It is a common refrain that excessive campaign spending and uncompetitive elections should raise concerns for the health of the American democratic system. Reforming State Legislative Elections wades into this discussion by examining campaign spending and electoral competition in state legislative elections. William M. Salka's argument comes with a specific point of view: namely, the influence of money on politics is negative, and more competitive elections are desirable. The book establishes early and often this refrain and lays out theoretical arguments to back this up and an empirical analysis to suggest reforms to increase competitiveness. While the normative argument is direct, the theoretical focus is somewhat more nuanced based on the argument that competition and spending are driven by the value of legislative seats. Namely, states with more valuable seats have more expensive and less competitive elections. The analysis adds a different twist on questions of money and competition by focusing on the state legislative level rather than the more traditional individual candidate or race level.
Salka supports his normative view by laying out the role of campaign contributions and the importance of competition in legislative elections. He follows the conventional argument for the importance of electoral competition: primarily, that less competitive elections makes government less responsive in a number of important ways. Since campaign costs have generally increased over the past thirty years, Salka argues it is an important factor to examine in relation to increases in uncompetitive elections. State legislative elections are an important place to study this relationship because of the variation in campaign spending and competitive elections across the country.
The theoretical framework focuses on two central arguments for why contributors give money to campaigns. The first is to determine electoral outcomes. The author suggests this is the least harmful influence of money in our system. In this theory, campaign spending will be the highest in the most competitive states. In this scenario, campaign contributions are “at least used to enhance electoral competition” (p. 12). The second theoretical argument suggests either no relationship between spending and competition or a spurious one at best as campaign contributions go to “states in which legislators have the most influence over public policy” (p. 12). Under this theory, contributors are worried about access to influential policymakers and not concerned about the electoral process.
While these theoretical views are not necessarily new to this argument, especially when considering general interest group strategies, the discussion and focus of these opposing views is a strength of the book. Salka does a nice job of laying out the competing arguments and showing how the results fit into these theoretical perspectives.
Before moving into a discussion of the findings, it is worth noting the level of analysis. This book focuses on the aggregate relationship between spending and competition in state legislative elections. The state legislative focus is very appropriate given the institutional variation across the country in important areas like campaign finance laws and levels of professionalization. The downside to the aggregate analysis is that it becomes more difficult to sort out the causal mechanism behind some of the findings, especially since the theoretical focus is primarily adapted from the individual level and not derived from an institutional perspective.
The heart of the book is two empirical chapters that examine campaign spending and levels of electoral competition. In terms of campaign spending, Salka finds that both term limits and more stringent campaign finance regulations lower the costs of elections. Most importantly, Salka finds little evidence that greater electoral competition and greater campaign contributions are related. Based on this finding, he argues the highest levels of campaign spending occur in states where legislative seats are most valuable. In this analysis, this equates to the most professionalized states. In terms of competition, states with stricter campaign finance laws have more competitive elections, while more professionalized states have lower levels of competition. Both chapters include case studies of individual states to move beyond the straightforward empirical analysis. These case studies provide interesting depth, especially when discussing public funding programs in Arizona, Maine, and Massachusetts.
This is essentially a book about reforming legislative elections. The purpose of any reform should be to enhance competition and limit campaign contributions. Based on the findings, the most obvious reform is for stronger campaign finance regulations. That states with more stringent regulations have both cheaper campaigns and more competitive races should provide fodder for those looking to strengthen regulations across the country. Since states with the most valuable legislatures (most professionalized) have the most expensive and least competitive elections, Salka's answer is for states to consider reforms that lower the value of the seats in the legislature. The primary way to do this would be to deprofessionalize legislatures across the states. However, this is an argument that seems to lose the forest for the trees as the number of consequences, both foreseen and unforeseen, go far beyond electoral competition. A serious push in this direction would surely meet with resistance from both scholars and practitioners. Salka recognizes this fact and does not, in the end, advocate for deprofessionalizing reforms. Two additional reforms are worth noting. The first is the move toward a top-two primary system as we now see in Washington and California. This system, Salka argues, can increase general election competitiveness by allowing candidates from the same party to run against one another in November. The second reform is an is increased use of multimember districts (MMDs). The argument is that MMDs could remove the partisan stranglehold found in uncompetitive states like Massachusetts and Idaho. The idea is that minority party candidates will have a greater chance of winning at least one seat in a district with multiple representatives. This move could provide a greater sense of electoral competition and the benefits associated with competition by increasing minority party seat share and making minority party voters relevant in more areas of a state.
Overall, Salka does a nice job of keeping the arguments and discussions in line with the empirical findings and not overreaching on the conclusions based on aggregate level data. However, the finding that no relationship between spending and competition means that contributions are made for reasons of access to powerful legislatures and not to influence electoral outcomes seems particularly vulnerable given the data. One issue that could use more attention is the idea that no relationship is found because contributors may be strategically targeting the same types of races in all states across the country, and these decisions are not influenced by state-level factors. In other words, donors target competitive districts regardless of the state-level attributes. Developing the theoretical and empirical links between the aggregate- and individual-level strategies and outcomes would have been a nice addition.
In the end, the book provides a thorough investigation of campaign spending and electoral competition. The book covers familiar and important territory and fills in some missing pieces of the discussion. For those looking for support in limiting money in politics, this book is especially relevant as Salka presents a compelling case for more stringent campaign finance laws, especially public funding programs.
