Under current public international law, states are liable for their wrongdoing and owe compensation and reparation to victims. In practice, this principle is applied sporadically and unequally with powerful states and their allies largely shielded from liability. However, in those instances in which the principle is applied, it presents a serious ethical challenge because the burden invariably falls on the state's population. In her book Responsible Citizens, Irresponsible States, Avia Pasternak asks whether distributing the burden of remedy for state wrongdoing to ordinary citizens can be justified morally. Her nuanced answer is that such a distribution is “typically” justified for democratic states but is usually not justified for nondemocratic ones (157).

The book's argument is positioned between two alternatives. On the one side are arguments that favor a proportional distribution of the burdens of remedy according to individual agents’ blameworthiness or relative causal contribution to the state's wrongdoing. On the other side is the current international practice of holding states liable and letting the burden fall indiscriminately on all citizens. For Pasternak, relying exclusively on a narrowly proportional distribution is problematic. There are practical obstacles to tracking down and identifying blameworthy individuals and causal contributors and assigning degrees of blame and contribution to them. And even if these obstacles are overcome, proportional distribution is unlikely to identify enough individuals with the means necessary to remedy state wrongs, thus leading to “responsibility shortfalls” (37, 44, 87). On the other hand, simply letting the burden fall indiscriminately on citizens “can yield morally unacceptable results” (158, 169). This latter point is well illustrated by the compensation scheme that was imposed on Iraq in the aftermath of its invasion of Kuwait, and that over a thirty-year period burdened ordinary Iraqi citizens indiscriminately with paying $52.4 billion, mostly to corporations, other states, and international organizations (160–72).

Between these two alternatives, Pasternak argues that a nonproportional distribution of the burdens to all citizens can be justified only under specific circumstances. Drawing on Christopher Kutz's theory of collective action, she offers the conceptual innovation of “intentional citizenship,” and argues that the nonproportional distribution of state liability to ordinary citizens is morally justified if they accept their membership in the state and willingly perform their roles in it. Citizens are expected to obey the laws, pay their taxes, and in some states, they are expected to also “vote, perform compulsory military service, attend political rallies, or report their neighbors’ political behavior” (71). When they willingly perform any “such roles, citizens see themselves as contributing to the maintenance of their state,” all the while “knowing that it will generate policies that [they] will not necessarily agree with” (71). This makes them intentional citizens, and they can as a result be justifiably burdened with remedying state wrongs.

Pasternak is fully aware that states are not voluntary institutions, so she adds the qualification that intentional citizens are only those who genuinely intend to participate in the state and contribute to its maintenance. What distinguishes them from those who are not intentional citizens is that they stay in the state even if the exit option is available to them “without incurring unreasonable costs . . . [or] if the costs [of leaving] are unreasonable, that . . . is not what motivates them to stay” (75–76). Pasternak's justification for the nonproportional distribution of burdens does not apply to nonintentional citizens who “reject their citizenship status [and] would like to give it up [if they have] the real opportunity to do so” (76).

Since Pasternak's argument is anchored in individual intention, the question arises as to how to determine who has the intention in question. She addresses this by turning to data from cross-national attitude surveys of national identification and focuses on responses that are related to whether people tend to obey the law, and whether they identify with the nation. The surveys do not distinguish between nations and states, but that is not a problem as the two concepts are also commonly conflated in the popular imagination. She concludes from the results of these surveys that “intentional citizenship is quite prevalent in real-world states” (109), especially democratic ones. In nondemocratic states, the extent of citizen participation may be limited, and even where it is extensive, as in totalitarian states, the level of repression makes it virtually impossible to determine its extent. Pasternak uses this data to identify the contexts in which her argument is applicable. She recognizes, however, that even in democratic states where the general level of intentional citizenship can be ascertained and is high, there are bound to be some nonintentional citizens, especially members of secessionist minorities and members of groups that are oppressed by the state (109). Where intentional citizenship is widespread and the burden for remedying state wrongs is distributed nonproportionally on that basis, some nonintentional citizens will likely be unjustifiably burdened. Pasternak recognizes this limitation and suggests that even though it is not possible to always relieve nonintentional citizens from bearing their share, the state could at least acknowledge that “oppressed citizens . . . are burdened unfairly” (153).

In addition to offering a novel justification for the nonproportional distribution of the burden of remedying state wrongs, Pasternak also develops a broad framework for applying this justification in practice. In that framework, her justification supplements other justifications and does not seek to replace them. She views the argument based on intentional citizenship as an addition to the collection of arguments that decision makers can use as they devise and implement distribution schemes, whether in international bodies or within states. In the broad framework she offers for this purpose, the burdens of remedy would first be distributed proportionally, primarily on the basis of blame tracking, as well as other factors, including the identification of “clear beneficiaries of the state's wrongdoing” (151). When that proves to be insufficient (as it likely will), the burden is distributed nonproportionally. At that point, the justification based on intentional citizenship would serve as one among others to be offered. For example, if the wrong committed by the state was necessitated by “a plausible interpretation of the citizens’ rights” (151), that would mean that, following Anna Stilz, all citizens would have implicitly authorized it, and would justifiably bear their share of the burden of remedy. In such a case, an argument based on intentional citizenship would be preempted and unnecessary. But such cases are rare, and when the authorization justification fails, Pasternak's justification for nonproportional distribution based on intentional citizenship would be deployed.

Both Pasternak's justification of the nonproportional distribution of the burdens of remedy on the basis of intentional citizenship and her framework for its practical application are significant contributions and make this book an important addition to the growing literature on responsibility for state wrongdoing. The book has the added of virtue of capturing some of the main debates in the broader literature on collective responsibility with exceptional clarity. It is also written in an accessible style that makes it well suited for those who are seeking orientation to this complex and rich scholarly literature.