested but without seeing their tragic relationship: “The Christian statesman's primary objective in governing piously should be to assist his subjects to love God in the truest way possible. This fundamental aim should guide all of his endeavours to advance the temporal welfare of his subjects, whether he seeks to assist those in material need or to discipline those who undermine public security” (210–11). Dodaro's failure to explore this dilemma makes it appear Augustine made the same mistake he accuses Cicero of making. While Dodaro splendidly shows how caritas perfects justice, his analysis insufficiently illuminates the manner in which the demands of justice remain for the statesman, and perhaps become more vexing, after caritas has done its transforming work in individual souls.
Because politics is emptied of its own moral authority, the Church, which transmits the mystery of the sacraments that are central to cultivating virtue, takes on added importance: “Liturgical and biblical sacraments are intended to wean the soul away from its obsession with the outer, visible world, and draw it into the light of the inner world” (125). Dodaro's individualistic reading of the virtues does not give much guidance on how life is led in the ecclesiastical societas, though he provides a slight hint when observing Augustine's insistence that the “understanding of justice through mystery requires scriptural exegesis,” presumably by clerics trained for this activity (145).
Politically, sacraments enable Christians to assert the true God as the only source of virtue: “[H]uman beings cannot gain it [virtue] from alternative sources (least of all from themselves), [which] justifies Christian leaders in suppressing other religious cults . . . . For this reason, all civic leaders must take refuge in God's grace” (199). Dodaro qualifies this Christian right to suppress others by observing Christians are most likely to seek social reconciliation. That ostensibly renders them least likely to resort to coercion. They acknowledge that “unlike other religions, in return to God for the pardon that they receive from him as sinners, all human beings are obliged to forgive one another” (199–200). Dodaro's discussion is in the context of Augustine's critique of the Donatists, whose belief in their own self-sufficiency made them “incapable of practicing true penitence and reconciliation” (201). While Augustine thought the self-righteousness and hyper-moralism of the Donatists made them closed to penance and reconciliation, his own position on coercing them is significantly more complicated than Dodaro presents. For instance, he seemed genuinely concerned about the Donatist threat to public order in a North Africa that was beset with near civil war (as documented by James O'Donnell). While as a general rule Augustine distinguished political from religious dissent (based on the different purposes of politics and of the ecclesia), in this specific case, circumstances made the difference meaningless.Footnote 6 Unlike the Saguntines, Augustine ostensibly chose safety over honor (the comparison should not be drawn too closely). Unfortunately, Dodaro's treatment of Augustine's choice in how to confront an enemy “incapable of … true penitence and reconciliation” is too sketchy and ultimately apolitical. He leaves the conflict between justice and survival unfinished. Furthermore, he offers his statesman little guidance on whether, and under what conditions, he should choose reconciliation and penitence to suppression. Dodaro's Augustine prizes practical and ethical judgments over legalistic rules. Unfortunately, Dodaro's sketchy portrait of political life disappoints this promise and fails to insulate Augustine from those who would want to turn him in an authoritarian direction.
James J. O'Donnell's biography of Augustine has the virtue of illuminating some of the burden of statesmanship that Augustine faced in his long career not only as theologian, but as bishop, judge, and pamphleteer. Instead of treating Augustine, and Augustine's own self-presentation, in a pious fashion, O'Donnell wants to present an Augustine in whom Christianity and the fruits of Western civilization cannot be taken for granted. Unfortunately, O'Donnell's strengths contribute to the biography's main weakness: his Augustine ends up as a mere public intellectual, which makes the biographer's methodological ecumenism look more like snobbish, liberal cosmopolitanism.
O'Donnell's best insight comes when he reminds readers that the image of Augustine as the solitary mystic and scholar (as seen, for example, in Vittore Carpaccio's “St. Augustine in His Study”) often eclipses his life as a public intellectual: “We would think of him as resembling in the first instance not so much Aquinas or Heidegger as Cicero or Pascal” (189). Like Cicero at least, Augustine was a public and political figure who understood that the essence of his public life was to create a world of meaning. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Hannah Arendt's understanding of “world” plays a role in O'Donnell's account of Augustine's presentation of himself. O'Donnell is at his best when he shows us Augustine involved in pamphleteering wars with rivals, his pugnacious attitudes, his hurt feelings, and his interactions with other leaders and with his congregants. His presentation of Augustine's role in North African culture is also excellent.
Unfortunately, the Arendt in O'Donnell's analysis is dominated by Freudian, Foucauldian, and other sources of postmodern hermeneutical suspicion. For Arendt, politics is about self-disclosures and communication to make the public world. Glory plays a significant role in her account. Augustine's critique of Roman glory means his own glory cannot be so self-serving, but O'Donnell thinks Augustine still played that game. What is worse, Augustine glorified himself by portraying himself as the humble confessor.
O'Donnell's Augustine is a provincial bumpkin who loved life in Rome and returned home as a failure. North Africa “felt a little like western Canada before World War II” (10). However, unlike Wallace Stegner who, during that time, lived on a dirt farm in southwestern Saskatchewan and went on to literary glory, Augustine could never live down his status as bumpkin. He made his confession because “he was afraid” (7) and because his career as rhetorician in Rome failed. His inferiority complex led him to establish a political and religious teaching that identified his Christianity with the gentlemanly culture of the late empire, and identified non-Christians as bumpkins (the literal meaning of paganus): hence, the title of his most famous political work: The City of God Against the Pagans.
As a result, O'Donnell restrictively interprets Augustine's life and thinking in light of his alleged neuroses and small town vanity. Augustine's philosophical mysticism gets reduced to his “gentleman's religion,” as if gentlemen were at all interested in philosophy (20–21, 122, 191). He dismisses Augustine's Free Choice of the Will as a “theologically unsophisticated piece” of a “Christian litterateur” (140); he dismisses book 10 of the Confessions as “repellent and frustrating” (36) and a “mind-numbing analysis of temptation” (71); and he treats Augustine's speculations about sexual life in prelapsarian Eden as “unintentionally comic” (271).
O'Donnell may be correct in these judgments, but his lack of argumentation in drawing them fails to arouse the reader's confidence in the interpretation. His contempt toward Augustine's views on sex is the root of many of his dismissals. He is skeptical about Augustine's philosophical dualism between spirit and body (see 159, 180). Augustine's dualism is based either on a mistake or on a self-delusion. O'Donnell might be the only Augustine scholar who “would love to know whether Augustine continued to frequent the public baths” after his conversion (107). Naturally, Augustine was too troubled by concupiscentia, which O'Donnell translates flatly as “hankerings” (348, n. 113). One can debate whether curiosity, love of music, praise, and the love of other worldly things are analogous to deformations of erotic lust. Even so, Augustine's distrust of concupiscentia has some impressive (and non-Christian) company in Plato, who in the Republic treats eros as an obstacle to wisdom and justice. For Augustine, affective knowledge means one imitates the things one loves. However, “hankerings,” with its denotation of “lingering” and “loitering,” does not reflect affective knowledge. One lingers because one is in expectation; one loiters because one is bored. In both cases, the subject is isolated in the world of objects and does not seek consubstantiality with them, as with Augustine's notion of affective knowledge.
As O'Donnell notes, Augustine's world is enchanted because it is in continuous contact with divine forces (28). O'Donnell views Augustine and his world in the manner that Tocqueville describes how democrats view the past. Democrats are skeptical about metaphysics, and they are especially skeptical about people in political authority making metaphysical claims. Democrats view themselves as autonomous, and as subjects moving through a world of separate objects. Their detachment makes their passions for each other and for the world cooler than how Augustine, who viewed humans as embedded in the world, saw things (though Tocqueville thought their detachment led to immoderation in other ways). Thus, democrats loiter, linger, and hanker, but they do not obsess, as with concupiscentia. They love equality. O'Donnell chides Augustine for not respecting equality and for his failure to seek the emancipation of slaves.Footnote 7 Tocqueville's democrat has a small soul, seeking many small enjoyments instead of one or a few large enjoyments, the quest for which is fraught with numerous painful temptations. O'Donnell explains that contemporary readers have difficulty sympathizing with Augustine's “hankerings” because they actually seek what Augustine disparages: “What were temptations to Augustine become life goals when moderns think of them as self-esteem, education, and sexual fulfillment” (66). Whereas Tocqueville lamented that the modern world produced souls without ambition and longing, O'Donnell seems to celebrate it. His biography is meant to please democratic souls. His reference to “better science” notwithstanding, he wants to replace Augustine's Christian myth with the myth of the democrat. Yet in flattering the democrat, in making him blink, O'Donnell the biographer obscures the reasons for reading biographies.
From Augustine the self-obsessed, we move to a fine little volume by the author of a classic on Augustinian moral psychology, Augustine and the Problem of Self-Love. Oliver O'Donovan's Common Objects of Love: Moral Reflection and the Shaping of Community is a profound reflection on the nature of collective moral reasoning and its prospects in the modern world. His reflections spring from two central puzzles: 1) the difference between theoretical and practical reason, and whether and how the two can inform one another, and 2) how our present moral and political decisions stand in relation to the past, to deliberations already concluded. Taking his cues from Augustine's definition, in book 19 of City of God, of a people as a community sharing common objects of love, O'Donovan provides a rich account of the meaning of political representation and the relationship of political community to history.
O'Donovan describes how political communities represent themselves to themselves. Recalling Augustine's view that knowledge is affective, common objects of love are those that form the souls of citizens. Citizens encounter such objects—be they life, liberty, money, honor, or God—as presumptions of our political milieu, and, therefore, already find themselves loving them before they reflect upon their goodness. The more such objects can be shared, the better they are. Affective knowledge, however, also involves reflection upon these objects, and that results in representation. O'Donovan refers to Eric Voegelin's understanding of “transcendental representations,” and not John Stuart Mill's representative government. They are the icons or signs that are pressed into service to represent society and the truth of existence it makes concrete: “To take the simplest example: the traveler long absent from home turns his thoughts and his affections toward some concrete thing connected with his homeland—a grain elevator, a dairy herd, a skyscraper, or whatever, and this represents his community to him” (30).
O'Donovan identifies two basic forms of representation: narration of history and art (34–35). Yet, not all representations are equal. Those most conducive to justice—the most shareable in Augustine's notion of common objects of love—are those that best remind us that “political identity means accepting the contingent determination of one's society by the decrees of God's historical providence, which allows no justification or criticism” (43). Reflection upon common objects of love entails reflecting upon those givens that constitute our affective knowledge. Biblical narrative and icons make our “contingent determination” most luminous. A society represented in terms of Biblical narrative (such as Christendom, according to O'Donovan) stands the best chance to exercise justice (see 69). In contrast with myths of the people or of the nation, citizens of Christendom do not regard their society as autonomous and self-grounding, which makes politics more open to reconciliation and penitence.
In the final chapter, O'Donovan considers a key component of modern representation, publicity. Publicity differs somewhat from fame or glory; publicity is arbitrary, indifferent to what its subjects have achieved and selects them in isolation of their public institutions. In short, publicity is fame without any meaningful sense of what is public (58–59). Modernity replaces communicatio with commerce, and the resulting void of common logos means late-modern communications depends upon the visually erotic. O'Donovan provides theoretical backing for William F. Buckley's claim that pornography has become the “creepy wallpaper of our daily lives.”Footnote 8
Like Dodaro, O'Donovan thinks moral regeneration comes not from anything within political authority and community itself, but exclusively from the Scriptural tradition, which is especially well equipped to respond to modernity's image-driven dynamo. While this is true as far as it goes, it makes too much of Augustine's defense of Christian virtues over non-Christian virtues. In book 5 of City of God and elsewhere, Augustine affirms the superiority of Christian virtue, but he also observes that non-Christian virtue provides a profound and rigorous standard that is difficult to meet, much less surpass. In a sense, Christians must go “through” the likes of Plato, Cicero, Regulus, and Cato before they can come to Christ. While on the way, their teachings and standards provide the “transcendental representations” that serve as mirrors for the pilgrims. While illuminating their shortcomings, Augustine also taught how they are part of the givens of his culture's “contingent determinations.” In the same way, “modernity,” as well as criticism of it (not to mention the view of those, including Voegelin, who thought the term “modern,” has limited philosophical meaning), constitutes part of our own “contingent determinations.” Reviewers of O'Donovan's other works have noted the narrow manner in which he speaks of “modernity,” which also runs through his account of publicity. One wishes he would consider “modernity” with the same spirit Augustine engaged with the ancients.
Augustine and Politics assembles scholars from a variety of disciplines to reflect upon Augustine's
1) understanding of human nature and its relation to politics,
2) understanding of politics, and
3) influence on political thought.
Part 1 is dominated by philosophers and theologians. Of note are the treatments of voluntas by Philip Cary and David Schindler, who counter Albrecht Dihle's famous treatment of voluntas as being a static “will,” with subtle analyses of voluntas as “intending” and “consent.” Accordingly, voluntas requires seeing human motivation within community with God and other human beings, and not in isolation as Dihle's modernizing account suggests. Kim Paffenroth rounds out part 1 with a helpful overview of Augustine's affirmation of friendship as love of neighbor.
Part 2 deals directly with political theory. Robert Dodaro provides an excellent overview of Augustine's political activity, which highlights his ethical efforts in light of practical considerations. By doing so, it fills in some of the missing discussion of politics in his previously discussed book. Thomas Martin explains the political importance of Augustine's monastic rule that places monastic life visibly within the polis. It is an image of the city of God placed in the middle of political community, which makes visible its virtues and concord for others to see. Thomas W. Smith's reflection on the glory and tragedy of politics complements Martin's essay by explaining precisely why the city of God provides a counterpoint to political community. Augustine teaches that political communities will likely obtain what they wish for (their common objects of love), but they should be careful what they wish for. Their restlessness and evanescence suggest the need for pragmatic counterexamples like monasteries—with their deeper practices of friendship—to teach what they should wish for, and Smith's essay points to ways the two sides can be leavened.
Even though it is placed in part 3, the focus of Todd Breyfogle's essay is more suited to the focus of part 2. He observes much Augustine scholarship is rendered opaque and abstract when interpreters bring modern political as well as epistemological understandings to bear on his thought. While interpretation always involves some shining of one's own light on the subject matter, Breyfogle sees the problem to be the neglect of Augustine's personalist understanding of politics: “for Augustine, political relationships are always specific relationship between persons… The relationship between the citizen and ‘the state’ or the ruling power is an abstraction of what is properly understood as the concrete relation between a particular citizen and a particular official in the political bureaucracy” (222, 228). As a result, a certain “clearing of the brush” is required to render an interpretation of Augustine that he would recognize as his own.
Breyfogle suggests three primary terms, societas, amicitia, and veritas, that are crucial to Augustine's understanding but are frequently overlooked by modern interpreters. The three sustain each other insofar as political society depends on networks of friends. These networks, in turn, depend on the highest forms of friendship, which themselves depend on the degree to which these friends live in truth. Breyfogle's outline of these three terms is very helpful. It also would have been helpful if he had pushed his analysis further to show how Augustine reconciled the love of particular friends with the command to love one's neighbor. This would have helped clarify how helpful Augustine is to understand political passions such as the love of one's own.
Peter Burnell's The Augustinian Person takes the strongest view concerning Augustine's “positive” attitude toward political life. This book focuses on Augustine's theological anthropology, with only one chapter devoted formally to political questions. However, political concerns run throughout the book. His central concern is whether Augustine makes good the ambitious claim he makes in the preface of City of God that 1) the human good is unitary and 2) its unity can be seen in specific temporal circumstances, including those like the example of the Saguntines, mentioned above, where moral principles appear to conflict with one another and appear to force human beings to choose moral evil. While Burnell's argument is at times overly compressed, he is largely successful at providing a most compelling interpretation of Augustine's thought in its full amplitude.
Burnell wrote two earlier articles that took the minority position that Augustine affirmed civic virtue (even among the pagans) as well as the rightfulness of using force to remove tyrants.Footnote 9 The Augustinian Person considers his political thought within the context of what Burnell calls the “Incarnational continuum” (154), which extends the central idea of those two articles that political life demands a deep care for the affairs of the world. Augustine's understanding of personhood means he “thought the center of morality to be one's relationship with others” (188). Loving God takes the form of bringing others and oneself to divine grace (127). The Incarnational continuum overturns what we usually take as Augustine's philosophical dualism. This is seen in Burnell's explanation of the Vision at Ostia Augustine shared with his mother. Monica's caritas was consummated by her son's salvation and not in the Vision's ecstasy of ascent (128). In another example, in the Resurrection, the blessed will see God by seeing the inward reality of others' souls, though not necessarily God directly (167, citing City of God 22.29).
Burnell's analysis moves between grand theological issues—the nature of original sin, the origin of the soul, as well as the nature of caritas in the Resurrection—and their manifestation in political and ethical questions. Most scholars of political philosophy will likely regard his attention to theology as sectarian and nonphilosophical. Indeed, Burnell's analysis could be improved by more direct engagement of Augustine with his ancient philosophical counterparts, Plato and Cicero. Burnell touches on such an engagement when he notes E.L. Fortin's observation that Augustine did not acknowledge “an independent realm of nature,” as found in Aquinas or Marsilius of Padua (203). However, the complexity of the issues involved requires a more adequate response than Burnell's dismissive comment that such a realm does not exist. His case would be stronger if he had drawn stronger linkages between Augustine's understanding of those grand theological issues (as drawn from Scripture) and his meditations on their incarnation in the soul (as when, for example, Augustine questions whether he seeks God on account of God first being in his memory). Augustine constantly reminds readers that the great theological doctrines are responses to movements within the soul.
Whatever the first principles sustaining Augustine, Burnell's great achievement is to have provided a rigorous interpretation of how Augustine regarded the good to appear in time. This provides a moral basis for affirming particular love and amicitia: “[A] human person is a uniquely individual determination of a uniquely individual form of human nature, by relation to other human individuals” (190). Elaborating our “contingent determinations” (O'Donovan's term), Burnell shows our neighbor's identity as one who shares our unique historical situation, and that we are put there out of love and in a reciprocal relationship rooted in love (which, of course, can be and usually is corrupted). Our proper response to learning we are loved is, of course, caritas, but one born out of the gratitude human beings are one of the mirabilia Dei, and “an admiration than which no admiration could be greater will readily embrace contemplation of that fact” (115). Or elsewhere: “Man is the animal whose purpose is to decorate the universe with its moral beauty” (184–85). Caritas is then the beginning and end, as it were, of human society, which leads Burnell to reject arguments upholding the household as Augustine's paradigm for societas. Rather, civitas is the paradigm of caritas because it brings out the widest and deepest expression of caritas (15, 139).
Yet, the moral underpinnings of the civitas are complicated for Burnell's Augustine. Burnell offers the following analogy: “States, though not parts of the earthly city by nature, have been, as it were, born into its service (as individual human beings, though not evil by nature, are born into original sin)” (150). Earlier, he states: “The earthly city is unnatural. A sovereign society concerned with practical government is at its core natural” (143). Burnell provides an extensive analysis of the relationship between Augustine's view of original sin and his view that human beings are good by nature. Human beings decorate the universe with their moral beauty, but they are also born into sin and what Albert Camus called “moral absurdity.” One of Burnell's examples is Augustine's description of the hapless judge whose work involves torturing innocent witnesses (200; City of God, 19.6). His duty is wicked or morally evil (nefas), but seemingly impossible to escape.
Burnell shows from Augustine's description of salvation, in the late books of City of God, that Augustine leaves as an open question whether the unity of good can be applied in the specifics of the human condition: “Even if every tear will be wiped away, and sin, even its possibility, will be abolished, still, our present life's partial unintelligibility (which for an intellectual creature is an evil) must in the nature of things persist” (202). The proper human response to this “open question” to whether the unity of the good can be applied in all its specific determinations is to develop a practical reason attentive to that openness and our ignorance. If we return to the political side of the analogy, Burnell shows that for Augustine, political life is part of the way man's moral beauty decorates the universe. However, just as very few individuals actually fulfill their natures in decorating the universe with their moral beauty, even fewer political societies, as a practical matter, are capable of performing their task. Those who, in taking up the burdens of statesmanship, recognize our existential blind spot deserve glory (170, 182–83).
Burnell's book constitutes the best available account of how Augustine's political thought fits into his theological anthropology. I have only covered a fraction of his argument. Of necessity, his argument cannot answer every question it raises. His account of Augustine's political thought requires some refinement as well. For instance, he consistently refers to the “state,” which runs counter to his exemplary treatment of personhood. He also underestimates somewhat Augustine's preference for some regime forms over others, citing Augustine's ostensible indifference toward oligarchs and democrats (149, 204). This indifference cannot be taken as sufficient evidence since his ancient predecessors, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, also thought their factional differences unimportant as compared to the difference the two of them share vis-à-vis the good regime, be it that ruled by philosopher-kings, the best regime, or that rooted in the soul of virtuous statesman like Scipio. Indeed, Augustine even declares better societies love better “common objects of love,” and he seems to have thought a mixed republic as more authentically political than the empire.Footnote 10
Recent scholarship on Augustine's political thought has uncovered a variety of fundamental issues that previous generations of interpreters did not take into account. At the same time, though, these interpreters are in broad agreement concerning the central questions to ask of Augustine. Even so, two deserve further elucidation. The first is Augustine's attitude toward preferential loves. In a time of rapid globalization and when national, cultural, and religious identities are getting ever more fluid (and rigid, in reaction), Augustine's nuanced account of friendship and the manner in which human relations are characterized by redeemable contingency provides a useful lens to confront these contemporary problems. The second related issue is the problematic role glory plays in politics. Augustine criticizes glory motivated by libido dominandi, but he also recognizes that glory involves myths, stories, art, and, as O'Donovan notes, the other means by which society represents itself to itself. Glory, as the representation of shining deeds and memories—Arendt's “world”—is more central to political activity than most liberal democrats think, because they focus on peace, security, and economic goods. With friendship as with politics, contemporary English-speaking Augustine scholars are doing a better job than previous generations. They are starting to think less like liberal democrats and more like Augustine did, but they have yet far to travel.
